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The Religious Naturalism of William James 
A New Interpretation Through the Lens of ‘Liberal Naturalism’ 
 
Jacob Herbert Bunzl 
 
Abstract: 
This thesis argues that recent developments in philosophical naturalism mandate a new 
naturalistic reading of James.  To that end, it presents the first comprehensive reading of 
James through the lens of liberal rather than scientific naturalism.  Chapter 1 offers an 
extensive survey of the varieties of philosophical naturalism that provides the conceptual 
tools required for the rest the thesis, and allows us to provisionally locate James within the 
field.  Crucially, it establishes the coherence and validity of a radical form of liberal 
naturalism that rejects ‘the causal closure of the physical’, and endorses doctrines of strong 
emergentism and macro-causation.  The thesis will argue that it was to this form of 
naturalism that James was ultimately committed.   
Chapter 2 provides a detailed chronological treatment of James’s key published works, 
seeking to understand the development of certain core naturalistic themes over the course 
of his career.  It unearths a nascent doctrine of emergentism in The Principles, a critique of 
scientificism in The Will to Believe, a psycho-biological account of religious experience in The 
Varieties, a doctrine of panpsychist identism in Essays in Radical Empiricism, an evolutionary 
theory of cognition in Pragmatism, and a doctrine of finite theism in A Pluralistic Universe.  
The underlying aim of chapter 2 is to demonstrate the superficiality of James’s endorsement 
of piecemeal supernaturalism in The Varieties.  It shows that he had originally planned to 
defend a doctrine of ‘theistic naturalism’ in his second course of Gifford Lectures, and that 
he only defined himself as a supernaturalist in contradistinction to a particularly austere 
doctrine of ‘mechanical naturalism’ that endorses ‘the causal closure of the physical’.  
James, whilst he rejected ‘the causal closure of the physical’, continued to endorse ‘the 
causal closure of nature’.  Through the schema developed in chapter 1, the thesis 
demonstrates how James can be classified as a radical religious naturalist.   
Finally, in chapter 3, the thesis enters a more consciously constructive phase.  Building on 
James’s suggestion that his philosophy was “too much like an arch built only on one side”, it 
embarks upon a detailed reconstruction of ‘the arch of James’s naturalism’.  It argues that 
reconstructed versions of James’s doctrines of panpsychism and emergentism, in addition 
to being coherent and fertile in their own right, serve as the basis for a restoration of his 
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endorses ‘the causal closure of the physical’.  James, whilst he rejected ‘the causal 
closure of the physical’, continued to endorse ‘the causal closure of nature’.  Through 
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classified as a radical religious naturalist.   
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on James’s suggestion that his philosophy was “too much like an arch built only on one 
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studies – its students and its staff – for the pleasure of their acquaintance and for the intellectual 
stimulation that their conversation and research has brought me.  First among them of course I must 
thank my supervisor Jeremy Carrette, for his tireless and diligent support (despite his daunting 
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as if he went and married someone else?   
So it was that I put James’s advice to the pragmatic test, and made my angel-possibility into an 
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and fuller verification.  Surely, the long-run consensus of the community of all inquirers will be that 
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List of Abbreviations 
James’s Works 
PP – The Principles of Psychology 
EMS – William James on Exceptional Mental States 
WB – The Will to Believe 
MPML – ‘The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life’ 
VRE – The Varieties of Religious Experience 
ERE – Essays in Radical Empiricism 
TPAF – ‘The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience’ 
PRAG – Pragmatism 
MT – The Meaning of Truth 
PU – A Pluralistic Universe 
SPP – Some Problems of Philosophy 
 
Other Abbreviations 
CCP – The Causal Closure of the Physical 
According to which all causal power is confined to the lowest level of natural phenomena 
(microphysical phenomena). 
CCN – The Causal Closure of Nature 
According to which all causal power is confined to the single space-time-causal system we 
call nature. 
SCI – Scientism 
 According to which only science can provide genuine knowledge/truth about reality. 
PER – The Principle of Epistemological Reducibility 
According to which theories/discourse about all entities/properties is reducible to 
theories/discourse about their lowest level parts/properties of their lowest level parts. 
POR – The Principle of Ontological Reducibility 
According to which all entities/properties are wholly reducible to their lowest level 
parts/properties of their lowest level parts. 
HSR – Hyperscientific Realism 
 According to which only entities postulated by scientific theories are real. 
 
 





MTN – The methodological thesis of naturalism 
 According to which philosophy is continuous with science. 
DSCI – The Disunity of Science  
According to which there is no single method or form that unites the sciences and 
demarcates them from non-sciences. 
WE – Weak Emergentism 
According to which theories/discourse about certain entities/properties is not reducible to 
theories/discourse about their parts/properties of their parts. 
SE – Strong Emergentism 
According to which certain entities/properties are not wholly reducible to their 
parts/properties of their parts. 
MC – Macro-Causation 
According to which certain strongly emergent entities/properties possess causal power 
over and above their parts/properties of their parts. 
ETRN – The Existential Thesis of Religious Naturalism 
 According to which nature or something within nature merits a religious response. 
INC – The Integral Nature of Consciousness 
According to which states of consciousness possess a strongly emergent boundary/unity. 
PPSI – The Psychophysical Structural Isomorphism Requirement 
According to which, given parallelism or psychophysical identity, physical facts must be 
structurally isomorphic with their mental counterparts. 
PCMB – The Problem of Stating the Connection Between the Mind and the Brain 
According to which, given parallelism or psychophysical identity, an atomistic brain cannot 
serve as the physical counterpart to an integral consciousness. 
MTRE – The Methodological Thesis of Radical Empiricism 
According to which only things that are directly experienced can be discussed in 
Philosophy. 
FTRE – The Factual Thesis of Radical Empiricism 
 According to which the relations between experiences are themselves parts of experience. 
MTPE – The Metaphysical thesis of Pure Experience 
According to which the world is wholly constituted of bits of pure experience held together 










The Causal Exclusion Argument 
According to which causal power at lower levels of nature excludes or makes redundant 
causal power at higher levels of nature. 
Epiphenomenalism 
According to which mental entities/properties are wholly dependent on physical 
entities/properties, and possess no causal power over and above physical 
entities/properties. 
Mereological Supervenience 
According to which one set of properties – X – is dependent upon another set of properties 
– Y –, such that given Y, X is automatically instantiated. 
Mereological Atomism 
According to which atoms are the only genuine entities; all other entities being wholly 
reducible to atoms. 
Priority-Monism 
According to which one entity (the universe or the totality of existence) has ontological 
priority; i.e. is more real or fundamental than others. 
Substance-Monism 
According to which all entities are constituted of one substance; i.e. mental substance or 
material substance. 
Thing-Monism/Existence-Monism 
According to which only one genuine entity exists; i.e. the universe or the totality of 
existence. 
Thing-Pluralism/Existence-Pluralism 
 According to which a plurality of genuine entities exists. 
Neutral Monism 
According to which both the inner/subjective and the outer/objective aspects of 
experience are differentiated out of an original, neutral experiential content. 
Russellian Monism 
According to which both physical and mental entities/properties are in some sense 
grounded in neutral entities/properties that are neither physical nor mental. 
Russellian Panpsychism 
According to which experiential entities/phenomenal properties constitute the intrinsic 
natures of physical entities/properties. 
 
 






According to which entities exist independently of human/other perception in the same 
mode as they exist within human/other perception; i.e. with secondary qualities, etc. 
The Boundary/Unity Problem 
According to which a bounded/unified macroexperience cannot be identical with a 
mereological aggregate of microexperiences. 
The Synchronic Constitution Problem 
According to which microexperiences cannot exist as self-identical individuals whilst 
simultaneously constituting a macroexperience. 







Scholars have widely acknowledged a naturalistic strain in the work of William James.  They have 
found justification for locating a naturalistic theory of mind in his work1; a naturalistic theory of 
cognition2; and a naturalistic ethical theory3, to name but a few4.  Yet James’s work also contains 
what some would call an antinaturalistic strain.  He conceives of definite, somewhat severe limits 
to the scientific enterprise; he endorses the existence of contra-causal spiritual forces at work in 
the natural world; and he believes that religion, and indeed God, play a vital role in human life5.  It 
is on this basis that commentators like Richard Gale warn against attempts to provide naturalistic 
interpretations of James.  Such interpretations, they say, inevitably leave important elements out, 
and distort our understanding of his worldview6.  It is partly for this reason that when 
philosophers began to explore the possibility of a distinctively ‘pragmatic naturalism’ in the latter 
half of the 20th century, they tended to place much more emphasis on the work of Peirce and 
Dewey than they did on the work of James7.  A recent anthology on Pragmatism and Naturalism 
contains a discussion of ‘Peirce’s Mature Religious Naturalism’, and another of ‘Deweyan 
Naturalism’, but we find no mention of a Jamesian Naturalism8.  Rather, we find only an 
                                                             
1 John Dewey, ‘The Vanishing Subject in the Psychology of James’, The Journal of Philosophy, 37 (1940), 
pp589-599.  See also: Owen Flanagan, ‘Naturalizing the Mind: The Philosophical Psychology of William 
James’, in The Science of the Mind (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1984).  Flanagan has since revised his 
view on this point.  He now believes that The Principles “cannot, without a good deal of interpretive sleight 
of hand, be given a consistent naturalistic reading”.  See: Owen Flanagan, ‘Consciousness as a Pragmatist 
Views it’, in The Cambridge Companion to William James, ed. by Ruth Anna Putnam (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), pp25-48 (p26).  He credits an essay of Wesley Cooper’s with having changed his 
mind.  See: Wesley Cooper, ‘William James’s Theory of Mind’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 28 
(1990), pp571-593 
2 Charles Augustus Strong, ‘A Naturalistic Theory of the Reference of Thought to Reality’ The Journal of 
Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 1, (1904), pp253-260; Henry Jackman, ‘William James’, in 
The Oxford Handbook of American Philosophy, ed. by Cheryl Misak (Oxford: OUP, 2008), pp60-86 
3 Graham Bird, William James (London: Routledge, 1986). See also: Richard Gale, The Divided Self of William 
James (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
4 We will review much of the literature concerning James and naturalism as we proceed with our 
chronological reading of James’s key texts in chapter 2. 
5 For an excellent summary of James’s prima facie conflicts with naturalism see: David Lamberth, 
‘Pragmatism and Naturalism: An Inevitable Conjunction?’, Cognitio, 2 (2001), pp76-87 (pp77-81). 
6 See: Richard Gale, ‘John Dewey’s Naturalization of William James’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
William James, ed. by R. A. Putnam, pp49-68 
7 See: Samuel Morris Eames, Pragmatic Naturalism (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977); 
Paul Kurtz, Essays in Pragmatic Naturalism (New York: Prometheus Books, 1990); Pragmatic Naturalism and 
Realism, ed. by John Shook (New York: Prometheus Books, 2003); Philip Kitcher: Pragmatic Naturalism, ed. 
by Marie I. Kaiser & Ansgar Seide (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2013).  One possible exception to this tendency 
is Thomas Martland Jr., who explicitly invokes James as a progenitor of pragmatic naturalism.  However, 
Martland, unlike most proponents of pragmatic naturalism, seems to define the doctrine almost exclusively 
in terms of its adoption of a process-metaphysics.  See: Thomas Martland Jr., The Metaphysics of William 
James and John Dewey (New York: Philosophical Library, 1963) 
8 See: Pragmatism and Naturalism, ed. by Matthew Bagger (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018) 
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exploration of ‘Religious Apologetic, Naturalism, and Inquiry in the Thought of William James’.  
Naturalism, it seems, can be found in the thought of William James, but James’s philosophy does 
not itself amount to a form of naturalism.  Among James’s interpreters Nancy Frankenberry and 
Phil Oliver are more or less alone in holding out hopes for a distinctively Jamesian naturalism.  The 
former, however, thinks that James’s views must be supplemented with those of Alfred North 
Whitehead in order to affect a genuine naturalistic synthesis9; while the latter, in spite of the 
many other merits of his study, defines naturalism so broadly as to drain the category of much of 
its content10. 
To say that naturalistic interpretations of James inevitably distort our understanding of his 
worldview is, of course, to assume that naturalism itself is a monolithic doctrine, susceptible to a 
single, unified interpretation.  In fact, it has become a classic trope of the naturalistic tradition 
that naturalism is susceptible to innumerable interpretations11.  The doctrine has undergone a 
number of transformations throughout its history; from an austere metaphysical doctrine 
committed to the causal closure of the physical12, to a relatively liberal metaphysical doctrine 
endorsing emergentism and macro-causation13, to a primarily methodological doctrine committed 
to the dispassionate use of empirical methods, etc.14  The form of naturalism most prevalent in 
the present day is widely known as ‘scientific naturalism’.  It is typically committed to at least the 
following theses: i) scientism, ii) the methodological thesis of naturalism, iii) the causal closure of 
the physical, iv) the principle of ontological reducibility15.  When contemporary commentators on 
James warn against naturalistic interpretation of his work, it is something like this form of 
naturalism that they have in mind. 
                                                             
9 Nancy Frankenberry, Religion and Radical Empiricism (New York: SUNY Press, 1987); Nancy Frankenberry, 
‘The Fate of Radical Empiricism and the Future of Pragmatic Naturalism’, in Pragmatism and Naturalism, ed. 
by Bagger, pp221-251. 
10 Oliver’s study does not aim for a systematic treatment of James’s philosophy.  Rather, it focuses on a 
Jamesian notion of ‘transcendence’ drawn from selective readings of his ethical and religious texts.  Oliver’s 
aim is to show that such a Jamesian notion of transcendence is compatible with what he calls ‘global 
naturalism’, according to which “everything experienced and experienceable is real and in precisely that 
sense is a part of nature”.  The study’s great merit, in our view, is not in establishing a thoroughgoing 
Jamesian naturalism, but in advancing lively and persuasive arguments for the conclusion that James’s 
approach to religion embodied the naturalistic spirit.  See: Phil Oliver, William James’s “Springs of Delight” 
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000), p28. 
11 See: Barry Stroud, ‘The Charm of Naturalism’, in Naturalism in Question, ed. by Mario De Caro & David 
Macarthur (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). See also: Owen Flanagan, ‘Varieties of 
Naturalism’, in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. by Philip Clayton (Oxford: OUP, 2008) 
12 James Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1906) 
13 Roy Wood Sellars, ‘Why Naturalism and not Materialism?’, The Philosophical Review, 36 (1927), pp216-
225 
14 James Pratt, Naturalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939) 
15 See the ‘List of Abbreviations’ for details. 






In recent decades, however, a new form of naturalism has been coming onto the philosophical 
scene.  A growing contingent of so-called ‘liberal naturalists’ dissent from several of the core 
theses of scientific naturalism.  They reject at least scientism, strong versions of the 
methodological thesis, and the principle of ontological reducibility.  Several of them are even 
suspicious of the principle of the causal closure of the physical.  A number of these liberal 
naturalists attempt to articulate their distinctive position in two recent anthologies edited by 
Mario De Caro and David Macarthur entitled Naturalism in Question and Naturalism and 
Normativity16.  Leading the charge, and inspiring the whole movement, are Hilary Putnam and 
John McDowell.  Richard Rorty, Donald Davidson, Barry Stroud, and John Dupre are among the 
other contributors.  Liberal naturalists, according to De Caro and Macarthur’s introduction, are 
committed to the causal closure of nature rather than the causal closure of the physical; and they 
are unified in having a nonreductive attitude towards intentionality, normativity, and 
consciousness17. 
Our central contention in this thesis is that these recent developments in philosophical naturalism 
merit a new naturalistic reading of James.  To that end, we will provide the first comprehensive 
interpretation of James’s work through the lens of liberal rather than scientific naturalism.  In 
doing so, we will be seeking to establish not so much that James was a naturalist, as that a 
Jamesian naturalism is possible.  At the same time however we will be aiming at real consistency 
with James’s views, and at faithfulness to the spirit of his philosophy.  We think that our 
interpretation is one that James’s texts fully support.  The project will be divided into three 
chapters.  We begin, in chapter one, with an extensive survey of the varieties of philosophical 
naturalism that will at once acquaint us with the conceptual tools required for the rest of our 
undertaking, and allow us to provisionally locate James within the field.  As well as surveying the 
varieties of naturalism, chapter one also contains a mostly implicit argument to the effect that 
more liberal forms of naturalism are coherent and valid.  Crucially, it describes and defends a form 
of naturalism which we call ‘radical liberal naturalism’, which endorses doctrines of strong 
emergentism and macro-causation.  It is to this form of naturalism – or rather, to its religious 
counterpart – that we think James was committed.  We move on, in chapter two, to a detailed 
chronological treatment of James’s key published works, seeking to understand the development 
of certain core naturalistic themes over the course of his career.  This will be the largest chapter 
of the thesis, because it is here that we will engage most directly with James’s voluminous corpus 
                                                             
16 Naturalism and Normativity, ed. by Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2010) 
17 Mario De Caro & David Macarthur, ‘Introduction: The Nature of Naturalism’, in Naturalism in Question, 
ed. by De Caro & Macarthur, pp1-17 
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(and its ample secondary literature).  In it, we apply many of the concepts, methods, and 
terminology we discovered in chapter one to a detailed rereading of James’s texts.  We find the 
fundaments of a doctrine of emergentism in PP; a detailed critique of scientificism in WB; a 
profoundly naturalistic psycho-biological account of religious experience in VRE; the beginnings of 
a doctrine of panpsychist identism in ERE; an evolutionary theory of cognition in Pragmatism; and 
the outlines of a doctrine of theistic naturalism in PU.  The key underlying argument in chapter 
two is that James’s avowal of ‘piecemeal supernaturalism’ in VRE is superficial18.  As we shall see, 
in an original draft for his second course of Gifford Lectures James had planned on calling his 
position ‘theistic naturalism’, but at some point in the following year he changed his mind, and 
settled on ‘piecemeal supernaturalism’ instead.  We argue it was likely his reading of James 
Ward’s Naturalism and Agnosticism – a book which he expected to be epoch-making – that 
caused him to change his mind.  According to Ward, naturalism is committed to the causal closure 
of the physical, a doctrine which James could not abide.  We contend that it was only in 
contradistinction to this austere form of naturalism that James defined himself as a 
supernaturalist.  In fact, he only rejected the causal closure of the physical, and continued to 
endorse the causal closure of nature.  As such, by our lights, he is to be classified as a radical 
liberal naturalist.  Finally, in chapter three, we will embark upon an ambitious reconstruction of 
‘the arch of James’s naturalism’, with doctrines of panpsychism and emergentism as its column 
and springer respectively, and a doctrine of theistic naturalism as its keystone.  The underlying 
argument of chapter three is that reconstructed versions of James’s doctrines of panpsychism and 
emergentism give him the resources he needs to accommodate a powerful, personal God within 
the natural world.  In addition, however, we also aim to bring out the independent merit of each 
of these doctrines, and to demonstrate the continuing fecundity of James’s philosophy. 
This project will be, first and foremost, a contribution to James scholarship19.  In addition to 
providing the first in-depth interpretation of his worldview from the perspective of liberal 
                                                             
18 By ‘superficial’ we emphatically do not mean that such avowals were unimportant or peripheral for 
James.  This, indeed, is one of Phil Oliver’s claims in William James’s “Springs of Delight”.  He says that “the 
supernatural “overbeliefs” James sometimes professes or flirts with may be seen as idiosyncratically 
personal curiosities, peripheral to his central insight into the natural ground of all kinds of religious 
speculation, including the supernatural.”  See: Oliver, pp29-30.  We differ sharply from Oliver on this point.  
We think that James’s over-beliefs are of great importance; to him personally, but even more so from the 
point of view of understanding his total philosophy.  In calling his avowal of piecemeal supernaturalism 
superficial we mean that it should not be understood as committing him to a traditional doctrine 
supernaturalism, according to which there exists some region of reality that is ontically discontinuous with 
nature. 
19 By ‘James scholarship’ we mean the effort to understand James’s philosophy in its own right; an effort 
inaugurated by Ralph Barton Perry’s seminal study, The Thought and Character of William James, and which 






naturalism, it will articulate several novel analyses/reconstructions of aspects of his philosophy.  
Thus, we shall provide a reconstruction of his doctrine of emergentism, a detailed exposition of 
his critique of scientificism, a new reading of the pragmatic theory of truth as an evolutionary 
theory of cognition, an interpretation of his panpsychism as a form of ‘russellian panpsychism’, a 
reconstruction of his dispositional model of value experience, and a reconstruction of his ‘theistic 
naturalism’.  Regarding James’s emergentism, both Bird and Sprigge have hinted that James may 
have endorsed a form of the doctrine, but neither have developed this line of thought in detail20.  
In chapter two we will present new insights that establish a definite mandate for an emergentist 
interpretation of James; and in chapter three we will provide a detailed reconstruction of James’s 
emergentism that illustrates its relationship to the rest of his philosophy.  As to James’s critique of 
scientificism, although his various critical statements regarding science and ‘scientificism’ are well 
known, our own treatment is the first to consolidate those statements into a single coherent 
critique, and to demonstrate its relevance to contemporary liberal naturalist critiques of scientism 
and hyperscientific realism21.  With respect to our reading of the pragmatic theory of truth as an 
evolutionary theory of cognition, whilst several commentators have noted the Darwinian 
inspiration for theory, our reading is totally original in drawing on contemporary studies in biology 
and cognitive science in order to exhibit previously unnoticed advantages of James’s account.  
There is nothing new, of course, in panpsychist interpretations of James, but our analysis covers 
new ground by locating a brand new ‘intrinsic nature argument’ for panpsychism in James’s work, 
and by utilizing recent studies of panpsychism to provide a more detailed classification of his 
version of the doctrine (specifically, as a form of ‘emergent, layered, russellian panpsychism’).  
Regarding James’s dispositional model of value experience, Graham Bird has indicated the natural 
synergy that James’s ethical philosophy has with such models22.  In chapter three we present a 
                                                             
continues in the work of numerous biographers and commentators past and present.  See: Ralph Barton 
Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, 2 vols (London: OUP, 1935) 
20 Bird suggests that both consciousness and values may be emergent for James.  In the former case he 
gives very little detail as to how he envisions James’s account.  In the latter case he suggests that 
contemporary dispositional models of value experience would be a good fit for James’s conception of 
emergent values.  See: Bird, William James, p127; p146; p158; p175.  Sprigge does not explicitly invoke the 
concept of emergence, but likens James’s view of consciousness/mental causation in PP to that of Roger 
Sperry; a well-known contemporary proponent of the doctrine.  See: Sprigge, James and Bradley: American 
Truth and British Reality (Chicago: Open Court, 1993), p71; p153.   
21 The most thorough treatment to date of James’s philosophy of science occurs in chapter 3 of William 
Gavin’s book, William James and the Reinstatement of the Vague.  Gavin’s treatment is more general and 
wide-ranging than our own, drawing on James’s total corpus, and not just on WB.  As a result, it is less 
detailed and less specific, attempting to formulate broad conclusions rather than precise arguments.  Gavin 
focuses on James’s instrumental stance toward scientific theories, but also touches, implicitly, on issues 
relating to normativity in science.  See: William Joseph Gavin, William James and the Reinstatement of the 
Vague (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), pp56-64 
22 Graham Bird, ‘Moral Philosophy and the Development of Morality’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
William James, ed. by R. A. Putnam, pp260-281 
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fresh reading of James’s essay on ‘The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience’ 
according to which it implicitly contains such a model.  Finally, a number of interpreters have 
recognized a naturalistic component in James’s religious views, with Eugene Taylor for instance 
saying that the orthodox interpretation finds James to be committed to some form of “naturalistic 
theism”23.  However, we go further than other interpreters in exploring the detailed nature of 
James’s concept of God, and in establishing its relations to his mature ethical and metaphysical 
views24.   
                                                             
23 Taylor, William James on Consciousness Beyond the Margin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 
p88 
24 Neil Williams provides an excellent contemporary account of James’s ethical philosophy that highlights its 
relation to the metaphysics of radical empiricism.  Williams’s account, however, errs in our view in claiming 
that God drops out of James’s ethics post-ERE.  For our part, we agree with Michael Slater in assigning 
ethical importance to VRE, and in taking that text to imply a role for God in James’s mature ethics.  And we 
agree with David Lamberth that the core details of radical empiricism were settled prior to VRE.  As such, 
we hold that God continued to play an important role in James’s ethics throughout his career.  See: Neil E. 
Williams, ‘Realism, Individualism, and Pluralism: The Metaphysics and Ethics of William James’ (Unpublished 
Doctoral Dissertation, The University of Sheffield, 2017) 






Chapter 1 – The Varieties of Naturalism: Locating James 
In the opening essay of De Caro’s and Macarthur’s Naturalism in Question, Barry Stroud presents 
a shrewd analysis of the concept of naturalism and its place in contemporary philosophy.  He 
begins by noting the overwhelming popularity of the doctrine among contemporary philosophers.  
This popularity, he thinks, is unsurprising, because naturalism, in and of itself, contains very little 
that is controversial.  The controversy only arises when philosophers try to prescribe what is and 
is not to be included in our concept of nature: 
“Naturalism” seems to me in this and other respects rather like “World Peace.”  
Almost everyone swears allegiance to it, and is willing to march under its banner.  But 
disputes can still break out about what it is appropriate or acceptable to do in the 
name of that slogan.  And like world peace, once you start specifying concretely 
exactly what it involves and how to achieve it, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
reach and to sustain a consistent and exclusive “naturalism.”25 
Stroud, we shall see, is quite right about this.  There are almost as many concepts of naturalism as 
there are philosophers to conceive them.  In this first chapter, therefore, we will attempt to 
survey several important forms of the doctrine, and to define explicitly the various tenets to 
which they are committed.  In doing so we will map the territory of philosophical naturalism, and 
develop a schema for categorizing varieties of the doctrine.  This, in turn, will lay the conceptual 
groundwork for the rest of the project, introducing and defining the key concepts and 
terminology that will be used throughout. 
The present chapter will consist of six sections.  Section 1.1, on ‘The Birth of Philosophical 
Naturalism’, will explore the origins and development of philosophical naturalism.  In doing so it 
will provide some vital historical context, and will demonstrate that the definition of naturalism 
has shifted back and forth between the poles of austerity and liberality since its inception.  One 
important conclusion of section 1.1 will be that no single version of naturalism can legitimately 
claim to be ‘the true naturalism’.  Section 1.2, on ‘Scientific Naturalism’, will attempt to establish 
the core tenets of the most popular form of contemporary philosophical naturalism.  This form of 
naturalism, as we shall see in chapter 2, is essentially similar to the mechanical naturalism which 
James aligned himself against in texts like VRE.  Section 1.3, on ‘Liberal Naturalism’, will examine 
several of the doctrines and arguments put forward in De Caro and Macarthur’s anthologies.  We 
                                                             
25 Stroud, ‘The Charm of Naturalism’, in Naturalism in Question, ed. by De Caro & Macarthur, p22.  This 
essay is a reprint of Stroud’s 1996 presidential address to The American Philosophical Association.  See: 
Barry Stroud, ‘The Charm of Naturalism’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical 
Association, 70 (1996), pp43-55 





shall see that the liberal naturalists define their position in contradistinction to scientific 
naturalism, and present a thoroughgoing critique of that doctrine.  In chapter 2 we will discover 
that this critique was significantly foreshadowed by James’s own critique of scientificism in WB.  
Section 1.4, on ‘Radical Liberal Naturalism’, will consider the possibility of a form of naturalism 
that rejects the causal closure of the physical, and endorses doctrines of emergentism and macro-
causation.  As we have noted, it is to the religious counterpart of this radical form of liberal 
naturalism that we think James’s was committed.  Finally, section 1.5, on ‘Religious Naturalism’, 
will give a brief overview of some doctrines of ‘religious naturalism’, and will provide a tabulated 
schema for categorizing the forms of naturalism considered so far.  At the end of section 1.5 we 
will provisionally locate James’s position in our schema; we will suggest that his philosophy 
constituted a form of ‘radical religious naturalism’. 
1.1. The Birth of Philosophical Naturalism 
When considering the origins and development of naturalism it is important to distinguish 
between ‘philosophical naturalism’ on the one hand, and what we might call ‘the naturalistic 
spirit’ on the other.  The former is a relatively explicit philosophical doctrine whose origins can be 
traced to a group of American philosophers in the late 19th and early 20th century26.  The latter is a 
more or less implicit attitude/approach to the world, characterised by a predominant interest in 
experience as opposed to a putative transcendent realm.  Thus, we might say, in accordance with 
a somewhat stereotyped view of these thinkers, that Aristotle possessed the naturalistic spirit to 
a greater degree than Plato did27.  In this section our main concern will be with philosophical 
naturalism rather than with the naturalistic spirit.  Plotting the origins of this doctrine in detail 
would of course go far beyond the scope of this project.  As such we have chosen to investigate 
them through a series of vignettes or snapshots of some early forms of the doctrine.  In each case 
we have tried to choose examples that are at once representative and enlightening, and at the 
same time relevant to the broader content of this project.  Thus, we begin with the mechanical 
naturalism of philosophers like Friedrich Paulsen, which James considered classic, and which 
                                                             
26 We have been unable to discover the first use of the term ‘naturalism’ in a sense continuous with the 
modern usage.  Such figures as George Combe, Thomas Huxley, Herbert Spencer, and John Tyndall are 
among those frequently named as progenitors of the doctrine, but none of them appear to have actually 
employed the term.  For more on the early origins of philosophical naturalism see: The Age of Scientific 
Naturalism: Tyndall and His Contemporaries, ed. by Bernard Lightman & Michael S. Reidy (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016); Bernard Lightman, ‘The “History” of Victorian Scientific Naturalism: 
Huxley, Spencer, and the “End” of Natural History’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and 
Biomedical Sciences, 58 (2016), pp17-23; John van Wyhe, Phrenology and the Origins of Victorian Scientific 
Naturalism (London: Routledge, 2004) 
27 James Pratt does in fact make this claim in his Lowell Lectures on Naturalism.  See: Pratt, p22. 






Ward had assailed in Naturalism and Agnosticism.  We then move on to the evolutionary 
naturalism of Roy Wood Sellars, who explicitly invoked the concept of emergentism in articulating 
his view, and whose illustrious son Wilfrid became a key source of inspiration to modern day 
scientific naturalists.  Next, we consider the ‘critical naturalism’ of James Pratt, who completed his 
PhD with William James at Harvard, and who presented one of the first essentially methodological 
doctrines of naturalism.  And finally, we examine the ‘new naturalism’ of John Dewey, a long-term 
friend and colleague of James, who was converted to the doctrine by his reading of the latter’s 
Principles of Psychology. 
1.1.1. Some Early Forms of Naturalism 
1.1.1.1. Mechanical Naturalism 
The following quotation is taken from James’s preface to the first American edition of Friedrich 
Paulsen’s Introduction to Philosophy: 
There have always been two ways of thinking about Nature.  For Christianity, e.g., 
Nature is something opposed to the truer unseen world, a surface of recoil to which 
we must first die.  For the more pantheistic systems the relation of Nature to the 
Unseen is not one of contrast but rather of less and more – there is but one world, 
partly seen and partly unseen, and its evolution is simple and direct.  Now if we give 
the name of “naturalism” to any specimen of the latter way of thinking which also 
asserts the universality of mechanistic determination throughout the universe, the 
present Introduction to Philosophy may be briefly described as an attempt so to state 
it as to make it harmoniously continuous with religious faith.28 
James adds that Paulsen’s “exposition of the naturalistic view as a whole is by the superiority of 
its form calculated to supersede all previous general statements” of the doctrine29.  By the lights 
of contemporary philosophy, James’s judgement in this regard is somewhat surprising.  Paulsen 
was by no means the most reductively/materialistically inclined philosopher of his time.  On the 
contrary, he appears to have endorsed a doctrine of priority-monism, for which the universe as a 
whole has existential primacy over its parts; and a universal psycho-physical identity theory, 
which amounted to a form of panpsychism.  What then, about Paulsen’s exposition, did James 
consider so definitive?  We get a clue as to the answer from the quotation above.  James says that 
there are two ways of thinking about nature: the broadly theistic (or dualistic), and the broadly 
pantheistic (or monistic).  Naturalism is a species of the monistic way of thinking about nature 
“which also asserts the universality of mechanistic determination throughout the universe”.  In 
                                                             
28 William James, ‘Preface’, in Friedrich Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, trans. by Frank Thilly (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1895), p. iii-iv.  Reprinted in: The Works of William James: Essays in Philosophy, 
ed. by Frederick Burkhardt (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp90-93 (p92) 
29 James, ‘Preface’, in Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, trans. by Thilly, p. v 





other words, it is a species of substance-monism which presupposes the scientific view of the 
world as an essentially deterministic, law-governed system.  In Paulsen’s words: 
The uniform reign of law in all natural occurrences is the principle of natural science.  
One domain after another has been made subject to this principle, and thus the 
thought gradually has come to prevail with irresistible force that all natural processes 
are to be considered as the results of uniformly-acting forces. … Whatever is not in 
accord with this thought lies outside of the sphere of modern philosophy.30 
This, it seems, was the definitive feature of naturalism for James; its commitment to ‘universal 
mechanistic determination’.  It was this kind of mechanical naturalism that constituted the chief 
target of James Ward’s critique in his Aberdeen Gifford lectures on Naturalism and Agnosticism; a 
critique which, as we have noted, James found to be decisive.  According to Ward naturalism is 
defined by its commitment to three philosophical/scientific doctrines: i) the mechanical theory of 
nature, ii) the theory of evolution, and iii) the theory of epiphenomenalism31.  Ward thought of 
the second and third of these doctrines as extensions of/extrapolations from the first.   
i) The Mechanical Theory of Nature 
According to the mechanical theory of nature, all natural phenomena are fully explicable in terms 
of the science of mechanics (or physics).  In practice, Ward says, this means that there is nothing 
that is “physically inexplicable”; biological and psychical phenomena “furnish no exceptions to 
purely physical laws”32.   
ii) The Theory of Evolution 
According to the theory of evolution, all the attributes of human beings – “not merely man’s erect 
gait and noble bearing, but his speech, his reason, and his conscience too” – came about through 
a process of Darwinian evolution33.  Furthermore, or so naturalists claim, this process is wholly 
“dysteleological” involving no hint of genuine purpose or design34.  
iii) The Theory of Epiphenomenalism 
According to the theory of epiphenomenalism all psychical phenomena are invariably 
accompanied by, and wholly dependent upon, a parallel set of physical phenomena.  The 
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psychical phenomena are causally inert, and have no effect whatsoever on the course of events in 
the physical world: 
The series of neural events – being physical – is already, so to say, closed and 
complete within itself, each neural state is held to be wholly the effect of the neural 
state immediately preceding it, and the entire cause of that directly following.35 
We think it is legitimate to say that the core thesis of naturalism, in Ward’s view, is one that is 
known in contemporary philosophy as ‘the causal closure of the physical’ (CCP).  According to this 
thesis all causal power is confined to the lowest level of natural phenomena, and is governed by 
fundamental physical laws. 
1.1.1.2. Evolutionary Naturalism 
A quarter of a century after Ward’s Gifford Lectures we find a neglected giant of American 
philosophy – Roy Wood Sellars – providing a very different take on the essential nature of the 
doctrine.  For Sellars naturalism is distinguished from materialism precisely by its rejection of CCP, 
and by its endorsement of a doctrine of emergentism.  According to the doctrine of emergentism, 
certain configurations of physical entities give rise to emergent entities/properties governed by 
emergent laws36.  Thus, certain configurations of atoms give rise to molecules governed by 
chemical laws; certain configurations of molecules give rise to cells governed by biological laws; 
and certain configurations of cells give rise to neural structures governed by mental laws.  In this 
way nature is stratified into a series of levels, each with its own distinctive domain of phenomena, 
each presided over by a different special science: chemistry, biology, psychology, etc.  In Sellars’s 
view those early naturalists who were the target of Ward’s critique – who endorsed CCP, and 
adopted what he called ‘the method of reduction’ – had made a great error: 
Psychology was to become physiology; physiology, chemistry; and chemistry, physics.  
By such a process of repeated translation the assimilation of man was to be 
accomplished.  That nature itself contained natural levels so that assimilation by 
reduction could only be carried through by being untrue to nature was not grasped.  
Dead-level mechanicalism forced a Procrustean bed upon naturalism; gave it a false 
task and ideal.  And its lack of success lowered its prestige.37 
What matters for Sellars is not the causal closure of the physical, but the causal closure of nature 
(CCN).  Whatever levels and modes of causality nature may include, these levels must be 
conceived of as forming one, continuous, “space-time-causal system”, not susceptible to influence 
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from a supernatural realm38.  This, for Sellars, is the difference between materialism and 
naturalism.  The former endorses CCP; the latter endorses CCN. 
1.1.1.3. Critical Naturalism 
Let us now jump forward once again to consider James Bisset Pratt’s 1939 Lowell Lectures on 
Naturalism at the University of Indiana.  As we said earlier, they represent the introduction of an 
important theme into naturalistic discourse; namely its emphasis on methodology.  Pratt diverges 
from both Ward and Sellars in refusing to identify naturalism with any particular metaphysical 
doctrine: 
Of course the principal point I have tried to make is the distinction between a crude 
and a critical Naturalism; and the importance of identifying Naturalism not with any 
particular theory but with its empirical method and its truth-seeking aim.  My little 
book I consider a defence of Naturalism against its most dangerous enemies; the 
majority of whom are usually found in the ranks of the “naturalists.”39 
Pratt is particularly concerned to resist the identification of naturalism with “some dogmatic form 
of extreme Materialism or Mechanism”40.  Thus, when he speaks of ‘crude naturalism’ he appears 
to have in mind something like what we earlier called ‘mechanical naturalism’.  It seems likely 
however that his suspicion of metaphysical forms of naturalism would extend to Sellars’ 
evolutionary naturalism, with its essential commitment to emergentism.  Critical naturalism, 
according to Pratt, is to be defined primarily in terms of its aim and its method.  Its aim is at 
nature, as opposed to some supernatural realm, and at truth, as opposed to comfort or 
satisfaction41.  Its method is the empirical method, defined in broad terms, without reference to 
any special scientific method.  Any theory or philosophy thus aligned deserves to be called 
naturalistic.   
1.1.1.4. The New Naturalism 
Just five years after Pratt’s Lowell Lectures we find a group of influential philosophers expounding 
yet another version of naturalism.  In Naturalism and the Human Spirit, the likes of John Dewey, 
                                                             
38 R. W. Sellars, ‘Why Naturalism and not Materialism?’, p217 
39 Pratt, p. ix-x 
40 Pratt, p2 
41 In this respect, he says, it is opposed to James’s will-to-believe doctrine.  Pratt evidently interprets said 
doctrine as implying a form of metaphysical idealism or constructionism.  He says that “[Naturalism] is in 
sharp and conscious contrast to the Will-to-Believe.  Its aim, as we have seen, is not propaganda; neither is 
it self-deception.  It is seeking not a pleasant feeling state nor a comfortable belief, but the truth.  And 
Naturalism believes that the truth is what it is, no matter what we think about it.  Nature, the world of 
reality, has a character, a structure of its own, and our opinions are true only insofar as they conform to this 
actual situation.”  See: Pratt, pp3-4.  In section 2.6.2.2, we will attempt to challenge idealist readings of the 
pragmatic theory of truth. 






Sydney Hook, and Ernest Nagel defend a version of naturalism that places special emphasis on the 
scientific method.  Thus, Dewey declares that “the naturalist is one who has respect for the 
conclusions of natural science”42; Hook defines naturalism as “the wholehearted acceptance of 
scientific method as the only reliable way of reaching truths about the world of nature, society, 
and man”43; and Abraham Edel insists that “reliance on scientific method, together with an 
appreciation of the primacy of matter and the pervasiveness of change, I take to be the central 
points of naturalism as a philosophical outlook”44.  These statements appear to evince – and 
closer reading of Naturalism and the Human Spirit confirms this – a commitment on the part of 
the contributors to a thesis that today is known as ‘scientism’, according to which only science can 
give us knowledge/truth about reality.  They may also be said to express a related methodological 
theme, according to which the methods of science are applicable to, and ought to be utilised in, 
every domain of inquiry.  In an article-length review of the book written in the year following its 
publication Arthur E. Murphy suggests that this methodological theme is the most distinctive 
feature of the new naturalism: 
Starting from the acknowledged achievements of scientific inquiry so far, the 
“naturalists” intend to show that these same methods, or others essentially 
“continuous” with them, are adequate also to those aspects and dimensions of “the 
human spirit” which in the past have often been held on philosophical grounds to 
transcend the methods and aims of science.45 
In addition to declaring their allegiance to the scientific method, the contributors to Krikorian’s 
volume also took a definite stance regarding the causal closure of the physical.  This stance is well 
expressed in a response on the part of Dewey, Hook, and Nagel, to a series of articles written by 
Yale philosopher and vocal critic of naturalism, W. H. Sheldon46. 
In the relevant articles, Dewey, Hook, and Nagel describe their position as a form of ‘non-
reductive materialism’47.  Non-reductive materialism holds that “the occurrence of a mental event 
is contingent upon [but not reducible to] the occurrence of certain complex physico-chemico-
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physiological events and structures”48.  It is contrasted with ‘reductive materialism’, which holds 
that “the mental is simply identical with, or is “nothing but,” the physical”49, and that “every 
psychological term is synonymous with, or has the same meaning as, some expression or 
combination of expressions belonging to the class of physical terms”50.  Neither reductive nor 
non-reductive materialism, so far as Dewey, Hook, and Nagel conceive of them, have any truck 
with the doctrine of emergentism: 
[The] structured object is not an additional thing which, in manifesting its properties, 
controls from some external vantage point the behaviour of its organized parts.  The 
structured object in behaving the way it does behave under given circumstances is 
simply manifesting the behaviour of its constituents as related in that structure 
under those circumstances.51 
In other words, Dewey, Hook, and Nagel endorse CCP.  But for their endorsement of scientism 
and the methodological theme, they have more or less reverted back to the mechanical 
naturalism attacked by Ward in his 1896 Gifford lectures.   
1.1.2. The Shifting Definition of Naturalism 
W. H. Sheldon, in the aforementioned series of articles, mounts a ‘Critique of Naturalism’ in which 
he accuses the “new naturalists” of misappropriating the term ‘naturalism’ and turning it to novel 
and, he thinks, philosophically suspect uses.  The new naturalists, according to Sheldon are simply 
attempting to rehabilitate the doctrine of materialism by giving it a new name: 
What then do the symposiasts we are to examine really stand for?  As we all know, 
they say they stand for the study of nature by scientific method.  But what do they 
mean by nature and by scientific method?  To what does their usage of these words 
commit them?  I now give point to the inquiry by a specific accusation.  Namely, their 
usage of said words in the contexts of the book shows them to be materialists.  Their 
naturalism is just materialism over again under a softer name.  They claim to have 
superseded that perennial type of metaphysic; I believe they slip back into the same 
old rut.52 
Sheldon does not provide much detail as to what, in his opinion, would constitute a more 
appropriate use of the term naturalism, but he does make the comment that the new use of the 
term differs, presumably for the worse, from the use employed by James Pratt in Naturalism53.  
Pratt, as we have seen, defined naturalism methodologically in terms of the disinterested pursuit 
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of truth by way of ‘the empirical method’.  Sheldon, it seems, thought that Pratt’s relatively liberal 
definition of naturalism was the more distinctive and useful one. 
Clearly the definition of naturalism was undergoing quite rapid and significant changes even very 
early on in its development.  In 1895-1899 Paulsen and Ward took for granted that naturalism was 
a relatively austere metaphysical doctrine, committed to the mechanical theory of nature.  In 
1924 Sellars considered that naturalism had broken free from mechanicalism and reductionism.  
Pratt, in 1939, likewise expressed a sense that the emergence of a more critical naturalism was in 
the offing.  Thus, a shift in the understanding of naturalism in the direction of liberality seems to 
have occurred between 1899 and 1939.  The publication of Naturalism and the Human Spirit in 
1944 heralded yet another shift, this time, back in the direction of austerity.  Thus, we see that 
movement between the poles of austerity and liberality has been a feature of our understanding 
and use of the term naturalism since its inception.  Indeed, Pratt found that this same pattern 
extended all the way back to the first manifestations of the naturalistic spirit in ancient Greece.  
He considered that the austere naturalism of Democritus had given way to the more liberal 
naturalism of Aristotle, and saw his own ‘critical naturalism’ as inaugurating a similar transition 
away from the kind of ‘crude naturalism’ that was the subject of Ward’s critique54.  We should be 
wary then of claims to the effect that a particular (austere or liberal) form of naturalism is ‘the 
true naturalism’.   
The following three theses emerge during this early phase in the development of philosophical 
naturalism: 
The Causal Closure of Nature (CCN): All causal power is confined to the one continuous space-
time-causal system that we call ‘nature’. 
The Causal Closure of the Physical (CCP): All causal power is confined to the lowest level of 
natural phenomena (microphysical phenomena). 
Scientism (SCI): Only science can provide us with knowledge/truth about reality
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1.2. Scientific Naturalism 
Roy Wood Sellars, in his essay on ‘The Emergence of Naturalism’, rejected what he called ‘the 
method of reduction’, according to which “Psychology was to become physiology; physiology, 
chemistry; and chemistry, physics.”  This method, he said, “forced a Procrustean bed upon 
naturalism; gave it a false task and ideal.”55  Twenty years later we found Dewey, Hook, and Nagel 
evincing similar suspicions about reductionism.  They distinguished naturalism from ‘reductive 
materialism’, which holds that “the mental is simply identical with, or is “nothing but,” the 
physical”56, and that “every psychological term is synonymous with, or has the same meaning as, 
some expression or combination of expressions belonging to the class of physical terms”57.  They 
doubted whether “any competent thinker has ever held such a view”, and said that “very little can 
be said in its favor”58.  What Dewey, Hook, and Nagel call ‘reductive materialism’ can, we suggest, 
be analysed in terms of its commitment to two key theses.  First, what we shall call the ‘principle 
of ontological reducibility’ (POR), of which the statement that “the mental is simply identical with, 
or is “nothing but,” the physical” is an apt expression.  According to this thesis all higher-level 
entities and properties are identical with physical entities and properties.  Second, what we shall 
call the ‘principle of epistemological reducibility’ (PER), according to which theories and discourse 
about higher-level entities and properties is reducible to theories and discourse about physical 
entities and properties.  The statement above that “every psychological term is synonymous with, 
or has the same meaning as, some expression or combination of expressions belonging to the 
class of physical terms” can be said to express a particularly strong version of this thesis.  In the 
present section we shall see that in the years following this early phase in the development of 
naturalism, philosophers’ negative attitudes towards reductionism began to thaw.  Ultimately, 
under the banner of ‘scientific naturalism’, the majority of professional philosophers would come 
to champion reductionism in one form or another.  This process can be said to have begun already 
with Ernest Nagel, who, though he rejects the crude expression of PER quoted above, came to 
give a very influential defence of a more nuanced version of the thesis.   
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1.2.1. The Principle of Epistemological Reducibility 
Nagel’s most definitive defence of PER occurs in his 1970 essay, ‘Issues in the Logic of Reductive 
Explanations’.  He begins the essay by noting some examples of successful theory reduction in 
modern science: 
For example, as a consequence of this reductive process, the theory of heat is 
commonly said to be but a branch of Newtonian mechanics, physical optics a branch 
of electromagnetic theory, and chemical laws a branch of quantum mechanics.  
Moreover many biological processes have been given physicochemical explanations, 
and there is continuing debate as to the possibility of giving such explanations for the 
entire domain of biological phenomena.59   
Clearly, Nagel thinks, something loosely describable as ‘reduction’ is possible in the realm of 
scientific theory.  The question is: what form does reduction take, and what conclusions, if any, 
can we draw from it?   
As to the first question, of what form reduction takes, Nagel outlines four broad possibilities: i) 
deduction, ii) correspondence, iii) replacement, and iv) instrumental analysis.  Reduction by 
deduction occurs when the reduced theory is logically/mathematically deduced/derived from the 
reducing theory.  This is only ever possible, according to Nagel, when the theories in question are 
‘homogeneous’, meaning that the same set of terms appears in both.  Thus, Kepler’s laws of 
planetary motion have been reduced to Newton’s theory of gravitation in the sense that the 
former have been derived from the latter.  But this was only possible because both theories 
appealed to the same set of terms; e.g. distance, time, acceleration, etc.  When two theories do 
not share the same set of terms they are said to be ‘inhomogeneous’.  In these cases, reduction 
by deduction is impossible.  One cannot deduce the second law of thermodynamics from classical 
mechanics because the former contains the notion of ‘heat’ (temperature) whereas the latter 
does not.  Some sort of ‘correspondence rules’ or ‘bridge laws’ are required, which offer an 
explanation (in the form of an empirical hypothesis) about the relation between the 
terms/referents of the theories60.  Thus, the bridge law in the above case says that temperature 
corresponds to average translational kinetic energy.  Given the appropriate bridge laws, Nagel 
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thinks, reductions by correspondence are essentially similar to reductions by deduction; one can 
deduce/derive the reduced theory from the reducing theory plus the bridge laws. 
In the case of heat or temperature the term which the bridge law explains refers to an attribute.  
In such cases bridge laws tend to specify the conditions, in terms of the reducing theory, under 
which the attribute occurs.  Thus, we say that a gas has X temperature when the average 
translational kinetic energy of its molecules has Y magnitude61.  In other cases, where the terms in 
question refer to entities rather than attributes, bridge laws may serve a different function; 
namely that of establishing identities between terms and their referents.  For instance, the claim 
that ‘the Morning star is identical with the Evening star’ is an example of an identity-establishing 
bridge law in astronomy; and the claim that ‘a water molecule is identical with two hydrogen 
atoms bonded to an oxygen atom’ is an example of an identity-establishing bridge law in 
chemistry.  Notice that identity-establishing bridge laws, unlike condition-specifying bridge laws, 
imply the ontological reducibility of the referents of the terms in question.  Temperature 
corresponds to average translational kinetic energy; water is (i.e. is nothing but) H2O.  Nagel 
suggests that “failure to distinguish between them [i.e. between identity-establishing bridge laws 
and condition-specifying bridge laws] is perhaps one reason for the persistence of the mistaken 
belief that reductive explanations establish the “unreality” of those distinctive traits of things 
mentioned in reduced laws.”62  Thus for Nagel (and Dewey and Hook) the mistake of reductive 
materialism, we may say, is its attempt to identify the mental with the physical, when it ought to 
have been content to specify the physical conditions under which the distinctive traits of the 
mental occur63. 
Finally, we consider the instrumental analysis of scientific reduction.  Nagel provides the following 
excellent summary: 
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[This view] is usually advocated by thinkers who deny a cognitive status to scientific 
laws or theories, regarding them as neither true nor false but as rules (or “inference 
tickets”) for inferring so-called “observation statements” (statements about 
particular events or occurrences capable of being “observed” in some not precisely 
defined sense) from other such statements.64  
This view, in other words, tends to be advocated by ‘scientific antirealists’.  Such thinkers, Nagel 
says, hold that scientific theories do not represent reality in any straightforward sense, but rather 
that they constitute sets of rules for predicting what observations will result in particular 
circumstances.  To put it crudely, they hold that theories about imperceptible entities like 
elementary particles for instance, do not necessarily tell us anything about little balls of matter 
whizzing around below the observable level; they tell us about what readings we can expect to 
see on our instrument dials given a particular experimental set up.  As such, they take the 
following view of reduction: 
The claim that a theory T (e.g., the corpus of rules known as thermodynamics) is 
reduced to another theory T’ (e.g., the kinetic theory of gases) would therefore be 
interpreted as saying that all the observation statements which can be derived from 
given data with the help of T can also be derived with the help of T’, but not 
conversely.65 
Thus, the instrumental analysis of reduction abstains from addressing questions about the 
content of scientific theories and confines itself to establishing the comparative ranges of 
observable phenomena to which the theories are applicable.  Nagel, for his part, thinks that the 
instrumentalist approach is overly cautious, and ultimately incomplete66. 
Although the instrumental approach to scientific reduction, and to science in general, was, for a 
time, in the ascendant, the philosophical consensus has, for the time being, come down in favour 
of Nagel.  The majority of contemporary philosophers adopt some form of scientific realism, and 
endorse some form of the reductionist project.  The success of reductionism in Sellars’s day may 
have been limited, but with the advent of quantum mechanics and the successful reduction of 
large parts of chemistry to physics and biology to chemistry, the fecundity of the reductive 
method is no longer in doubt.  Many philosophers and scientists, contra Nagel’s warnings, have 
taken this success to imply the truth of universal ontological reducibility.  Even in the present day, 
when the prospects for full epistemological reduction are doubted by many scientific naturalists, 
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the principle of ontological reducibility is still popular.  In the next section we will attempt to tell 
part of the story of the increasingly widespread acceptance of POR.    
1.2.2. The Principle of Ontological Reducibility  
The increasingly widespread acceptance of the principle of ontological reducibility could be 
demonstrated with reference to the work of any number of philosophers, but we have chosen 
Wilfrid Sellars, the son of Roy Wood Sellars, for this purpose.  We have done this partly for the 
sake of continuity, but mainly because Sellars (from now on ‘Sellars’ is Wilfrid Sellars unless 
otherwise specified) provided, in any case, probably the most influential expression of this thesis 
of any philosopher in the twentieth century.  Furthermore, others of his ideas, as we shall see, 
have been highly influential on contemporary naturalism, so it will be doubly efficient to make his 
acquaintance at this early stage.   
The ideas most relevant to the present subject, namely POR, occur very distinctively in Sellars’s 
seminal essay on ‘Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man’67.  It is here that he draws the now 
famous distinction between ‘the manifest image’ and ‘the scientific image’.  He characterises the 
manifest image as a refinement and development of ‘the original image’, where the original 
image is “the framework in terms of which man came to be aware of himself as man-in-the-world. 
… the framework in terms of which, to use an existentialist turn of phrase, man first encountered 
himself”68.  The manifest image affirms the full reality of “persons, animals, lower forms of life and 
‘merely material’ things, like rivers and stones”69.  It also affirms the reality of “sensation, image, 
feeling, conscious or unconscious thought”70, and of values, rights, and duties71.  In other words, 
the manifest image includes irreducible wholes (and by implication a commitment to 
emergentism), consciousness, intentionality, and normativity.  Sellars pointedly emphasizes the 
fact that the manifest image is not simply the naive and pre-scientific worldview of primitive man; 
it is an intellectually respectable refinement of that worldview, incorporating everything that it 
can of contemporary science and philosophy.  But he goes on to tell us that “There is, however, 
one type of scientific reasoning which it, by stipulation, does not include, namely that which 
involves the postulation of imperceptible entities, and principles pertaining to them, to explain 
                                                             
67 Wilfrid Sellars, ‘Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man’, in Science, Perception and Reality (California: 
Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1963) 
68 W. Sellars, ‘Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man’, in Science, Perception and Reality, p6 
69 W. Sellars, ‘Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man’, in Science, Perception and Reality, p9 
70 W. Sellars, ‘Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man’, in Science, Perception and Reality, p22 
71 W. Sellars, ‘Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man’, in Science, Perception and Reality, p39 






the behaviour of perceptible things”72.  This type of scientific reasoning, which is governed by 
what Sellars calls the ‘principle of reducibility’73, is the foundation of the scientific image: 
If an object is in a strict sense a system of objects, then every property of the object 
must consist in the fact that its constituents have such and such qualities and stand in 
such and such relations or, roughly, every property of a system of objects consists of 
properties of, and relations between, its constituents.74 
At first glance this might look like another version of CCP, but in fact it is a much stronger thesis.  
Sellars does not just think that higher level phenomena are without causal power; he thinks that 
the properties of higher-level phenomena “consist of”, or are identical with, properties of lower-
level phenomena.  This then, is nothing other than the principle of ontological reducibility which 
Dewey, Hook, and Nagel had so vehemently rejected.  Sellars, pace his eminent forebears, thinks 
it is a principle that science cannot do without, and which the success of science confirms.   
And so, an obvious problem comes into view: the manifest and scientific images do not appear to 
fit together.  How can one and the same object – a human being for instance – be both an 
irreducible whole, possessing consciousness, and responsive to reason and value, and, at the 
same time, a system of particles, devoid of non-physical properties, blindly obeying physical laws?  
Sellars thinks there are broadly three options open to us for solving the problem.  1) manifest 
objects are reducible to the objects of physics without remainder, 2) the objects of physics are 
just abstract or symbolic ways of representing manifest objects, and are reducible to manifest 
objects without remainder, or 3) manifest objects are ‘appearances’ of a reality that is constituted 
by the objects of physics, and these appearances are ultimately identical with systems of such 
objects (i.e. with brain states)75.  Sellars thinks that option 1 amounts to abolishing the manifest 
image altogether, and finds it ultimately unacceptable.  Option 2 does the reverse, abolishing the 
scientific image, and is likewise unacceptable.  The most viable of these alternatives in Sellars’s 
view is option 3.  He therefore endorses the primacy of the scientific image, but suggests a 
strategy of sympathetic reduction rather than all-out elimination of the manifest image.  He 
supposes that there must be “sufficient structural similarities” between manifest objects and their 
scientific counterparts to account for the success of the manifest image, but warns against 
piecemeal attempts to elucidate such structural similarities76.  Rather he thinks that the job of 
philosophers should be to establish the best possible version of each image, and to let them stand 
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side by side77.  As to how he envisions the relationship between the final versions of the images, 
one of his most memorable and oft quoted statements makes this clear:  
[O]f course, as long as the existing framework [the manifest image] is used, it will be 
incorrect to say – otherwise than to make a philosophical point about the framework 
– that no object is really coloured, or is located in Space, or endures through Time.  
But, speaking as a philosopher, I am quite prepared to say that the common sense 
world of physical objects in Space and Time is unreal – that is, that there are no such 
things.  Or, to put it less paradoxically, that in the dimension of describing and 
explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of 
what is not that it is not.78 
Sellars’s position here can be said to express a doctrine known today as ‘scientific realism’.  
Scientific realism states, contra instrumentalism and positivism, that the entities postulated by 
science, including unobservable ones, really do exist.  Indeed, Sellars goes further than this, 
straying into a kind of ‘hyperscientific realism’: he says not only that such entities exist, but that 
only such entities exist.   
1.2.3. The Methodological Thesis of Naturalism 
In the previous section we saw that the ‘new naturalists’ – the contributors to Krikorian’s 
anthology – began to develop a methodological theme of naturalism, according to which 
philosophy ought to employ scientific methods in the study of the human spirit.  However, as 
Jaegwon Kim remarks in an article on ‘The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism’, the 
American naturalists, with the possible exception of Ernest Nagel, seem to have been relatively 
uncritical (compared, for example, with the logical positivists) about the question of how the 
methods of science ought to be applied in philosophy79.  In an address to the American 
Philosophical Association published in 1944 Nagel suggests that philosophers ought to stop 
emulating the system-builders of the past, attempting to contribute to some supposed perennial 
philosophy, and ought instead to imitate the strategy of modern science by directing their 
energies toward “the resolution of limited problems and puzzles that emerge in the analysis of 
scientific and ordinary discourse”80.  He even raises the question of whether philosophy ought to 
become “a specialized positive science”81.  This is about as explicit as this methodological theme 
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becomes in this phase of the development of naturalism.  In the decades that followed however, 
it became a dominant feature of the most popular forms of the doctrine.   
Willard Van Orman Quine in particular is credited with having brought this methodological theme 
to the fore.  Having studied under Rudolph Carnap, Quine’s background was in logical positivism.  
The logical positivists are notable for their combination of scientism, scientific antirealism, and 
phenomenalism.  They believed that scientific inquiry was the only means of arriving at truth 
about the world, but that the imperceptible entities postulated by science were abstractions 
reducible to manifest objects; specifically, one class of manifest objects, namely sensations82.  The 
positivists envisioned a relatively sharp separation between science and philosophy, with 
scientists discovering facts about the world, and philosophers submitting these facts to 
conceptual analysis.  Quine’s great contribution to the development of naturalism came in the 
form of his undermining of some of the assumptions of logical positivism.  In his now famous 
essay ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ he argued against both the possibility of reducing the objects 
of the sciences to sensation, and against the sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic 
truths (and therefore, as he saw it, between philosophy and science)83.  He concluded that there 
need not be any such thing as ‘first philosophy’ with a goal of grounding, justifying, or otherwise 
domesticating science.  Rather, the best philosophy will itself be continuous with science.  As he 
would later comment: 
[M]y position is a naturalistic one; I see philosophy not as an a priori propaedeutic or 
groundwork for science, but as continuous with science.  I see philosophy and science 
as in the same boat – a boat which, to revert to Neurath’s figure as I so often do, we 
can rebuild only at sea while staying afloat in it.  There is no external vantage point, 
no first philosophy.84 
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In another well-known essay, ‘Epistemology Naturalized’, Quine indicated what he meant by 
philosophy that is continuous with science, and gestured at the direction in which he hoped 
naturalistic philosophy would develop85.  He later summarised his view as follows:  
Naturalism does not repudiate epistemology, but assimilates it to empirical 
psychology.  Science itself tells us that our information about the world is limited to 
irritations of our surfaces, and then the epistemological question is in turn a question 
within science: the question how we human animals can have managed to arrive at 
science from such limited information.  Our scientific epistemologist pursues this 
inquiry and comes out with an account that has a good deal to do with the learning 
of language and with the neurology of perception.  He talks of how men posit bodies 
and hypothetical particles, but he does not mean to suggest that the things thus 
posited do not exist.  Evolution and natural selection will doubtless figure in his 
account, and he will feel free to apply physics if he sees a way.86 
Here we see the aforementioned methodological theme developed to its limit.  Naturalistic 
philosophy does not just respect, utilise, and imitate science; it is science.  It investigates the 
history and logic of the sciences and their methods.  It tries to bring the findings of the different 
sciences together into a single intelligible scheme.  It works at the frontiers and peripheries of the 
sciences, attempts to trace the contours of unknown territory, to establish the sorts of questions 
that are worth asking, and to develop methodologies for approaching those questions.  When it is 
sufficiently successful in a given area, it breaks off from the rest of philosophy and actually 
becomes a special science.  This is part of the story of cognitive science, the field that occupies 
Quine’s famous pupil Daniel Dennett (and indeed, as James himself acknowledged, it is also part 
of the story of psychology87).  Such was Quine’s vision, and it is a vision that is now shared by large 
numbers of philosophers, and by the majority of philosophers who call themselves naturalists.  In 
their recent widely-read anthology Naturalism in Question Mario De Caro and David Macarthur 
call this Quinean brand of naturalism ‘scientific naturalism’88.  They identify projects that have 
been carried out in the spirit of scientific naturalism in ontology89, epistemology90, and 
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semantics91.  We might add that similar projects exist in the philosophy of mind92, ethics93, and 
the philosophy of religion94.  This is just a tiny sample of the work being done today in this 
Quinean spirit.  Contemporary analytic philosophy journals abound with articles devoted to the 
finer points of such naturalization projects.   
In addition to the three theses discussed so far, scientific naturalism may be said to endorse the 
following: 
The Principle of Epistemological Reducibility (PER): Theories/discourse about all entities is 
reducible to theories/discourse about their lowest level parts/properties of their lowest level 
parts.   
The Principle of Ontological Reducibility (POR):  All entities/properties are wholly reducible to 
their lowest level parts/properties of their lowest level parts.   
Hyperscientific Realism (HSR): Only entities postulated by scientific theories are real. 
The Methodological Thesis of Naturalism (MTN): Philosophy is continuous with science. 
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1.3. Liberal Naturalism 
Not surprisingly given its reductive pretensions, scientific naturalism has attracted a number of 
critics from both within and outside of the movement.  The contributors to De Caro and 
Macarthur’s anthology endorse a doctrine of ‘liberal’ or ‘expansive naturalism’ which rejects the 
thesis of scientism, as well as the principle of epistemological reducibility (PER) and strong 
versions of the methodological thesis of naturalism (MTN).  Many of the contributors also reject 
the principle of ontological reducibility (POR), and some seem to have doubts about the causal 
closure of the physical (CCP)95.  De Caro and Macarthur suggest that, for all of their contributors, 
expansive naturalism shares four general features: i) it represents a shift in philosophical focus 
from nonhuman nature to human nature, ii) it endorses a nonreductive attitude to normativity, 
iii) it conceives philosophy as in some respects autonomous from scientific method, and iv) it 
acknowledges the disunity of the sciences; “not just that there is no single method or set of 
methods that is properly called the scientific method, but, more than this, that there is no clear, 
uncontroversial, and useful definition of science to do the substantial work scientific naturalists 
require of it”96.  In the first essay of the anthology, ‘The Charm of Naturalism’, Barry Stroud helps 
to flesh out the distinctive content of liberal naturalism: 
What I am calling open-minded or expansive naturalism says we must accept 
everything we find ourselves committed to in accounting for everything that we 
agree is so and want to explain.  We want to explain the thoughts, beliefs, 
knowledge, and evaluative attitudes that we think people have got.  If mathematical 
and logical truths have to be accepted in order to make sense of those attitudes, 
then they must be accepted, however in some sense “non-natural” they might seem.  
If some evaluative propositions must be endorsed in order even to recognize the 
evaluative attitudes of others, then evaluative states of affairs must be included too, 
however difficult it might be to decide which particular evaluations are correct.  If we 
have to hold that objects are colored in order to specify and acknowledge all the 
perceptions and beliefs that we know people have, then the colors of things must be 
allowed into the picture, and not in reductionist form.97 
Liberal naturalists, we may say, are committed to preserving the manifest image within a 
naturalistic framework.  In this spirit, Donald Davidson defends his anomalous monism, and its 
thesis that psychological concepts are indispensable for the understanding of human thought and 
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action, and irreducible to the concepts of physics, chemistry, and biology98; Hilary Putnam argues 
for the possibility of a “conceptual pluralism” for which ethical statements and statements of 
meaning and reference are bona fide forms of rational discourse, governed by norms of truth and 
validity99; John Dupre defends the doctrine of the disunity of science, and rejects CCP100; John 
McDowell argues that naturalism ought to include reasons and values as sui generis natural 
items101; and Akeel Bilgrami argues that intentional facts and normative facts do not supervene on 
physical facts102.   
1.3.1. Liberal Naturalism and Science 
In section 1.1.2 we saw that the so-called ‘new naturalists’ – the contributors to Krikorian’s 
anthology – endorsed a thesis known today as scientism.  As Sidney Hook put it, they accepted 
‘the scientific method’ as “the only reliable way of reaching truths about the world of nature, 
society, and man”103.  This thesis immediately suggests certain conclusions.  Firstly, it suggests 
that subjects such as the nature of society and man – subjects originally held to be in the domain 
of philosophy rather than science – ought in fact to be investigated using the methods of science.  
The implication is that philosophy, if it is to continue investigating these subjects, ought to utilize 
those methods in its investigations.  This is what we called the methodological thesis of 
naturalism (MTN).  Another conclusion, which we saw exemplified in the work of Wilfrid Sellars, is 
that the deliverances of science take precedence over those of common sense, and that where 
the two are in conflict, science is to be preferred.  This notion of the precedence of science over 
common-sense, when it pertains to the reality of entities postulated by physics, may be said to 
express a doctrine of ‘hyperscientific realism’, according to which only the unobservable entities 
postulated by physics are real104.  Concomitant with this doctrine is the principle of ontological 
reducibility (POR), according to which all properties are identical with properties of such entities.  
Liberal naturalists, as we have just seen, reject most of these theses.  They reject scientism, MTN, 
PER, and often POR; and they resist hyperscientific realism, preferring a reconciliatory approach 
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to the deliverances of science and common sense.  They therefore envision a very different 
relationship between naturalism and science than that advocated by scientific naturalists. 
In this section we will discuss this relationship under three heads.  In section 1.3.1.1 we will 
consider some varieties of scientism, and some of its consequences, and we will look at the liberal 
naturalist critique of that thesis.  In section 1.3.1.2 we will consider the liberal naturalist critique 
of hyperscientific realism, which is itself a natural consequence of strong versions of scientism.  
Finally, in section 1.3.1.3, we will discuss the disunity of science thesis, paying special attention to 
John Dupre’s exposition of it in De Caro and MacArthur’s anthology and elsewhere.  Our reasons 
for examining the liberal naturalist critique of scientific naturalism are twofold.  Firstly, it is largely 
through its opposition to scientific naturalism, as established in this critique, that liberal 
naturalism is defined.  Understanding it is therefore essential to grasping what is distinctive about 
the liberal naturalist position.  Secondly, as we shall see in chapter 2, the liberal naturalist critique 
of scientific naturalism overlaps at several points with James’s critique of scientificism.  We will 
argue that James’s critique, like that of the liberal naturalists, does not evince hostility towards 
naturalism, but only expresses his frustration with a particularly austere form of it.  
1.3.1.1. Critique of Scientism 
We have said that scientism stands for the claim that “only science can provide us with knowledge 
of reality”.  There are however a number of distinct varieties of scientism that are worth 
distinguishing between.  Varieties of scientism differ first, according to their strength, second, 
according to their liberality or austerity (or broadness/narrowness105), and third, according to 
their scope.  As regards strength, they may claim, i) that only science can reliably provide us with 
knowledge of reality (weak scientism), ii) that only science can provide us with knowledge of 
reality (scientism), or iii) that only science can provide us with knowledge and understanding of 
reality (strong scientism)106.  The liberality or austerity of doctrines of scientism refers to the 
range of sciences they include as possible providers of knowledge.  Thus, we may say that liberal 
scientism includes the human and social sciences; regular scientism (or just ‘scientism’) includes 
only the natural sciences, of physics, chemistry, and biology; and austere scientism says that 
physics alone can provide knowledge of reality.  Finally, doctrines of scientism vary as to their 
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scope.  There can be scientism about metaphysics, scientism about ethics, and scientism about 
reality as a whole.   
The new naturalists, we may say, were mostly proponents of weak liberal scientism about reality 
as a whole, but they were particularly concerned with the application of the methods of science 
to ‘the human spirit’.  Wilfrid Sellars and Willard van Orman Quine would probably be classified as 
proponents of austere scientism about reality as a whole.  Someone like Sam Harris, as regards his 
project in The Moral Landscape, might be said to advocate liberal scientism about ethics107.  
James Ladyman and Don Ross, in their recent polemic Everything Must Go, advocate austere 
scientism about metaphysics108.  Finally, Alex Rosenberg is a well-known contemporary proponent 
of strong austere scientism about reality as a whole109.  Liberal naturalists stand opposed to all 
these forms of scientism.  At the very least they wish to include such enterprises as history and 
the humanities as possible providers of knowledge of reality110.  Many would contend that such 
things as art, religion, and common-sense are providers, if not of knowledge, then at least of 
understanding of reality111.  Accordingly, they view philosophy as basically autonomous from 
science.  This does not mean that philosophers ought not to respect the findings of science, and 
even to imitate its methods to some degree; it means that philosophy has a right to exist as an 
independent enterprise, with a subject matter of its own.  Furthermore, they see it as a significant 
role of philosophy, pace Sellars and Quine, to attempt to reconcile the scientific and manifest 
images; to fit such phenomena as intentionality, normativity, and phenomenal consciousness into 
nature, rather than eliminating them from it.  In what follows we will consider some of the prima 
facie difficulties with scientism, and some of the detailed arguments against it.   
As soon as one thinks about scientism for a moment, one begins to spot certain prima facie 
difficulties with the doctrine.  Chief among these are the fact that it discounts all sorts of 
seemingly bona fide instances of knowledge as genuine examples of knowledge.  If anything more 
than weak scientism is true, then beliefs based on perception, memory, and introspection do not 
count as knowledge.  You do not know, for instance, that you are reading this dissertation.  You 
do not even know that you are having a conscious experience of reading this dissertation.  Indeed, 
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contra Descartes, you do not even know that you exist.  Neither, by the way, do beliefs based on 
basic logical and mathematical intuitions count as knowledge.  You do not know that Socrates is 
mortal, even if you know that Socrates is a man and that all men are mortal.  And the same goes 
for beliefs based on ethical, aesthetic, and religious intuitions: that murdering children is wrong, 
and that it is not beautiful or holy.  This, of course, is a highly counter-intuitive result, and explains 
the rejection of scientism among the vast majority of human beings.  Philosophical critics of 
scientism are not of course content to reject it on the basis of counter-intuitiveness alone; rather, 
they formulate explicit arguments against it.  We will consider two such arguments in the 
remainder of this section: first, ‘the fundamental argument’, and second, ‘the argument from 
non-scientific values/principles in science’. 
i) The Fundamental Argument 
Versions of the fundamental argument against scientism have been suggested or implied for over 
a century, but the philosopher Rik Peels was the first person to name it, and to formulate it as an 
explicit argument112.  His own formulation, which takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum, is 
rather long and technical, so we present a shortened version below: 
• P1: Scientism holds that only science can provide us with knowledge of reality. 
• P2: In order for a belief-source to count as a provider of knowledge, belief-sources which 
it presupposes upon must count as providers of knowledge. 
• P3: Science presupposes such belief-sources as perception, memory, and 
logical/mathematical intuitions. 
• P4: Science counts as a provider of knowledge. 
• P5: Perception, memory, and logical/mathematical intuitions count as providers of 
knowledge  
• C2: Scientism is absurd. 
The argument, we contend, is valid.  The conclusion follows from the premises.  Furthermore, P1 
is simply a statement of the thesis of scientism, P4 is implied by P1, and P5 is entailed by P2, P3, 
and P4.  The weight of the argument therefore rests entirely on P2 and P3.  Of these, P3 is hardly 
controversial113.  P2 is a little trickier, but Peels argues convincingly that familiar considerations of 
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so-called Gettier cases make it highly plausible114.  If premises 2 and 3 hold, then scientism looks 
to be in a bad spot.  The proponent of scientism can however modify the doctrine so as to evade 
the fundamental argument.  Instead of scientism, he can endorse scientism 2.0: ‘only science and 
the belief-sources it presupposes can provide us with knowledge of reality’.  Scientism 2.0 
concedes that perception, memory, and logical/mathematical intuition count as potential 
providers of knowledge, but it excludes ethical, aesthetic, and religious intuitions.  This leads us to 
our second argument, according to which science itself involves certain ethical/aesthetic 
intuitions, and so those intuitions ought not to be discounted as potential providers of knowledge, 
or as contributors to belief-sources that are providers of knowledge.   
ii) The argument from non-scientific values/principles in science 
The argument in this case takes exactly the same form as the fundamental argument except that 
it substitutes ‘non-scientific values/principles’ for ‘perception, memory, and logical/mathematical 
intuitions’.  The key premise that needs defending is now premise 3, which reads: ‘Science 
presupposes non-scientific values/principles as sources of belief’.  Two questions immediately 
arise in connection with this premise.  How does science presuppose non-scientific 
values/principles, and which non-scientific values/principles does it presuppose?  Various answers 
to these questions are possible.  According to early philosophers of science like Charles 
Churchman (a student of William James at Harvard) and Richard Rudner, science presupposes 
certain epistemic values in deciding the evidential value of particular results115.  Thomas Kuhn 
later acknowledged the role of epistemic values in theory selection, but argued that science could 
remain objective provided it did not appeal to non-epistemic values116.  Subsequent philosophers 
have challenged the notion that there is any definite boundary between epistemic and non-
epistemic values, and have argued that scientists’ choices of epistemic values are often shaped by 
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social values117.  More recently it has been argued that certain aesthetic values have a place in 
theory choice too118.  Finally, according to the influential feminist critique of science, science 
presupposes social values which further the agenda of powerful institutions; e.g. science itself and 
the institutions which support it119.  In this last case of course, it can hardly be argued that the 
values in question contribute to the success of science as a knowledge producing enterprise, but it 
is worth mentioning all the same.  The overall point is that the ideal of science as a value-free 
enterprise is a false one.   
If the above arguments are convincing, then scientism is already on shaky ground.  In the final 
part of this section (1.3.1.3) we will investigate the disunity of science thesis, which itself 
constitutes a powerful argument against scientism.  If, after all, “there is no clear, uncontroversial, 
and useful definition of science to do the substantial work scientific naturalists require of it”, then 
there can be no sense in saying that only science can provide us with knowledge of reality.  But 
first, we will look at the liberal naturalist critique of hyperscientific realism.  The disunity thesis, 
we shall see, bears on that critique also. 
1.3.1.2. Critique of Hyperscientific Realism 
Next, we wish to consider the liberal naturalist critique of hyperscientific realism.  First, we must 
map out the doctrine of scientific realism in more detail.  As with scientism, a number of varieties 
and permutations of the doctrine are possible.  We have already noted the distinction between 
scientific realism, which says that entities postulated by science really exist, and hyperscientific 
realism, which says that only entities postulated by science really exist.  Doctrines of realism also 
differ, like doctrines of scientism, as regards their liberality or austerity.  Thus, liberal scientific 
realism says that entities postulated by all sciences, including the human and social sciences, 
really exist; regular scientific realism (or just ‘scientific realism’) says that entities postulated by 
the natural sciences really exist; and austere scientific realism says that entities postulated by 
physics really exist.  This may also be expressed in terms of the belief that the kinds of entities 
postulated by the relevant sciences constitute ‘natural kinds’ (as opposed to mere patterns120).  
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Thirdly, doctrines of realism can differ in assigning more or less weight to the notion of the 
convergent nature of scientific truth.  Some realists will want to claim that the entities postulated 
by today’s science really exist; others – so-called ‘convergent realists’ – will be more cautious, and 
say that science is converging on theories whose postulated entities will exist.  Finally, certain 
philosophers endorse what is called ‘structural realism’.  Structural realists hold that the structural 
properties (as opposed to supposedly intrinsic properties, and opposed to entities) described by 
physics really exist.   
Thus, we may say that Roy Wood Sellars endorsed liberal scientific realism; the instrumentalists 
and positivists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century endorsed scientific antirealism; 
and Wilfrid Sellars endorsed austere hyperscientific realism.  Alex Rosenberg is an example of a 
contemporary proponent of austere hyperscientific realism who gives relatively little weight to 
the notion of the convergent nature of scientific knowledge.  He holds that only the most basic 
entities described by physics, substantially as they are described by today’s physics, really exist121.  
Liberal naturalists are typically scientific realists of some description, but they are united in laying 
great weight on the notion of the convergent nature of scientific knowledge, and in rejecting 
hyperscientific realism.  In the remainder of this section we will briefly consider a pair of famous 
arguments against realism that serve to establish the importance of the notion of the convergent 
nature of scientific knowledge.  Then, in section 1.3.1.3, we will investigate the disunity of science 
thesis, which cuts against doctrines of hyperscientific realism. 
i) The Argument from Underdetermination 
The argument from underdetermination generally takes Pierre Duhem’s famous 
underdetermination thesis as its starting point.  In The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory 
Duhem argued that physical theories are underdetermined by data in at least two respects122.  
First, scientific data consists in highly precise and accordingly approximate measurements taken 
using scientific instruments.  This approximate data must then be made determinate by the use of 
averages etc., and translated into a symbolic form wherein it can become part of a physical 
theory.  Any given data set, Duhem insists, because of its approximate nature, is susceptible to an 
infinite number of different and incompatible symbolic translations (i.e. an infinite number of 
theoretical formulations)123.  The theory, therefore, is underdetermined by the data.  Secondly, 
and more importantly, Duhem argues that any given hypothesis in physics presupposes a large 
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number of auxiliary theories and hypotheses.  No set of data therefore, can directly verify or 
falsify a single hypothesis.  The most it can do is show that at least one hypothesis in a given 
theory-group is false.  Thus, even when one is sure that hypothesis A fits the data better than 
hypothesis B (where both A and B presuppose theory-group X), one cannot possibly be sure that 
an entirely different theory-group, Y, will not generate hypotheses that fit the data just as well as 
A124.  According to the argument from underdetermination, this creates a presumptive concern 
for realism.  If, for any given set of data, there are multiple hypotheses/theory-groups that fit that 
data equally well, and if, moreover, these hypotheses/theory-groups differ in their description of 
postulated entities/properties, then why should we suppose that a given theory’s description is 
correct/realistic?125   
ii) The Pessimistic Meta-Induction 
The next argument we wish to discuss is called a pessimistic induction or a pessimistic meta-
induction.  In full, it is referred to as ‘the pessimistic meta-induction from the history of science to 
scientific anti-realism’.  Hilary Putnam gives a classic summary in an article entitled ‘What is 
Realism?’126.  The history of science contains numerous examples of theories whose terms turned 
out, after subsequent discoveries, not to refer to any existing entities (i.e. the ether and 
phlogiston).  “What if this keeps happening?”, Putnam asks; “What if all the theoretical entities 
postulated by one generation … invariably “don’t exist” from the standpoint of later science?”127: 
[T]he following meta-induction becomes overwhelmingly compelling: just as no term 
used in the science of 50 (or whatever) years ago referred, so it will turn out that no 
term used now (except maybe observation terms, if there are such) refers.128 
Putnam suggests that the force of this argument is curbed to some degree if we employ the 
principle of charity in interpreting the reference of terms in scientific theories.  Consider the 
following.  Bohr did not assign electrons the property of complementarity of position and 
momentum, whereas current theories do.  Strictly speaking therefore, we might wish to say that 
Bohr’s term ‘electron’ did not refer to the same entity as our term ‘electron’; indeed, that from 
the standpoint of current science, Bohr’s term ‘electron’ did not refer to anything at all.  However, 
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Bohr’s electrons shared various properties in common with our current electrons: one to each 
hydrogen atom, negative unit charge, appropriate mass, etc.  If we employ the principle of 
charity, Putnam suggests, it does not seem unreasonable to identify the referent of Bohr’s term 
‘electron’ with that of current science.  At the same time however, there are clearly instances in 
which the principle of charity cannot be so reasonably employed.  Phlogiston and the ether would 
be two such instances; Larry Laudan lists various others in his widely-read article, ‘A Confutation 
of Convergent Realism’129.  In these cases, the referents of terms in successful scientific theories 
really did turn out simply not to exist.  The convergence of scientific knowledge is not always a 
smooth process.  At the same time as we employ the principle of charity therefore, we ought also 
to employ a precautionary principle.  We should not be over-zealous about declaring the reality of 
entities postulated by current scientific theories, and we should not be overly confident about 
how closely current theories approximate to the truth.   
iii) Structural Realism 
The aforementioned ‘structural realists’ take a message from the critique of scientific realism.  
Even if the entities postulated by older theories tend not to be preserved in newer theories, 
something, at any rate, is preserved.  This something (or these somethings), they contend, are the 
relational or structural properties of the states of affairs described by the theories.  We find the 
roots of this contention already in Poincaré: 
[T]here is in them [older theories] something which usually survives.  If one of them 
has taught us a true relation, this relation is definitively acquired, and it will be found 
again in a new disguise in the other theories which will successively come to reign in 
place of the old.130 
Building on this insight, John Worrall coined the term ‘structural realism’ in his 1989 article, 
‘Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?’131.  Since then a number of philosophers have 
contributed to the development of structural realism into a rigorous and systematic position132.  
We suggest that it is a natural fit for liberal naturalists because it allows, potentially, for a more 
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reconciliatory approach to the relation between the scientific and manifest images.  The scientific 
image, according to structuralism, is an image of the structural properties of the world.  And 
structural properties, by stipulation, may coexist with (may even require) intrinsic properties.  This 
leaves open the possibility that the properties of the manifest image which liberal naturalists wish 
to preserve may have the status of intrinsic properties.  Now, however, is not the time to consider 
the details of how such a reconciliation might be affected.  Instead, we move on to the disunity of 
science thesis, which, we said, constitutes a powerful argument against both scientism and 
hyperscientific realism. 
1.3.1.3. The Disunity of Science 
Of the contributors to De Caro and MacArthur’s anthology, the key defender of the disunity thesis 
is John Dupre.  He elects to analyse it negatively, in terms of its opposition to a counter-thesis; 
namely that of the ‘unity of science’.  The renowned biologist Richard Lewontin articulates the 
unity thesis in common-sense terms when he says that “[h]istorians of science, epistemologists, 
and, when they are in a contemplative mood, natural scientists picture science as having a single 
mode or form.”133  According to Dupre, a number of different versions of the unity thesis are 
possible, but the most prevalent asserts unity on the basis of a shared ‘scientific method’.  The 
most popular candidate for such a method, in recent decades, is usually taken to be 
falsificationism.  But according to Dupre, the notion that scientific method consists in falsification 
has been on shaky ground for decades.  As Thomas Kuhn (building on the work of Duhem) is 
credited with having shown, actual as opposed to idealized scientific practice simply does not 
proceed by falsification134.  Any scientific theory will have a large number of premises and 
presuppositions.  As such, any supposed falsification of a theory – any negative result of an 
experiment – may point to any one of a number of faulty premises rather than to the falsity of the 
theory itself.  Upon finding negative results scientists will typically seek, and often find, possible 
faulty premises of a theory rather than abandoning the theory: 
A classic case is that of the inference by Leverrier and Adams from unexplained 
irregularities in the orbit of Uranus to the existence of the planet Neptune.  These 
irregularities were not, needless to say, taken as refuting Newtonian mechanics, but 
rather as motivating a search for the erroneous assumption, a search that culminated 
in the prediction of the existence and orbit of Neptune.135 
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Dupre insists that no serious rivals to falsificationism have been developed since.  And this, he 
thinks, is not particularly surprising.  Different scientific projects are developed in order to answer 
very different questions, and their methods must differ accordingly.  This is especially true in the 
modern day, in which advances in technology have allowed for the development of entirely novel 
kinds of scientific methodology136. 
The solution, Dupre thinks, is to treat science as a family-resemblance concept137.  This means 
abandoning the search for some set of essential properties that a thing must possess in order to 
be called ‘scientific’, and instead allowing that “there will be a number, perhaps an indefinite 
number, of features characteristic of parts of science, and every part of science will have some of 
these features, but very probably none will have all.”138  This does not of course mean that Dupre 
considers astrology, for instance, to have the same epistemic status as physics.  Rather, he 
suggests that all knowledge-producing enterprises, including scientific ones, should be judged on 
the basis of their actual epistemic virtues; virtues like “sensitivity to empirical fact, plausible 
background assumptions, coherence with other things we know, exposure to criticism from the 
widest variety of sources, and no doubt others”139.  This has immediate consequences for the 
theses of scientism and hyperscientific realism, and for the methodological thesis of naturalism.  If 
there is no clear definition of science, then there is little sense in claiming that only science can 
provide us with knowledge of reality, or in claiming that only entities postulated by science really 
exist.  Dupre thinks that disunity should encourage us to accept all sufficiently epistemically 
virtuous knowledge-producing enterprises as potentially providing knowledge of reality.  Likewise, 
we might suppose, it should encourage us to accept entities/properties postulated by 
epistemically virtuous knowledge-producing enterprises as potentially real (colours, numbers, 
values, etc.).  As regards the methodological thesis of naturalism, it means that although 
philosophy may aspire to some of the same epistemic virtues that the sciences embody, and 
perhaps to imitate some of the methods (in the plural) utilized by the sciences, little is gained by 
claiming any radical continuity between philosophy and science.   
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1.3.2. Liberal Naturalism and Emergence 
Liberal naturalists are committed to a “nonreductive attitude” towards normativity (and also 
towards intentionality and consciousness140).  In many cases, this nonreductive attitude rises to 
the level of an explicit commitment to the epistemological and/or ontological irreducibility of 
these phenomena.  Another way of putting this, in the terms of contemporary analytic 
philosophy, is to say that these phenomena are weakly (i.e. epistemologically) and/or strongly 
(i.e. ontologically) emergent.  Emergence, we may say, is the opposite of reducibility.  To the 
extent, therefore, that liberal naturalism is characterised by a comparatively nonreductive 
attitude, it is characterised by a comparatively emergentistic attitude.  The concept of emergence, 
we suggest, and its associated terminology, is of great use in capturing what is distinctive about 
liberal naturalism.  In this section we therefore propose to investigate liberal naturalism through 
the lens of emergence and emergentism.  Our reasons for doing so are threefold.  Firstly, in 
emergentism we find many of the key doctrines of liberal naturalism brought together in a single 
well-established philosophical tradition, with conceptual tools already at hand for dealing with 
the relevant ideas, problems, and distinctions.  Secondly, in section 1.4, on ‘Radical Liberal 
Naturalism’, we are going to attempt to establish the possibility of an even more liberal version of 
naturalism, and we think that it is best distinguished from liberal naturalism in terms of its 
endorsement, and liberal naturalism’s rejection, of certain classic emergentist doctrines.  Thirdly, 
the emergentist tradition, the origins of which are commonly dated to 1843 (with the publication 
of John Stuart Mill’s A System of Logic141), provides an ideal bridge between James and his 
contemporaries and the more modern varieties of naturalism142.  Indeed, a number of 
commentators note elements of emergentist doctrines in James’s philosophy, with Brian 
McLaughlin even naming him (along with Roy Wood Sellars) as an American counterpart of the 
British Emergentists143.   
The concept of emergence, in its most basic sense, may be said to express the intuition that 
certain entities are ‘more than the sums of their parts’.  These entities, it says, or certain of their 
properties, are emergent from their parts, or from the properties of their parts.  Such 
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entities/properties are taken to be in some sense dependent on their parts, and in some sense 
autonomous from them144.  The exact sense of this dependence/autonomy differs from one 
doctrine of emergentism to the next145.  Two broad notions of emergence are commonly invoked 
in contemporary philosophy: weak emergence and strong emergence.  Weakly emergent 
entities/properties are dependent on their parts in the sense of being ontologically reducible to 
them, and autonomous in the sense of being epistemologically irreducible to them.  Strongly 
emergent entities/properties are dependent on their parts in the sense of supervening on 
them146, and autonomous in the sense of being both ontologically and epistemologically 
irreducible to them.  According to some philosophers, strongly emergent entities/properties must 
also possess macro-causal power over and above the causal power of their parts.  It is however 
conceivable that an entity/property could be strongly emergent in the sense of being ontologically 
irreducible to its parts without possessing any macro causal power, as per epiphenomenalism.  
We may think epiphenomenalism crude and implausible, but it is certainly conceivable, and 
philosophers not infrequently commit themselves to it unintentionally, so we will generally 
employ the notion of strong emergence in the sense described above, distinguishing it from the 
often-attendant doctrine of macro-causation147.   
The doctrine of emergence first came to the fore with the tradition of British Emergentism in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  With the rise of reductionism in the twentieth 
century, it entered a period of dormancy.  In recent decades there has been a marked resurgence 
of interest in the concept of emergence.  Some form of emergentism is now endorsed by the 
majority of professional philosophers.  However, questions about how best to understand 
emergence, and about how prevalent emergent phenomena are, are still hotly debated.  There 
are those – perhaps the majority – who endorse weak emergentism about particular phenomena, 
but who reject strong emergentism and macro-causation.  Most scientific naturalists and a few 
liberal naturalists are in this category.  Then there are those who endorse strong emergentism 
about particular phenomena, but who reject macro-causation.  It appears that the majority of 
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liberal naturalists are in this camp.  Finally, there are those who endorse both strong emergentism 
and macro-causation.  Of these, some are more conservative, holding that only phenomenal 
consciousness, or only mental phenomena are strongly emergent/causally powerful148, and others 
endorse something closer to classic British Emergentism, with various ‘natural levels’ of causally 
powerful entities149.   
Regarding the contributors to De Caro and Macarthur’s anthology, we may say the following: 
Hilary Putnam is a weak emergentist about intentionality and ethical norms150; Donald Davidson is 
a weak emergentist about mental phenomena and norms of rationality151; David Macarthur is a 
weak emergentist about the phenomena of psychology and sociology152; John Dupre is at least a 
weak emergentist, and possibly a strong emergentist, about the phenomena of biology153; Mario 
De Caro and Alberto Voltolini are strong emergentists about modal properties154; John McDowell 
is a strong emergentist about normativity155; Akeel Bilgrami is a strong emergentist about 
intentionality and normativity, and may attribute macro-causal power to them156; Erin Kelly is a 
strong emergentist about ethical norms157; Jennifer Hornsby seems to be a strong emergentist 
about agency (which would presumably involve a commitment to macro-causation)158; and Carol 
Rovane is a strong emergentist about, and attributor of macro-causal power to, persons and 
personal identity159.  A key commonality among the liberal naturalists, we contend, is their 
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endorsement of at least weak emergentism and often of strong emergentism about intentionality 
and normativity.  Strangely, none of the contributors explicitly address the phenomenon of 
consciousness (perhaps because it is so well covered elsewhere), but a number of philosophers 
who are prima facie locatable in the liberal naturalist tradition view consciousness as an emergent 
phenomenon.  As such we propose, in what follows, to give a brief overview of the liberal 
naturalist’s conception of intentionality, normativity, and consciousness. 
1.3.2.1. Intentionality  
Intentionality, to give a brief and simplistic definition, may be characterised as ‘aboutness’.  It is 
“the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, 
properties and states of affairs”160.  Franz Brentano, who is credited with having first articulated 
the notion, famously claimed that it was an essential characteristic of mental phenomena, and a 
characteristic essentially lacking from physical phenomena161.  From this he concluded that 
intentionality was in principle irreducible to physical phenomena, and that an autonomous 
science of intentionality – i.e. phenomenology – was therefore required to investigate it.  As 
Quine was later to point out, however, it is possible to draw a quite contrary conclusion from 
Brentano’s thesis: 
One may accept the Brentano thesis as either showing the indispensability of 
intentional idioms and the importance of an autonomous science of intention, or as 
showing the baselessness of intentional idioms and the emptiness of a science of 
intention. My attitude, unlike Brentano's, is the second.162 
For Quine, as for contemporary scientific naturalists, the notion of the irreducibility of 
intentionality is problematic.  This is because intentionality, as common-sense conceives it, looks 
to be a very unusual sort of property by the standards of modern science.  Alex Rosenberg puts 
the problem in the following way.  Intentionality, he says, requires that one clump of stuff – a 
collection of neural connections in the human brain – be about another clump of stuff – a physical 
object outside the brain – and requires that it do so all by itself and without the aid of an 
interpreter.  This, he thinks, is impossible: 
Physics has ruled out the existence of clumps of matter of the required sort.  There 
are just fermions and bosons and combinations of them.  None of that stuff is just, all 
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by itself, about any other stuff. … So, when consciousness assures us that we have 
thoughts about stuff, it has to be wrong.163 
Scientific naturalists, therefore, typically take a reductionist stance towards intentionality, either 
eliminating it outright or attempting to provide a reductive analysis of it that does not 
compromise on a physicalist ontology.  Liberal naturalists, by contrast, are typically more 
concerned to accommodate the common-sense notion of intentionality, with Akeel Bilgrami for 
instance arguing that intentional properties are strongly emergent from physical properties164.   
1.3.2.2. Normativity 
If intentionality can be simplistically characterized as ‘aboutness’ then normativity can be 
simplistically characterized as ‘oughtness’.  It is, we might say, the power of events, entities, and 
states of affairs to establish obligations.  More generally, it is anything that pertains to obligating, 
justifying, warranting, meriting, or otherwise rationally/ethically requiring.  Wilfrid Sellars 
famously characterized phenomena that involve normativity in terms of their belonging in ‘the 
logical space of reasons’165.  John McDowell, building on this notion, developed the distinction 
between the ‘space of reasons’ and the ‘space of nature’.  Objects in ‘the space of reasons’ hang 
together by essentially normative relations of rational justification or warrant.  Objects in the 
space of nature hang together by the essentially nomological relations studied by the natural 
sciences.  My reason for making coffee – that I am feeling sleepy and would like to feel more 
awake – does not cause me to make coffee in the way that gravity causes an apple to fall to the 
ground.  I am responsive to reasons, and so might be persuaded not to make coffee, but to make 
tea instead, or to go without.  In other words, my coffee-making behaviour involves a normative 
element.  By contrast, normativity plays no role in the behaviour of the apple falling to the 
ground.  Gravity is not a reason to which the apple is responsive; it is a strict law that the apple 
obeys irrespective of its capacities.  It would be absurd to offer the fact of gravity as a rational 
justification for an action, just as it would be absurd to offer a reason or intention as a strict law 
bound cause of some physical event.  “The contrast”, McDowell suggests, “is such as to suggest 
that the content of concepts that belong in the space of reasons, such as the concept of 
knowledge, cannot be captured in terms of concepts that belong in the contrasting logical space, 
the space of placement in nature”166.   
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Now, this seeming irreducibility of normativity gives rise to a dilemma much like the one 
discussed above, with reference to intentionality.  One may interpret McDowell’s thesis either as 
mandating the autonomous study of normativity, or as showing normativity to be baseless and 
empty.  Scientific naturalists, fearing that the former option may require the postulation of queer 
quasi-platonistic metaphysical entities, typically take the latter167.  Liberal naturalists, 
unencumbered by such fears, typically take the former.  Thus, McDowell himself proposes a 
“naturalized Platonism”, in which the space of reasons, although sui generis and irreducible, is 
only accessible to natural beings who have acquired the appropriate conceptual capacities and 
have been educated in their use.  The space of reasons, he says, “could not float free of 
potentialities that belong to a normal human organism”, and this, he thinks “gives human reason 
enough of a foothold in the realm of law to satisfy any proper respect for modern natural 
science”168.  McDowell suggests that reasons and values could be understood analogously to 
secondary qualities: as dispositional properties of objects/states of affairs to merit, in conjunction 
with appropriately educated cognitive capacities, certain evaluative judgements169.  This analysis, 
we contend, is easily construed in emergentist terms.   
1.3.2.3. Consciousness 
When speaking about consciousness in the context of the emergentist/reductionist debate it is 
important to distinguish between two popular senses of the term.  On the one hand there is the 
common-sense or functional notion of consciousness, according to which it is one special function 
of the brain among others; implicated, perhaps, in cognition or in wakefulness.  On the other, 
there is the philosophical notion of ‘phenomenal consciousness’; of the qualitative character or 
what-it-is-likeness of conscious experience.  This latter notion is perhaps best construed through 
Frank Jackson’s well-known ‘knowledge argument’, which goes as follows.  Imagine a super-
scientist called Mary who has spent her entire life in a completely black and white room, 
containing only black and white objects.  Mary uses completed versions of the natural sciences to 
learn absolutely everything there is to know about the physical properties of colour and colour 
experience.  Then Mary leaves the black and white room and sees a rose for the first time.  In 
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seeing the rose Mary learns something completely new: she learns what it is like to see red170.  
The knowledge argument uses colour experience as an example, but there is of course a what-it-
is-likeness for every modality of sensory experience, as well as for certain kinds of non-sensory 
experience like the experience of emotions.  These what-it-is-likenesses – the redness of red, the 
softness of soft, the burnt-toastness of the smell of burnt toast, etc. – are called qualia or 
phenomenal properties.  When we say that liberal naturalists have a non-reductive attitude 
towards consciousness, we are talking about phenomenal consciousness.  On this point they once 
again stand opposed to the majority of scientific naturalists, who argue that phenomenal 
consciousness is some kind of illusion, or, what amounts to the same thing, that it can be reduced 
to something non-phenomenal/non-experiential171.   
Galen Strawson may be said to have well expressed the liberal naturalist’s attitude on this matter 
in his 2011 APA address on ‘Real Naturalism’: 
[R]eal naturalism is directly opposed to the wildly anti-naturalistic doctrine now 
commonly known as “naturalism,” which has for the last fifty years or so treated its 
first and fundamental datum – experience – as if it were its greatest problem, and 
has tried to deal with it by questioning its existence, more or less covertly, or at least 
questioning its claim to be, in a fundamental respect, exactly as it seems, and indeed 
is.  Real naturalists know there’s no warrant for leaping over their starting data – 
experience itself – into a theory of the nature of the physical from which it follows 
that some sort of reductive or irrealist account of experience must be true.  This leap 
is not only wild metaphysics; it also has no positive warrant in physics, nor in any 
position that can legitimately claim to be naturalistic.172 
The only alternatives to a reductive approach according to Strawson are either to conceive of 
consciousness as fundamental, or to conceive of it as emergent.  In the former case we get 
panpsychism; in the latter, emergentism or property-dualism.  
Liberal naturalists then, may be said to endorse, in addition to the causal closure of nature (CCN), 
some or all of the following theses: 
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The Disunity of Science (DSCI): There is no single method or form that unites the sciences and 
demarcates them from non-sciences. 
Weak Emergentism (WE): Theories/discourse about certain entities/properties is not reducible to 
theories/discourse about their parts/properties of their parts. 
Strong Emergentism (SE): Certain entities/properties are not reducible to their parts/properties 
of their parts.





1.4. Radical Liberal Naturalism 
Liberal naturalists, we said in the last section, are committed to a non-reductive attitude towards 
intentionality, normativity, and consciousness.  They endorse, at the very least, the weak 
emergence all of these phenomena; and most endorse the strong emergence of some them.  
However, they generally stop short, we said, of attributing macro-causal power to emergent 
phenomena.  They say, for instance, that normativity is irreducible, and that there are sui generis 
reasons and values in nature, but they will not say that reasons and values have causal power 
over and above the micro-physical phenomena on which they supervene173.  This is by no means 
universally true of all liberal naturalists, but it does seem to be the norm.  Some, indeed, seem to 
be strongly against any such notion of macro-causation.  Others only imply such a notion, not 
always obviously aware that they have done so.  Even those more explicitly in favour tend to 
express their views tentatively and often obscurely.  This issue, we suggest, is something of a 
philosophical elephant in the room of liberal naturalism, introducing tacit tensions and 
ambiguities into the movement.  It will be helpful therefore – for the purposes of this project at 
any rate – to introduce a further distinction in the concept of naturalism.  We propose to call the 
form of liberal naturalism which explicitly rejects CCP, and which endorses doctrines of strong 
emergentism and macro-causation, ‘radical liberal naturalism’.  In what follows we will investigate 
these key tenets in more detail.  We will aim to show that radical liberal naturalism is a valid and 
coherent doctrine.  This will be a pivotal part of our overall argument, because ultimately, we 
wish to claim that James can be classified as a naturalist of this kind. 
1.4.1. The Question of Causal Closure 
The doctrine of the causal closure of the physical states that all causal power is confined to the 
lowest level of natural phenomena, conceived by the majority of naturalists in terms of the 
elementary particles and forces described by the science of physics.  According to a popular 
narrative the progressively unanimous acceptance of CCP among philosophers and scientists has 
occurred largely as a result of developments in the natural sciences.  Some of the earliest 
arguments concerning causal closure are framed in terms of Newtonian physics.  Thus, those who 
rejected CCP tended to postulate some non-physical force or forces – for instance a vital force – 
that acted upon particular configurations of matter.  At its inception, Newtonian physics was 
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perfectly amenable to such hypotheses, and indeed they were freely indulged in by scientists.  
However, with the quantum mechanical revolution and subsequent advances it became apparent 
that chemical phenomena and the majority of biological phenomena could be explained without 
appeal to configurational forces.  By the mid twentieth century a relative scientific consensus had 
been reached: configurational forces were simply obsolete.  The philosopher David Papineau 
thinks that this inductive argument is among the most powerful arguments for CCP: 
Over the last hundred and fifty years a great deal has come to be known about the 
workings of biological systems (including brains), and there has been no indication 
that anything other than basic physical forces is needed to account for their 
operation. In particular, the twentieth century has seen an explosion of knowledge 
about processes occurring within cells, and here too there is no evidence of anything 
other than familiar physical chemistry. The result has been that the overwhelming 
majority of scientists now reject vital and mental forces, and accept the causal 
closure of the physical realm.174 
This narrative has indeed proved forceful for many philosophers and scientists.  Others however 
are prevented from feeling its force, usually by an unshakable intuition that certain higher-level 
phenomena (typically mental phenomena) are strongly emergent and causally powerful.  In order 
to get a firmer grasp on just what CCP (or its rejection) entails, we will consider a pair of popular 
metaphysical arguments for the doctrine – the ‘downward causation argument’ and the ‘causal 
exclusion argument’, – first formulated by the philosopher Jaegwon Kim. 
1.4.1.1. The Downward Causation Argument 
The downward causation argument is supposed to show that macro-causation – i.e. any causal 
process not occurring at the very bottom level – can only be realized through ‘downward 
causation’.  In other words, it is supposed to show that causal chains originating above the 
bottom level must go through the bottom level in order to produce their effects; i.e. that there 
are no causal chains going directly from one higher-level entity/property to another.  The causal 
exclusion argument, in turn, is supposed to show that any putative instance of downward 
causation is circumvented by bottom-level processes.  Let us first consider the downward 
causation argument. 
Kim begins the argument by defining a doctrine of ‘mereological supervenience’, which he 
assumes will be accepted by most emergentists: 
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[Mereological Supervenience] Systems with an identical total microstructural 
property have all other properties in common.  Equivalently, all properties of a 
physical system supervene on, or are determined by, its total microstructural 
property.175 
Kim stipulates that the relation of supervenience/emergence is not causal, but that a 
supervenience/emergence base is ‘nomologically sufficient’ to instantiate an emergent 
entity/property.  There are, he says, three ways that emergents might manifest macro-causal 
powers: i) same-level causation, ii) downward causation, and iii) upward causation.  The first part 
of the downward causation argument involves showing that upward causation entails same-level 
causation (we have provided original diagrams below to illustrate Kim’s argument): 
Suppose that a property M, at a certain level L, causes another property M+, at level 
L + 1.  Assume that M+ emerges, or results, from a property M* at level L (M* 
therefore is on the same level as M).  Now we immediately see a tension in this 
situation when we ask: “What is responsible for this occurrence of M+?  What 
explains M+’s instantiation on this occasion?”  For in this picture there initially are 
two competing answers: First, M+ is there because, ex hypothesi, M caused it; 
second, M+ is there because its emergence base M* has been realized.  Given its 
emergence base M*, M+ must of necessity be instantiated, no matter what 
conditions preceded it [mereological supervenience] … This apparently puts M’s 
claim to have caused M+ in jeopardy.  I believe the only coherent description of the 
situation that respects M’s causal claim is this: M causes M+ by causing its base 
condition M*.  But M’s causation of M* is an instance of same-level causation.  This 






In other words: according to mereological supervenience, the existence of a supervenience base 
(M*) necessitates the instantiation of a supervenient property (M+).  But if M+ is already 
necessarily instantiated by the mere existence of M*, then the putative upward causal action of 
M upon M+ is redundant (fig. 1).  Rather than speaking of M causing M+ through some upward 
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causal activity, we should say that M causes M+ by causing M*, which necessarily instantiates M+ 
(fig. 2).   
The second part of the downward causation argument involves showing that same-level causation 
entails downward causation: 
Suppose M causes M* where both are at level L.  But M* itself arises out of a set of 
properties M- at level L – 1.  When we ponder the question how M* gets to be 
instantiated on this occasion, again we come to the conclusion that M caused M* to 
be instantiated on this occasion by causing M-, its base condition, to be instantiated.  








Here the reasoning is precisely the same as in the previous case.  The putative same-level causal 
action of M upon M* is made redundant by the fact that M* is already necessarily instantiated by 
the existence of M- (fig. 3).  The only sensible way to tell this causal story is to say that M causes 
M* by causing M-, which necessarily instantiates M* (fig. 4).  The foregoing leads Kim to 
formulate what he calls ‘the principle of downward causation’: “To cause any property (except 
those at the very bottom level) to be instantiated, you must cause the basal conditions from 
which it arises (either as an emergent or as a resultant).”178 
1.4.1.2. The Causal Exclusion Argument 
The downward causation argument, as we have said, paves the way for the ‘causal exclusion 
argument’.  In the following discussion Kim somewhat unhelpfully switches the symbols he is 
using, making P the supervenience base of M and P* the supervenience base of M*.  Our 
diagrams below will hopefully clear up any confusion.  “The critical question”, Kim says, “that 
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motivates the argument is this: if an emergent, M, emerges from basal condition P, why can’t P 
displace M as a cause of any putative effect of M?”: 
For if causation is understood as nomological (law based) sufficiency, P, as M’s 
emergence base, is nomologically sufficient for it, and M, as P*’s cause, is 
nomologically sufficient for P*.  Hence, P is nomologically sufficient for P* and hence 
qualifies as its cause. … Moreover it is not possible to understand the situation as 
involving a causal chain from P to P* with M as an intermediate causal link.  The 
reason is that the emergence relation from P to M cannot be viewed as causal.  This 
appears to make the emergent property M otiose and dispensable as a cause of P*; it 
seems that we can explain the occurrence of P* simply in terms of P, without 










In other words, if P is nomologically sufficient for M, and M is the putative cause of P*, then P is 
nomologically sufficient for P*.  But if this is so, then why not simply cut out the middle man, and 
suppose that P is the direct cause of P* (fig. 7)?  Why invoke the downward causal action of M 
upon P* (figs. 5 & 6) when the whole story can be told at the level of the Ps? 
1.4.1.3. Response 
The causal exclusion argument seems at first glance like a strong one, and is touted by numerous 
contemporary philosophers as decisive on this matter.  However, close examination of the 
argument reveals that erroneous reasoning and/or logical sleight of hand is at work in it.  Consider 
the following.  Kim, at the outset, stipulates that the emergence relation is not a causal one, but 
that it does imply ‘nomological sufficiency’.  This allows him to deny the possibility of a causal 
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chain going from P through M to P*.  There can be no such causal chain because “the emergence 
relation from P to M cannot be viewed as causal”.  However, he asks us, at the same time, to 
understand causation in terms of nomological sufficiency, and tells us that P, being nomologically 
sufficient for M, and transitively, for P*, qualifies as the cause of P*.  Now, Kim cannot be saying 
that nomological sufficiency entails causal sufficiency, because then the original stipulation about 
the emergence relation being non-causal is either meaningless or hopelessly ad hoc.  Rather, he 
appears to be saying that, given nomological sufficiency, causal sufficiency comes for free; and 
that, in the interests of being economical, we ought to assume it in this case.  But then the 
argument does not show that downward causation is impossible or incoherent, as Kim seems to 
think it does; it only shows that it is unnecessary.  It is only likely to be convincing, therefore, to 
someone who already endorses CCP for independent reasons180.   
We may summarise as follows.  If nomological sufficiency entails causal sufficiency, then we ought 
to suppose that the emergence relation is (at least partially) a causal relation, in which case we 
may suppose that downward causation involves a causal chain from P through M to P* (fig. 8).  If 
nomological sufficiency does not entail causal sufficiency, then we are free to suppose that M 
exerts a downward causal influence upon P* (fig. 9).  These two possibilities are illustrated in the 






The causal exclusion argument clearly fails to demonstrate that macro-causation is impossible or 
incoherent.  The question remains, however, as to what, precisely, the modus operandi of macro-
causation might be, and of whether there is any empirical evidence for it.  This is the issue to 
which we turn in the next section. 
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1.4.2. Approaches to Macro-Causation 
We begin the present section by attempting to clear up one or two confusions surrounding the 
notion of downward causation.  Proponents of the doctrine do not all agree as to what it entails, 
and as to which natural processes potentially qualify as instances of it.  The likes of Roger Sperry, 
George Ellis, and Helen Steward for example, seem to think that something like the way the shape 
of a ball influences the movements of its constituent molecules should count as an instance of 
downward causation181.  To others, this is evidently a case in which putative macro-causal power 
reduces to the micro-level.  An excellent paper by Brian Davies sheds valuable light on this matter.  
To begin with, he says, the ball example is most certainly a dead end: 
Sometimes physicists use the language of whole-part causation for ease of 
description.  For example, a ball rolling down a hill implies that each of the ball’s 
atoms is accelerated according to the state of the ball as a whole.  But it would be an 
abuse of language to say that the rotating ball caused a specific atom to move the 
way it did; after all, the ball is the sum of its atoms.  What makes the concept ‘ball’ 
relevant in this case is the existence of (non-local) constraints that lock the many 
degrees of freedom together, so that the atoms of the ball move as a coherent whole 
and not independently.  But the forces that implement these constraints are 
themselves local fields, so in this case whole-part causation is effectively trivial in 
nature.182 
Any putative instance of downward causation involving non-local principles/constraints is going to 
be trivial so long as it is granted that those non-local principles/constraints are realized by familiar 
physical forces.  What is required, according to Davies, for the notion of macro-causation to get 
off the ground, is either the introduction of “explicit top-down physical forces” or a 
transformation of “the fundamental categories of causation”183.  This of course means that any 
non-trivial doctrine of macro-causation is going to require a relatively radical departure from the 
current scientific consensus (hence, our decision to call any form of naturalism which endorses 
such a doctrine ‘radical liberal naturalism’).  We have no intention of obscuring the view we are 
discussing with false claims of scientific acceptability.  That being said, to say something is not 
currently accepted by scientists is not at all the same as saying that it is physically impossible.  In 
what follows we will consider two approaches to macro-causation that are, we contend, 
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meaningful, coherent, and possibly true.  We begin, in the next section, with the British 
Emergentist approach. 
1.4.2.1. The British Emergentist Approach 
Emergentism, as we noted in the previous section, is generally thought to have originated with 
John Stuart Mill’s A System of Logic.  It was here that Mill set forth his principle of the 
‘composition of causes’, and his notions of homopathic and heteropathic effects/laws.  Briefly, the 
principle of the composition of causes is said to hold in cases where “the joint effect of several 
causes is identical with the sum of their separate effects”, and not to hold in cases where the joint 
effect of several causes is not identical with (i.e. is more than) the sum of their separate effects184.  
Mill calls effects which conform to the principle (i.e. effects that are identical with the sum of their 
causes) ‘homopathic effects’, and effects which fail to conform to the principle (i.e. effects that 
are more than the sum of their causes) ‘heteropathic effects’.  Accordingly, ‘homopathic laws’ are 
laws describing the relation of causes to homopathic effects and ‘heteropathic laws’ and laws 
describing the relation of causes to heteropathic effects.  Mill thinks that the phenomena/laws of 
chemistry, biology, and psychology are heteropathic in this sense; in other words, that they are 
emergent.  He thinks, moreover, that the ‘action’ of the various kinds of heteropathic phenomena 
must be understood as being governed by distinct forces; i.e. chemical forces, biological forces, 
psychological forces, etc.  These forces are not intended to involve anything spooky; they are 
conceived, like other forces in physics, wholly in terms of their effects on the motion of matter.  
They are best understood as applying to particular “collocations” of ‘agents’ or ‘powers’185; i.e. to 
particular configurations of matter.  This makes them instances of what Brian McLaughlin, in an 
excellent essay on the subject, calls ‘configurational forces’; forces which endow certain 
configurations of matter with macro-causal power186.   
The above constitutes a very brief summary of the core emergentist position.  Subsequent 
developments, though important, were not particularly substantive.  After Mill, G. H. Lewes 
actually coined the term ‘emergent’187; Samuel Alexander first spoke of emergent ‘qualities’ (i.e. 
properties)188; Lloyd Morgan applied the concept to the evolution of the cosmos189; and Broad 
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gave the doctrine its first systematic formulation in The Mind and its Place in Nature190.  The work 
of this series of thinkers, from Mill to Broad, constitutes the tradition of British Emergentism.  As 
we mentioned in the previous section, McLaughlin names both Roy Wood Sellars and William 
James as American counterparts to the British Emergentists.  He provides the following helpful 
summary of the core doctrines of the tradition: i) “that everything is made of matter”, ii) “that 
matter is grainy … that it bottoms out into elementary particles”, iii) that “nothing happens, no 
change occurs, without some motion of elementary particles”, iv) that “all motion is to the beat of 
the laws of mechanics”, v) that “there is a hierarchy of levels of organizational complexity of 
material particles that includes, in ascending order, the strictly physical, the chemical, the 
biological, and the psychological level”, vi) that “[t]here are certain kinds of material substances 
specific to each level” which are “wholly composed of kinds of lower-levels, ultimately of kinds of 
elementary material particles”, and vii) that “there are certain properties [i.e. emergent 
properties] specific to the kinds of substances of a given level”191.  He also shows that the British 
Emergentists were committed to the doctrine that emergent properties possess macro causal 
power, but for some reason omits this from the above list.   
We may reconstruct British Emergentism’s account of macro-causation as follows.  There are, 
besides the fundamental forces already accepted in physics, a number of additional fundamental 
forces.  Unlike the currently accepted fundamental forces, whose foci are elementary particles, 
the foci of these additional forces are configurations of elementary particles; e.g. molecules, cells, 
complexes of neurons, etc.  These configurations, as foci for these new forces, make possible 
novel motions/interactions of elementary particles.  These novel motions/interactions, and the 
novel higher-level behaviours that result, are governed by novel laws not reducible to the existing 
laws of physics.  At no point in this story do higher-level entities produce effects by means of 
mysterious non-physical impulses; all their effects are realised through the motions of elementary 
particles.  Neither, strictly speaking, are higher-level entities capable of same-level causal 
interactions; the flow of causal power always goes via elementary particles, as per Kim’s principle 
of downward causation.  The following diagram illustrates this account: 
 
 
                                                             
190 Charlie Dunbar Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 
1925) 
191 McLaughlin, ‘The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism’, in Emergence: Contemporary Readings in 
Philosophy and Science, ed. by Bedau & Humphreys, pp19-20 

















The above account obviously raises questions about the combability of emergentism with physics, 
in which regard McLaughlin offers the following analysis.   Firstly, he says, physics allows for force 
generating properties that are possessed by certain kinds of matter and not others (e.g. electrons 
do not exert the strong nuclear force); the case of force generating properties possessed by 
certain configurations of matter is not radically different192.  Moreover, since forces combine by 
vector addition, physics can, in theory, accommodate additional fundamental forces without 
implying any violation or interruption of existing forces193.  Secondly, there is no reason to 
suppose that configurational forces should not conform to the laws of motion, including the 
conservation of momentum.  Neither is there any reason to suppose that they should violate 
other conservation principles; i.e. of mass, energy, or (with the advent of Relativity theory) mass-
energy194.  Finally, quantum mechanics presents no special difficulties for emergentism; the 
Schrodinger equation says nothing about what kinds of forces there are, and although the 
Hamiltonian operator is concerned with energy rather than force, the emergentists could just as 
well speak of kinds of energy specific to certain configurations of matter as kinds of forces/force 
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generating properties195.  McLaughlin concludes therefore that the doctrines of British 
Emergentism are not in conflict with physics in any formal/mathematical sense.   
However, although not in formal conflict with physics, McLaughlin does think that British 
Emergentism came, at a certain point, to be in empirical conflict with physics.  The conflict in 
question, he says, had to do with certain discoveries in quantum mechanics.  In June 1922, just 
months before Broad’s publication of Mind and its Place in Nature, Niels Bohr gave the series of 
lectures at Gottingen in which he outlined the application of his solar system model of the atom 
to the phenomena of chemistry196.  The periodicity of the periodic table, and various chemical 
properties of the elements, were to be explained in terms of the electrons in the outermost orbits 
of atoms.  The first decisive step had thereby been taken towards the reduction of chemistry and 
chemical bonding (taken by emergentists to be the paradigmatic instance of a heteropathic 
effect) to physics.  Within a decade the quantum mechanical revolution had reached a crescendo, 
and its influence had spread into biology.  It was not long before the hypothesis of configurational 
forces, and with it the whole tradition of British Emergentism, was abandoned by most 
philosophers and scientists.  Jaegwon Kim notes that the fall of emergentism coincided exactly 
with the rise of positivism and reductionism, as championed by such thinkers as Carl Hempel and 
Ernest Nagel197.  We note also that it coincided with the fall of Roy Wood Sellars’s evolutionary 
naturalism, and with the rise of the ‘new naturalism’, as exemplified in Krikorian’s anthology. 
For some decades following the quantum mechanical revolution emergentism lay dormant.  
Mclaughlin suggests that Broad’s magnum opus was the last major work to be published in the 
emergentist tradition until Sperry began writing on the topic in the 1950s.  When the re-
emergence of emergence began, it was likewise catalysed by developments in science and 
philosophy.  Firstly, philosophers and scientists began to note serious limitations to the 
reductionist project.  Theory reductions of the kind advocated by Nagel became rare, and could 
not be produced in cases where they were expected198.  By the end of the 20th century, even most 
hard-line scientific naturalists had abandoned strong versions of PER199.  Secondly, the scientific 
study of complex and chaotic systems (for which epistemological reduction was out of the 
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question and ontological reduction was, for some at least, in doubt), became an increasingly 
active area of research200.  And thirdly, recognition among philosophers of the special difficulties 
of reduction in the case of certain mental phenomena (especially phenomenal consciousness) 
became commonplace201.  This has led to the situation of the present day, in which, as Jaegwon 
Kim puts it, “we now see an increasing, and unapologetic, use of expressions like “emergent 
property,” “emergent phenomenon,” and “emergent law,” substantially in the sense intended by 
the classic emergentists, not only in philosophical writings but in primary scientific literature as 
well.”202  This re-emergence of emergence, we would like to point out, coincides, more or less, 
with the development of liberal forms of naturalism.  If what we have been saying about the 
relationship between these doctrines is correct, this is not surprising.  In the next section we shall 
consider ‘the quantum approach’ to macro-causation.  To be clear, we take this approach too, to 
be consistent with a broadly emergentist model of macro-causation, as represented in figs. 8 and 
9 above (section 1.4.1.3). 
1.4.2.2. The Quantum Approach 
Quantum physics is a branch of the science of physics and a body of physical theories that 
attempt to describe physical phenomena at the smallest scales.  It originated with a series of 
experiments at the turn of the twentieth century and was given roughly its present formalisation 
by a group of physicists including Erwin Schrödinger and Werner Heisenberg in the mid-1920s.  
We often hear it said that the development of quantum physics heralded a revolution in our 
understanding of the physical world.  This is due mainly to the fact that the experiments and 
theories of quantum physics reveal and describe fundamentally new (from the point of view of 
classical physics) types of behaviour and interaction among physical phenomena at small scales.  
To describe all of these phenomena accurately and in detail would certainly go beyond the scope 
of this thesis.  As such we will attempt, as far as possible, to refrain from using too much technical 
terminology, and to describe the relevant concepts in natural language.  The first key thing that 
we need to understand is that the science of quantum physics is supposed to confirm the reality 
of ontological indeterminism.  There are events, according to quantum mechanics, that have a 
variety of possible outcomes.  Quantum approaches to macro-causation claim that higher-
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level/emergent/mental phenomena realize their causal power by operating on this space of 
possibilities.  In what follows we will examine one of the more popular proposals regarding how 
this is supposed to occur in the realm of mental phenomena; that of the physicist Henry Stapp203.  
But first, we must give a brief summary of the concept of quantum indeterminism. 
The concept of chance or random events is by no means a new one.  Lucretius famously proposed 
that atoms in the void were subject to what he called the ‘clinamen’, a random swerve that would 
cause them to deviate from their linear trajectories and collide with one another in various 
ways204.  Of course, a great many ordinary people have believed in chance and chaos for 
millennia, but the idea has usually been regarded with suspicion among philosophical and 
scientific types.  The majority of western philosophers have, for one reason or another, been 
determinists.  According to a stereotypical but plausible narrative this has to do with their 
generally possessing a certain intellectual temperament that predisposes them to find 
randomness and chance fundamentally irrational205.  It is possible that many scientists share this 
temperament, but scientists also have independent reasons for rejecting the existence of chance 
events.  It is clearly a sound methodological principle when investigating natural phenomena to 
assume that any given event has a cause.  If scientists threw up their hands in dismay and cried 
‘randomness!’ every time the cause of some natural event failed to reveal itself, then the 
scientific enterprise would not have advanced very far.  Instead scientists sensibly assume that 
every natural event has a definite cause in some other natural event and proceed to propose 
hypotheses and devise experiments that will allow them to discover those causes.  The existence 
of random events has thus been denied, on methodological grounds, by the majority of scientists 
since Newton.  But as Heisenberg explains, the quantum mechanical revolution brought an end to 
this status quo: 
Let us consider a radium atom, which can emit an alpha particle.  The time for the 
emission of the alpha particle cannot be predicted.  We can only say that in the 
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average the emission will take place in about two thousand years.  Therefore, when 
we observe the emission we do not actually look for a foregoing event from which 
the emission must according to a law follow. … we know that a foregoing event as 
cause for the emission at a given time cannot be found.206 
That events like these are ontically indeterministic, and cannot be construed as merely 
unpredictable as a result of human ignorance, is now the overwhelming consensus among 
physicists207.  This consensus is accepted by the majority of contemporary philosophers calling 
themselves naturalists.  We will therefore assume for the sake of argument that this consensus is 
correct. 
Quantum physics then, says that nature contains events for which there is not a sufficient physical 
cause.  This however is not to say that those events are completely random; rather, it is to say 
that they are inherently probabilistic.  When the emission of an alpha particle by a radium atom 
will occur is not a complete mystery; we know that it will occur, on average, in about two 
thousand years.  Indeed, quantum theory provides incredibly accurate predictions about the 
probabilities with which these events will occur.  Such events are described by a ‘wavefunction’ 
which assigns certain probability amplitudes to possible outcomes of the events.  Prior to any 
definite outcome, the system is conceived of as being in a state of potential.  Potential in this 
context is to be understood, according to Heisenberg, as a distinct ontological category; “a 
strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality”; “a quantitative 
version of the old concept of ‘potentia’ in Aristotelean philosophy”208.  One of the peculiar 
features of the inherently probabilistic events described by quantum theory is that their 
behaviour changes in unexpected ways in response to measurement or observation209.  
Measurement is said to cause the wavefunction to ‘collapse’, causing just one of the many 
possible outcomes of the event to become actual.  It is the outcome of such collapses that is held 
to be indeterminate in the most popular interpretations of quantum theory.  Thus, quantum 
approaches to macro-causation generally appeal to the collapses of wavefunctions as the loci for 
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macro-causal influences.  Before we consider such approaches in detail, we must address one last 
relevant concept: the phenomenon of ‘quantum decoherence’.  
As we move from the microscopic to the macroscopic scale, quantum events/entities become 
subject to a phenomenon known as decoherence.  Decoherence refers to the apparent 
disappearance of indeterminacy and other typical characteristics of quantum phenomena at 
macroscopic scales.  It is because of decoherence that our predictions of macroscopic phenomena 
like the orbits of comets are not upset by quantum indeterminacy.  In order, therefore, for macro-
causation to utilize wavefunction collapse as a mechanism for producing its influence, quantum 
decoherence will somehow have to be circumvented.  There will have to be some mechanism for 
amplifying the effects of indeterminate events up to the macroscopic scale.  Such mechanisms are 
known to exist.  Consider the following examples provided by George Ellis, of the mammalian eye 
and biological evolution respectively: 
In some species the eye can detect individual photons falling on the retina. The 
photon is absorbed by a molecule of rhodopsin, eventually resulting in a nervous 
impulse coming out of the opposite end of the cell with an energy at least a million 
times that contained in the original photon.210 
The trajectories of photons are subject to quantum indeterminacy.  Thus, a photon headed 
towards the retina of a mammalian eye will be in a state of superposition described by a 
wavefunction, with certain probability amplitudes assigned to each of a number of possible 
landing sites on the retina.  The collapse of the photon’s wavefunction will result in its landing at 
one of these sites rather than the others.  If therefore a macro-causal process was able to 
influence which possibility was actualized, the effect of that macro-causal influence could then be 
amplified up to the macroscopic level – to the visual experience of the mammal in question – via 
the mechanism Ellis describes.   
A second example has been presented by Ian Percival, who states that “DNA 
responds to quantum events, as when mutations are produced by single photons, 
with consequences that may be macroscopic—leukemia for example.” In this case 
the amplifier is the developmental process by which the information in DNA is read 
out in the course of the organism’s developmental history. [ … ] Indeed, mutations 
caused by cosmic rays may well have played a significant role in evolutionary 
history.211 
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Both of these cases involve a number of common factors: i) an environment in which quantum 
phenomena are able to occur in relative isolation without being subject to decoherence, ii) a 
mesoscopic trigger sensitive enough to be affected by the relevant phenomena, and iii) a 
mechanism whereby said triggering can lead to macroscopic effects.  With this in mind, we move 
on to consider Henry Stapp’s proposal. 
What Stapp proposes is that such amplification mechanisms may exist in the human brain, and 
that they may be the realizers of the macro-causal power of human consciousness.  He supposes 
that a variety of the relevant sort of mechanisms may exist in the brain, but for mainly 
methodological reasons singles out mechanisms governing the release of neurotransmitters in 
nerve terminals as a likely candidate: 
Nerve terminals are essential connecting links between nerve cells. The general way 
they work is reasonably well understood. When an action potential travelling along a 
nerve fibre reaches a nerve terminal, a host of ion channels open. Calcium ions enter 
through these channels into the interior of the terminal. These ions migrate from the 
channel exits to release sites on vesicles containing neurotransmitter molecules. A 
triggering effect of the calcium ions causes these contents to be dumped into the 
synaptic cleft that separates this terminal from a neighbouring neuron, and these 
neurotransmitter molecules influence the tendencies of that neighbouring neuron. 
At their narrowest points, calcium ion channels are less than a nanometre in 
diameter ... This extreme smallness of the opening in the calcium ion channels has 
profound quantum mechanical implications. The narrowness of the channel restricts 
the lateral spatial dimension. Consequently, the lateral velocity is forced by the 
quantum uncertainty principle to become large. This causes the quantum cloud of 
possibilities associated with the calcium ion to fan out over an increasing area as it 
moves away from the tiny channel to the target region where the ion will be 
absorbed as a whole, or not absorbed at all, on some small triggering site.  This 
spreading of this ion wave packet means that the ion may or may not be absorbed on 
the small triggering site. Accordingly, the contents of the vesicle may or may not be 
released.212 
In other words, calcium ions, upon exiting ion channels, are in a state of superposition, with 
probability amplitudes assigned to different possible trajectories (and so different landing-sites on 
vesicles).  It is at this point, Stapp thinks, that the action of consciousness causally influences the 
collapse of the calcium ion’s wavefunction, determining whether or not the calcium ion hits or 
misses certain triggering sites, and so whether or not certain neurotransmitters are released.  This 
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in turn may have a relatively large effect on an individual’s behaviour.  The following diagram 







We note that the above diagram is highly simplified.  It implies that individual conscious acts are 
correlated with individual neurophysiological events.  The real situation, if this proposal turned 
out to be true, might be much more complex.  It might be, for example, that conscious acts are 
emergent from groups of neurophysiological events.  The basic causal story of the quantum 
approach is, in any case, essentially consistent with the broad emergentist framework.  Certain 
lower-level events are caused partially by other lower-level events and partially by higher-level 
events.  Provided we have no prior commitment to CCP, there is nothing incoherent or illogical 
about this story.  The key differences between this and the British Emergentist approach are i) 
that Stapp does not invoke any configurational or other fundamental forces in accounting for 
macro-causal activity, and ii) that Stapp’s model has a much narrower sphere of application; 
applying only to systems in which the relevant sort of quantum-event-involving processes occur, 
and in which their effects can be amplified by appropriate mechanisms.  That being said, there is 
no reason to think that the two approaches are mutually exclusive.  One could, on the quantum 
approach, invoke emergent laws which govern the exercise of quantum-process-involving macro-
causal power. 
The important point is that radical liberal naturalists, in addition to at least the causal closure of 
nature (CCN) and strong emergentism (SE), endorse the thesis of macro-causation: 
Macro-Causation (MC): Certain strongly emergent entities/properties possess causal power over 


















1.5. Religious Naturalism 
In his recent book Where the Conflict Really Lies, Alvin Plantinga gives expression to a widely held 
view when he says the following: 
Now central to the great monotheistic religions – Christianity, Judaism, Islam – is the 
thought that there is such a person as God: a personal agent who has created the 
world and is all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good.  I take naturalism to be 
the thought that there is no such person as God, or anything like God.  Naturalism is 
stronger than atheism: you can be an atheist without rising to the full heights (sinking 
to the lowest depths?) of naturalism; but you can’t be a naturalist without being an 
atheist.213 
Naturalism, according to Plantinga, is stronger than atheism.  He thinks that you cannot be a 
naturalist without also being an atheist.  This, he says, is because naturalists are committed to 
CCN, and therefore to the rejection of a supernatural being.  He therefore implies that any God 
worthy of the name must necessarily be supernatural.  This is a view that the present thesis seeks 
to challenge.  As we have noted, William James once thought to classify his view as ‘theistic 
naturalism’ (a classification which we intend to resurrect in chapter 3).  He believed in a finite 
God, existing within the natural world, and yet endowed with personality, and possessed of 
abundant power and goodness.  In what follows we will attempt to challenge the perception, well 
expressed by Plantinga, that naturalism is necessarily in conflict with religion.  In doing so we will 
draw upon the tradition of religious naturalism, the very existence of which is a testament to the 
superficiality of this conflict. 
1.5.1. The Varieties of Naturalism 
In an article entitled ‘Varieties of Naturalism’ written for the Oxford Handbook of Religion and 
Science, Owen Flanagan suggests that the “common core” of naturalism is the rejection of 
supernaturalism214.  However, he goes on to say that it is only one particular form of 
supernaturalism that is really problematic: 
Let me be clear about a matter of considerable importance: the objectionable form 
of ‘supernaturalism’ is one according to which (i) there exists a ‘supernatural being or 
beings’ or ‘power(s)’ outside the natural world; (ii) this ‘being’ or ‘power’ has causal 
commerce with the world; (iii) the grounds for belief in both the ‘supernatural being’ 
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and its causal commerce cannot be seen, discovered, or inferred by way of any 
known and reliable epistemic method.215 
It is perfectly possible, Flanagan thinks, to embrace a form of spirituality whilst rejecting the 
conjunction of (i) – (iii): 
I myself am religious: a Celtic-Catholic-Buddhist.  And I see my ethical commitments 
as supported and enhanced by deep transcendental cognitive convictions and 
emotions that powerfully ground a conviction that I am part of a whole, inextricably 
connected to everything else that there is.  But I reject (i) – (iii).216 
Religious individuals who reject the conjunction of (i) – (iii), like Flanagan, may legitimately call 
themselves ‘religious naturalists’.  We can say that religious naturalists, in addition to endorsing 
(at least) CCN, endorse an existential thesis: 
Existential Thesis of Religious Naturalism (ETRN): Nature, or something within nature, merits a 
religious response217. 
Religious naturalism, like its secular counterpart, includes a wide spectrum of positions, from the 
more austere to the more expansive.  Flanagan himself, in addition to being a religious naturalist, 
is also a scientific naturalist, endorsing CCP, POR, SCI, and MTN.  He is certainly on the austere end 
of the spectrum of religious naturalism.  He is joined there by thinkers like Ursula Goodenough218, 
Willem Drees219, and Jerome Stone220.  Towards the middle of the spectrum we find thinkers like 
Loyal Rue221 and Donald Crosby222 (possibly Andrei Buckareff is in this category too223).  And at the 
liberal end we find the likes of Arthur Peacocke224, Philip Clayton225, and David Ray Griffin226.  In 
recent years they have been joined by a growing contingent of analytic philosophers, with Mark 
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Johnston227, Thomas Nagel228, Peter Forrest229, and Sam Coleman230 (to name a few), defending 
relatively liberal doctrines of religious naturalism.  The following tabulated schema illustrates the 
possible varieties of naturalism and religious naturalism231: 
 
In each case the religious naturalisms differ from their non-religious counterparts only in 
endorsing the existential thesis of religious naturalism.  There does not seem to be anything 
logically problematic about this thesis.  We take it therefore that if the non-religious naturalisms 
are legitimate philosophical positions, then the religious naturalisms are likewise legitimate.  In 
the case of positions like those advocated by Owen Flanagan and Loyal Rue this claim is not likely 
to be controversial.  In the case of positions like those advocated by Arthur Peacocke and Philip 
Clayton on the other hand, many non-religious naturalists will have serious doubts.  In what 
follows we will investigate some doctrines of radical religious naturalism in more detail, and 
attempt to dispel lingering doubts as to their naturalistic credentials. 
1.5.2. Radical Religious Naturalism  
Within the category of radical religious naturalism, there are, as there are within every category 
of naturalism we have delineated, a large spectrum of possible positions.  These positions, we 
may say, can be arranged from weak to strong along any number of possible axes.  One such axis 
that is relevant to the present discussion is that of personality; i.e. the extent to which personality 
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Fig. 13 Varieties of Naturalism  
 Scientific Naturalism Scientific Religious Naturalism 
Theses CCN, CCP, SCI, MTN, PER, POR, HSR CCN, CCP, SCI, MTN, PER, POR, HSR, ETRN 
Exponents Sellars and Quine Flanagan and Goodenough 
 Liberal Naturalism  Liberal Religious Naturalism 
Theses CCN, CCP, DSCI, WE/SE CCN, CCP, DSCI, WE/SE, ETRN 
Exponents John McDowell Loyal Rue 
 Radical Liberal Naturalism  Radical Religious Naturalism 
Theses CCN, DSCI, WE, SE, MC CCN, DSCI, WE, SE, MC, ETRN 
Exponents Roy Wood Sellars Arthur Peacocke 





is attributed to a religious object/objects.  On the weak end of the spectrum we find positions 
which invoke a mere property of holiness, sacredness, deity, etc. as the object of religious 
devotion.  Thus, the British Emergentist Samuel Alexander proposed that deity is an emergent 
property from certain configurations of mental entities.  We may call such positions ‘impersonal 
religious naturalisms’.  On the strong end of the spectrum we find positions which invoke a God or 
Gods, construed in personal terms, as the object of religious devotion.  Thus, one may endorse 
pantheism or panentheism, and say that God is identical with or emergent from the universe as a 
whole; or one may endorse a finite theism, for which God is identical with or emergent from some 
portion of the universe.  Such positions may be called ‘theistic religious naturalisms’.  Another 
relevant axis is that of the degree of temporality attributed to the divine being/property.  Thus, on 
the weak end of the spectrum we have positions which hold that deity or God emerges from the 
universe only gradually, in step with cosmic evolution.  In extreme cases it may be held that deity 
or God is not yet even close to fully emerging; that the future emergent God stands to the present 
universe as a present human being stands to the primordial slime four billion years ago.  We may 
call such positions ‘temporal religious naturalisms’.  At the strong end of the spectrum we find 
positions which hold that God or deity emerges instantaneously – already complete – at the 
beginning of the universe; or even that God precedes the universe in time and/or ontological 
priority.  We may call such positions ‘atemporal religious naturalisms’232.  Now, the doctrines we 
wish to consider in the present section occupy the strong end of the spectrum on the axes of both 
personality and temporality.  In other words, they are atemporal theistic religious naturalisms.  In 
addition, being radical religious naturalisms, they attribute macro-causal power to their religious 
objects.  Such doctrines are undoubtedly the most controversial from the point of view of the 
broader naturalistic tradition.  If therefore we can establish the naturalistic credentials of such 
doctrines, we will thereby have established the general validity of the category of radical religious 
naturalism.  Let us therefore consider the doctrines of radical religious naturalism presented by 
Arthur Peacocke and Philip Clayton, both of whom explicitly invoke doctrines of emergentism and 
macro-causation in formulating their positions. 
To begin with let us note that there are differences in the ways that Peacocke and Clayton present 
their positions.  For the most part these differences revolve around the way in which they 
conceive of divine action.  For Peacocke, divine action occurs exclusively through what he calls 
‘whole-part influence’ or ‘top-down causation’.  He cites self-organizing systems (e.g. sand dunes 
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and flocks of birds) and dissipative systems (e.g. storm systems and organisms) as examples of 
phenomena that exhibit this kind of causation, as in the following passage: 
In these examples [self-organizing/dissipative systems], the ordinary physico-
chemical descriptions of the interactions at the micro-level simply cannot account for 
the observed phenomena.  It is clear that what the parts … are doing and why the 
patterns they form are what they are [is] because of their incorporation into the 
system-as-a-whole – in fact these are patterns within the systems in question. … The 
parts would not be behaving as observed if they were not parts of that particular 
system (the ‘whole’).  The state of the system-as-a-whole is influencing (i.e. acting 
like a ‘cause’ on) what the parts, the constituents, actually do.233 
Construed in this way, whole-part influence sounds suspiciously like what we saw Brian Davies, in 
section 1.4, dismissing as a trivial effect of ‘non-local constraints’ on a system.  Non-local 
constraints, he explained, restrict the degrees of freedom of the constituents of a system; as the 
shape of a ball restricts the motion of its constituent particles.  But such constraints, he insisted, 
are wholly realized or implemented by familiar physical forces acting on elementary particles.  If 
this reading of Peacocke’s proposal is correct, then his doctrine of divine action looks defunct 
from a scientific perspective.  What he requires, on Davies’ analysis, are emergent configurational 
forces; in other words, something like the British Emergentist approach.  This approach, we 
contend, fits Peacocke’s view perfectly well, for he views nature as organized into a hierarchy of 
natural levels – physico-chemical, biological, mental, etc. – each with its relative reality and 
sphere of macro-causal influence.  Seeing as he explicitly rejects the quantum approach to macro-
causation, something like this would appear to be his best option.  In any case, his account of 
macro-causation fits into the broad emergentist framework we described in section 1.4.  The 






The vertical lines in the figure represent the mereological relation between the state 
of the whole system H and the entities of which it is constituted at the lower level L 
at particular times (1, 2, 3 …).  The diagonal arrow implies that the holistic state H2 
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(which is composed of constituents L2) is determined by (‘caused by’), and is a 
consequence of, the holistic state H1 jointly with L1.234 
Clayton, in contrast to Peacocke, does not reject the quantum approach.  He thinks that it serves 
as a valuable supplement to something like Peacocke’s account235.  God, on his view, is able to 
influence the collapse of the wavefunctions of any and all quantum events in the universe, 
determining which possible outcomes of the events are actualised.  As we noted in section 1.4, 
quantum approaches to macro-causation require some mechanism for amplifying the effects of 
quantum events.  Clayton suggests that quantum divine action takes place largely through the loci 
of biological evolution and human brains, where, if Eliis’s analysis and Stapp’s proposal prove 
sound, mechanisms for amplification do exist236.  Clayton’s view therefore also fits into the 
emergentist framework we discussed in section 1.4.  Something like the following diagram, we 
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God, on this view, is strongly emergent from the configuration of elementary particles that 
constitutes the totality of the universe.  This configuration, since the beginning of the universe, 
has given rise to emergent properties/laws, and to emergent macroscopic activity at the level of 
the universe as a whole.  This activity will manifest, in the long run, in a cosmic tendency towards 
the realization of God’s purposes and intentions.  Alternatively, or in addition, God, as an 
emergent entity, can influence the outcomes of quantum events within his body (the universe) – 
for example, those underlying human mental activity and genetic mutation – in such a way as to 
guide biological and cultural evolution in accordance with his purposes and intentions.  Something 
like this would appear to capture what Peacocke and Clayton have in mind.  Talk of purposes and 
intentions should not be allowed to muddle this account.  On the view we are considering God’s 
purposes and intentions, just like human purposes and intentions, are emergent from 
configurations of elementary particles.  In the case of human purposes, those configurations 
occur within the brains of biological organisms; in God’s case they will presumably occur 
elsewhere in the wider universe, disguised as some cosmic process with whose outward 
appearance they have nothing to do.  We can expect God’s purposes to be as different from 
human purposes as their respective emergence bases are different from one other; which is to 
say, so different as to be almost unrecognizable.  Thus, such talk of purposes and intentions 
should be taken in a highly analogical sense.   
The above account, we contend, deserves to maintain its naturalistic credentials.  It does not 
assert the existence of a supernatural being existing outside the universe; it does not assert that a 
supernatural being has causal commerce with the universe; and it does not assert that 
justification for the belief in a divine being cannot be gotten through reliable epistemic methods.  
What it does assert is that the universe, like a human organism, has something analogous to a 
mind, and something analogous to purposes, which, like a human organism, it tends to realize 
through natural macro-causal processes.  This idea may seem farfetched to some people – it may 
even seem ugly and immoral – but this, we insist, does not bear on its naturalistic credentials.  
Some scientific naturalists, after all, are appalled by liberal naturalism, and deny its naturalistic 
credentials.  Some liberal naturalists are appalled by radical liberal naturalism, and deny its 
naturalistic credentials.  Some radical liberal naturalists are appalled by religious naturalism, and 
deny its naturalistic credentials.  And some religious naturalists, no doubt, are appalled by radical 
religious naturalism, and deny its naturalistic credentials.  Where then, ought we to draw the line?  





The simple fact is that all of these positions, insofar as they are logically coherent and endorse 
CCN, are forms of naturalism237.   
1.5.4. Locating James 
Having now thoroughly mapped the conceptual space of philosophical naturalism, we come to the 
question of where to locate William James with respect to our schema.  James, we would like to 
suggest, was a radical religious naturalist.  He endorsed a weak version of the methodological 
thesis of naturalism, constantly appealing to science and imitating its methods in various respects 
throughout his career.  He developed a critique of what he called ‘scientificism’ that overlaps 
significantly with the liberal naturalists’ critique of scientific naturalism.  He took an approach to 
intentionality, normativity, and consciousness that is likewise deeply consonant with that of 
liberal naturalism.  He articulated a doctrine of emergentism essentially similar to that of the 
British Emergentists, and a doctrine of macro-causation consistent with the strictures of radical 
liberal naturalism.  Finally, he set forth a doctrine of ‘pluralistic pantheism’ (or theistic naturalism) 
similar in many respects to that of Peacock and Clayton238.  Our task in chapter 2 will be to provide 
the textual evidence to support this provisional assessment. 
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Chapter 2 – The Development of James’s Naturalism 
Having now established the varieties of naturalism, and acquainted ourselves with the necessary 
concepts and terminology, our task in chapter 2 will be to trace the development of James’s 
worldview in relation to naturalism.  Investigating every facet of James’s philosophy is obviously 
out of the question here, so we will limit ourselves to considering certain key naturalistic themes 
in his work.  However, taking our cue from Perry and Myers, we will be investigating these themes 
through a chronological treatment of his core texts239.  Thus, in section 2.2, on The Principles, we 
will – in addition to demonstrating the widely recognized methodological naturalism of that text – 
unearth James’s doctrine of the strong emergence of mental phenomena, and examine his 
doctrine of mental causation.  This is of vital importance to our thesis, for these two doctrines will 
serve, in chapter 3, as models for reconstructing James’s broader doctrines of emergentism and 
macro-causation.  In section 2.3, on The Will to Believe, we will turn our attention to James’s 
critique of scientificism, and the exposition of his ethical philosophy in ‘The Moral Philosopher 
and the Moral Life’.  Regarding the former, we shall see that James’s critique foreshadowed the 
liberal naturalists’ critique of scientific naturalism in almost every important respect.  We will 
argue that it ought to be read in a similar vein, not as an attack on naturalism per se, but as a 
rejection of a particularly austere form of it.  Regarding the latter we shall see that James’s early 
ethical philosophy consisted in an overtly naturalistic part and seemingly non-naturalistic religious 
part.  We will indicate the terms of our proposed reconciliation of these parts, awaiting a fuller 
treatment in chapter 3.  In section 2.4, on The Varieties, we will mount a thorough investigation of 
James’s views on religious experience.  We shall see that this text is, in many respects, much more 
naturalistic than is usually supposed.  James’s basic commitment to the psychological/pragmatic 
methods, his insistence on the empirical testing of religious hypotheses/experiences, his steps 
towards the development of a science of religions, and his psycho-biological explanation of 
religious experience are all profoundly naturalistic.  Besides these points however, our main aim 
in section 2.4 will be to demonstrate the superficiality of James’s commitment to ‘piecemeal 
supernaturalism’.  We shall see that he only defined himself as such in contradistinction to an 
austere mechanical naturalism that endorses the causal closure of the physical.  He remained 
committed to the causal closure of nature.  According to our schema, therefore, his position is to 
be classified as a form of radical religious naturalism.  In section 2.5, on the Essays in Radical 
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Empiricism, we will be concerned to establish the outcome of James’s widely acknowledged 
‘break with dualism’.  We will argue in favour of a panpsychist interpretation of the doctrine of 
pure experience, according to which the inner nature of external realities is constituted of 
phenomenal consciousness.  Together with our treatment of PU in section 2.7, this discussion will 
serve as the foundation for our reconstruction of James’s panpsychism in chapter 3.  In section 
2.6, on Pragmatism, we will consider James’s account of the pragmatic method, and the 
pragmatic theory of truth.  We shall see that the former, with its insistence on the continuity of 
philosophy with science, is totally consonant with the methodological thesis of naturalism.  
Regarding the latter, we shall first argue against idealist readings of the theory, which are 
sometimes thought to constitute a point of conflict between pragmatism and naturalism, and 
second, we shall present a novel reading of the theory as an evolutionary theory of cognition, 
according to which ‘truths’ amount to adaptive heuristics for dealing with our environment.  On 
the basis of this reading we will show how the pragmatic theory of truth works to undermine 
scientism, and to establish the potential cognitive value of religion/religious experience.  Finally, 
in section 2.7, we will investigate James’s transition from the ‘piecemeal supernaturalism’ of The 
Varieties to the ‘pluralistic pantheism’ of A Pluralistic Universe.  Our main aim in this section will 
be to show how James’s adoption of panpsychism allowed him to defend a doctrine of finite 
theism, according to which God’s consciousness constitutes the inner nature of a certain portion 
of the physical universe.  This discussion will serve as the foundation for chapter 3, which will seek 
to demonstrate that James’s finite theism, supported by reconstructed doctrines of panpsychism 
and emergentism, is consistent with the strictures of radical religious naturalism.  Before we move 
on to the substance of chapter 2, we will address some preliminary considerations regarding the 
interpretation of James. 
2.1. Preliminary Considerations 
In interpreting the work of any philosopher certain key questions are bound to arise.  To what 
extent did the philosopher’s ideas change in the course of their career?  Did later ideas come to 
supersede earlier ones?  To what extent are his/her ideas – in their most mature, unified form – 
actually consistent with one another?  Are there brute inconsistencies/errors that cannot be 
interpreted away?  How are the philosopher’s works to be weighted?  Are certain of the works 
more canonical and others more experimental, etc.?  Ought we to take a more descriptive or a 
more constructive approach in interpreting a given philosopher’s work?  These questions, we 
suggest, may be grouped together under four headings: i) unity vs disunity, ii) consistency vs 





inconsistency, iii) weighting, and iv) description vs construction.  In what follows we will attempt 
to address all of these issues as they pertain to James, and to our interpretation of him. 
i) Unity vs Disunity 
We begin with the question of unity vs disunity in James’s work.  At the most basic level, this issue 
concerns the development of James’s professional interests and motivations.  For instance, Perry 
states, in his seminal study, that James’s thought can be divided into three distinct but 
overlapping phases: the first psychological, the second ethical/religious, and the third 
philosophical/metaphysical240.  Thus, PP and the lectures on exceptional mental states fall into the 
first period; WB, Human Immortality, and VRE fall into the second, and ERE, Pragmatism, and PU 
fall into the third.  Although the majority of commentators assent to this schema in broad outline, 
it is important to note its potentially distorting effects.  To begin with, PP (and some of the articles 
that preceded it) contains much that is philosophical, including discussions of epiphenomenalism 
and panpsychism, and germinal forms of the doctrines of the mother sea of consciousness, pure 
experience, and the pragmatic theory of truth241.  Secondly, despite his occasional suggestion to 
the contrary, James’s psychological interests extended well into his middle and late periods, as is 
evident in VRE, and as can be seen also in ERE and Pragmatism242.  And thirdly James’s religious 
interests continued to be relevant in his very last published works; i.e. in PU, and in some of his 
articles on mysticism243.   
Beyond the development of James’s broad professional interests, this issue of unity vs disunity 
touches a number of more specific debates in James scholarship.  Bruce Wilshire for instance 
insists that the publication of Psychology: Briefer Course signals James’s turning his back on the 
naturalistic approach of PP244.  Almost all commentators agree that ERE heralds James’s formal 
‘break with dualism’ (although they disagree as to what James replaced it with).  Suckiel and 
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Slater both argue that VRE constitutes a reversal of certain doctrines of WB245; and Slater further 
argues that VRE signals a transition from a more traditional theism to a pluralistic approach to 
religion246.  Finally, James himself acknowledged that his reading of Bergson’s Creative 
Evolution247 in 1907 allowed him to finally resolve the combination problem and embrace the 
pluralistic pantheism of PU248.  Several commentators have interpreted this as entailing his 
conversion to panpsychism249. 
However, despite these various claims regarding development and disunity, a thorough 
examination of James’s corpus leaves little doubt as to the underlying theoretical unity of his 
work.  Jeremy Carrette has characterised this underlying unity by likening James’s philosophy to a 
spiral which periodically cycles round to the same themes and concerns throughout his career250.  
All of his most competent commentators have stressed this fact, emphasizing the presence of 
later ideas in PP and in the articles/letters that preceded it.  In particular we note our agreement 
with David Lamberth (and Perry and Myers) that the chief doctrines of radical empiricism had 
taken shape by 1895, and that texts like VRE ought to be interpreted in light of those doctrines251.   
ii) Consistency vs Inconsistency 
Next, we address the issue of internal consistency.  James may well have the honour of being the 
most respected and influential philosopher to be most often accused of inconsistency.  It has 
become a trope in James scholarship to note that James was ‘not a systematic thinker’ and to 
comment on his ‘vague and impressionistic style’252.  Thus, Myers noted apparent conflicts 
between his doctrines of mental causation and substance monism; between his integral and 
deflationary accounts of the self in PP; and between his notions of the privacy of consciousness 
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and the publicity of pure experience (in PP and ERE respectively)253.  In the realm of epistemology 
both Rorty and Gale have suggested a conflict between the pragmatic theory of truth and the 
religious realism of VRE254; Ford and Bird find a conflict between the pragmatic theory of truth 
and panpsychism255; and Putnam finds a conflict between the pragmatic theory of truth and an 
underlying account of objective truth256.  In the realm of religion and ethics Gale and Slater note a 
conflict between James’s naturalistic ethics and his deontological/religious ethics257.   
Gale and Cooper have each attempted to develop overarching solutions to these inconsistencies.  
According to Gale the inconsistencies are not so much internal to James’s philosophy as they are 
internal to James himself.  James, says Gale, possessed a divided self.  He was half ‘Promethean 
Pragmatist’, half ‘Anti-Promethean Mystic’.  As a pragmatist he tended towards naturalism, 
relativism, and moral strenuousness; as a mystic he tended towards supernaturalism, absolutism, 
and moral relaxation.  He did in fact possess, as it were, two philosophies, each consistent in 
itself, but inconsistent with the other258.  Cooper rejects Gale’s solution.  He thinks that James’s 
apparent inconsistencies result from the fact that his philosophy has a ‘two-level’ structure.  It 
consists in an empirical level, devoted to scientific and naturalistic hypotheses, and a 
metaphysical level, devoted to over-beliefs.  His naturalistic psychology, utilitarian ethics, and 
pragmatic theory of truth belong to the empirical level; his neutral monism, deontological ethics, 
and metaphysical realism belong on the metaphysical level259.  We tend to agree more (though by 
no means completely) with Cooper on this issue.  James’s supposed inconsistencies are frequently 
over-emphasized, and often serve to justify lazy interpretations of his work.  
iii) Weighting 
There are a number of views among scholars concerning how to weight James’s works when 
interpreting his philosophy.  First of all, we may distinguish between selective vs holistic 
approaches to weighting his work.  According to philosophers in the selective camp, like Rorty, 
Cooper, and Schwarz, we may legitimately give precedence to some particular subset of James’s 
                                                             
253 Gerald Myers, William James: His Life and Thought (London: Yale University Press, 1986), p58; p61; p311 
254 Richard Rorty, ‘Some Inconsistencies in James’s Varieties’, in William James and A Science of Religions, 
ed. by Wayne Proudfoot (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), pp86-97; Gale, The Divided Self of 
William James, p19 
255 Ford, pp2-3; Bird, William James, p8 
256 Hilary Putnam, ‘James’s Theory of Truth’, in The Cambridge Companion to William James, ed. by R. A. 
Putnam, pp166-185 
257 Gale, The Divided Self of William James, p48; Slater, William James on Ethics and Faith, p74 
258 Gale, The Divided Self of William James, p19 






work; his naturalistic work, his religious work, his best work, etc.260  According to those in the 
holistic camp, like Perry, Myers, Gale, Taylor, Carrette, and Campbell, the selective approach is 
bound to have a distorting effect on our understanding of James.  We ought, rather, to consider 
James’s entire corpus in attempting to provide an informed interpretation of his worldview261.  
Within the holistic camp, there are those like Myers and Taylor who give precedence to James’s 
earlier work, and those like Gale and Lamberth, who give precedence to the later work.  There are 
also those who give precedence to his published work, and those who give precedence to his 
letters and notes262. 
For our part we think that the issue of weighting is a relatively straightforward one.  We must 
assess James’s entire corpus, and give precedence to his later published works.  Selective studies 
of individual works may be tremendously interesting and useful, but they will not give an accurate 
impression of James’s overall worldview.  Of particular note in regard to our own weighting of 
James’s work is the emphasis we place, with David Lamberth, on PU.  This is James’s last complete 
work, and there is no good reason to suppose that is does not represent the most definitive 
statement of his mature philosophical views.  As such, chapter 3 of this thesis will be largely 
centred around it.   
iv) Description vs Construction  
The issue of description vs construction in the interpretation of James is a particularly tricky one.  
This is so for a number of reasons.  Firstly, James was a prolific philosopher with wide-ranging 
interests, publishing a large volume of work on a variety of subjects.  Second, much of his work 
was conducted in the form of public lectures and addresses, ill-suited to dealing with 
technicalities or to attaining perfect philosophic clarity.  And thirdly, because James was a 
conscious innovator in philosophy, standing outside of any established tradition, and therefore 
not easily susceptible to analysis in terms of traditional hermeneutical strategies.  Among 
commentators on James’s work we may say that the likes of Perry, Myers, Lamberth, and 
Campbell tend to employ a more descriptive approach, while Ford, Bird, Suckiel, Seigfried, 
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Sprigge, Gale, and Cooper tend to employ a more constructive approach263.  Most of the more 
recent commentaries come from a constructive angle.  This may be because Perry and Myers 
succeeded so admirably on the descriptive front.  It may also be because systematic presentation 
of James’s ideas requires some efforts in the way of construction.  Bird for instance has argued 
that James’s anti-intellectualism manifests in an aversion to systematic argument, and that if 
systematization of his ideas is to be achieved, as is desirable, then it must be imposed to some 
degree from without264.  Seigfried meanwhile has argued that the supposed dichotomy between 
descriptive and constructive interpretation is a mistake.  Descriptive interpretations are inevitably 
selective, and are therefore bound to reflect the author’s biases just as much as constructive 
interpretations (sometimes more so, on account of their pretence to neutrality).  The answer, she 
thinks, is to provide a constructive interpretation that is as transparent and self-reflexive as 
possible265.  We ourselves have elected to take a more descriptive approach in chapter 2 and a 
more constructive approach in chapter 3.  All in all, we will tend towards construction.  We are 
seeking, as we said in the introduction, to develop a ‘Jamesian naturalism’ rather than to show 
that ‘James was a naturalist’.  With these preliminary considerations settled, let us now move on 
to the substance of our interpretation. 
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2.2. The Principles of Psychology 
The Principles of Psychology is counted by many as James’s greatest work.  It is certainly by far 
and away his most substantial work, containing twenty-eight mostly very long chapters devoted 
to a range of subjects spanning the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychology, 
physiological psychology, descriptive psychology, clinical psychology, and applied psychology.  The 
rough structure of the book is as follows.  James begins with various discussions of the methods of 
psychology and of basic principles/facts of physiological psychology.  He then proceeds to a 
philosophical discussion of the relation between the mind and brain, the apparent purpose of 
which is to head off certain metaphysical questions at the outset.  Following this he launches into 
a series of descriptive psychological accounts of our various mental faculties – attention, 
conception, memory, sensation, emotion, etc. – in each case attempting, through the use of 
experimental evidence and introspective analysis, to connect the faculties in question with 
physiological processes in the brain266.  Although the greater part of the principles is devoted to 
descriptive and physiological psychology, our own investigation will be more or less confined to 
the relatively few chapters which discuss philosophy of psychology and philosophy of mind.  In 
section 2.2.1 we will discuss James’s general approach to psychology, which we hold, along with 
many of James’s commentators, to be basically naturalistic.  In section 2.2.2, we will consider 
what James says in PP about the relation between the mind and the brain.  Taking our cue from 
the suggestions of Graham Bird, Timothy Sprigge, and Brian McLaughlin, we will try to show that 
James articulated a doctrine of emergentism in PP.  Finally, in section 2.2.3 we will investigate 
James’s doctrine of freewill/mental causation as it appears in PP.  As we have said, these two 
doctrines (of emergentism and mental causation) are vital to our interpretation, as they will serve 
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2.2.1. Science and Methodological Naturalism in The Principles 
2.2.1.1. The Methodological Ban on Metaphysics 
In the preface to The Principles James informs the reader that he will keep “close to the point of 
view of natural science throughout the book”267.  For James natural science is defined in part by 
its exclusion of metaphysics.  It must “assume certain data uncritically” and refrain from 
metaphysical discussions of that data268.  The data of psychology are, according to James: “(1) 
thoughts and feelings, and (2) a physical world in time and space with which they coexist, and 
which (3) they know”269.  Psychology ought not to seek any philosophical foundation or 
justification for this data.  It ought not concern itself with questions of epistemology; of how 
knowledge is possible, or of what is the precise nature of the relation between the mind and 
external reality.  As such, James contends that “psychology, when she has ascertained the 
empirical correlation of the various sorts of thought or feeling with definite conditions of the 
brain, can go no further – can go no further, that is, as a natural science”270.   
James’s separation in PP of psychology and metaphysics might at first be thought to imply a 
rejection of the methodological thesis of naturalism; namely, of the continuity between 
philosophy and science.  This, however, would be a drastically mistaken reading of his position.  
Although James wishes to ban metaphysics from psychology, he says nothing about banning 
psychology, or science in general, from metaphysics.  Indeed, his various forays into metaphysics 
in PP evince a strong commitment to the methodological thesis.  He draws amply from science in 
all of these instances, and is clearly concerned to achieve consistency with science.  Moreover, 
the metaphysics he wishes to ban from psychology is not the metaphysics of today, which under 
the auspices of the analytic tradition has become well-defined and methodical, but a metaphysics 
still contaminated with much unbridled apriori speculation, trading in absolutes and immortal 
souls.  All in all, James’s attitude regarding the relation between science and philosophy in PP is 
very much consistent with contemporary naturalism271.   
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2.2.1.2. Psycho-physical Parallelism 
James opens the first chapter of PP with a discussion of ‘The Scope of Psychology’.  He begins by 
summarising some of the doctrines and methods of what were then the two leading schools of 
thought in psychology: spiritualism and associationism.  Spiritualism postulates the personal soul 
as a substantial entity in which our various mental states inhere; associationism assumes that 
mental states are composed of elementary mental atoms or ‘simple ideas’272.  The battle between 
these two schools, and the ultimate insufficiency of them both, is one of the key threads that runs 
through The Principles.  James thinks that many of the doctrines of these schools, and many of the 
disagreements between them, are largely metaphysical; they revolve around broad issues in 
epistemology and ontology.  They can be avoided or circumvented if we pay closer attention to 
the actual facts of experience and physiology.  And this is precisely the path that psychology, in 
James’s opinion, ought to take.    
The key fact with which psychology must begin is “The fact that the brain is the one immediate 
bodily condition of the mental operations”273.  This fact entails something about the appropriate 
methodology of psychology.  First, psychology ought to postulate a general law: “that no mental 
modification ever occurs which is not accompanied or followed by a bodily change”274 (in other 
words, psychology ought to assume a theory of psycho-physical parallelism).  Second, psychology 
ought to involve a certain amount of brain physiology275.  Accordingly, in every chapter of PP 
which treats of some definite faculty of the mind – attention, memory, sensation, imagination, 
etc. – James devotes ample space to physiological theories and explanations of the faculty in 
question276.   
2.2.1.3. The Method of Introspection 
James’s discussion of the methods of psychology continues in chapter seven, on ‘The Methods 
and Snares of Psychology’.  Here James reiterates his methodological ban on metaphysics, 
outlines the various methods that may be utilized to discover psychological facts, and warns of 
some possible ‘snares’ into which psychologists are liable to fall.  Of particular interest to us is 
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James’s discussion of the methods of psychology.  This is because it reveals his attitude towards 
introspection, a method which many contemporary naturalists regard as epistemically dubious277.   
According to James the methods of psychology are: i) Introspective Observation, ii) The 
Experimental Method, and iii) The Comparative Method.  Of these, he says, introspection “is what 
we have to rely on first and foremost and always”278.  It involves looking into our own mind and 
reporting what we discover there.  What we discover, according to James, are “states of 
consciousness”279.  He declares that the existence of such states “has never been doubted by any 
critic”280.  As we have seen, James could not have made this declaration if he were writing today, 
for it is now not uncommon to find philosophers expressing doubt about the existence of 
phenomenal consciousness.  Scarcely able to conceive of such doubts however, James assumes 
that introspection is at least possible.  The real question for him is whether it is fallible, or rather, 
how fallible it is.  He quotes the remark of Auguste Comte, that introspection is problematic 
because it involves dividing oneself in two (in order to examine the one half with the other), 
which is both intellectually demanding, and modifies the state one is trying to observe281.  He then 
quotes Mill’s reply that no such division is required when one introspects just after the fact, using 
fresh memories of the states in question282.  James endorses Mill’s view.  A state of consciousness, 
he thinks, cannot be its own object.  As such, all introspection occurs after the fact; it is really 
retrospection.  It is therefore liable to all the errors and inaccuracies that ordinary observation and 
memory are liable to283.  But introspection is still foundational.  It cannot be avoided, and we have 
no grounds for disregarding it altogether.  Gerald Myers and Richard Gale both find introspection 
to be central in James’s philosophy284.  We shall see later for example that James uses the 
structure of his own stream of consciousness – as revealed through introspection – as a model for 
the inner structure of external realities.   
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2.2.1.4. Esse Est Sentiri 
Connected with James’s views on introspection is his so-called ‘esse est sentiri’ doctrine.  James 
articulates this doctrine in chapter six of PP, on ‘The Mind-Stuff Theory’, in the context of a 
discussion of whether or not unconscious mental states exist.  The theory of unconscious mental 
states holds that there are mental states which lack conscious/phenomenal properties, and that 
these mental states may serve as a kind of intermediary between matter and conscious mental 
states.  James rejects this theory, and spends a large portion of chapter six arguing against ten 
supposed proofs of it.  He repeatedly offers variations of the same four replies to these proofs: i) 
the relevant states are conscious, but occur so quickly and/or inattentively that no memory of 
them remains, ii) the relevant states are conscious, but the memory of them is lost in “rapid 
oblivescence”, as commonly occurs in the aftermath of dreams, iii) the relevant states are 
conscious, but they exist in a split-off condition, and iv) the relevant states are not mental 
phenomena at all; they are purely physiological processes285.  James resists the notion of 
unconscious mental states because he finds it intuitively incoherent.  He thinks that mental 
phenomena just are conscious: 
There is only one ‘phase’ in which an idea can be, and that is a fully conscious 
condition.  If it is not in that condition, then it is not at all.  Something else is, in its 
place.  The something else may be a merely physical brain process, or it may be 
another conscious idea.286 
Thus, James insists “that esse in our mental life is sentiri, and that an idea must consciously be felt 
as what it is”287.  This doctrine, we may say, has two parts.  First, that the esse of mental 
phenomena is their sentiri, and second, that the qualities of mental phenomena are necessarily 
precisely what they are consciously felt to be.  It is worth unpacking these ideas briefly.   
To begin with, we note that the Latin term ‘sentiri’ has connotations of sense perception, but that 
James is clearly not saying that the essence of mental phenomena is to be sensed via the sense 
organs.  Rather, as the above quote implies, he is saying that the essence of mental phenomena is 
to be conscious.  Neither is he using the term ‘conscious’ here in the sense of his later Essays in 
Radical Empiricism, to stand purely for the function of knowing.  Rather, we contend, James is 
saying that the essence of mental phenomena is to be phenomenally conscious (i.e. to have 
phenomenal properties/conscious qualities/qualia, etc.).  As to the second part of the esse est 
sentiri doctrine, according to which the qualities of mental phenomena are precisely what they 
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are felt to be, this is intended to capture the intuition that one cannot be wrong about the quality 
of what one is consciously experiencing.  Thus, one cannot be mistaken about a claim of the form 
‘I am having a conscious experience of X’.  Granted, the conscious experience may be 
hallucinatory, and the object of the experience may not exist, but the conscious experience itself 
is precisely what it is, and cannot be otherwise.  James invokes the esse est sentiri doctrine to 
justify the claim that mental states are, as they are consciously felt to be, integral things not made 
of parts.   
2.2.2. Consciousness and the Brain 
2.2.2.1. The Integral Nature of Consciousness 
Without a doubt one of the most important notions in James’s work – one which we will return to 
repeatedly throughout this dissertation – is that of the integral nature of consciousness.  It was in 
PP that James first introduced this idea, expressing it in terms of the claim that “consciousness … 
is itself an integral thing not made of parts”288.  This claim is explicated in chapter nine of PP, on 
‘The Stream of Thought’, in which James outlines five key characteristics of human consciousness 
that can be discovered through introspection.  Of these five, the first three together may be said 
to constitute the integral nature of consciousness.  The first characteristic is that “Every thought 
tends to be part of a personal consciousness”289.  The important point about this characteristic, 
for our purposes, is the fact that streams of consciousness are said to be “ejective” to one 
another; that is, they are said to have definite boundaries290.  The second characteristic is that 
“Within each personal consciousness thought is always changing”291.  By this James means that 
“no state once gone can recur and be identical with what it was before”292.  This is so, he 
contends, because every element in a state of consciousness is in some sense shaped or coloured 
by every other.  In other words, a state of consciousness constitutes a total gestalt whose 
‘elements’, though we may distinguish them conceptually, cannot be adequately analysed in 
isolation from the whole293.  The third characteristic is that “Within each personal consciousness 
thought is sensibly continuous”294.  It is with reference to this characteristic that James introduces 
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his famous metaphor of ‘the stream of consciousness’.  The point of this metaphor is to 
counteract the notion, popular at the time of his writing, that consciousness breaks down into 
discrete states or instants that hang together by external (non-experiential) relations.  James 
insists that the relations between ‘states’ of consciousness are themselves parts of consciousness, 
and that consciousness is therefore sensibly continuous.  In fact, to speak of ‘states’ of 
consciousness at all is rather like speaking of cross sections of a stream or river; it is a conceptual 
abstraction that fails to capture the reality of the phenomenon in question.   
This then, is what James means by the claim that consciousness is an integral thing not made of 
parts.  He means that: i) it has a boundary, ii) it constitutes a total gestalt that cannot be analysed 
into isolated elements, and iii) it is sensibly continuous (we will group both ii and iii together 
under the concept of the ‘unity’ of consciousness).  He implies, as we shall see, that these 
properties of consciousness are strongly emergent; or, what amounts to the same thing, that 
consciousness, insofar as it possesses these properties, is itself a strongly emergent phenomenon.  
Let us call this the ‘integral nature of consciousness thesis’, or INC for short.   
INC: The human stream of consciousness possesses a strongly emergent boundary/unity. 
INC, James tells us, when held in conjunction with the doctrines of psycho-physical parallelism 
and mereological atomism (roughly equivalent to POR: see the next section), gives rise to a 
certain difficulty; namely the “difficulty of stating the connection between mind and brain”295. 
2.2.2.2. The Problem of stating the Connection Between Mind and Brain 
The difficulty (or problem) of stating the connection between mind and brain turns on the 
presumed truth of a doctrine known today as ‘mereological atomism’.  According to this doctrine, 
in James’s words: “Nothing is but the everlasting atoms.  When grouped in a certain way, we 
name them this ‘thing’ or that; but the thing we name has no existence out of our mind”296.  In 
other words, such things as cells, brains, and organisms are not genuine individuals; they are just 
patterns of atoms picked out by the mind.  The problem arises when we consider this doctrine in 
conjunction with James’s parallelism, and his claim that consciousness is integral or holistic.  
Given psychophysical parallelism, every mental fact must correspond to some physical fact.  But if 
consciousness is essentially integral or holistic, and physical facts are essentially atomistic, then 
how are we to envision this correspondence?  The natural supposition, according to James, is that 
consciousness corresponds to “the entire activity of the brain”297.  But if mereological atomism is 
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true, then the term ‘the brain’ is “a fiction of popular speech”, which “cannot serve as the 
objectively real counterpart to any psychic state whatever”298.  This constitutes the problem of 
stating the connection between mind and brain (PCMB).  Let us briefly unpack this problem.   
What James seems to be saying is that the brain, in order to serve as the counterpart to human 
consciousness, would have to be a genuine entity in its own right, and not merely an aggregate of 
atoms.  An aggregate of physical atoms, we might suppose, could only serve as the counterpart to 
an aggregate of mental atoms, and not to an integral consciousness.  The implication, we 
contend, is that there is some sort of structural mismatch between an integral consciousness and 
an atomistic brain, and that this structural mismatch violates parallelism.  Another way of putting 
this would be to say that parallelism carries with it the requirement that physical facts must be 
structurally isomorphic with their mental counterparts (and vice versa).  We will call this the 
psycho-physical structural isomorphism requirement (PPSI for short).   
PPSI: Physical facts must be structurally isomorphic with their mental counterparts. 
PPSI is generally supposed to be a requirement of psychophysical identity theories.  It makes 
perfect sense therefore in the context of a strict theory of psychophysical parallelism.  And so, the 
problem can be stated thus:  
PCMB: every fact about the mind must correspond with some fact about the brain (parallelism) 
with which it is structurally isomorphic (PPSI); but the mind being holistic (INC) and the brain 
atomistic (mereological atomism/POR), structural isomorphism fails to hold between them. 
At the time of his writing PP, James could see only two workable solutions to PCMB.  The first was 
to embrace the ‘material-monad theory’, attributed to Leibniz, according to which the total 
stream of consciousness corresponds to a single mereological atom299.  This theory, according to 
James, although free from logical contradiction, involves such staggering “physiological 
improbability” that it is not worth seriously considering300.  The other possibility was to fall back 
upon an attenuated version of the ‘soul-theory’, according to which the total stream of 
consciousness – although its elements, once abstracted from it conceptually, correspond with 
elements of the brain – does not, as a whole, correspond with the brain as a whole.  This solution, 
in other words, would involve making an exception to his parallelism (and so to PPSI).  In PP this 
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was the path James reluctantly took, even while insisting that it represented only a “provisional 
halting place” from which no empirical conclusions could be drawn301. 
2.2.2.3. The “Emergence” of Integral Consciousness 
It may seem strange to describe the above position as a version of “the soul-theory”.  James is not 
suggesting, after all, that the total stream of consciousness is ontologically independent of the 
brain.  In the terminology of contemporary analytic philosophy, it would seem more appropriate 
to describe James’s view as a version of property dualism or emergentism, for which the total 
stream of consciousness, although not identical or strictly parallel with the brain, is nevertheless 
dependent on it in some respect.  This reading is all but confirmed by a tremendously important 
passage in a footnote to chapter six of PP.  Before we quote that passage however, we must 
provide some context.   
Chapter six of PP is concerned with ‘The Mind-Stuff Theory’ (otherwise known as panpsychism), 
and its relevance to psychology.  We will be discussing panpsychism, and James’s ultimate 
conversion to it, in much greater detail in chapter 3.  To avoid redundancy, we will therefore 
confine ourselves at this stage to providing only what context is required for the present 
discussion.  The following will suffice.  In the context of his investigation into panpsychism James 
considers the theory of ‘psychic summation’, according to which higher mental states are 
produced by combining lower ones together.  It is here that he introduces his famous 
combination problem.  The combination problem, as we shall see in chapter 3, has much in 
common with PCMB.  It may be stated thus: just as an atomistic brain cannot serve as the physical 
counterpart to an integral consciousness (PCMB), so an atomistic consciousness cannot be 
regarded as identical to an integral consciousness.  It is at this point that the footnote to which we 
have alluded occurs.  The relevant passage is the following one: 
We say the two sorts of fact [atomistic facts and integral facts] are not identical: a 
higher state is not a lot of lower states; it is itself.  When, however, a lot of lower 
states have come together, or when certain brain-conditions occur together … we 
have not for a moment pretended that a higher state may not emerge.  In fact it does 
emerge under those conditions … But such emergence is that of a new psychic entity, 
and is toto coelo different from such an ‘integration’ of the lower states as the mind-
stuff theory affirms.302 [our emphasis] 
An integral consciousness cannot be identical or strictly parallel with an atomistic 
brain/consciousness, but it can – indeed it does – emerge from an atomistic brain/consciousness.  
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We note that George Henry Lewes, who was himself a prominent psychologist, and who 
introduced the concept of emergence into philosophy, is referenced in PP no fewer than fourteen 
times303.  Indeed, it was Lewes, and not James, who coined the term ‘Stream of Consciousness’; 
and in the very same work – Problems of Life and Mind – in which he introduced the concept of 
emergence304.  James, then, evidently made close study of this text.  It is perfectly possible, we 
contend, that he picked up the term ‘emergence’ from Lewes and consciously employed it in a 
manner consistent with its intended usage.   
An illuminating passage from the final chapter of PP lends further support to this view.  In the 
passage in question James is attempting to describe the relationship between ‘passive associative 
experience’ and ‘free mental play’.  The latter stands to the former, he says, as the ‘internal 
forces’ at work in material objects stand to the ‘outward forces’ with fashion them.  In parsing this 
analogy, he says the following:  
What happens in the brain after [passive, associative] experience has done its utmost 
is what happens in every material mass which has been fashioned by an outward 
force … The fashioning from without brings the elements into collocations which set 
new internal forces free to exert their effects in turn. 305 
James here distinguishes between ‘outward forces’ which act on all matter invariantly (i.e. 
familiar physical forces) and ‘new internal forces’ which arise only when matter is organized into 
particular ‘collocations’.  This use of the highly specific term “collocations” may well be a direct 
reference to Mill, who employed the same term in his account of heteropathic forces in A System 
of Logic306.  We contend that what James is describing here are precisely the configurational 
forces of British Emergentism.  He goes on to say: 
The higher thought processes owe their being to causes which correspond far more 
to the sourings and fermentations of dough, the setting of mortar, of the subsistence 
of sediments in mixtures, than to the manipulations by which these physical 
aggregates came to be compounded.307 
In other words, such phenomena as fermentation, the setting of mortar, and, James suggests, the 
higher thought processes, are governed by higher-level configurational forces.  The reference to 
the ‘sourings and fermentations of dough’ here is particularly significant.  Throughout James’s 
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lifetime a lively public debate raged over the nature of the fermentation process, with scientists 
like Liebig and Wohler arguing that it was the result of simple chemical reactions, and scientists 
like Cagniard-Latour, Schwann, and Pasteur arguing that it involved higher level configurational 
forces308.  James would almost certainly have been aware of this debate.  It is probable that the 
above passage is, directly or indirectly, a reference to it.  There can be little doubt therefore as to 
the nature of James’s account.  He may call it a version of the soul-theory, but by the lights of 
contemporary philosophy it is essentially a doctrine of emergentism.   
2.2.2.4. The Vanishing Subject 
That the soul-theory (or emergentism) constituted the most economical solution to the problem 
of stating the connection between mind and brain was, for James, a metaphysical conclusion.  
Psychology, strictly speaking, had no use for such a conclusion, and could get along perfectly well 
without it.  Indeed, when James attempts to analyse the soul or ‘spiritual self’ in purely 
psychological terms, he finds that it threatens to disappear altogether.  He experiences his soul, 
he says, as “a constant play of furtherances and hindrances” in his thought; of “tendencies that 
run with desire, and tendencies which run the other way”; and of the “incessant reactions of my 
spontaneity upon them, welcoming or opposing, appropriating or disowning, striving with or 
against, saying yes or no”309.  But in all of this, James says, he cannot detect “any purely spiritual 
element at all”310.  What he detects is something altogether different: 
Whenever my introspective glance succeeds in turning around quickly enough to 
catch one of these manifestations of spontaneity in the act, all it can ever feel 
distinctly is some bodily process, for the most part taking place within the head.311 
James elaborates, describing the different intra-cephalic sensations that typically attend exercises 
of one’s different mental faculties.  Acts of visual attention are felt as “a fluctuating play of 
pressures, convergences, divergences and accommodations in my eyeballs”; acts of remembering 
are felt as a “rolling outwards and upwards of the eyeballs”; acts of mental attention and 
reasoning are felt as “alterations of direction in movements occurring inside the head”; acts of 
assent and dissent are felt as “the opening and closing of the glottis” and the “movement of the 
muscles of the brow and eyelids”; and acts of effort are felt as “contractions of the jaw-muscles 
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and of those of respiration”312.  James is convinced that the feeling he has of his own soul is 
wholly exhausted by these intra-cephalic sensations; i.e. it is nothing but intra-cephalic 
sensations.  If this is correct, he thinks, then it follows that the soul is essentially a physiological 
phenomenon whose activity ought to obey the reflex type313.   
Dewey famously interprets the above account as a “reduction of the subject to a vanishing 
point”314.  He thinks that this is a key example of the “naturalistic strain” in PP315.  “If it had been 
consistently developed”, he says, “it would have resulted in a biological behaviouristic account of 
psychological phenomena”316, for which the subject is “identified with the organism”, and for 
which the organism has “no existence save in interaction with environing conditions”317.  For 
Dewey, James’s account of the spiritual self is just one key example of the naturalistic strain in PP.  
He thinks that naturalistic tendencies run throughout the text; in James’s behaviouristic definition 
of mental phenomena; in his empirical treatment of personal identity; in his flirtations with 
neutral monism; and in his repeated suggestions in various places that physiological explanations 
of mental phenomena may usurp higher level explanations.  As we mentioned in the introduction, 
thinkers like Richard Gale doubt that James’s naturalistic strain is as prominent as Dewey 
suggests.  Gale argues that James’s apparent flirtations with neutral monism in PP are superficial 
and that the ultimate thrust of the text is in the direction of interactionist dualism318.  The most 
convincing support for Gale’s reading comes from chapters eleven and twenty-six of PP, on 
‘Attention’ and ‘Will’, which we will discuss in the next section. 
2.2.3. Freewill 
2.2.3.1. The Evolution of Mental Causation 
Consciousness, for James, is an integral thing not made of parts.  It is, metaphysically speaking, 
something over and above the atoms that constitute the human brain.  The question which this 
naturally raises is this: does consciousness possess causal power over and above the brain?  The 
answer to this question was by no means obvious to James.  In the following quote we see him 
wondering whether mental phenomena are causally excluded, as per Kim’s argument: 
If neural action is as complicated as mind; and if in the sympathetic system and lower 
spinal cord we see what, so far as we know, is unconscious neural action executing 
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deeds that to all outward intent may be called intelligent; what is there to hinder us 
from supposing that even where we know consciousness to be there, the still more 
complicated neural action which we believe to be its inseparable companion is alone 
and of itself the real agent of whatever intelligent deeds may appear?319 
The position that results from accepting this line of reasoning is called epiphenomenalism, 
characterised by Huxley as the view that consciousness is “as completely without power of 
modifying that working [of the body], as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a 
locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery”320.  It is a view that was widely reviled 
by James’s philosophical contemporaries at the time of his writing PP, but James himself was 
prescient enough to see its attractiveness and importance (he even reveals in a footnote that as a 
medical student in 1869 he once drafted an essay in support of the theory321).  We know however 
that by the time of his reading of Renouvier in 1872 he was ready to abandon epiphenomenalism 
and to embrace a doctrine of freewill.  In chapter five, on ‘The Automaton-Theory’, he outlines an 
important argument against epiphenomenalism; one which sheds light on his conception of the 
macro-causal power of consciousness. 
• P1: consciousness is unevenly distributed in the animal kingdom, some animals possessing 
more of it and some less. 
• P2: it therefore appears to be “an organ, superadded to the other organs which maintain 
the animal in the struggle for existence”322. 
• P3: like any other organ or biological function, consciousness must have been selected for 
in the evolutionary process. 
• P4: in order to have been selected for, consciousness must confer an adaptive advantage 
upon organisms possessing it. 
• P5: in order to confer an adaptive advantage, consciousness must be causally efficacious. 
• C: consciousness is causally efficacious.   
James speculates that organisms, in order to achieve greater flexibility of action, had to become 
more complex, and that with greater complexity came greater instability.  The outcomes of events 
in the brain of a highly complex and therefore highly unstable organism are like the throws of a 
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dice.  Consciousness, he suggests, evolved in order to “load the dice” so as to bring about actions 
favourable to the organism323. 
2.2.3.2. The Role of Indeterminism 
James develops this account further in chapter twenty-six.  There he tells us that if consciousness 
is to possess macro-causal power, then the outcomes of conscious acts will have to be 
indeterministic324.  There will have to be a range of “genuine possibles” available, of which a 
conscious act will “make one effective”325.  In other words, conscious acts will bring about effects 
in the physical world by influencing the outcomes of indeterministic events in the brain and 
nervous system: 
The soul presents nothing herself; creates nothing; is at the mercy of the material 
forces for all possibilities; but amongst these possibilities she selects; and by 
reinforcing one and checking others, she figures not as an ‘epiphenomenon,’…326 
“And although”, James says, “such quickening of one idea might be morally and historically 
momentous, yet, if considered dynamically, it would be an operation among those physiological 
infinitesimals which calculation must forever neglect”327.  He elaborates on this comment, saying 
that measurement of the relevant psychic and neural ‘quantities’ is “forever beyond human 
reach”, and adding that “No serious psychologist or physiologist will venture even to suggest a 
notion of how they might be practically made”328.  James may have been being overly pessimistic 
here, but he has not been proved wrong just yet.  There are still a host of relevant physiological 
variables that cannot be measured sufficiently accurately to decide the issue in question.  As such, 
James says, neither science nor psychology can resolve the question of freewill.  Rather, he tells 
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us, in terms that look forward to The Will to Believe, the question must be settled on ethical 
grounds329.   
2.2.3.3. The Phenomenon of Effort 
The final part of James’s doctrine of freewill involves his account of the phenomenon of effort.  
He begins this account by noting the familiar distinction between volition and action.  Volition is 
the process whereby an idea comes into the mind and is maintained there; action is the name we 
give to the subsequent discharge of motor activity.  From a lengthy discussion of the physiological 
correlates of volition and action (which we cannot go into in detail) James concludes that “The 
movements which ensue [upon having the idea of a given movement] are exclusively 
physiological phenomena, following according to physiological laws upon the neural events to 
which the idea corresponds”330.  In other words, action is a purely physiological phenomenon, 
involving no violation of CCP.  It is therefore in the processes involved in volition rather than those 
involved in action that we must seek the locus of mental causation.  Specifically, we must look to 
the maintaining of ideas in the mind.  Which ideas occur to us, James says, is, like motor activity, a 
function of physiological processes in the brain, but the amount of effort we exercise in 
maintaining ideas, once they have occurred, might not be331.  As to how the effort to attend to an 
idea would bring about significant effects, James offers the following speculation: 
It would deepen and prolong the stay in consciousness of innumerable ideas which 
else would fade more quickly away.  The delay thus gained might not be more than a 
second in duration – but that second might be critical; for in the constant rising and 
falling of considerations in the mind, where two associated systems of them are 
nearly in equilibrium it is often a matter of but a second more or less of attention at 
the outset, whether one system shall gain force to occupy the field and develop 
itself, and exclude the other, or be excluded itself by the other.332 
Timothy Sprigge provides the following helpful summary (which we present in the form of a 
diagram below) of the causal picture implied by James’s account of freewill in PP: 
At any one moment there is a brain state N1 and a simultaneous state of 
consciousness C1, the nature of which is largely but not entirely settled by the 
character of N1 but is partly somehow self-chosen (in virtue of the different degrees 
of attention given to the various contents of C1 which are settled by N1).  Then at the 
next moment there is a brain state N2, the character of which is largely due to N1, 
and various purely physical inputs to the brain, but is also influenced by the self-
chosen features of C1.  Simultaneous to N2 is a state of consciousness C2 related to it 
as C1 was to N1.  And N2 and C2 are followed, God willing, by an N3 and C3 which 
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It is worth pointing out here, though we will discuss it in more detail later, how closely James’s 
account maps onto that of Henry Stapp, which we investigated in chapter one.  Recall that for 
Stapp consciousness causes effects in the physical world by influencing the outcomes of 
indeterministic events in the brain – the collapses of calcium ion wavefunctions – and thereby the 
release of neurotransmitters and the behaviour of the organism.  It seems very likely that 
something like Stapp’s proposal would be agreeable to James.  If we suppose that calcium ion 
wavefunction collapses are the physiological correlates of exertions of effort, then their accounts 
fit together remarkably well.  We will take up this discussion once more in chapter three. 
2.2.4. Conclusions 
PP can sometimes seem to be a rather contradictory text; not in the sense of being self-
contradictory perhaps, but rather in the sense of embodying methods and motives which do not 
seem to belong together.  James employed a methodological psycho-physical parallelism in PP, 
only to abandon it in the sections on free will; he insisted on the separation of psychology and 
metaphysics, and then felt compelled to write several long metaphysical chapters; the book 
clearly embodies the naturalistic spirit, but at the same time betrays sympathy for the likes of 
freewill, spiritualism, and theism or pantheism.  These seeming tensions are reflected in the 
contradictory responses PP has received.  Royce called James “a naturalist” in his review of the 
book334; Peirce called him “materialistic to the core”335; and Shadworth Hodgson thought that, 
despite James’s best efforts, PP had lent powerful support to the automaton-theory336.  We have 
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already seen that John Dewey found ample evidence for a “naturalistic strain” in PP, and was 
practically converted from Hegelianism to naturalism by his reading of it.  More recently Ralph 
Barton Perry has concluded that PP “betrayed a leaning toward a naturalistic metaphysics”337, and 
numerous modern commentators have agreed with him338.  Meanwhile G. Stanley Hall detected 
in PP a yearning for an old-fashioned idea of the soul339, James Ward was exasperated by the 
“penchant for spiritualism” it demonstrated340, and contemporary analytic philosophers like 
Richard Gale and Owen Flanagan think The Principles is “spooky”341, and that it cannot be given a 
consistent naturalistic reading342. 
That there are differing views regarding the naturalistic credentials of PP is perhaps not surprising 
given what we discovered in chapter one about the differing views regarding naturalism itself.  
Those with a more liberal concept of naturalism judge PP to be naturalistic, or to have a 
naturalistic strain.  Those with a more austere concept of naturalism judge it to be spooky.  From 
the point of view of the schema we developed in chapter one, we suggest that James, on the basis 
of PP alone, ought to be classified as a radical liberal naturalist.  This is so because he rejects the 
thesis of CCP, and endorses doctrines of the strong emergence and macro-causal power of mental 
phenomena.  As Timothy Sprigge has remarked, James’s approach remains “naturalistic” because 
it presents consciousness as “a feature of animals which has emerged in the course of evolution” 
rather than as a pre-existent substance that interacts with organisms irrespective of physiological 
conditions343.  For James human beings’ capacity for freewill is not attributed to a substantial soul 
that pre-exists the body and interacts with it in some mysterious ad hoc fashion.  Rather, our 
capacity for free will is attributed to an integral consciousness that is emergent from the physical 
properties of the human body.  It has evolved through a process of natural selection, relative to 
physiological conditions, and utilizing the body’s own physiological mechanisms.   
As we have said, we shall see in chapter 3 how James’s doctrine of the strong emergence and 
macro-causal power of mental phenomena can be developed into a more general doctrine of 
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emergentism and macro-causation.  The development of this more general doctrine, we shall 
argue, is absolutely essential in order to make James’s mature philosophy consistent.  For here in 
PP James has argued that integral consciousness is necessarily emergent, and later, in PU, he will 
attribute integral consciousness to myriad infrahuman and superhuman entities.  If integral 
consciousness is emergent in all these cases, then James evidently requires a much broader 
doctrine of emergentism.




2.3. The Will to Believe 
The publication of The Will to Believe is said to signal James’s ‘turn to philosophy’.  In the 
introduction to chapter two we pointed out the potential danger of imputing ‘phases’ onto 
James’s work, but in this case, the strategy really is useful.  The Principles, despite its forays into 
metaphysics, was, in spirit, a primarily scientific text.  James had evinced a naïve faith in the 
scientific enterprise, in the prospects of psychology as a natural science, and in the potential 
continuity of philosophy with science, etc344.  Already in Psychology: Briefer Course, his attitude on 
these issues was beginning to change.  There he revised his notion of the scientific status of 
psychology, and conceded that the inherent incompleteness of psychology mandated an 
independent philosophical project345.  Post PP, we may say, James began to develop a more 
critical attitude towards science.  By our lights, The Will to Believe is most significant as a herald 
and manifestation of that development.  It represents, as it were, a shift in James’s naturalism 
toward the pole of liberality346. 
Of the group of essays which comprise The Will to Believe, the most famous and widely discussed 
is undoubtedly the eponymous opening essay.  It is here that James advances his notorious ‘will-
to-believe doctrine’ (or ‘WB doctrine’), which states that human beings may rightfully decide 
between options for belief in accordance with their passional natures when said options are i) 
living, ii) forced, and iii) momentous347.  According to a widespread misinterpretation of the WB 
doctrine, it entails that human beings may believe whatever makes them feel good, regardless of 
the content of the belief, or of the existence of contradictory evidence.  It is on the basis of this 
sort of misinterpretation that James Pratt insisted that the WB doctrine was incompatible with 
the empirical spirit of his critical naturalism348.  James however states quite explicitly that an 
option for belief could not be living – not for any sensible modern-day person at any rate – unless 
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there were no definitive scientific evidence against it349.  In other words, the WB doctrine only 
really applies in cases where the scientific evidence is inconclusive.  It is precisely in these cases, 
after all, that W. K. Clifford – the antagonist of the essay – insists upon agnosticism.  James’s 
doctrine is essentially a response to Clifford; where Clifford insists upon agnosticism, James 
recommends belief.  We therefore dismiss Pratt’s claim that the WB doctrine is incompatible with 
naturalism.  In what follows we will not discuss the WB doctrine in detail.  It is, in any case, only 
one small part of a more general critique of ‘scientificism’ developed by James in WB, and it is this 
more general critique that will be our chief concern350.  Besides the critique of scientificism we will 
also discuss James’s ethical views in this section.  ‘The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life’ 
(MPML) is widely regarded as the key source for James’s ethical philosophy.  This essay amply 
demonstrates the tension between naturalism and religion in James’s thinking, and has been 
alleged by Michael Slater to entail supernaturalist commitments on James’s part.  We will 
therefore investigate it in detail in section 2.3.2.  But first, in section 2.3.1, we turn to James’s 
critique of scientificism. 
2.3.1. James’s Critique of Scientificism 
None of the essays in The Will to Believe are explicitly devoted to the topic of science, but many of 
them are littered with discussions about science and related issues.  In the present section we 
have attempted to draw these various discussions together into what we are calling James’s 
‘critique of scientificism’.  ‘Scientificism’ is the name James gives to the scientific worldview351.  He 
distinguishes it from science itself, which, in accordance with his views in PP, he identifies as 
essentially a method, free from metaphysical baggage of any kind352.  Scientificism, unlike science, 
presupposes various metaphysical doctrines; in particular the doctrine that “the hidden order of 
nature is mechanical exclusively”353 (which James seems to associate with materialism, 
determinism, and atomism354).  Scientificism is not only a metaphysical doctrine however.  
Indeed, its more fundamental features are epistemological.  Specifically, scientificism is 
committed to the theses of scientism and hyperscientific realism, and to the claim that there is a 
sharp boundary between science and non-science.  It is from these epistemological theses that its 
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endorsement of the various metaphysical doctrines follows, and it is these, consequently, that 
form the main targets of James’s critique.  
James’s strategy as regards scientism is to undermine science’s claim to special epistemic status.  
He does so by arguing that science has a significant normative component, and therefore lacks 
the kind of objectivity that scientificists claim for it (2.3.1.1).  His strategy as regards 
hyperscientific realism is to advance a pessimistic meta-induction from the history of science, 
essentially similar to one we saw Putnam describing in chapter 1 (2.3.1.2).  In criticizing the claim 
that there are sharp scientific boundaries he draws on both of the preceding critiques (2.3.1.3).  
James’s critique of scientificism in WB is, we shall see, naturally supplemented by the pragmatic 
theory of truth.  The pragmatic theory of truth undermines scientism by developing a non-
scientistic criterion of truth, and it undermines hyperscientific realism because it entails an 
instrumentalist interpretation of science/the scientific enterprise.  We will only touch on this 
intersection between WB and Pragmatism briefly in what follows, postponing a lengthier 
treatment until section 2.6. 
2.3.1.1. Critique of Scientism 
The following quote serves as a good description of proponents of scientificism: 
There is included in human nature an ingrained naturalism and materialism of mind 
which can only admit facts that are actually tangible.  Of this sort of mind the entity 
called ‘science’ is the idol.  Fondness for the word ‘scientist’ is one of the notes by 
which you may know its votaries; and its short way of killing any opinion that it 
disbelieves in is to call it ‘unscientific’.355 
Scientificists, James says, “only admit facts that are actually tangible”.  It is only “truth as 
technically verified” that interests them; and they have “ceased to care for truth by itself at all”356.  
They insist that “amid the wreck of every other god and idol one divinity still stands upright”, and 
that “his name is Scientific Truth”357.  Indeed, it seems that proponents of scientificism, even in 
James’s day, took this reductive approach to its logical conclusion, and held that “the ‘truths’ of 
bare physics in particular” were the only “uncontaminated” truths358.  These scientificists, it 
seems, endorsed the thesis of scientism, according to which only science can provide us with 
knowledge of reality.  What justified them in this endorsement, or so they thought, was the belief 
that science alone is “pure” and “uncontaminated” by subjective passions; that it alone 
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constituted a tabula rasa on which reality could be passively registered.  It is this belief that is the 
main target of James’s critique of scientism.  Contra the scientificists, James insists that science 
involves significant normative components; firstly, insofar as the scientific enterprise presupposes 
faith in the uniformity of nature, and secondly, insofar as the selection of scientific theories 
presupposes certain norms of rationality. 
i) The Scientific Enterprise Presupposes Faith in the Uniformity of Nature 
The necessity of faith as an ingredient in our mental attitude is strongly insisted on by 
the scientific philosophers of the present day; but by a singularly arbitrary caprice 
they say that it is only legitimate when used in the interests of one particular 
proposition, – the proposition, namely, that the course of nature is uniform.359  
Clearly, if we did not believe that the course of nature was uniform – that the cover of physical 
law was constant and absolute – then there would be relatively little motivation to conduct 
scientific experiments, and to construct scientific theories.  But this belief in the uniformity of 
nature is famously not susceptible of proof.  As Hume is supposed to have demonstrated in An 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, this belief really amounts to nothing more than a 
custom or habit360.  We find that certain events occur in constant conjunction and we habitually 
expect them to occur in constant conjunction in the future.  Then we infer a mysterious 
“necessary connection” between conjoined events and name it ‘the law of causality’, as though 
this clears the matter up.  But we have no evidence or proof for the existence of this law (besides 
the circular one which invokes inductive inferences from past experience).  It remains, after all, 
only a mysterious ‘necessary connection’, the existence of which we posit habitually, or, if 
consciously, by faith.  James agrees wholeheartedly with Hume’s analysis: 
The principle of causality, for example, – what is it but a postulate, an empty name 
covering simply a demand that the sequence of events shall someday manifest a 
deeper kind of belonging of one thing with another than the mere arbitrary 
juxtaposition which now phenomenally appears?  It is as much an altar to an 
unknown god as the one Saint Paul found at Athens.361   
Scientists have faith in the uniformity of nature; they have faith in causality.  And without this 
faith the scientific enterprise would never have gotten off the ground.  James thinks that scientists 
– or rather, proponents of scientificism – exercise their capacity for faith in this case, and refuse 
to do so in others, because the proposition in question in this case – that the course of nature is 
uniform – is one that appeals to their particular temperaments.  But the scientist’s 
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temperamental need for uniformity, James insists, is, on the face of it, no more justified than the 
religious man’s temperamental need for spirituality.  Proponents of scientificism are simply wrong 
in supposing that the former is somehow objective or non-normative. 
James’s argument here may be translated into a version of the fundamental argument.  Consider 
the following formulation: 
• P1: Scientism states that only science can provide us with knowledge of reality. 
• P2: In order for a belief-source to count as a provider of knowledge, belief-sources which 
it presupposes must count as providers of knowledge. 
• P3: Science presupposes faith as the source of its belief in the uniformity of nature. 
• P4: Science counts as a provider of knowledge. 
• P5: Faith counts as a provider of knowledge  
• C2: Scientism is absurd. 
The notion that faith counts as a provider of knowledge may seem strange at first, but it accords 
quite well with another of James’s claims in WB; namely that “faith creates facts”.  In particular 
James has in mind the class of facts that involve interpersonal relations and the states of mind 
that arise therein; facts about how people feel about one another for instance: 
Do you like me or not? – for example.  Whether you do or not depends, in countless 
instances, on whether I meet you half-way, am willing to assume that you must like 
me, and show you trust and expectation.  The previous faith on my part in your 
liking’s existence is in such cases what makes your liking come.  But if I stand aloof, 
and refuse to budge an inch until I have objective evidence, … ten to one your liking 
never comes.362 
Insofar as faith helps to create such facts, and is a source of our beliefs about them, it must be 
instrumental in enabling knowledge of them.  Of course, scientificists might try to deny that such 
facts are a part of reality at all, but then it is they who are stretching the limits of credulity. 
ii) Scientific Theory Selection Presupposes Norms of Rationality 
In ‘The Sentiment of Rationality’ James articulates the hypothesis that rationality and irrationality 
are not, as they are often supposed to be, objective features of thoughts, or objective standards 
which thoughts do or do not meet, but rather that they are feelings that accompany certain of our 
thoughts.  Specifically, he suggests that irrationality is the feeling of obstruction and frustration in 
thought, and that rationality is the feeling of fluency and ease.  He further suggests that there are 
a number of different ways in which our thought can become obstructed, and a number of 
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different ways in which human beings seek relief from these obstructions.  For instance, we feel 
frustration and puzzlement when a thought is overly complex and disunified; we get relief by 
reducing its manifoldness to simplicity.  This is what James calls ‘theoretic rationality’363.  The 
desire of many philosophers and scientists to produce a ‘unified theory of everything’ well 
expresses the ideal goal of theoretic rationality according to James364.  Alongside theoretic 
rationality with its “passion for simplification”, there exists what we might call ‘factual rationality’, 
animated by a “passion for distinguishing”365.  Some minds are offended whenever a thought is 
overly abstract and disconnected from concrete facts; and they gain relief by becoming 
acquainted with the relevant facts.  Now, according to James different individuals possess the 
passion for simplification or the passion for distinguishing to different degrees, and will assign 
more or less value to theoretic/factual rationality accordingly.  James suggests that the balance of 
these passions in an individual, and their relative valuation of theoretic/factual rationality, 
significantly determines their overall philosophic attitude366.  Thus, rationalists favour theoretic 
rationality while empiricists favour factual rationality367.  Notice that this account of rationality 
makes it an essentially normative phenomenon.  Even if each form of rationality was in itself 
totally lacking a normative component, absent some non-normative standard for deciding 
between forms of rationality, normativity will still enter into the equation insofar as we favour or 
value one form over another. 
With the above account in mind, consider the following statement of James’s from ‘Reflex Action 
and Theism’: 
The appetite for immediate consistency at any cost, or what logicians call the ‘law of 
parsimony,’ – which is nothing but the passion for conceiving the universe in the 
most labor-saving way, – will, if made the exclusive law of the mind, end by blighting 
the development of the intellect itself quite as much as that of the feelings or the 
will.  The scientific conception of the world as an army of molecules gratifies this 
appetite after its fashion most exquisitely.368 
What James here calls the “appetite for immediate consistency” and the “passion for conceiving 
the universe in the most labor-saving way” would seem to be species of what he earlier called the 
“passion for simplification”.  The faculty of theoretic rationality, James said, caters most aptly to 
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these kinds of passions or needs.  Now he seems to be telling us that particular “scientific 
conception[s]” gratify these needs especially well; indeed, that they might gratify them too well, 
and in doing so fall into error.  There would seem to be an implication here that other scientific 
conceptions might not gratify these needs so well (and that in James’s view, this might not be a 
bad thing).  We might say therefore, that for James, different scientific conceptions embody 
different forms of rationality to different degrees.  For example, broadly reductive 
theories/conceptions will almost always be simpler, and therefore more theoretically rational 
than non-reductive theories.  Higher-level theories meanwhile may account for a greater number 
of facts, and may thereby be more factually rational.   Now, as we have just said, absent some 
non-normative standard for choosing between forms of rationality, favouring or valuing one form 
or another is going to involve normativity.  If then, as James seems to be suggesting, we select or 
adopt scientific theories partly on the basis of their embodying particular forms of rationality, 
then the selection of scientific theories is a partly normative process. 
This analysis might be supposed to apply to James’s example of the ‘one-fluid’ and ‘two-fluid’ 
theories of electricity: 
There is nothing improbable in the supposition that an analysis of the world may 
yield a number of formulae, all consistent with the facts.  In physical science different 
formulae may explain the phenomena equally well, – the one-fluid and the two-fluid 
theories of electricity, for example.  Why may it not be so with the world?  Why may 
there not be different points of view for surveying it, within each of which all data 
harmonize, and which the observer may therefore choose between, or simply 
cumulate one upon another?369 
The two-fluid theory, proposed by Charles Francois de Cisternay du Fay, held that there were two 
electrical fluids, one carrying a positive charge and one carrying a negative charge; when the two 
fluids met, they would produce a neutral charge.  The one-fluid theory, popularised by Benjamin 
Franklin, held that there was only one electrical fluid, and that a positive charge was produced by 
an abundance of it, a neutral charge by a ‘normal’ amount of it, and a negative charge by a 
shortage of it.  Ultimately, Franklin’s one-fluid theory was victorious, though it was to be 
superseded of course by the theory of electromagnetism.  James, we are suggesting, might adopt 
something like the following analysis of this state of affairs.  The one-fluid theory, because it 
posits fewer entities, is simpler, and therefore more theoretically rational.  The majority of 
physicists, with their temperamental preference for theoretic rationality, therefore adopted it. 
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2.3.1.2. Critique of Hyperscientific Realism: James’s Pessimistic Meta-Induction 
In chapter one we articulated the thesis of scientific realism through Wilfrid Sellars’s distinction 
between the manifest and scientific images.  Sellars insisted that such entities and properties as 
persons, phenomenal qualities, and values (entities and properties that comprise what he called 
‘the manifest image’) must be identical with entities and properties described by the science of 
physics (entities and properties that comprise ‘the scientific image’).  James appeals to a 
remarkably similar distinction in WB.  He distinguishes between ‘the personal view of life’ and ‘the 
impersonal or mechanical view of life’.  On the personal view, “personal forces” such as free wills, 
phenomenal qualities, meanings, reasons, and values, “are the starting point of new effects”370 
(i.e. are causally efficacious).  On the impersonal view “the hidden order of nature is mechanical 
exclusively”, and “non-mechanical categories are irrational ways of conceiving and explaining 
even such things as human life”371.  Proponents of scientificism hold to the impersonal view of life, 
and insist that entities and properties that comprise the personal view must be reducible to those 
that comprise the impersonal view372.   
Now, James has already said in PP that he suspects the “radically physical point of view” of being 
“an unreal abstraction”373.  In WB he goes further, saying that this view constitutes a massive 
“alteration and falsification of the simply ‘given’ order of the world”374: 
Physics is but one chapter in the great jugglery which our conceiving faculty is forever 
playing with the order of being as it presents itself to our reception.  It transforms the 
unutterable dead level and continuum of the ‘given’ world into an utterly unlike 
world of sharp differences and hierarchic subordinations…375 
The mechanical view of life (the scientific image) transforms “the unutterable dead level and 
continuum of the ‘given’ world” into a “world of sharp differences and hierarchic subordinations”.  
The world as it appears to us does not seem to be one that is organized into definite “hierarchic” 
levels, in which the lowest level phenomena have causal and existential primacy; it seems, on the 
face of it, to be a “continuum” of highly various causally powerful entities.  James then, thinks 
that the mechanical view of life (the scientific image) undermines the personal view of life (the 
manifest image) to an implausible degree.  He accordingly chooses the second of Wilfrid Sellars’s 
options for resolving the conflict between the images; he thinks that the objects of physics are 
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just abstract or symbolic ways of representing manifest objects, and are reducible to manifest 
objects without remainder.  James is not at his most explicit on this point in WB, but we shall see 
when we come to discuss Pragmatism and ERE that this is certainly his mature position. 
As we have already mentioned, James’s method of attack against hyperscientific realism in WB is 
through an argument by pessimistic meta induction from the history of science376.  The following 
passage constitutes James’s clearest statement of this argument: 
When from our present advanced standpoint we look back upon the past stages of 
human thought, whether it be scientific thought or theological thought, we are 
amazed that a universe which appears to us of so vast and mysterious a complication 
should ever have seemed to anyone so little and plain a thing.  Whether it be 
Descartes’s world or Newton’s … it always looks the same to us, – incredibly 
perspectiveless and short.  Even Lyell’s, Faraday’s, Mill’s, and Darwin’s consciousness 
of their respective subjects are already beginning to put on an infantile and innocent 
look.  Is it then likely that the science of our own day will escape the common doom; 
that the minds of its votaries will never look old-fashioned to the grandchildren of 
the latter?  It would be folly to suppose so.377 
The scientific worldview has changed a great deal over time.  It has undergone a number of 
revolutions, in which supposedly fundamental scientific theories and conceptions have had to be 
radically revised.  If this pattern continues into the future, then there is good reason to think that 
our current scientific theories will likewise be subject to radical revisions.  In which case those 
theories cannot possibly represent the world entirely accurately.  This supposition is made even 
more convincing, according to James, when we consider how young the scientific enterprise is, 
and how rapid its progress has been.  In three hundred years it has transformed our worldview 
completely beyond recognition.  It seems reasonable to suppose that our current worldview will 
be likewise transformed during the next few hundred years of scientific progress: 
Think how many absolutely new scientific conceptions have arisen in our own 
generation, how many new problems have been formulated that were never thought 
of before, and then cast an eye on the brevity of science’s career.  It began with 
Galileo, not three hundred years ago. … Is it credible that such a mushroom 
knowledge, such a growth overnight as this, can represent more than the minutest 
glimpse of what the universe will really prove to be when adequately understood?  
No! our science is a drop, our ignorance a sea.  Whatever else be certain, this at least 
is certain, – that the world of our present natural knowledge is enveloped in a larger 
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world of some sort of whose residual properties we at present can frame no positive 
idea.378 
Thus, the claims of James’s colleagues at Harvard, that “all the fundamental conceptions of truth 
have already been found by science, and that the future has only the details of the picture to fill 
in”379 (which would be controversial in many circles even today) look absurd in the extreme.  
Proponents of scientificism think that only science can give us truth about reality.  They think that 
science has, for the most part, already delivered on that promise.  James disagrees.  By way of a 
pessimistic meta-induction, he argues that the current scientific worldview is very unlikely to be 
the finally correct worldview.  Scientificism has once again overstepped its bounds.  We should 
have no reservations therefore, about rejecting the terms of its proposed reduction/elimination 
of the personal view of life. 
2.3.1.3. The Boundaries of Science 
In chapter one we examined the doctrine of the disunity of science.  We saw that the contributors 
to De Caro and Macarthur’s anthology believe “not just that there is no single method or set of 
methods that is properly called the scientific method, but, more than this, that there is no clear, 
uncontroversial, and useful definition of science to do the substantial work scientific naturalists 
require of it”380.  This notion of ‘the unity of science’ is closely connected with another notion; 
that of ‘the boundaries of science’.  In proportion as we establish unity in science, we establish 
boundaries between science and non-science.  This, in part, is what scientific naturalists hope to 
achieve through the notion of unity.  They want to separate science from non-science, and 
thereby separate naturalistic philosophy (which is continuous with science) from non-naturalistic 
philosophy (which is not continuous with it).  In so doing they hope to establish a superior status 
for their own brand of philosophy.  Now James, although he does not address the issue of 
unity/disunity directly in The Will to Believe, is keenly aware of issues relating to the boundaries of 
science.  He argues that those boundaries are not as sharp as scientificists would like to think, and 
that a number of enterprises/disciplines not traditionally included under the auspices of science 
might nevertheless attain to a quasi-scientific status. 
The substance of James’s discussion of the boundaries of science revolves around the in-his-view-
mistaken idea promulgated by scientificists, that science is closed or complete: 
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The ideal of every science is that of a closed and completed system of truth.  The 
charm of most sciences to their more passive disciples consists in their appearing, in 
fact, to wear just this ideal form.  Each one of our various ologies seems to offer a 
definite head of classification for every possible phenomenon of the sort which it 
professes to cover; and so far from free is most men’s fancy, that, when a consistent 
and organized scheme of this sort has once been comprehended and assimilated, a 
different scheme is unimaginable.381 
As an ideal of course, this view is perfectly healthy, but as a belief about science as it 
presently exists, it is disastrous.  It is disastrous because science as it presently exists is 
emphatically not closed or complete.  As we have seen James arguing in the previous 
section, science has changed drastically and rapidly over the years, and there is good 
reason to think it will continue to change in the future.  Just as outdated phenomena are 
constantly being dispensed with, new phenomena are constantly being discovered.  But if 
we believe, as the scientificists do, that science is closed and complete, then we must 
dismiss any phenomena not presently classifiable in the system as “paradoxical 
absurdities”382.  This, James thinks, is what underlies the scientificists’ dismissal of the 
personal view of life.  It is also, he suggests, what underlies their dismissal of religious, 
ethical, and psychical phenomena.  
Now, this notion of the completeness of science arises, James thinks, because of the tendency to 
identify science with “a certain set of results”383.  This tendency, he insists, is erroneous, because 
science, in fact, “only stands for a method and for no fixed belief”384.  That method is the method 
of ‘verification’, and it can be extended, in principle, to various traditionally non-scientific 
domains385.  Thus, in testing ethical theories, James says, “we might proceed exactly as does the 
physical philosopher in testing an hypothesis”: 
He deduces from the hypothesis an experimental action, x; this he adds to the facts 
M already existing.  It fits them if the hypothesis be true; if not, there is discord.  The 
results of the action corroborate or refute the idea from which it flowed.  So here: 
the verification of the theory … can only consist in this, – that if you proceed to act 
upon your theory it will be reversed by nothing that later turns up as your actions 
fruit; it will harmonize so well with the entire drift of experience that the latter will, 
as it were, adopt it…386 
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And the case is similar with theories pertaining to religious and psychical phenomena387.  Thus, we 
could, in principle, develop a ‘science of religions’388, a ‘science of ethics’389, and a ‘science of 
psychical phenomena’390. 
James then, in the final assessment, may after all be said to endorse a version of the unity of 
science thesis.  He holds that science is united by its use of the method of verification.  However, 
he construes that method in such broad terms that it ceases to establish any sharp boundaries 
between science and non-science; it ceases, as it were, to do the work that scientificists require of 
it.  Indeed, it serves, on the contrary, to potentially raise the epistemic status of certain 
traditionally non-scientific enterprises.  In so doing it goes against the spirit of contemporary 
versions of the unity thesis, and functions, instead, as a critique of that thesis391.   
2.3.2. James’s Ethical Theory 
We said in the introduction to section 2.3 that ‘The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life’ is the 
main source for James’s ethical philosophy.  We also said that this essay displays the tension 
between James’s naturalistic and religious tendencies.  As with PP, this tension manifests in the 
divergent interpretations MPML has received from James’s commentators.  According to Graham 
Bird, MPML reveals James to be “a confirmed naturalist” in ethics392; and according to Richard 
Gale, it can be read as an attempted “naturalization of ethics”393.  Michael A. Cantrell meanwhile 
                                                             
387 James does not speak about the religious case specifically in WB, but we shall see in section 2.4 (on VRE) 
that he holds the method of verification to be likewise applicable to religious theories.   
388 James, The Will to Believe, p. xii 
389 James, The Will to Believe, pp208-210 
390 James does not use the phrase ‘science of psychical phenomena’, but the whole thrust of ‘What 
Psychical Research Has Accomplished’ is towards such a possibility.  Indeed, it was the explicit mandate of 
the Society for Psychical Research to investigate psychical phenomena using the methods of science: “The 
aim of the Society is to approach these various problems without prejudice or prepossession of any kind, 
and in the same spirit of exact and unimpassioned inquiry which has enabled science to solve so many 
problems, once not less obscure nor less hotly debated.”  See: ‘Circulars of the American Society for 
Psychical Research’, in The Works of William James: Essays in Psychical Research, ed. by Frederick Burkhardt 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), p6 
391 For an excellent book-length study of James’s attempts to navigate the boundaries of science and 
philosophy see: Francesca Bordogna, William James at the Boundaries (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2008).  Paul Croce has recently provided a discussion in the same vein regarding James’s view of the 
relation between scientific and sectarian medicine.  See: Paul Jerome Croce, Young William James Thinking 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2018), pp77-133.  For a more general discussion of the 
relationship between the pragmatic tradition and issues relating to the boundaries of science, see: Sami 
Pihlström, ‘Toward Pragmatically Naturalized Transcendental Philosophy of Scientific Inquiry And Pragmatic 
Scientific Realism’, Studia Philosophica Estonica, 5 (2012), pp79-94 
392 Bird, William James, p280.  See also: pp174-175 
393 Gale, The Divided Self of William James, p10 




holds that James endorsed a meta-ethical divine command theory in MPML394; and Mark Boone 
says that the upshot of the essay is that “we must conform our minds to the mind of God”395.  In 
William James on Ethics and Faith, Michael Slater recognizes both sides of this tension.  He 
suggests that James did indeed develop a naturalistic ethical theory in MPML, but that he also 
supplemented it with a religious ethic.  Ultimately, Slater thinks, the religious supplement is 
essential for James, and renders his total ethical theory supernaturalistic396.  For our part we 
agree with Slater that MPML contains both a naturalistic ethic and a religious ethic, and we agree 
that the religious ethic is essential, but we deny that the religious ethic entails a commitment to 
supernaturalism397.  The details of our interpretation will be worked out in chapter three.  For 
now, we confine ourselves to a straightforward exposition of James’s ethical views.   
James organizes his discussion in MPML around three important ethical questions.  These are: 1) 
the psychological question, of what the origins of our moral judgements are, 2) the metaphysical 
question, of what the meaning of our ethical terms are, and 3) the casuistic question, of how to 
weight/order our moral judgements.  In response to these questions, he may be said to articulate 
five ethical doctrines.  These are: i) a doctrine of evolutionary intuitionism, ii) a social theory of 
moral obligation, iii) a desire-satisfaction theory of well-being, iv), a doctrine of preference-
utilitarianism, and v) a doctrine of theological voluntarism.  James’s evolutionary intuitionism 
answers the first of the ethical questions; his social theory of moral obligation and his desire-
satisfaction theory answer the second; and his preference-utilitarianism and theological 
voluntarism answer the third.   
2.3.2.1. Evolutionary Intuitionism 
At the time of his writing MPML, James tells us, the philosophical consensus seems to be that the 
psychological question (of the origin of our moral ideas) resolves into a choice between two 
alternatives: namely ‘evolutionism’ and ‘intuitionism’.  According to evolutionism our moral ideals 
“have gradually resulted from the teaching of the environment”.  On this view human beings are 
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395 Mark Boone, ‘Taking God Seriously, But Not Too Seriously: The Divine Command Theory and William 
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born without any innate ethical ideals/intuitions, and only gradually build these up by learning 
from experience; chiefly from experiences of pleasure and pain, and inferences of utility 
therefrom.  According to intuitionism our ethical ideas result, at least in part, from the fact that 
we possess “an altogether unique faculty called ‘conscience’” (i.e. apriori ethical intuitions) 398. 
Now James, true to his avowed empiricism, is highly sceptical of a priori moral intuitions, but at 
the same time he cannot help but note that the evolutionism fails as an explanation of certain of 
our moral judgements.  Consider the following often-discussed ‘lost soul intuition’: 
[I]f the hypothesis were offered us of a world in which Messrs. Fourier’s and 
Bellamy’s and Morris’s utopias should all be outdone, and millions kept permanently 
unhappy on the one simple condition that a certain lost soul on the far-off edge of 
things should lead a life of lonely torture, what except a specifical and independent 
sort of emotion can it be which would make us immediately feel, even though an 
impulse arose within us to clutch at the happiness so offered, how hideous a thing 
would be its enjoyment when deliberately accepted as the fruit of such a bargain?399 
Such intuitions, James thinks, cannot be explained purely in terms of pleasure/utility.  Rather, he 
thinks, they are the result of “incidental complications to our cerebral structure” which arose in 
the course of evolution with “no reference” to the specific content of the intuition or the 
circumstances which provoke it.  He calls such intuitions “brain-born”, by which he means that 
they result from the apriori structure of the human brain400.  James thus takes a middle way 
between evolutionism and intuitionism.  He thinks that human beings possess ethical intuitions, 
but that these intuitions are the “brain-born” results of the process of evolution401.  Hence, we 
choose the name ‘evolutionary intuitionism’ to describe James’s position402.   
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399 James, The Will to Believe, p188 
400 James, The Will to Believe, p187.  Bernard Brennan, in his relatively early study of James’s ethical 
philosophy, already recognized the importance of this evolutionary dimension of his ethics.  He suggested, 
more or less correctly in our view, that: “Although these views are definitely materialistic and naturalistic in 
their implications, in the wider context of James’s philosophy they are made eventually to fit into a spiritual 
setting.”  This ‘spiritual setting’, he notes, is provided by James’s mature panpsychist worldview.  See: 
Bernard Brennan, The Ethics of William James (New York: Bookman Associates, 1961), p78; p168 
401 The philosopher Jacob G. Schurman is a likely source of this view.  In his review of Schurman’s book, The 
Ethical Import of Darwinism, James refers approvingly to the author’s discussions of this topic: “Sudden 
variations in the way of intuitive perceptions of the superior excellence of social over selfish instincts would 
(if we understand Dr. Schurman rightly) be the only origin of conscience which he would himself allow to be 
plausible.”  See: The Works of William James: Essays, Comments, and Reviews, ed. by Frederick Burkhardt 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp407-410 (p409).  This review originally appeared in 
Nation: William James, ‘The Ethical Import of Darwinism’, Nation, 45 (1887), p376.  We refer to The Works 
reprint for reasons of accessibility. 
402 In choosing this name we did not mean to imply any relation to the philosopher Brian Zamulinski’s 
‘evolutionary intuitionism’.  However, an interesting issue arises in this connection.  Zamulinski makes much 
of the distinction between ‘adaptationist’ theories of morality and ‘by-product’ theories of morality.  
According to the former, morality has evolved because it is adaptive; i.e. because it confers an evolutionary 




2.3.2.2. Social Theory of Moral Obligation 
Next James moves on to consider the metaphysical question, of what the meanings of ethical 
terms are.  In particular he is interested in the meanings of the terms ‘obligation’, ‘good’, and ‘ill’.  
He begins with an intriguing thought experiment: 
Imagine an absolutely material world, containing only physical and chemical facts, 
and existing from eternity without a God, without even an interested spectator: 
would there be any sense in saying of that world that one of its states is better than 
another?403 
James thinks that the answer is self-evidently ‘no’.  And from this he deduces the following 
principle: that the words ‘obligation’, ‘good’, and ‘ill’ “can have no application or relevancy in a 
world in which no sentient life exists.”404  Michael Slater calls this James’s ‘existential condition for 
ethics’405.  Having established this principle, James continues with his thought experiment.  He 
asks us now to imagine that sentient beings are introduced into our hypothetical universe.  The 
moment this occurs, he thinks, moral relations begin to have a status; the sentient beings 
instantaneously have obligations to one another.  The question is, what is the source of those 
obligations?  James’s suggestion is that the source of those obligations is simply the demands of 
the sentient beings themselves: 
Take any demand, however slight, which any creature, however weak, may make.  
Ought it not, for its own sole sake, be satisfied?  If not, prove why not.  The only 
possible kind of proof you could adduce would be the exhibition of another creature 
who should make a demand that ran the other way.406 
From this James deduces a second principle: that demand and obligation are “coextensive terms”.  
We may call this the principle of the ‘coextensivity of demand and obligation’.  These two 
principles together – the ‘existential condition for ethics’ and the ‘coextensivity of demand and 
obligation’ – constitute James’s social theory of moral obligation.  It may be formulated as 
follows: 
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and does not contribute towards adaptivity.  See: Brian Zamulinski, Evolutionary Intuitionism: A Theory of 
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• P1: Obligations are the foundational moral facts. 
• P2: There can be no obligations without demands. 
• P3: There can be no demands without sentient beings. 
• C: Moral obligation is grounded in sentient beings. 
This theory may seem trivial in the present day, but in James’s time it was controversial.  A large 
number of James’s philosophical contemporaries were still ardent Platonists in ethics, believing in 
“an abstract moral order in which the objective truth resides”407, raining obligatoriness down 
upon our demands “much as upon the steel of the compass-needle the influence of the Pole rains 
down from out of the starry heavens.”408 
2.3.2.3. Desire-Satisfaction Theory 
With the social theory of moral obligation James has answered the question of what the word 
‘obligation’ means, but he has yet to answer the question of what the words ‘good’ and ‘ill’ mean.  
It is to this question that he turns next.  He begins with a survey of extant attempts to answer it: 
Thus to be a mean between two extremes; to be recognized by a special intuitive 
faculty; to make the agent happy for the moment; to make others as well as him 
happy in the long run; to add to his perfection or dignity; to harm no one; to follow 
from reason or flow from universal law; to be in accordance with the will of God; to 
promote the survival of the human species on the planet, – are so many tests, each 
of which has been maintained by somebody to constitute the essence of all good 
things or actions so far as they are good.409 
None of these theories, James says, have given general satisfaction.  Some, like the character of 
‘harming no one’, or that of ‘following a universal rule’, are evidently not present in all actions we 
would wish to describe as good; for good actions can be cruel and exceptional.  Others, like 
‘following the will of God’, or ‘promoting survival’ are vague and unascertainable410.   
The best, on the whole, of these marks and measures of goodness seems to be the 
capacity to bring happiness.  But in order not to break down fatally, this test must be 
taken to cover innumerable facts and impulses that never aim at happiness; so that, 
after all, in seeking for a universal principle we are inevitably carried onward to the 
most universal principle, – that the essence of good is simply to satisfy demand.411 
The above statement would seem to constitute a fairly straightforward endorsement of the 
desire-satisfaction theory of well-being (DST).  The notion that happiness as a measure of 
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goodness breaks down fatally was, and still is, widely touted as a reason for preferring desire-
satisfaction theories to hedonistic theories412.  It is important to note that James’s statement of 
DST seems to imply that the ethical status of a demand is not related to its quality.  After all, if it 
was so related then the essence of good would not be to satisfy demands, but to satisfy certain 
kinds of demands.  James does however suggest that demands may differ quantitively.  “Any 
desire”, he says, “is imperative to the extent of its amount”413.  This will be important in what 
follows. 
2.3.2.4. Preference Utilitarianism  
So, the essence of ‘good’ is to satisfy demand (and the essence of ‘ill’, we may infer, to thwart it).  
The metaphysical question has therefore been answered.  But the casuistic question remains.  
How are we to subordinate demands to one another?  We saw in the last section that the ethical 
status of demands, for James, does not depend on their quality; “all demands as such are prima 
facie respectable”414.  This being the case, James says, “the best simply imaginary world would be 
one in which every demand was gratified as soon as made”415.  However, such a state of affairs 
plainly cannot be realized in the actual world in which we live: 
There is hardly a good which we can imagine except as competing for the possession 
of the same bit of space and time with some other imagined good.  Every end of 
desire that presents itself appears as exclusive of some other end of desire.416 
The obvious solution, according to James, is to adopt a maximization principle; specifically, a 
principle of demand-satisfaction maximization/demand-dissatisfaction minimization417: 
Since everything which is demanded is by that fact a good, must not the guiding 
principle for ethical philosophy (since all demands conjointly cannot be satisfied in 
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this poor world) be simply to satisfy at all times as many demands as we can?  That 
act must be the best act, accordingly, which makes for the best whole, in the sense of 
awakening the least sum of dissatisfactions.418 
It is because of his adoption of this maximization principle that many of James’s commentators 
have described his position as basically utilitarian419.  We add however that his rejection of 
hedonism impels us to categorize him as a ‘preference utilitarian’; it is not pleasure that James 
wishes to maximize, but desire/demand-satisfaction420.   
The upshot of James’s maximization principle is that we must strive to find the most inclusive set 
of demands; that is, ‘the largest possible set of mutually consistent demands’421.  “The course of 
history”, James says, “is nothing but the story of men’s struggles from generation to generation to 
find the more and more inclusive order”: 
Following this path, society has shaken itself into one sort of relative equilibrium 
after another by a series of social discoveries quite analogous to those of science.  
Polyandry and polygamy and slavery, private warfare and liberty to kill, judicial 
torture and arbitrary royal power have slowly succumbed to actually aroused 
complaints; and though some one’s ideals are unquestionably the worse off for each 
improvement, yet a vastly greater total number of them find shelter in our civilised 
society than in the older savage ways.422 
In this way, James says, moral progress of a kind is possible, even in the absence of any truly 
objective standard.  Whether or not God exists, he says, “we form at any rate an ethical republic 
here below”423. 
2.3.2.5. Theological Voluntarism 
The preceding four subsections constitute the overtly naturalistic part of James’s ethical theory. 
According to James, it “affords a basis for ethics as well as theism does”.  Whether, however, this 
“purely human system” can gratify the philosopher’s demand for moral objectivity, is, James says, 
an entirely different question; one which he intends to answer before the close of the essay424.  
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The problem for the philosopher, he suggests, is that there is “nothing final” in any given 
equilibrium of human ideals.  It merely represents the will of the majority, or of the most 
powerful among them, at a given point in history.  Demands that are insignificant and disposable 
today may thus be victorious tomorrow; and we are none the wiser about which demands are 
destined to be triumphant.  It is as this point that God enters into James’s account.  If we 
postulate a God who knows which demands are destined to be triumphant, and whose own 
demands coincide with these, then moral objectivity is secured:  
If such a thinker existed, his way of subordinating the demands to one another would 
be the finally valid casuistic scale; his claims would be the most appealing; his ideal 
universe would be the most inclusive realizable whole.  If he now exist, then 
actualized in his thought already must be that ethical philosophy which we seek as 
the pattern which our own must evermore approach.  In the interests of our own 
ideal of systematically unified moral truth, therefore, we, as would-be philosophers, 
must postulate a divine thinker, and pray for the victory of the religious cause.425 
Thus, God’s “all-enveloping demands” exert an overwhelming obligation on human beings, and 
abolish the moral relativity of the ethical republic.  They do so, James notes, not because they are 
of a different kind to human demands, but “simply because they are the greatest in amount.”426  It 
is for this reason that thinkers like Michael Cantrell ascribe a divine command theory to James; 
because in the final assessment, he holds that our most important moral obligations have their 
source in God.  We take Cantrell’s suggestion seriously, but ultimately we agree with Mark Boone 
that James’s doctrine is too dissimilar from traditional divine command theories to be worthy of 
the name.  God, after all, is not the exclusive source of moral obligation for James.  Indeed, he is a 
source of moral obligation in just the same way that human beings are; by virtue of his being a 
person and having demands (as per James’s social theory of moral obligation427).  For this reason, 
we prefer to classify this part of James’s ethical philosophy as a doctrine of metaethical 
theological voluntarism.  It constitutes a doctrine of theological voluntarism because it appeals to 
God’s will as a source of moral obligation.  It is metaethical because it does so only formally; it 
says nothing about the content of God’s demands428.   
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God then, may be said to serve a metaethical purpose in James’s philosophy.  But this is not the 
only purpose he serves.  He also has a more practical role.  James makes a vital distinction in 
MPML between what he calls ‘the easy-going mood’ and ‘the strenuous mood’.  The easy-going 
mood characterises most of us most of the time; in it, we give ourselves some wiggle-room in 
ethical matters, and allow ourselves the occasional ‘moral holiday’.  The strenuous mood on the 
other hand is what we feel in times of dire need and profound religious excitement; it is the 
condition of all our most heroic and saintly deeds429.  Now, what James suggests in the final 
section of MPML, is that the ‘purely human system of ethics’ – what he elsewhere calls “the 
religion of humanity”430 – is not sufficient to awaken the strenuous mood.  Life, he says, for the 
religion of humanity, is “a genuine ethical symphony; but it is played in the compass of a couple of 
poor octaves, and the infinite scale of values fails to open up”: 
When, however, we believe that a God is there, and that he is one of the claimants, 
the infinite perspective opens out.  The scale of the symphony is incalculably 
prolonged.  The more imperative ideals now begin to speak with an altogether new 
objectivity and significance, and to utter the penetrating, shattering, tragically 
challenging note of appeal.431 
Thus God, in MPML, serves a dual metaethical and practical purpose.  He is the condition for the 
possibility of moral unity and objectivity; and he is the inspiration for a morally strenuous life.  
Michael Slater, as we mentioned in the introduction, has claimed that this religious part of 
James’s ethical philosophy is essentially supernaturalistic.  The basis of this claim appears to be 
James’s use of the term ‘infinite’, as in the quotes above.  We will not discuss this claim in detail 
now, but we signal the manner of our eventual response by noting our agreement with Richard 
Gale in his review of Slater’s book: James’s God is a finite God, existing within nature.  As such it is 
doubtful that his appeal to God in MPML commits him to supernaturalism432. 
2.3.3. Conclusions 
In this section we have investigated The Will to Believe under two heads: ‘James’s Critique of 
Scientificism’, and ‘James’s Ethical Theory’.  In the former we saw James describing a position he 
called ‘scientificism’, which was characterised by commitments to scientism and hyperscientific 
realism, and to the claim that there are sharp boundaries between science and non-science.  We 
saw that he mounted critiques of these doctrines; in the first case centred around the argument 
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that science presupposes faith and norms of rationality; in the second around a pessimistic meta 
induction; and in the third around a liberal definition of the scientific method.  It might be thought 
that these critiques imply some sort of conflict with naturalism, but this, we insist, is a superficial 
view.  Each of James’s critiques overlaps significantly with the critiques advanced by liberal 
naturalists which we covered in chapter one.  His arguments against scientism are essentially 
versions of ‘the fundamental argument’ and ‘the argument from non-scientific values/principles 
in science’.  They are echoed by a number of the contributors to Naturalism in Question and 
Naturalism and Normativity; for instance, by Hilary Putnam in ‘Science and Philosophy’433 and by 
Donald Davidson in ‘Could There Be a Science of Rationality?’434.  His pessimistic meta-induction is 
essentially similar to modern versions of the argument, like those advanced by Putnam and 
Laudan.  Finally, his discussion of the boundaries of science overlaps with the critiques presented 
by John Dupre in ‘The Miracle of Monism’ and ‘How to be Naturalistic Without Being Simplistic in 
the Study of Human Nature’435, and with David Macarthur’s arguments in ‘Taking the Human 
Sciences Seriously’436.  James’s views on these topics, we contend, far from implying conflict with 
naturalism, place him squarely in the camp of ‘liberal naturalism’. 
As to ‘James’s Ethical Theory’, we have seen that it consisted in both a naturalistic and a religious 
part.  The naturalistic part is, it must be admitted, quite thoroughly naturalistic.  James argues 
that moral intuitions are the ‘brain-born’ results of the process of evolution; that all moral facts 
are grounded in natural beings; that the essence of good is in satisfying the desires of those 
beings; that the only valid casuistic principle is to maximise desire-satisfaction; and that in so 
doing we may achieve moral progress in this “ethical republic here below”.  This, as Richard Gale 
says, could well be construed as an attempted naturalization of ethics.  However, there is no 
sense in denying that the religious part of James’s ethics constitutes a deviation from this classic 
naturalistic pattern.  In it he invokes a powerful, personal God, whose divine demands serve to 
secure moral objectivity and to ground the strenuous mood.  Yet the question remains open as to 
whether this deviation is a deviation into supernaturalism.  In our view, it would be better 
interpreted as a deviation into radical religious naturalism.  Our argument for this conclusion 
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however must await a fuller picture of James’s concept of God.  Part of this picture will be 
revealed to us in the next section, on The Varieties of Religious Experience. 




2.4. The Varieties of Religious Experience 
The Varieties of Religious Experience is undoubtedly James’s most important text as regards his 
views on religion.  In it, James famously aligns himself with supernaturalism and against 
naturalism.  However, the precise ontological commitments of his so-called ‘piecemeal 
supernaturalism’ are far from clear.  On one hand James considers that God’s being extends into a 
“supernatural” or “mystical” dimension of existence, but on the other he calls God a “higher part 
of the universe”437.  James is known to have flirted with the doctrine of a finite God throughout 
his career, and to have explicitly defended that doctrine in PU438.  For this reason, Eugene Taylor 
and others describe James’s mature view as a form of ‘naturalistic theism439.  As we shall see, 
James himself used a similar term – “theistic naturalism” – to describe his position in a notebook 
containing an original plan for his second course of Gifford Lectures440.  The suggestion of Nancy 
Frankenberry, that we may be able to “make naturalistic sense” of James’s notion of an ‘unseen 
order’ in VRE, does not, therefore, seem implausible441.  Frankenberry hints that a doctrine of 
emergentism may be of help in this endeavour, but Graham Bird insists that while James’s ethical 
views can be fit into the schema of emergentism, his religious views cannot442.  Along with Richard 
Gale and Wayne Proudfoot he considers that James is committed in VRE to a typical, modern 
concept of supernaturalism, according to which God’s being (or in Gale’s case, the Mother Sea of 
consciousness, considered as something distinct from God) extends beyond nature, and may even 
be ontically discontinuous with it443.   
Our overriding concern in this section will be to show that readings like Bird’s and Proudfoot’s are 
mistaken, and that James’s avowal of piecemeal supernaturalism is superficial.  This will be the 
focus of our final subsection (2.4.4), but first we must investigate James’s overall account of 
religious experience.  As we mentioned in the introduction to chapter 2, this account can 
justifiably by called naturalistic in several respects.  First and foremost, it definitely evinces 
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James’s continued commitment to the methodological thesis of naturalism, for he explicitly 
endeavours to maintain “contact with science” throughout444.  We will organize our investigation 
into four parts.  In section 2.4.1 we will address James’s general approach and methodology in 
VRE, his model of mystical experience, and his conclusions regarding the intellectual content of 
religious and mystical experience.  In section 2.4.2 we will examine James’s notion of the 
testing/verification of religious experience by its fruits, his conclusions regarding the epistemic 
status of religious/mystical experience, and his proposal of a ‘Science of Religions’.  In section 
2.4.3 we will investigate James’s notion of subliminal consciousness, his theory of the divided self 
and the process of its unification, and his conclusions regarding the biological function of 
religion/religious experience.  Finally, in section 2.4.4, we will investigate the notion of ‘over-
belief’, the content of James’s own over-belief, and his classification of that over-belief in terms of 
‘piecemeal supernaturalism’. 
2.4.1. The Phenomena of Religious Experience 
2.4.1.1. Religious Experience 
In late January 1898 the University of Edinburgh’s senate voted to make James the Gifford 
Lecturer for 1899-1900 and 1900-1901.  Later the same year, whilst camping in the Adirondacks 
with friends, James found himself slipping one night into “a state of spiritual alertness of the most 
vital description”: 
The influences of Nature, the wholesomeness of the people round me, … the thought 
of you and the children, … the problem of the Edinburgh lectures, all fermented 
within me till it became a regular Walpurgis nacht.  I spent a good deal of it in the 
woods, where the streaming moonlight lit up things in a magical checkered play, and 
it seemed as if the gods of all the nature-mythologies were holding an indescribable 
meeting in my breast with the moral gods of the inner life. … The intense significance 
of some sort, of the whole scene, if one could only tell the significance; the intense 
inhuman remoteness of its inner life, and yet the intense appeal of it; its everlasting 
freshness and its immemorial antiquity and decay; … It was one of the happiest 
lonesome nights of my existence, and I understand now what a poet is.  He is a 
person who can feel the immense complexity of influences that I felt, and make some 
partial tracks in them for verbal statement.  In point of fact, I can’t find a single word 
for all that significance, and don’t know what it was significant of, so there it remains, 
a mere boulder of impression.445   
“Doubtless in more ways than one, though,” James adds, “things in the Edinburgh lecture will be 
traceable to it”.  One of the most important aspects of the Gifford Lectures that is partly traceable 
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to James’s Walpurgisnacht is his focus on religious experience.  But while this experience may 
have provided the inspiration for the approach of VRE, it cannot be said to have provided the 
intellectual motives for it.  Those motives, we may say, were twofold.  Firstly, James intends to 
take a pragmatic approach to the study of religion, and in order to get at the pragmatic meaning 
of religion, it is necessary to go back to experiences and their effects.  Secondly, he intends his 
approach to be psychological, and psychology, for James, is primarily concerned with private 
experiences. 
The first of these motives is elucidated in James’s famous talk on ‘Philosophical Conceptions and 
Practical Results’ delivered to the Philosophical Union at Berkeley in 1898446.  This talk was, James 
acknowledged, “a rehearsal for Edinburgh”447.  In it, he introduced some of the key themes of The 
Varieties.  It is also noteworthy for being the first lecture in which James invoked the concept of 
pragmatism, and therefore for signalling “the beginning of the pragmatist movement”448.  James 
begins ‘Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results’ by outlining the “principle of practicalism 
– or pragmatism” which had been introduced to him by Charles Sanders Peirce at a meeting of the 
Metaphysical Club at Harvard in the 1870s449: 
To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider 
what effects of a conceivably practical kind the object may involve – what sensations 
we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare.  Our conception of 
these effects, then, is for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that 
conception has positive significance at all.450 
This principle, James says, when applied to certain philosophical problems, shows them to be 
illusory or insignificant; or else serves to sharpen and clarify the meanings of their terms.  For 
instance, when we apply the principle to certain concepts of scholastic theology – God’s ‘aseity’, 
his ‘necessity’, and his ‘simplicity’, among others – we find that these terms are utterly empty of 
practical significance; they “awaken no responsive active feelings and call for no particular 
conduct of our own”451.  The sensations we may expect and the reactions we must prepare in a 
universe in which God possesses aseity are exactly the same as they would be in a universe in 
which he does not.  These concepts make no practical difference to our lives, and so, according to 
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the principle of pragmatism, they have no meaning.  The real meaning of the word “God”, James 
says – what really “keeps religion going” – is “concrete religious experiences”; “conversations with 
the unseen, voices and visions, responses to prayer, changes of heart, deliverances from fear, 
inflowings of help, assurances of support”452.  It would be concrete experiences like these, rather 
than the “secondary accretions” of theology, that would form the primary subject matter of 
VRE453. 
As to James’s second motive, he remarks at the beginning of the first lecture of VRE that he is 
neither a theologian, nor an anthropologist, nor a historian of religion, but a psychologist.  “If the 
inquiry be psychological,” he insists, “not religious institutions, but rather religious feelings and 
religious impulses must be its subject”454.  This constitutes an important disclaimer to James’s 
controversial definition of religion in the following lecture (according to which it consists of “the 
feelings, acts and experiences of individual men in their solitude” 455).  James is not – not naively 
at least – trying to give an essentialist definition of religion, or to construct the category in a way 
that justifies his protestant bias; he is merely trying to establish a mandate for his psychological 
approach to the topic456.  Besides his focus on private experiences, this approach also warrants 
various other methodological and thematic choices.  For instance, James appeals frequently to 
psychopathology (i.e. in his comparison of religious genius and madness), to the psychology of 
personality and temperament (in his account of the sick-soul and healthy-mindedness), to clinical 
psychology (in his emphasis on the therapeutic effects of religion), and to psychological concepts 
like that of the subconscious self and its associated automatisms.  James considers that the 
psychological character of his investigation means that it maintains “contact with science”457.  In 
modern terms, we may say that it upheld the methodological thesis of naturalism.  Indeed, we 
shall see in what follows that VRE is, in some ways, one of James’s more profoundly naturalistic 
texts. 
2.4.1.2. Mystical Experience 
James includes in VRE accounts and discussions of a truly staggering variety of religious 
experiences.  Indeed, he seems to consider just about any unusual or anomalous experiences 
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provided they have religious content of some kind.  He considers accounts of sudden changes of 
heart, of the overcoming of addiction, of obsessive ideas, unaccountable motor impulses, 
delusions, hallucinations, experiences of ecstasy, drug-induced experiences, and more.  It is 
perhaps for this reason that he does not attempt to formulate a general schema for assessing the 
phenomenal content of any and all religious experience.  What he gives us instead is a schema for 
assessing the phenomenal content of one relatively well-defined class of religious experiences, 
namely mystical experiences, together with the claim that these experiences may serve as a 
model for religious experience more generally.  Let us first address this claim about the 
relationship between religious and mystical experience.  It occurs at the beginning of his lecture 
on ‘Mysticism’: 
One may say truly, I think, that personal religious experience has its root and centre 
in mystical states of consciousness; so for us, who in these lectures are treating 
personal experience as the exclusive subject of our study, such states of 
consciousness ought to form the vital chapter from which the other chapters get 
their light.458 
James offers little in the way of justification for this claim.  Ironically, he appeals for support to the 
ecclesiastical institutions of the various religious traditions, noting that they generally accept 
some version of it459.  Thus, many religious traditions contain something loosely describable as a 
‘mystical tradition’ which aims at the systematic cultivation of mystical states, and which 
enshrines them as authoritative and revelatory.  But the mere consensus of religious believers or 
of ecclesiastical authorities ought not to be definitive on this question.  More robust empirical 
evidence would certainly be required to establish James’s claim to the satisfaction of his critics460.   
Let us now outline the four typical characteristics which, on James’s view, constitute the common 
core of mystical experience.  The first two characteristics, of ‘ineffability’ and ‘noetic quality’, are, 
he says, the most typical, and will, by themselves, “entitle any state to be called mystical”461: 
1. Ineffability.– … The subject of it immediately says that it defies expression, that no 
adequate report of its contents can be given in words.  It follows from this that its 
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quality must be directly experienced; it cannot be imparted or transferred to 
others.  In this peculiarity mystical states are more like states of feeling than like 
states of intellect. 
 
2. Noetic quality.– Although so similar to states of feeling, mystical states seem to 
those who experience them to be also states of knowledge.  They are states of 
insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect.  They are 
illuminations, revelations, full of significance and importance, all inarticulate 
though they remain; and as a rule they carry with them a curious sense of authority 
for after-time. 
The second two characteristics, of ‘transiency’ and ‘passivity’, are “less sharply marked, but 
are usually found”: 
3. Transiency.– Mystical states cannot be sustained for long.  Except in rare instances, 
half an hour, or at most an hour or two, seems to be the limit beyond which they 
fade into the light of common day.  Often, when faded, their quality can but 
imperfectly be reproduced in memory; but when they recur it is recognized; and 
from one recurrence to another it is susceptible of continuous development in 
what is felt as inner richness and importance. 
 
4. Passivity.–  Although the oncoming of mystical states may be facilitated by 
preliminary voluntary operations, as by fixing the attention, or going through 
certain bodily performances, or in other ways which manuals of mysticism 
prescribe; yet when the characteristic sort of consciousness once has set in, the 
mystic feels as if his will were in abeyance, and indeed sometimes as if he were 
grasped and held by a superior power.462 
Following his enumeration of these characteristics, James proceeds to give various examples of 
states that will be classified as mystical according to his schema.  He begins by telling us that 
mystical states can vary considerably in intensity and in purported religious significance463.  On 
one end of the spectrum we have relatively insignificant states like déjà vu.  Experiences of déjà 
vu are ineffable to some degree; they involve a profound sense of familiarity, but we cannot say 
what this sense of familiarity consists in.  They possess noetic quality; we seem to recognize, and 
hence to cognize the objects of the experience.  They are transient; lasting only for a few seconds.  
And there is some sense of passivity or dreaminess in experiences of déjà vu as well.  At the other 
end of the spectrum we have the deliberately cultivated experiences of the various religious 
mystics.  James cites Swami Vivekananda’s account of ‘samadhi’, Al-Ghazali on the ‘transports’ of 
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Sufism, and Saint Teresa on the ‘orison of union’, among others464.  In each case he attempts to 
show how the accounts in question conform to his schema465.   
2.4.1.3. The Intellectual Content of Religious and Mystical Experience 
The reader will notice that there is nothing in James’s INTP schema about any intellectual content 
of mystical experience.  And yet many of the reports of mystical experience that James considers 
– with the pointed exception of the apophatic utterances of Pseudo-Dionysus and the Buddhist 
accounts of śūnyatā – seem, on the face of it, to contain a good deal of intellectual content.  That 
nothing exists except for “a pure, absolute, abstract Self”466; that human beings are “identical with 
the Atman or Universal Soul”467; that we are immersed in “the infinite ocean of God”468; destined 
for “total absorption in God”469; for “unity with all that is”470.  These are so many ways that 
mystics have expressed part of that intellectual content.  The upshot of all these varied 
expressions, according to James, is the claim of “the unity of man with God”: 
This is the everlasting and triumphant mystical tradition, hardly altered by 
differences of clime or creed.  In Hinduism, in Neoplatonism, in Sufism, in Christian 
mysticism, in Whitmanism, we find the same recurring note, so that there is about 
mystical utterances an eternal unanimity which ought to make a critic stop and think, 
and which brings it about that the mystical classics have, as has been said, neither 
birthday nor native land.  Perpetually telling of the unity of man with God, their 
speech antedates languages, and they do not grow old.471 
It is important to note that when James uses the term ‘God’ in this case he does not intend it to 
have any specific theological connotations.  In particular he wants to dissociate it from the 
attributions of unity and infinity that are typically made for it by mystics: 
[I]n the interests of intellectual clearness, I feel bound to say that religious 
experience, as we have studied it, cannot be cited as unequivocally supporting the 
infinitist belief.  The only thing that it unequivocally testifies to is that we can 
experience union with something larger than ourselves and in that union find our 
greatest peace.472 
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Religious and mystical experiences testify to our union with something larger than ourselves.  But 
that is all they testify to.  Whether that something is finite or infinite, pluralistic or monistic, 
unitary or trinitary, jealous or magnanimous, etc., is not disclosed in the experiences themselves.  
This may seem like a meagre intellectual content, but it is from this content, according to James, 
that the various religious traditions and religious individuals build out their myriad ‘over-beliefs’.  
This is, as it were, the foundation upon which the whole intellectual edifice of religion is built.  Let 
us therefore turn in the next section to the question of whether or not the foundation is sturdy; of 
what is the epistemic status of mystical experience, and of knowledge claims derived therefrom. 
2.4.2. The Epistemology of Religious Experience 
2.4.2.1. By Their Fruits You Shall Know Them 
In section 2.3, on The Will to Believe, we saw James advocating a verificationist approach to the 
testing of moral theories.  His doctrine in VRE, that religious experiences are to be known by their 
fruits, amounts, in our view, to an extension of that approach into the realm of religion.  As in WB, 
one advantage to this approach is its empirical/quasi-scientific character.  Religious theories 
vindicated by such a method may be supposed to have an epistemic status similar to that of 
ethical theories, and not wholly dissimilar to that of physical theories.  Another advantage, 
according to James, is that this approach avoids a fallacy that is all too common in the evaluation 
of religious experiences; namely the genetic fallacy.  Religious experiences are all too often 
venerated or condemned on the basis of their purported origins.  Thus, critics of religion declare 
many religious experiences epistemically dubious on account of their pathological origins; Saint 
Paul’s on account of his epilepsy; Saint Teresa’s on account of her hysteria; Saint Francis’s on 
account of his hereditary degeneracy, and so on473.  Supporters of religion meanwhile declare the 
same experiences infallible on account of their supposedly divine origins474.  James thinks that this 
way of dealing with religious experience will get us nowhere.  We should instead take a leaf out of 
the book of “the natural sciences”, and test religious experiences and hypotheses “by logic and by 
experiment”475. 
In WB, recall, James proposed that the testing of moral theories would involve: i) devising a 
hypothesis, ii) deducing experimental actions from it, iii) performing those actions, and iv) seeing 
whether the results harmonize with experience.  Now, in the case of religious theories, we may 
presumably adopt precisely the same procedure; but in the case of religious experiences, the 
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situation would seem to be different.  We do not generally deduce experimental actions from 
religious experiences; rather actions follow more or less automatically from them.  All we need do 
therefore, is see whether the fruits of those actions harmonize with subsequent experience.  
Using the ample data he has gathered concerning those fruits from the lives of converts and 
saints, James proposes to do just that476.  The fruits of religious experience, as manifested in 
saintliness, are, he says, as follows: 
a. Asceticism.– The self-surrender may become so passionate as to turn into self-
immolation.  It may then so overrule the ordinary inhibitions of the flesh that the saint 
finds positive pleasure in sacrifice and asceticism… 
 
b. Strength of Soul.– The sense of enlargement of life may be so uplifting that personal 
motives and inhibitions, commonly omnipotent, become too insignificant for notice … 
Fears and anxieties go, and blissful equanimity takes their place. 
 
c. Purity.– The sensitiveness to spiritual discords is enhanced, and the cleansing of existence 
from brutal and sensual elements becomes imperative. 
 
d. Charity.– The ordinary motives to antipathy, which usually set such close bounds to 
tenderness among human beings, are inhibited.477 
The question is, do these fruits harmonize with experience or not?  As manifested in converts, the 
beneficial character of these fruits is evident.  Depression is alleviated, sinfulness is vanquished, 
addiction is overcome478.  As manifested in saints, the situation is more complex.  Saints 
sometimes possess these fruits to such a degree that they prove poorly adapted to the 
circumstances of their time.  But the saints, James suggests, with their excesses of virtue, may be 
prophetic.  They may be “impregnators of the world, vivifiers and animaters of potentialities of 
goodness which but for them would lie forever dormant.”479  They may be “torch-bearers” for a 
“millennial society” that is yet to be realized.  In this way the saints may be regarded as “leavens” 
of moral progress and social justice.  In the final assessment, James thinks, they serve an 
indispensable function in social evolution480. 
In a general way, then, and ‘on the whole,’ our abandonment of theological criteria, 
and our testing of religion by practical common sense and the empirical method, 
leave it in possession of its towering place in history.481 
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Thus, religious experience, and the interpretations and theories it engenders, stand vindicated.  
They have, we may suppose – according to the standards James set out in WB – been “verified”.  
And yet James is reluctant to say that we have thereby demonstrated the truth of religion.  He 
supposes that his readers will insist that he has so far only demonstrated its utility.  To get at its 
truth, he says, we must assess the phenomenon of mysticism482. 
2.4.2.2. Mystical Experiences as Perceptual Experiences 
In lecture three of VRE (on ‘The Reality of the Unseen’) James introduces the notion of a ‘sense of 
objective presence’:  
It is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of 
objective presence, a perception of what we may call ‘something there’, more deep 
and more general than any of the special and particular ‘senses’ by which the current 
psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed.483  
This ‘sense of objective presence’, he speculates, has likely played a major role in the formation of 
beliefs about ghosts, gods, and other unseen entities throughout human history484.  Many 
religious persons, past and present, have experienced this sense of objective presence, and have 
associated it with the existence of a deity.  These persons, James says, “possess the objects of 
their belief, not in the form of mere conceptions which their intellects accept as true, but rather in 
the form of quasi-sensible realities directly apprehended”485.  And as this sense of objective 
presence fluctuates “so the believer alternates between warmth and coldness in his faith”486.   
Now, James thinks that in mystical experiences this sense of objective presence rises to a fever 
pitch.  Subjects of mystical experience feel that they have been “grasped and held by a superior 
power”, and they feel that they know this to be the case487.  James thinks that such experiences 
are analogous in some respects to sensory experiences.  Like sensory experiences they come 
without our consent, and they take the form not of conceptions or mental images, but of “face to 
face presentations of what seems immediately to exist”488.  Indeed, the impression is so strong 
that it is “realized with an intensity almost like that of a hallucination”489, which, James said in PP, 
is “a strictly sensational form of consciousness, as good and true a sensation as if there were a real 
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object there”490.  This leads him to conclude in his lecture on ‘Mysticism’ that these experiences 
are, as a matter of psychological fact, “absolutely sensational in their epistemological quality”491.  
What he means by this is that when we observe how mystics treat their experiences – how they 
speak about them, and how they respond to them – we find they treat them as epistemically 
equivalent to sensory experiences.  The accounts of mystical experience quoted by James speak of 
being “face to face” with God492, of having “perceived” God493, of being surrounded by God “like 
the physical atmosphere”494, and of having heard God’s voice “so clearly … that it seems my outer 
ear must have carried the tone”495.  Onlookers may justly debate their epistemic status, but the 
subjects of mystical experience themselves can no more doubt what they have perceived than 
subjects of hallucination or ordinary sensation can496.  
And so, James offers the following conclusion (of which we give the first two of three parts; the 
third to be discussed at a later stage): 
(1) Mystical states, when well developed, usually are, and have the right to be, absolutely 
authoritative over the individuals to whom they come. 
 
(2) No authority emanates from them which should make it a duty for those who stand 
outside of them to accept their revelations uncritically.497 
Non-mystics are under no obligation to accept mystical knowledge claims.  They are perfectly 
entitled to assess their value by the usual “empirical methods”498; i.e. on the basis of the sort of 
verification procedures outlined above. “By their fruits ye shall know them,” James says, “not by 
their roots.”499   
2.4.2.3. The Science of Religions 
The category of religious experience is an incredibly broad one.  Although these experiences can 
evidently contain an abundance of intellectual content, James does not embark, in VRE, upon 
what would surely be the mammoth task of systematizing that content.  Even when he comes to 
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assess the relatively well-defined sub-category of mystical experience, he does not deign to derive 
explicit knowledge claims from them.  However, James is far from denying the possibility of a 
more systematic treatment of the intellectual content of religious and mystical experience.  
Indeed, he thinks such a treatment is positively mandated.  This task cannot be carried out by a 
solitary individual however, or completed in a single book.  It will require a collaborative effort on 
the part of many academics over many generations to achieve; and James thinks it ought to 
follow something like the model of a natural science in its approach and methodology. 
A “critical Science of Religions”, James says, would compare the doctrines of the various religious 
traditions, and the deliverances of their respective mystics, and would attempt to “eliminate the 
local and the accidental” from them.  This would involve removing all “historic incrustations” from 
them; such incrustations, we might imagine, as the notion that we must accept a particular 
historical figure as our saviour in order to attain salvation.  It would also involve “confronting the 
spontaneous religious constructions with the results of natural science”, and eliminating any 
doctrines that contradict them.  Thus, we might presume, the notion of a ‘young earth’, and the 
doctrine of creationism would have to be abandoned.  Proceeding in this way, a science of 
religions would sift out all “unworthy formulations” until it was left with “a residuum of 
conceptions that at least are possible”.  These, James says, it would then test, “in all the manners, 
whether negative or positive, by which hypotheses are ever tested”500.  This, presumably, means 
subjecting them to sort of tests we discussed in section 2.4.2.1.    
The Science of Religions will thus have four main goals: 
i) Cataloguing religious phenomena.  
ii) Locating a common core of religious phenomena.  
iii) Making that common core continuous with the best contemporary science.  
iv) Testing resulting religious hypotheses.  
VRE, James says, is intended to be a “crumb-like” contribution to the science of religions.  It 
catalogues various religious experiences; it locates a common core in the form of the INTP schema 
of mystical experience; it makes that common core continuous with science by grounding 
religious experience in the scientific hypothesis of subliminal consciousness (to be discussed in the 
following section); and it tests the resultant religious actions/theories using 
pragmatic/verificationist methods (i.e. the lectures on ‘Conversion’ and ‘Saintliness’).  The work of 
numerous scholars in the present day may be viewed as contributing to the science of religions 
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along the lines advocated by James.  For instance, scholars at ‘The Religious Experience Research 
Centre’ work diligently to catalogue accounts of religious experience501; scientific models of 
mysticism from Walter Pahnke through Ralph Hood Jr. to Roland Griffiths (as well as more 
philosophical/theological projects from the likes of Stace, Smith, and Forman) build on James’s 
INTP schema in their effort to locate a common core of religious experience502; work in the 
neuroscience of religion from the likes of Andrew Newberg, Mario Beauregard, and Patrick 
McNamara503, together with the sort of naturalistic theology that frequently graces the pages of 
Zygon, and which is also exemplified in Buckareff’s and Nagasawa’s recent anthology504, attempts 
to make religious hypotheses continuous with the best contemporary science; and a plethora of 
scientific studies subject religious experiences/practices to the kind of testing that James 
envisioned505. 
Jeremy Carrette and David Lamberth suggest that the notion of a science of religions is a post-hoc 
and largely speculative one for James.  It is in some sense “superseded”, they think, by his final 
pluralistic metaphysics506.  In support of this contention they note that the term ‘science of 
religions’ vanishes from James’s works after VRE.  Our own analysis suggests a slightly different 
reading.  We think that James remained committed to a project of this kind, and that his dropping 
of the term ‘science of religions’ reflects a shift in emphasis.  We have already seen that James 
defines the scientific method very loosely, in terms of verification, broadly construed.  In section 
2.6 we shall see that this method coincides to a large extent with the pragmatic method.  Indeed, 
James considered that the pragmatic method contained and superseded the scientific method507.  
Our suggestion is that post 1906 James came to see the appropriate method for studying religion 
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as pragmatic rather than exclusively scientific, and that this is why he dropped the term ‘science 
of religions’508.  In the next section we will investigate the third aspect of James’s contribution to 
the science of religions; his grounding of religious experience in the scientific hypothesis of 
subliminal consciousness. 
2.4.3. The Psychology of Religious Experience 
2.4.3.1. Subliminal Consciousness 
In the course of our investigation of PP, in section 2.2.1.3 (on ‘The Method of Introspection’), we 
saw James invoke the notion of ‘split-off consciousness’ as part of an argument against the 
existence of unconscious mental states.  He argued, recall, that we cannot infer that a putative 
mental state is unconscious from the fact that we have no consciousness of it, because it may 
exist in a split-off condition.  Though we only mentioned it in passing, this notion of split-off 
consciousness is in fact vital to James’s understanding of a variety of psychological phenomena; 
for instance, hysteria, hypnosis, alternating selves, mediumship, possession, madness, and genius.  
It is also, as we shall see, a vital part of his psychological account of religion.  
James’s initial exploration of split-off consciousness occurs in the context of a discussion of the 
phenomena of ‘hysterical anaesthesia’.  The comparatively well-known phenomenon of 
‘hysterical blindness’ is just one species of hysterical anaesthesia, which can also affect hearing, 
taste, smell, and touch509.  In James’s estimation the work of Pierre Janet and Alfred Binet had 
shown that “during the times of anaesthesia, and coexisting with it, sensibility to the anaesthetic 
parts is also there, in the form of a secondary consciousness entirely cut off from the primary or 
normal one, but susceptible of being tapped and made to testify to its existence in various odd 
ways”510.  For example, one of Janet’s patients, Lucie, whenever she was engaged in conversation, 
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was utterly unable to notice anybody except the person she was speaking to.  Janet discovered 
that he was able to tap into the split-off consciousness of Lucie’s anaesthetic arm while she was in 
this distracted state511.  He would place a pencil in her anaesthetic hand and a piece of paper 
within her reach, and would stand behind her and whisper questions.  Lucie herself would show 
no sign of having heard the questions, but her anaesthetic arm would respond by writing on the 
piece of paper.  Crucially, her arm was able to register sensory stimuli in this state, and to respond 
to questions accordingly; i.e. it would correctly identify in its written response how many times it 
had been touched, etc.  In some cases, the written responses were unmistakably intelligent.  All in 
all, the phenomenon appears to have been strikingly similar to what we observe in patients with 
split-brain conditions512. 
Perhaps even more striking as a demonstration of split-off consciousness was the phenomenon of 
what James called ‘alternating selves’513.  In these cases the subject’s normal waking personality 
would be replaced by an entirely different one for extended periods of time.  When the primary 
personality regained control, it would have no knowledge of the activity of the secondary 
personality.  James cites the case of one Ansel Bourne of Greene, Rhode Island, a carpenter by 
profession, who one day inexplicably boarded a horse-car to Pennsylvania, declared that his name 
was A. J. Brown, and set up a small grocery store in Norristown.  Two months later his primary 
personality regained control and he awoke with a fright, totally unable to recall his activities in the 
intervening period514.  Other cases of alternating selves, such as M. Janet’s patient Leonie, were 
more complex.  Leonie had three personalities, each variously anaesthetic, each variously aware 
of the other personalities’ existence.  Thus, James says, “Leonie 1 knows only of herself; Leonie 2, 
of herself and of Leonie 1; Leonie 3 knows of herself and both the others.  Leonie 1 has a visual 
consciousness; Leonie 2 has one both visual and auditory; in Leonie 3 it is at once visual, auditory, 
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and tactile.”515  James speculates that the alternate personalities in such cases must correspond 
with different “system[s] of cerebral paths” in the brain, that are somehow able to throw one 
another out of gear and gain predominance alternately516. 
James thought that cases of mediumship constituted yet another example of split-off 
consciousness.  In his view such cases were fundamentally similar to those of ‘alternating selves’, 
because the medium’s primary personality would be temporarily replaced by that of a ‘control’ – 
usually supposed to be the spirit of a diseased human being – who would provide readings for the 
sitters.  James had an ingenious – though in his view partial – explanation for this phenomenon.  
He had already argued earlier in PP that human experience is significantly shaped by selective 
attention; that we only attend to a very small range of the thoughts and sensations available to 
us517.  He went on to suggest that those thoughts and sensations which pass unattended do not 
immediately become non-existent or unconscious, but rather continue to exist consciously in the 
subliminal region of the individual’s mind.  Once there, he speculated, the subliminal 
consciousness could actually organize them into an intelligible scheme; even infer new 
information from them.  Mediums, James hypothesised, were individuals who had unusually 
porous boundaries between their primary and subliminal consciousnesses.  They were able to 
enter a trance state, more or less at will, in which their subconscious selves, taking the form of 
‘controls’, would present details about their sitters which their primary selves alone could not 
have divined518.   
Finally, in the penultimate chapter of PP, James discussed the phenomenon of hypnosis.  There he 
argued in favour of a particular rendition of the ‘suggestion-theory’ of hypnosis, according to 
which hypnotism consists in bringing the hypnotic subject into a special ‘hypnotic state’ or 
‘trance’ characterised by heightened suggestibility, and by a susceptibility to the splitting-off of 
consciousness519.  Some of the more remarkable phenomena of hypnosis, such as those of post-
hypnotic suggestion, were to be explained in terms of these key features of the trance state.  
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Suggestions made to subjects in the trance state would tend to take hold, and would come to rest 
in portions of split-off consciousness, where they would remain dormant – though still conscious 
– until such time as the operator called for them to be enacted520.  In James’s Lowell Lectures on 
Exceptional Mental States, he utilized the suggestion-theory of hypnosis as part of his explanation 
of hysteria.  He affirmed the hypothesis of Frederic Myers and others that hysteria was “a disease 
of the hypnotic stratum”521.  The idea here was that hysteric patients, as a result of nervous 
exhaustion, would enter a kind of fugue state (essentially similar to a hypnotic trance), and would 
thereby become susceptible to the auto-suggestion of various hysteric symptoms.  James 
surmised that an essentially similar mechanism was likely behind phenomena such as witchcraft, 
demoniacal possession, mediumship, and multiple personality.  He grouped all of these 
phenomena together under the category of ‘alternating personality’522.  All of them, he thought, 
involved the subject’s possession of a porous boundary between the primary and subliminal 
consciousness.   
Now, there was a widespread belief in James’s day that the subconscious was home only to vague 
and nonsensical impressions523.  This belief is well expressed in a letter from Ward to James upon 
the former’s reading of VRE: 
I do not, of course, object to your taking the subconscious for granted, but I feel that 
you go too far in accepting Myers’s views as so much “gospel truth.”  So far as I can 
see the entire presentative content of subconsciousness is derivative: it consists, as 
you seem to admit, of memories or suggestions.  It would, I think, be substantially 
true to say: “There is nothing in subconsciousness – in the way of idea at least – that 
was not first in consciousness.”524 
James could not agree with Ward.  He believed that the subconscious was not just a repository of 
impressions, but an intelligent, interested, agent.  Cases of alternating personality proved as 
much.  They proved that all consciousness, split-off or otherwise, partook of the five 
characteristics James had outlined in PP; all consciousness thus tended to take a personal form, 
and to function as a selecting agency.  This is why the split-off consciousness of mediums took the 
form of ‘controls’; i.e. a personal form.  It is why the automatisms produced by split-off 
                                                             
520 James, The Principles, II, pp613-615 
521 Eugene Taylor, William James on Exceptional Mental States (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1984) p59 
522 Taylor, William James on Exceptional Mental States, p73 
523 Indeed, this belief persists into the present day, with Ruth Anna Putnam for instance saying that the 
subconscious self is “too limited as well as too fragmented” to do the work James requires of it.  See: Ruth 
Anna Putnam, ‘Varieties of Experience and Pluralities of Perspective’, in William James and the Varieties of 
Religious Experience, ed. by Carrette, pp149-160 (p158) 
524 The Correspondence of William James, ed. by Ignas K. Skrupskelis & Elizabeth M. Berkeley, 12 vols 
(London: University Press of Virginia, 2002) X, p87 





consciousnesses so often demonstrated intelligence.  “It is … to no ‘automatism’ in the 
mechanical sense that such acts are due”, James insisted: “a self presides over them, a split-off, 
limited and buried, but yet a fully conscious self”525.  His core hypothesis in EMS was that this 
subconscious intelligence, together with its automatisms, could be utilized in constructive and 
evolutive ways.  In the next section we will see that this hypothesis formed a key part of his 
psychological explanation of religious experience in VRE. 
2.4.3.2. The Divided Self, and the Process of Its Unification 
In lectures four to seven of VRE James describes two distinct temperamental dispositions of 
human beings; that of the ‘healthy mind’ and that of the ‘sick soul’526.  In the religious sphere, 
these temperamental dispositions correspond with two forms of religious life; that of the ‘once-
born’ and that of the ‘twice-born’.  The healthy minded naturally find the universe to be 
fundamentally satisfactory, and given the right circumstances, develop their religious propensities 
steadily and gradually without arrest or frustration.  The sick souls naturally find the universe to 
be fundamentally unsatisfactory, and, even given the right circumstances, must undergo a 
dramatic experience – must be ‘born again’ – in order to develop their religious propensities fully.  
The majority of religious geniuses, James thinks, belong in the twice-born camp; their lives are 
beset with bouts of melancholy, with temptations and conflicts, and with bizarre and 
transformative experiences527.   
Now, in lecture eight of VRE, on ‘The Divided Self and the Process of Its Unification’, James 
suggests that “[t]he psychological basis of the twice-born character seems to be a discordancy or 
heterogeneity in the native temperament of the subject, an incompletely unified moral and 
intellectual constitution.”528  Having an incompletely unified moral and intellectual constitution – 
i.e. a divided self – means having multiple sets of contradictory impulses, desires, and ideas.  
Thus, one’s religious impulses may contradict one’s carnal impulses, one’s intellectual impulses 
may contradict one’s reproductive/child-rearing impulses, one’s moral impulses may contradict 
one’s survival impulses, etc.  The unification of a divided self, James tells us, is typically achieved 
by an individual identifying the whole of their self with one set of these contradictory impulses, 
and by becoming unresponsive to the opposing set of impulses.  Thus, one might achieve 
unification by identifying with one’s carnal impulses and becoming unresponsive to one’s religious 
impulses, or by identifying with one’s intellectual impulses and becoming unresponsive to one’s 
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reproductive/child-rearing impulses, etc.  In VRE, James is of course concerned exclusively with 
cases of religious self-unification; i.e. cases where one identifies with one’s religious impulses.  
The process of unification, James tells us, often involves dramatic changes in an individual’s 
personality; one’s emotional centre of gravity completely shifts, one experiences a radical 
reduction in fear and anxiety, is released from addictions that have plagued one for years, etc.  In 
some cases it almost seems as though a whole new personality has replaced or subsumed the old 
one.  This leads him to speculate, in the first of his lectures on ‘Conversion’, that the process of 
unification may involve an individual harnessing latent “possibilities of character” that lie hidden 
in the subliminal region of consciousness529.  The process generally proceeds in something like the 
following manner.  The possibility of conversion is suggested (or auto-suggested) to an individual; 
the idea undergoes a process of subconscious “incubation” in the individual’s mind, combining 
with material furnished from perception and memory to produce a content that is uniquely 
meaningful and motivating to that individual; that content bursts forth into the individual’s 
conscious mind in the form of an automatism such as a religious experience530.  This of course 
recalls some of the ideas James discussed in PP, in EMS, and in his essays in psychical research.  
What he appears to be suggesting is that, i) the process of unifying a divided self consists in co-
opting the resources of one’s subliminal selves in order to bolster or reconstruct one’s primary 
consciousness, and ii) the religious experiences which catalyse this process are themselves 
automatisms which have their source in the subliminal region of consciousness. 
This pattern of experience – of division and subsequent unification through the utilization of 
subliminal resources – although typified by the twice-born, is not unique to them.  James derives 
a schema from it which he thinks applies to the religious life of human beings generally.  Religion, 
he says in his concluding lecture, consists of two parts:  
(1) An uneasiness … a sense that there is something wrong about us as we naturally 
stand. 
 
(2) Its solution … a sense that we are saved from the wrongness by making proper 
connection with the higher powers.531 
Elaborating on this schema, James tells us that “making proper connection with the higher 
powers” consists in identifying one’s whole being with a “germinal higher part” of one’s self (the 
locus of one’s religious impulses) that is “continuous with a MORE of the same quality”532.  This 
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‘MORE’, he says, “whatever it may be on its farther side … is on its hither side the subconscious 
continuation of our conscious life.”533  It is, in other words, nothing other than the “subconscious 
self”534; i.e. the subliminal self of PP and EMS.  James considers that the subconscious self, at the 
time of his delivering VRE, is “a well accredited psychological entity”535, and that “[s]tarting thus 
with a recognized psychological fact as our basis, we seem to preserve a contact with science 
which the ordinary theologian lacks”536.  He adds the following: 
At the same time the theologian’s contention that the religious man is moved by an 
external power is vindicated, for it is one of the peculiarities of invasions from the 
subconscious region to take on objective appearances, and to suggest to the Subject 
an external control.  In the religious life the control is felt as ‘higher’; but since on our 
hypothesis it is primarily the higher faculties of our own hidden minds which are 
controlling, the sense of union with the power beyond us is a sense of something, not 
merely apparently, but literally true.537 
The wider subconscious self which we encounter in religious experience is felt as external.  On 
James’s hypothesis this is perfectly understandable, because it is external in a sense; in the sense, 
namely, of being ejective to the primary consciousness.  Moreover, James, says, it is felt as an 
external ‘control’.  His use of the word ‘control’ here is of course no accident.  Just as the 
automatisms of mediums are mediated by a ‘control’, so religious automatisms are mediated by a 
‘control’; i.e. by an entity that seems to possess personality and intelligence.  In the latter case 
however, the control is felt as ‘higher’; it is not the mere spirit of a deceased human being, but 
the spirit of God we are encountering.  Finally, our sense of union with the subconscious self is 
also perfectly understandable on James’s account, because we really are unified with it.  It is 
realized – at least on its hither side – by the same brain as our primary self; it is contingent upon 
“system[s] of cerebral paths” that are literally connected with those upon which our primary self 
is contingent538.   
2.4.3.3. Religion as a Biological Function 
Lastly, we want to explore James’s notion that “from the biological point of view” religion is “an 
essential organ of our life, performing a function which no other portion of our nature can so 
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successfully fulfil”539.  It is natural to frame this discussion around James’s repudiation of ‘The 
Survival Theory’ of religion in the concluding lecture of VRE.  The survival theory holds that 
religion is a by-product of a primeval type of thought which has somehow managed to survive 
even after that primeval type of thought has become obsolete.  The primeval type of thought in 
question was one that postulated “personal forces” with “individual needs and claims” as the 
causes of natural events540.  Thus, our ancestors would postulate personal forces behind the rain, 
the volcano, the forest, etc., and would attempt to “coerce the spiritual powers” behind these 
phenomena “and get them on our side”541.  Religion, according to the survival theory, is an 
outgrowth of this type of thought.  Just as our primitive ancestors postulated personal forces 
behind individual natural phenomena, so religion postulates a personal force behind nature as a 
whole.  But whereas the general belief in personal forces has vanished, the belief in God remains.  
Religion, therefore, is not an adaptation, but a by-product; and a by-product, moreover, of 
something that might not have been particularly useful in the first place. 
We can already guess at the outlines of James’s response to the survival theory.  Religion, he said 
in the ‘Saintliness’ lectures, had been vindicated from the point of view of utility.  Not only does it 
yield beneficial fruits for individuals – helping them to overcome depression, sinfulness, and 
addiction – but it serves a vital social function as a leaven of moral progress.  Given the foregoing, 
we may add to these another function; namely that of uniting divided selves542.  That it possesses 
these functions is enough to refute the survival theory, and to demonstrate that religion has 
“enormous biological worth”543.  But this does not go far enough for James.  So far from being a 
by-product, he thinks, religion’s worth may be primarily biological.  In support he cites Leuba: 
The truth of the matter can be put in this way: God is not known, he is not 
understood; he is used – sometimes as meat-purveyor, sometimes as moral support, 
sometimes as friend, sometimes as an object of love.  If he proves himself useful, the 
religious consciousness asks for no more than that.  Does God really exist?  How does 
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he exist?  What is he? are so many irrelevant questions.  Not God, but life, more life, 
a larger, richer, more satisfying life, is, in the last analysis, the end of religion.544 
James, although he may not agree with Leuba that religion is a purely adaptive, agrees that it 
must be counted “amongst the most important biological functions of mankind”545.  He agrees, 
furthermore, that religion itself is to some extent a product of adaptation.  Those religions best 
adapted to serving our “vital [i.e. biological] needs” survive; those which are poorly adapted 
disappear546.  Religion, he concludes, “cannot be a mere anachronism and survival, but must exert 
a permanent function, whether she be with or without intellectual content, and whether, if she 
have any, it be true or false.”547 
2.4.4. The Metaphysics of Religious Experience 
2.4.4.1. Over-belief 
According to James’s psychological account of religious experience the ‘more’ which we 
encounter in religious experience is, on its hither side, our own subconscious self (or one such self 
at any rate).  However, what it is on its farther side – i.e. where the limits or boundaries of that 
subconscious self are – is an open question, to be settled, he says, by our own particular ‘over-
belief’.  This notion of over-belief is an important one for James.  The first use of this term occurs 
in the preface of WB, but the concept clearly has its roots in ‘The Sentiment of Rationality’, first 
delivered in 1880.  It is, we suggest, James’s chosen translation for what he there calls 
‘Aberglaube’.  Speaking about the decision between options for belief that cannot be settled by 
evidence, he says the following: 
In short, it is almost certain that personal temperament will here make itself felt, and 
that although all men will insist on being spoken to by the universe in some way, few 
will insist on being spoken to in just the same way.  We have here, in short, the 
sphere of what Matthew Arnold likes to call Aberglaube, legitimate, inexpungable, 
yet doomed to eternal variations and disputes.548 
The word ‘aberglaube’, which was popularised by Goethe, is generally translated into English as 
‘superstition’.  However, as Matthew Arnold remarks, Goethe used the term without the negative 
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connotations that attach to the English ‘superstition’, in the simple sense of “extra-belief, belief 
beyond what is certain and verifiable”549.  Thus, James’s use of the term here in WB, following 
shortly after his exposition of the will-to-believe doctrine, reads naturally as denoting beliefs 
which result from exercises of the will to believe; that is, beliefs which cannot be settled by 
evidence, and whose adoption is forced and momentous.  In VRE, we contend, James is using the 
term ‘over-belief’ in just the same way.  Where his evidence-based psychological account of 
religious experience ends, he says, over-beliefs begin: 
Here the over-beliefs begin: here mysticism and the conversion-rapture and 
Vedantism and transcendental idealism bring in their monistic interpretations and 
tell us that the finite self rejoins the absolute self, for it was always one with God and 
identical with the soul of the world.  Here the prophets of all the different religions 
come with their visions, voices, raptures, and other openings, supposed by each to 
vindicate his own peculiar faith.550 
Psychology can tell us that religious experiences have their source in a subconscious self, but it 
cannot tell us what the limits or boundaries of that self are.  Those limits may be confined to a 
system of ‘cerebral paths’ in the brain like the alternate selves of dissociative identity disorder 
(fig. 17); they may encompass a larger part of the brain and nervous system (fig. 18); or they may 
extend beyond the brain and nervous system altogether.  If the latter, they may encompass only a 
larger portion of the physical universe (fig. 19); they may extend to the universe as a whole (fig. 
20); or they may extend beyond the universe, into a supernatural reality (fig. 21).  If they do so 
extend into a supernatural reality, that reality may be identified with the God of Christianity, the 
God of Judaism, the God of Islam, and so on.  Each of these options for belief differs pragmatically 
from the others.  Depending on which we believe to be true, we are likely act very differently551.  
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2.4.4.2. James’s Own Over-belief 
James states his own over-belief as follows: 
The further limits of our being plunge, it seems to me, into an altogether other 
dimension of existence from the sensible and merely ‘understandable’ world.  Name 
it the mystical region, or the supernatural region, whichever you choose. … God is the 
natural appellation, for us Christians at least, for the supreme reality, so I will call this 
higher part of the universe by the name of God.552 
This is an ambiguous statement.  James seems clearly to suggest that the boundaries of the 
subconscious self extend beyond the brain and nervous system, but it is less clear whether he 
thinks that they extend beyond the universe.  On the one hand he says that they plunge into a 
“supernatural” dimension; but on the other he seems to count that dimension as a “higher part of 
the universe”.  The following consideration may help to clear this matter up.  James, in the above 
statement, uses the terms ‘mystical’ and ‘supernatural’ interchangeably.  Now, each of these 
terms may be said to have both a technical and a colloquial sense.  In their technical senses they 
are not, in fact, interchangeable.  ‘Supernatural’ is opposed to ‘natural’, and denotes a portion of 
reality that is ontically discontinuous with nature, whereas ‘mystical’ refers to a certain aspect or 
                                                             
552 James, The Varieties, pp515-516 
Fig. 17 Fig. 18 Fig. 19 
Fig. 20 Fig. 21 




category of human spiritual traditions, practices, and experiences553.  In their colloquial senses 
meanwhile, both of these terms have roughly the same meaning; namely something like 
‘mysterious’ or ‘otherworldly’.  We reason therefore that in using these terms interchangeably 
James meant them in their colloquial rather than their technical sense.  In this case they do not 
necessarily imply a traditional form of supernaturalism. 
Next James addresses the pragmatic meaning of his over-belief; that is, “what sensations we are 
to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare”: 
[T]he unseen region in question is not merely ideal, for it produces effects in the real 
world.  When we commune with it, work is actually done upon our finite personality, 
for we are turned into new men, and consequences in the way of conduct follow in 
the natural world upon our regenerative change.554 
He elaborates on this theme: 
We and God have business with each other; and in opening ourselves to his influence 
our deepest destiny is fulfilled.  The universe, at those parts of it which our personal 
being constitutes, takes a turn genuinely for the worse or for the better in proportion 
as each one of us fulfils or evades God’s demands.555 
In other words, the sensations James expects are saving experiences and the regenerative 
changes they bring; the reactions he must prepare are an openness to God’s influence and a 
willingness to meet his demands.  He notes that this account, as it stands, makes human beings’ 
“personal centres of energy” the sole loci of God’s influence.  Ultimately, he thinks, such an 
account does not go far enough: 
A good hypothesis in science must have other properties than those of the 
phenomenon it is immediately invoked to explain, otherwise it is not prolific enough.  
God, meaning only what enters into the religious man’s experience of union, falls 
short of being a hypothesis of this more useful order.  He needs to enter into wider 
cosmic relations in order to justify the subject’s absolute confidence and peace.556 
God, James thinks, in order to have some pragmatic meaning over and above that of being a 
putative source of religious experience, must have influence beyond the human psyche; he must 
enter into “wider cosmic relations” of some sort.  Just what these cosmic relations are, James 
does not venture to hypothesize at this stage.  We will explore this question in greater detail in 
chapter 3 (section 3.3). 
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2.4.4.3. From Theistic Naturalism to Piecemeal Supernaturalism 
James’s Gifford Lectures consisted in two courses; each course containing ten lectures.  Thus, the 
first course, up to and including the second lecture on ‘Conversion’, was delivered in 1901, and 
the second course, from ‘Saintliness’ to the ‘Conclusions’, was delivered in 1902.  James remarks 
in the preface to VRE that he had originally intended only the first course to be concerned with 
the psychology of religion, while the second course was to be primarily “metaphysical”.  In the 
end however the “growth of the psychological matter … resulted in the second subject being 
postponed entirely”557.  Only in the concluding lecture and the postscript, he says, does he touch 
on those topics which he had originally planned to address in the metaphysical course of lectures.  
The concluding lecture and the postscript are devoted almost entirely to an account of James’s 
over-belief concerning religious experience.  We think it reasonable, therefore, to suppose that 
the metaphysical course of lectures, had they been completed as planned, would have consisted 
in a much fuller and lengthier exposition of that over-belief558.  In a notebook containing James’s 
original plan for the second course of Gifford Lectures we find the following intriguing 
memorandum concerning part of their prospective content: 
The God of theistic naturalism will, then, fill the requirements of our total nature.  
The point is to establish him upon the three lines of 1) experience of his presence; 2) 
faith; 3) definition of his nature.559 
This passage occurs on folios 6-7 of the relevant notebook.  A blank sheet of paper is pasted over 
the upper three-quarters of folio 6, and the folios immediately preceding and following it contain 
notes on unrelated topics.  As such, we must take it more or less on its own terms.  There is 
however one other brief discussion in the same notebook that appears to be related.  On folios 18 
to 20 James outlines three different ways of conceiving of the relationship between nature and 
‘the Ideal’.  The first way is that of “naturalistic pluralism”, which says that the world is becoming 
increasingly ideal, but that this increase is not necessary or guaranteed.  The second way is that of 
dualism, which says that the ideal principle is opposed to an obstructive principle, but that the 
former is guaranteed to be victorious.  And the third is that of monism, which says that nature is 
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already wholly ideal, and that the apparently unideal parts are illusory560.  After providing this 
outline, James says the following: 
Evolutionistic optimism (barring the final dissolution of the world which it must now 
predict) is an example of the first type.  When combined with some sort of idealism 
or panpsychism, à la Paulsen, … it may merge into the second type; and here 
apparently my own theistic way of taking the world would find vaguely a place.561 
James here identifies his position as a form of “naturalistic pluralism” that incorporates 
“panpsychism” and “theism”.  Significantly, he locates this position alongside that of Paulsen, 
who, as we saw in chapter 1, he identified as an archetypal exponent of naturalism.  He names 
Platonism as an example of the dualistic conception of the relation between nature and the ideal, 
and absolutism as an example of the monistic conception.  We take it that traditional theism 
would also be an example of the dualistic conception.  In this case, James, in saying that the 
naturalistic pluralistic conception combined with panpsychism “may merge into” the dualistic 
conception, would seem to be suggesting that naturalistic pluralism, by incorporating a doctrine 
of panpsychism, is able to accommodate a non-traditional form of theism.  This, we contend, 
makes perfect sense, for a doctrine of panpsychism allows the naturalistic pluralist to identify the 
divine consciousness with the ‘mind’ or ‘soul’ of some portion of the natural world. 
Thus, it seems that James had originally planned to defend a doctrine of ‘theistic naturalism’ in his 
second course of Gifford lectures.  And yet, when he came to write the postscript for the final 
version of VRE, he classified his over-belief as ‘piecemeal supernaturalism’.  In this section, we aim 
to suggest an explanation for this change of heart.  This explanation begins, we contend, just 
where our own thesis began, with James Ward’s Aberdeen Gifford Lectures on Naturalism and 
Agnosticism.  James, we know, was greatly influenced by Ward’s view562.  He wrote the following 
in a letter to Ward dated August 1899: 
[I]t is a great book, and if I mistake not, it will be recognized as marking the 
termination of one stage, and the beginning of another, in English philosophical 
literature.  “Naturalism” or scientificism will linger in the by-ways, but on the 
highways I don’t see how it can survive … The whole thing has been a great help to 
me about my second Gifford course, which in many respects is planned to cover 
similar ground…563 
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In the memorandum from his notebook James planned to establish a doctrine of “theistic 
naturalism”.  But in his letter to Ward he supposed that naturalism had been defeated, and 
identified it with scientificism, a position more or less defined in terms of its aberration and 
excess.  This leads us to an intriguing hypothesis.  Namely, that James had originally planned to 
call his position ‘theistic naturalism’, recognizing perhaps, as later commentators have recognized, 
that given his belief in a finite God, existing within the natural world, this would seem to be an apt 
description.  However, upon reading Ward’s Naturalism and Agnosticism, a book which he 
expected to be widely read and epoch-making, he decided against it564.  He considered that Ward 
had once and for all established an austere and restrictive definition for naturalism.  Using that 
term now could only result in confusion.  It was no longer fit for his purpose565. 
The question is, what aspect of naturalism – as defined by Ward – did James object to?  What 
made him define himself, in contradistinction to that doctrine, as a ‘piecemeal supernaturalist’?  
The answer, we submit, is suggested by James’s discussion of piecemeal supernaturalism in the 
postscript of VRE, and it has to do with the issue of causal closure.  There, James tells us that 
‘piecemeal supernaturalism’ is to be distinguished from ‘refined supernaturalism’.  For the latter, 
“the world of the ideal has no efficient causality, and never bursts into the world of phenomena”; 
while for the former, there is “no intellectual difficulty in mixing the ideal and the real worlds 
together by interpolating influences from the ideal region among the forces that causally 
determine the real world’s details”566.  Piecemeal supernaturalism therefore involves a violation 
of CCP, which, according to Ward’s definition, entails a breach with naturalism.  It is this, we 
contend, that caused James to define himself, somewhat reluctantly, as a supernaturalist: 
Notwithstanding my own inability to accept either popular Christianity or scholastic 
theism, I suppose that my belief that in communion with the ideal new force comes 
into the world, and new departures are made here below, subjects me to being 
classed among the supernaturalists of the piecemeal or crasser type.567 [our 
emphasis] 
Now, as we have already seen, the ‘ideal’, ‘supernatural’, or ‘mystical’ region, is, for James, a 
“higher part of the universe”.  It is to be interpreted, we suggest, not in dualistic terms, as a 
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substance ontically discontinuous with nature, but in broadly emergentist terms, as per James’s 
doctrine of the soul in PP.  This, we note, accords perfectly well with James’s final statement 
concerning his overbelief on the penultimate page of the postscript: 
It [God/the Ideal] might conceivably even be only a larger and more godlike self, of 
which the present self would then be but the mutilated expression, and the universe 
might conceivably be a collection of such selves, of different degrees of inclusiveness, 
with no absolute unity realized in it at all.568 
The ideal, supernatural, or mystical region is, for James, a larger and more godlike self, standing to 
the physical universe – or rather to a portion of it – as the human self stands to the human body.  
Its possessing causal power does not therefore involve a violation of the causal closure of nature, 
but only of the causal closure of the physical; a principle which, as we argued in chapter 1, is 
inessential to naturalism.  This, at any rate, is our contention.  We concede that it cannot be 
definitively established from VRE alone, but it will, we think, emerge as an increasingly plausible 
interpretation in what follows569. 
2.4.5. Conclusions 
The Varieties is a pivotal text in our interpretation of James.  It is here, for the first time, that 
James shows himself to be a bona fide religious realist.  In MPML belief in God had played a 
significant role, but God’s actual existence was scarcely an issue.  In VRE on the other hand, James 
explicitly takes the view that God is a real being with real causal power, capable not only of 
communing with human beings through religious experiences, but also of entering into “wider 
cosmic relations”.  Here, if anywhere in James’s work, there is a prima facie conflict with 
naturalism.  But whether we take this conflict to be real or superficial very much depends on how 
we understand James’s concept of God.  Recall Owen Flanagan’s suggestion in chapter 1 that 
religion only entails conflict with naturalism insofar as it holds the following theses: 
(i) there exists a ‘supernatural being or beings’ or ‘power(s)’ outside the natural 
world; (ii) this ‘being’ or ‘power’ has causal commerce with the world; (iii) the 
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grounds for belief in both the ‘supernatural being’ and its causal commerce cannot 
be seen, discovered, or inferred by way of any known and reliable epistemic 
method.570 
James, to be sure, holds that God exists and that he has causal commerce with the natural world.  
He may also be said to hold that God’s existence cannot be discovered using reliable epistemic 
methods, if by ‘reliable epistemic methods’ we mean exclusively the methods of contemporary 
natural science.  What is less clear however is whether he holds God to exist ‘outside the natural 
world’.  If our arguments in this section have been convincing, this conclusion will be in doubt.  If, 
as we contend, James’s God exists within the natural world, then his position is not necessarily in 
conflict with naturalism.  It entails the rejection of CCP rather than CCN.  In which case James 
should be classified, according to our schema, as a radical religious naturalist.    
Leaving aside this key ontological issue, we have seen that VRE embodies James’s continued 
commitment to methodological naturalism.  He endeavours throughout to maintain “a contact 
with science”, employing the methods of psychology; developing a thoroughly naturalistic 
psychological account of religious experience; and proposing a ‘Science of Religions’ that would 
utilize the methods of science to catalogue, refine, and test religious experiences and 
hypotheses571.  In all of these respects, The Varieties of Religious Experience is a profoundly 
naturalistic text.  The fact that the subject matter is religion, and that the author ultimately adopts 
a stance of religious realism, only accentuates this point.  
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2.5. Essays in Radical Empiricism 
Following his return to America after the Gifford Lectures, James quickly began to entertain ideas 
for a new book project.  In it, he intended to address many of the themes he had originally 
planned to cover in his second course of Gifford Lectures.  The book was to be called The Many 
and the One, and would expound a “system of tychistic and pluralistic philosophy of pure 
experience”572.  Although the book never came to fruition, his 1902 lecture notes for a new course 
on ‘The Philosophy of Nature’ give some inkling of the ideas he was germinating at this time.  In 
them, he devoted lengthy discussions to the doctrines of panpsychism and ‘tychism’ (“Peirce’s 
suggestion [that] order results from chance-coming, and survival of the more coherent”), and 
attempted to formulate a “description of the world as a multitude of moments of experience”573.  
Although The Many and the One was never completed (or even really started574), James’s thinking 
and reading in this period did bear considerable fruit.  Between 1903 and 1905 several of the 
pieces that comprise Essays in Radical Empiricism were composed.   
Radical empiricism, James says in the preface to The Meaning of Truth, “consists first of a 
postulate, next of a statement of fact, and finally of a generalized conclusion”575.  According to the 
postulate, only “things definable in terms drawn from experience” are debatable in philosophy.  
According to the statement of fact, the relations between experiences are “as much matters of 
direct particular experience” as the experiences themselves.  And according to the generalized 
conclusion the universe may consist entirely of bits of experience held together by experienced 
relations with “no extraneous trans-empirical connective support”576.  In William James and the 
Metaphysics of Experience David Lamberth calls these ‘The methodological thesis of radical 
empiricism’ (MTRE), ‘The factual thesis of radical empiricism’ (FTRE), and ‘The metaphysical thesis 
of pure experience’ (MTPE).  He notes that in addition to these three theses James also develops 
two other important doctrines in ERE, which he calls ‘the functional account of direct 
acquaintance’ and ‘the functional account of knowledge about’577.  We will follow Lamberth in 
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adopting this terminology in the present section.  Thus, we will investigate the methodological 
and factual theses in section 2.5.2, and the metaphysical thesis and functional accounts of 
knowledge in section 2.5.3.  First however, we must address a special interpretative problem 
arising in connection with ERE; namely the nature of James’s so-called ‘break with dualism’. 
2.5.1. James’s Break with Dualism 
Essays in Radical Empiricism is very probably James’s most controversial text from the point of 
view of his contemporary commentators.  It is this text, more than any other, that gives rise to 
significant divergences in interpretations of his worldview.  All of these divergences, we may say, 
revolve around one central issue.  Commentators generally agree that ERE marks James’s ‘break 
with dualism’; but they utterly fail to agree on the question of what he replaces his dualism with. 
Both Russell and Ayer are said to have attributed a doctrine of ‘neutral monism’ to James, but 
their definitions of this doctrine differ considerably578.  For Ayer neutral monism holds that the 
subjective (inner) and objective (outer) aspects of experience are differentiated out of an original 
neutral content called pure experience, and further, that nothing exists outside of this 
experiential content.  Neutral monism, on this view, is a form of phenomenalism579.  For Russell 
on the other hand, neutral monism holds that mental and physical events/entities are constituted 
out of an original neutral substance which itself possesses neither mental nor physical 
properties580.  Thus, Russell’s interpretation yields an entirely different and contrasting picture of 
James’s position.  Russell however concedes that James never fully developed the doctrine along 
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Experience’ and the External World’, Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 2 (1905), 
pp128-133 (p130).   
580 David Chalmers interprets James along the same lines as Russell.  He thinks that James takes an 
eliminative view of phenomenal consciousness in ERE and endorses a form of panprotopsychism called 
‘panqualityism’.  See: David Chalmers, ‘The Combination Problem for Panpsychism’, in Panpsychism: 
Contemporary Perspectives, ed. by Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (Oxford: OUP, 2017), pp179-214 
(p183).  Cooper endorses an essentially similar interpretation.  See: Cooper, The Unity of William James’s 
Thought, p8.  We think that such interpretations suffer from the same defects as Russell’s (of which more 
shortly).   




the lines he advocated.  For the sake of clarity, we will refer to Russell’s interpretation of James’s 
position as ‘Russellian monism’ and Ayer’s as ‘neutral monism’. 
Perry and Cooper may be said to share Ayer’s reading in part, but they add the important proviso 
that James’s phenomenalism is combined with a doctrine of ‘naïve realism’, according to which 
the pure experiences which constitute objective (outer) phenomena are public, and not 
dependent on the minds of sentient beings581.  Thus, the table in front of me will continue to 
exist, as a bundle of phenomenal properties, even when no sentient being perceives it.  It will 
exist as a kind of free-floating, self-subsistent, pure experience.  Such a free-floating pure 
experience might be thought of as a kind of superposition of all the possible phenomenal 
properties that any sentient being might perceive the table to have, all existing simultaneously, 
waiting for the sensory apparatuses of particular sentient beings to pick out some set of them582.   
Myers, Ford, Sprigge, and Gale accept that James seems to endorse naïve realism in ERE, but hold 
that he does so only confusedly.  For one thing, they say, the doctrine itself is incoherent.  For 
another, it conflicts with a doctrine that James came to adopt later in his career; namely 
panpsychism583.  Panpsychism is held to be incompatible with naïve realism because it claims that 
outer objects continue to exist when no sentient being perceives them, not as a free-floating pure 
experiences possessing the same phenomenal properties with which they appear to observers, 
but as an experiences for themselves; conglomerations of mind-dust, so to speak, whose 
phenomenal properties bear no definite relation to those with which they appear to observers584.    
                                                             
581 See: Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, II, pp591-592; Cooper, The Unity of William 
James’s Thought, pp71-73.  Other proponents of the naïve/natural realist interpretation include Robert G. 
Meyers and Andrew Reck.  See: Robert Meyers, ‘Natural Realism and Illusion in James’s Radical Empiricism’, 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 5 (1969), pp211-223 (p212); Andrew Reck, Introduction to 
William James (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967) pp64-65.  We have just said in footnote 580 
that Cooper endorses a panprotopsychist interpretation of James along the same lines as Chalmers.  Yet he 
also seems to endorse this naïve realist/neutral monist interpretation.  These two interpretations might 
seem to be contradictory insofar as the former implies that qualities of perceived objects are really qualities 
of the perceiver’s brain whereas the latter implies that they belong to the objects themselves.  We will 
discuss this issue in further detail in section 3.1.1.   
582 There is some reason to think that James’s preferred version of naïve realism would make only 
perceptions of space public, while all other perceptions remained private.  See: James, Essays in Radical 
Empiricism, pp84-86 
583 Timothy Sprigge provides by far the most lucid and detailed treatment of the relationship between naïve 
realism and panpsychism in James’s work.  See: Sprigge, James and Bradley, pp120-137 
584 For instance, your stream of consciousness is presently constituted of the phenomenal properties of 
whiteness, spread into a rectangular shape, and blackness, formed into small markings and arranged into 
lines.  Yet your stream of consciousness appears to observers as a part of your brain and nervous system, 
possessing phenomenal properties like ‘pinkness’, ‘softness’, ‘wetness’, etc.  The former properties – of 
whiteness and blackness – do not seem to bear any definite relation to the latter.   





Our chief aim in this section, besides providing an exposition of the core doctrines of ERE, will be 
to establish the superiority of this latter, panpsychist reading of James’s doctrine of pure 
experience.  This reading is the key to reconciling ERE with A Pluralistic Universe; James’s other 
key metaphysical text.  It is also, therefore, the key to establishing the underlying theoretical unity 
of James’s worldview.  Most importantly for our purposes, it will serve as the foundation, in 
chapter three, for our detailed discussion of James’s mature doctrine of panpsychism. 
2.5.2. The Methodological Thesis of Radical Empiricism  
James introduces his doctrine of radical empiricism by explaining its relationship to traditional 
empiricism.  Like traditional empiricism, he says, it takes concrete experiences to be fundamental.  
However, where traditional empiricism still entertains transempirical principles and hypotheses, 
albeit cautiously, radical empiricism totally excludes them.  Moreover, where traditional 
empiricism excluded certain experiences, whether by accident or because of conscious bias, 
radical empiricism insists on admitting any and all of them: 
The Methodological Thesis of Radical Empiricism (MTRE): “To be radical, an empiricism 
must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor 
exclude from them any element that is directly experienced.”585 
Note that there is both a negative and a positive part to this thesis; the former insisting on the 
exclusion of anything that is not directly experienced, and the latter insisting on the inclusion of 
anything that is directly experienced.  Each of these parts is distinct, and is novel and controversial 
in its own way.  We will therefore treat of them separately in what follows. 
The negative part of MTRE states that we must exclude anything which is not directly experienced 
from our philosophical constructions.  Notice that this goes far beyond merely treating experience 
as fundamental.  James’s use of the phrase ‘directly experienced’ would seem to imply that 
entities which are, so to speak, indirectly experienced – i.e. which are inferred from direct 
experience – are likewise to be excluded.  Thus, not only such transempirical entities as result 
from runaway apriori speculation – i.e. transcendental egos and absolutes – but all transempirical 
entities in principle are disqualified.  This, it seems, would include things like material substances 
and entities postulated by scientific theories (insofar as they are conceived as non-experiential).  
Right at the outset then, doubt is cast upon interpretations of James’s doctrine of pure experience 
which appeal to such entities.  Interpretations, for instance, like Russell’s, which take James to 
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endorse the existence of a neutral substance which possesses non-experiential properties, would 
seem to be precluded.   
Nowadays this negative part of MTRE strikes us as extreme, but in James’s day such sceptical 
conclusions regarding trans-empirical entities were not uncommon.  Everyone from 
phenomenologists like Brentano and Husserl, to personal idealists like Lotze and Schiller, to 
absolute idealists like Royce and Bradley, to phenomenalists like Mill and Mach entertained such 
sceptical conclusions.  Two factors may be said to have typically informed such conclusions: i) a 
trend, prompted by the rapidly increasing purview of science, towards the acceptance of 
substance-monism; and ii) traditional Berkleyan arguments against the coherence of 
transempirical entities/principles.  These two factors together led very naturally in the direction of 
idealism, phenomenalism, and panpsychism.  In the modern day the purely scientific/physical 
description of the world seems more solid and independent than it once did, and Berkeleyan 
considerations tend to be less hard-hitting.  The result is that the majority of contemporary 
philosophers prefer materialism or physicalism to idealism, phenomenalism, or panpsychism.   
The positive part of MTRE states that we must include anything which is directly experienced in 
our philosophical constructions.  Once again, we should note the radical nature of this injunction.  
James is not merely saying that we are entitled to utilize anything that is directly experienced in 
our philosophical constructions; he is saying that we must utilize them.  In ERE he has a particular 
set of experiences in mind; namely experiences of relations.  Philosophers, he thinks, have 
traditionally viewed relations as essentially trans-empirical entities.  In PP James explained how 
this led the more empirically inclined philosophers of the associationist school to abolish the 
relations between experiences altogether, and the more rationalistically inclined philosophers of 
the spiritualist school to introduce substantial souls and transcendental egos to relate bits of finite 
experience together from without586.  Both of these approaches, he argued, ultimately failed.  The 
solution is to see that the bits of finite experience that constitute a stream of consciousness are 
joined together by experienced relations like the ‘co-conscious transition’, through which they are 
made sensibly continuous with one another without the need of “extraneous transempirical 
connective support”587.  The so-called ‘factual thesis of radical empiricism’ extends this analysis of 
the relations between the bits of experience that constitute a single stream of consciousness to 
all relations.  It says that all relations, including those between distinct streams of consciousness, 
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and those between streams of consciousness and the objects which they know, must be 
experienced relations, essentially similar in kind to the co-conscious transition: 
The Factual Thesis of Radical Empiricism (FTRE): “For such a philosophy, the relations that 
connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation 
experienced must be accounted as ‘real’ as anything else in the system.”588 
Although James’s primary concern in ERE is with the experience of relations, the positive part of 
MTRE is clearly also relevant to other sorts of experience he considers in his work; namely ethical, 
religious, and paranormal experiences.  In this sense MTRE can be seen to enshrine in an explicit 
methodology, James’s repeated entreaties in WB that we should not prematurely exclude ethical, 
religious, and psychical phenomena from the scientific synthesis, and his insistence in VRE that all 
experiences are prima facie respectable regardless of their origins.  James’s intention, in insisting 
upon the inclusion of such experiences, is not to affirm any particular interpretation of them, or to 
take a realist stance with respect to their objects, but rather to guard against their arbitrary 
dismissal, and to signal radical empiricism’s capacity to accommodate them. 
2.5.3. The Metaphysical Thesis of Pure Experience 
As we noted in the introduction to this section, the metaphysical thesis of pure experience states 
that the universe may consist entirely of bits of experience held together by experienced 
relations.  It is easy enough to see how this thesis fits together with the methodological and 
factual theses.  If the methodological thesis is sound, then a complete philosophical description of 
the world is only possible if the world consists entirely of experience.  If, after all, the world 
contained non-experiential elements, philosophy could not deal with those elements, and its 
description of the world would have to remain incomplete.  We have already seen that in James’s 
time there were a number of popular candidates for broadly experiential descriptions of the 
world, the most prevalent being phenomenalism and idealism.  Both of these however suffered a 
core defect in James’s view; they failed to account for the reality of experienced relations.  The 
former thereby left the world fundamentally disjointed, while the latter made appeal to trans-
empirical entities.  Only radical empiricism, with its recognition of the reality of experienced 
relations, could offer a description of the world that was at once truly coherent and wholly 
experiential.  If therefore the methodological thesis is sound, then the metaphysical thesis of pure 
experience represents the only possible route to a complete philosophical description of the 
universe.  The key obstacle to developing such a description, in James’s view, was the relation of 
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knowledge.  The question was: how can we describe the relation between the human mind and 
an object which it knows in purely experiential terms?  And how, furthermore, can we explain the 
relation between two different minds and the same object?  It is in the process of answering these 
questions that James articulates the detailed metaphysical position of radical empiricism. 
2.5.3.1. Does Consciousness Exist? 
‘Does Consciousness Exist?’ is undoubtedly the most widely read and discussed of all the essays 
that comprise ERE.  Bertrand Russell described it as having “startled the world”589, and indeed, in 
it, James makes what seems to be a startling claim: 
For twenty years past I have mistrusted ‘consciousness’ as an entity; for seven or 
eight years past I have suggested its non-existence to my students, and tried to give 
them its pragmatic equivalent in realities of experience.  It seems to me that the hour 
is ripe for it to be openly and universally discarded.590 
He adds, by way of clarification, that he means only “to deny that the word stands for an entity”, 
and that he intends to argue instead that it stands “for a function”591.  The function in question is 
that of knowing, or cognition.  Thus, consciousness is to be understood as a functional term, and 
not as a concrete noun referring to an entity or substance.  “There is, …” James says, “no 
aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which material objects are made, out 
of which our thoughts of them are made”592.  This looks, at first, like a complete reversal for 
James.  It looks as though he is embracing reductive materialism, and attempting to eliminate 
phenomenal consciousness from his worldview.  If we read on however, we find that this 
impression is radically mistaken. The aboriginal stuff out of which both thoughts and things are 
made is not, as these statements might seem to suggest, matter, but something else, which he 
calls ‘pure experience’: 
My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or 
material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call that 
stuff ‘pure experience,’ then knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of 
relation towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter.593 
James, we contend, is not denying the existence of consciousness in the sense of phenomenal 
consciousness; rather, he is denying the existence of consciousness construed as a special entity 
or substance that is involved in higher mental processes like cognition.  His final conclusions, far 
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from denying phenomenal consciousness, point strongly towards the identity of pure experience 
with phenomenal consciousness.  To see why this is so, consider the following. 
To begin with we note that interpreting James’s thesis as a denial of the existence of phenomenal 
consciousness involves assuming a radical and unannounced shift in his worldview; namely the 
total abandonment of the ‘esse est sentiri’ doctrine of PP.  This assumption, we insist, is certainly 
untenable.  For one thing, James explicitly affirms his continued commitment to the doctrine in 
another of the essays in the volume (namely ‘How Two Minds Can Know One Thing’; published 
within months of ‘Does Consciousness Exist?’594).  For another, James tells us at the beginning of 
the article that he has doubted the existence of consciousness for twenty years; since well before 
the publication of PP.  The explanation for this, in our view, is simple enough.  James had not 
doubted the existence of phenomenal consciousness for twenty years; he had doubted substance 
dualism, and the notion that consciousness was a special substance associated with cognition.  
Now twenty years, as it happens, is precisely the amount of time that had elapsed since the 
publication of ‘The Function of Cognition’, in which James first articulated his functional account 
of knowledge.  That account holds that cognition “takes place” wholly within “states of 
consciousness”, but specifies that states of consciousness are to be “considered subjectively, or 
without respect to their possible function”595.  In other words, it specifies that states of 
consciousness are to be considered phenomenally.  Thus, cognition, in ‘The Function of Cognition’ 
– an essay which James considered representative of his mature views, and thus reprinted as the 
opening essay of MT – was to be regarded as a function taking place wholly within phenomenal 
consciousness.  We contend that James’s view did not substantially change between ‘The 
Function of Cognition’ and ‘Does Consciousness Exist?’.  All that really changed was his 
terminology.  Specifically, he dropped the term consciousness in order to distance himself from 
the popular notion of consciousness as a special entity or substance, and he adopted the term 
‘experience’ to denote consciousness considered subjectively or phenomenally596.  The modifier 
‘pure’ signifies that phenomenal consciousness, considered as a primal stuff, should be abstracted 
from any special characteristics of human consciousness, such as its concept laden nature597.  This 
reading is all but confirmed by the following passage: 
                                                             
594 James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p127 
595 James, The Meaning of Truth, pp1-2 
596 It has the added advantage, according to James, of being a ‘double-barrelled’ term, essentially 
ambiguous as to whether its referent is ‘subjective’ or ‘objective’ in the ordinary, dualistic sense of those 
words.  See: Essays in Radical Empiricism, p10.  For more on this point see David Lamberth’s discussion in: 
Lamberth, William James and the Metaphysics of Experience, pp25-29 
597 Thus, James’s repeated suggestions that ‘pure experience’ may be taken to stand indifferently either for 
‘thoughts’ or for ‘things’ (see: James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p10) should not be interpreted as 




If you ask what any one bit of pure experience is made of, the answer is always the 
same: “It is made of that, of just what appears, of space, of intensity, of flatness, 
brownness, heaviness, or what not.” … Experience is only a collective name for all 
these sensible natures, and save for time and space (and, if you like, for ‘being’) there 
appears no universal element of which all things are made. [our emphasis] 
Pure experience, James says, is made of ‘sensible natures’; of properties like ‘flatness’, 
‘brownness’ and ‘heaviness’.  Sensible natures, we contend, are nothing other than what 
contemporary philosophers call ‘phenomenal properties’.  In the final analysis therefore, James 
does not deny the existence of phenomenal consciousness; he says that the world is wholly 
constituted of it598.   
2.5.3.2. The Functional Account of Knowledge 
So, the question which James now faces is this: how, given MTPE – the thesis that the world is 
wholly constituted of pure experience or phenomenal consciousness – are we to explain the 
function of knowing or cognition?  On the classic dualist account, my thoughts come to ‘know’ 
something – a tiger in India for instance – by somehow transcending themselves and 
instantaneously hooking-up with the tiger599.  But for James, these notions of ‘the self-
transcendency of thought’ and ‘the instantaneous hooking-up of thought with thing’ are blatantly 
transempirical; neither refers to a process or relation that is directly experienced.  He proposes, 
instead, to explain knowing as a relation between “two pieces of actual experience belonging to 
the same subject, with definite tracts of conjunctive transitional experience between them”600.  A 
thought is said to ‘know’ a tiger in India in the sense that it may literally lead us, through a 
                                                             
meaning that it can stand indifferently either for entities within the stream of phenomenal consciousness or 
for material entities totally devoid of phenomenal consciousness; rather it should be interpreted as 
meaning that it can stand indifferently either for subjective/inner elements within the stream of 
phenomenal consciousness or for objective/outer elements within the stream of phenomenal 
consciousness.  What we here call ‘subjective/inner elements’ and ‘objective/outer elements’ may be taken 
as equivalent to the ‘Self’ and ‘not-Self’ of PP.  See: James, The Principles, I, p304. 
598 James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, pp26-27.  James’s comments to the effect that there is “no general 
stuff” or “universal element of which all things are made” are often interpreted as a kind of retraction of his 
earlier statement that pure experience is the “one primal stuff or material in the world … of which 
everything is composed”.  See for instance: William Joseph Gavin, William James in Focus (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2013), p47.  We read these comments differently.  We think James is saying that it 
is useless to posit some underlying stuff like ‘being’ or ‘nervous energy’ out of which the various 
phenomenal properties that we experience are differentiated.  In PP he had quoted (and rejected) 
Spencer’s theory that all phenomenal properties – all tactile sensations, smells, sounds, etc. – are 
differentiated out of a common “primordial element” called a ‘nervous shock’.  See: James, The Principles, I, 
p152.  Now he is dismissing questions about the ultimate constitution of phenomenal properties in similar 
terms.  Phenomenal properties are not made of anything; they just are. 
599 Compare: James, The Meaning of Truth, pp43-50 
600 James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p53 





continuous series of experiences, to an experience of an actual tiger, or to an equivalent 
substitute601.  
This account clearly looks forward to the pragmatic conception of truth.  However, the precise 
relation between the two doctrines is not transparent.  In the preface to Pragmatism James insists 
that they are entirely independent, and that each can be accepted without accepting the other602.  
Yet in the preface to MT he says that the acceptance of the pragmatic account of truth is “a step 
of first-rate importance” towards the acceptance of radical empiricism603.  This, he suggests, is 
because the pragmatic account of truth is a completion of the functional/experiential account of 
cognition from ERE.  If one accepts it, then a key barrier to the acceptance of radical empiricism – 
namely its difficulty explaining the knowledge relation – is overcome.  On the other hand, our 
acceptance of MTRE and MTPE establish a warrant for developing the pragmatic account of truth, 
for if the world is wholly comprised of pure experience, then an experiential account of knowing 
must be possible.  We think that James’s later statement of the relation between these doctrines 
is the truer one.  They are, if not interdependent, then at least mutually reinforcing.  This, we 
suggest, explains some of James’s intellectual acrobatics in Pragmatism which so infuriated his 
critics.  The real mandate for the pragmatic account of truth had always lain in the metaphysics of 
radical empiricism.  James presented the doctrines as independent in Pragmatism because he was 
concerned to construe the eponymous philosophy as a stand-alone project, as many of its 
admirers had taken it to be604.  As such he attempted to divorce the pragmatic account of truth 
from the metaphysics of radical empiricism.  The result was an account of truth that appeared, in 
the eyes of many readers, to be needlessly contorted into a purely experiential mould. 
2.5.3.3. Naive Realism 
But now another problem arises: how, given this functional/experiential account of knowledge, 
can two minds be said to know one thing?  Consider, once again, the classic dualist account.  On 
that account two minds know one thing – a pen on the desk for instance – because their 
individual perceptions of the pen are representations of one underlying material reality.  On 
                                                             
601 It is an essential part of James’s functional account of knowledge that direct sense experiences of the 
objects of a given piece of knowledge can be replaced with alternative experiential or purely conceptual 
substitutes.  See: James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, pp62-66.  Thus, the experience of an actual tiger may 
be substituted with a dictionary article or a museum exhibit on tigers. 
602 James, Pragmatism (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907), pp. viii-ix 
603 James, The Meaning of Truth, p. xii 
604 James was surprised and gratified by the great success of pragmatism.  It had captured the imaginations 
of a new generation of philosophers, many of whom took it to be a stand-alone doctrine, worthy of 
adherence in its own right.  James had no intention of upsetting the prospects of his fledgling school by 
tying its fate to a comparatively obscure and unpopular metaphysical system (even though he personally 
regarded that system as more important). 




James’s account the underlying material reality is excluded.  The pen only exists as experienced, 
and the two minds experience it very differently.  Each mind, it seems, knows only its own 
perception of the pen; not the same identical pen. 
Given his rejection of materialism, there are three possibilities available to James for resolving this 
problem: 
i) Idealism: the ‘true pen’ coincides with God’s perception of it, and our several finite 
perceptions are derived from God’s perception. 
 
ii) Panpsychism: our several perceptions of the pen are only outward appearances of a 
single underlying experiential reality. 
 
iii) Naive Realism: the pen exists as a kind of self-subsistent perception (or a superposition of 
multiple perceptions) of which our several minds variously partake. 
James rejects idealism because it leads to absolutism.  If, after all, God’s perceptions are to 
guarantee the reality of all external objects, then all external objects will have to be contained in 
God’s perception.  Absolutism is unacceptable to James on ethical grounds; it entails determinism 
and thus undermines any motivation for moral striving.  James rejects panpsychism, somewhat 
provisionally, because he is still yet to find a solution to the combination problem, or to the 
problem of stating the connection between the mind and the brain.  The only option left, 
therefore, is naïve (or natural) realism.  And thus, James says, “natural realism, so long decently 
buried, raises its head above the turf, and finds glad hands outstretched from the most unlikely 
quarters to help it to its feet again.”605  James, however, is clearly undecided on this issue.  He 
only says that natural realism may “pass for possible”606, and elsewhere he makes statements 
which would seem to indicate a preference for panpsychism607.  We will investigate this 
alternative panpsychist reading in the final part of this section.  
                                                             
605 James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p40 
606 James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p82 
607 Interestingly, in his notes for the 1903-1904 course ‘Philosophy 20c’ James omits the naïve realist 
solution from a similar discussion of the problem of how two minds can know one thing.  Indeed, he seems 
to suggest that naïve realism, because it conceives of no subject/experiential reality underlying our 
perceptions, makes those perceptions in some sense untrue.  Consider the following statement: “I lay stress 
on the point that the actual presence of the other S[ubject] there is what constitutes the veracity of our 
consciousness that the matter of our own tho’t is objective.  The form of our consciousness must always be 
objective.  But only when the other S[ubject] is there is it veraciously so. … The thought of a physical object 
existing in se, though cognitive in form is not veracious. … The physical object to be truly known must be 
conceived as a psychical one.”  We read these statements in the following way.  The thought of a physical 
object – which appears to us as a bundle of phenomenal properties – existing in itself (as per naïve realism), 
although cognitive, “is not veracious”.  In order for the thought to be veracious, it must posit a subject – a 






Despite the possibility of naive realism, James says, we may nevertheless continue to believe in 
“an existing beyond”; i.e. a thing-in-itself underlying our perceptions of external objects: 
The beyond must, of course, always in our philosophy be itself of an experiential 
nature.  If not a future experience of our own or a present one of our neighbour, it 
must be a thing in itself in Dr. Prince’s and Professor Strong’s sense of the term – that 
is, it must be an experience for itself whose relation to other things we translate into 
the action of molecules, ether-waves, or whatever else the physical symbols may 
be.608 
This, he tells us, “opens up the chapter of the relations of radical empiricism to panpsychism, into 
which I can not enter now”609.  Later, of course, in A Pluralistic Universe, James would enter into 
this discussion610.  He would articulate the “pluralistic panpsychic view of the universe” that 
characterizes his mature philosophy611.  In hindsight, therefore, these comments from ERE appear 
very definitely as early flirtations with panpsychism. 
The following excerpt taken from James’s syllabus for his ‘Philosophy 1a’ course for the year 
1905-1906 adds further weight to the panpsychist reading: 
                                                             
psychical/experiential reality – behind the physical object (as per panpsychism).  James says that theism 
gets around this difficulty by saying that God’s perception is the psychical reality that underlies the physical 
object, and by saying that our own perceptions approximate to God’s.  In this way, theism manages to 
“preserve the physical appearance” of outer objects; i.e. it makes our perceptions of those objects 
veracious, without having to postulate individual subjects behind them as per panpsychism.  This may 
indicate that James had ultimately intended to combine his naïve realism with a doctrine of theism.  See: 
The Works of William James: Manuscript Lectures and Notes, ed. by Burkhardt, p278 
608 James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, pp88-89.  In a footnote James adds: “Our minds and these ejective 
realities would still have space … in common.  These [experiences for themselves] would exist where, and 
begin to act where, we locate the molecules, etc., and where we perceive the sensible phenomena 
explained thereby.”  See: James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p89.  In connection with this note James 
references the aforementioned Dr. Prince and Professor Strong.  According to Prince, states of 
consciousness are identical with “neural vibrations”, and we may suppose, on the basis of an argument by 
analogy/continuity, that all motions/vibrations in physics are likewise identical with states of consciousness.  
See: Morton Prince, The Nature of Mind and Human Automatism (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 
1885), pp44-82.  Strong makes an almost identical argument, stating that “the movements of particles by 
which a crystal is formed, or those by which minute portions of water in falling gather themselves into 
globules, are, despite their vastly greater simplicity, strictly analogous to animal movements, and hence to 
be regarded as manifestations of feeling.”  The same is true, he says, even of “the very simplest motions, 
those of molecules and atoms, thus breaking down the barrier between the organic and the inorganic and 
making mind omnipresent in nature.”  See: Charles Augustus Strong, Why the Mind Has a Body (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1903), p291.  We note that all of these statements strongly suggest 
panpsychism’s affinity with metaphysical and scientific realism (of which more shortly). 
609 James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p89 
610 We note that Perry attaches a footnote to the above quote referencing lectures IV and VII of A Pluralistic 
Universe (in which James articulated his doctrine of panpsychism).  It seems therefore that despite his final 
classification of James as a naïve realist, Perry regarded PU as the consummation of these early flirtations 
with the doctrine. 
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Our only intelligible notion of an object in itself is that it should be an object for itself, 
and this lands us in panpsychism and a belief that our physical perceptions are 
effects on us of “psychical” realities. … That something exists when we as individuals 
are not thinking it, is an inexpungable conviction of common sense.  The various 
stages of idealist reflection are only as many successive attempts to define what the 
something is that thus exists.  The upshot tends pretty strongly towards something 
like panpsychism.612 
And yet, as Perry notes, it seems from James’s correspondence with C. A. Strong that he is still 
reluctant to accept panpsychism as late as 1907613.  His repeated rebuffing of Strong’s panpsychist 
advances, together with his increasingly concrete flirtations with the doctrine in ERE and in 
Philosophy 1a, give the strong impression that James wants to accept panpsychism, but for some 
reason is prevented from doing so wholeheartedly.  Building on this thought, we think that the 
following reading becomes highly compelling.  James considered that radical empiricism was 
potentially compatible with both naive realism and panpsychism.  At the time of his writing the 
essays that comprise ERE, he still had not figured out the solution to the combination problem, 
and so left both of these options open.  By the time of his writing PU, he had solved the 
combination problem, and so settled the matter in favour of panpsychism.  All of this, we shall 
see, accords well with James’s own account of his evolution on this topic.  After blackening 
countless pages of his notebooks trying to solve the combination problem, he says, finally, upon 
reading Bergson (around 1907), he saw his way out of it614.   
Lastly, we get a clue as to the form of panpsychism to which James was inclined from his 
reference to chapters III and IV of Morton Prince’s The Nature of Mind and Human Automatism.  
In said chapters, Prince endorses a form of panpsychism for which physical entities/events are not 
just correlated with consciousness, but are identical with it: 
It must be distinctly understood that it is not a question of translation or 
transformation at all, but of identification.  Physical changes are not transformed into 
                                                             
612 Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, II, p446.  James’s notes for philosophy 1a (delivered 
at Stanford) do not appear in the Harvard edition of The Works “because of the considerable duplication 
with similar notes for his courses at Harvard”.  See: The Works of William James: Manuscript Lectures and 
Notes, ed. by Burkhardt, p651.  We note that one such duplication relevant to the present case occurs in 
James’s notes for the ‘Philosophy D’ course of 1906-1907, where he says: “Idealistic panpsychism … in some 
shape or other will probably be the theory of the future.”  See: The Works of William James: Manuscript 
Lectures and Notes, ed. by Burkhardt, p396 
613 Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, II, p, p534-552.  Perry refers to a series of letters 
between James and Strong written in 1907 and 1908.  For these and other relevant letters see volume XI of 
The Correspondence of William James; especially Strong’s letter of October 5th 1907.  See: The 
Correspondence of William James, ed. by Skrupskelis & Berkeley, XI, pp457-459 
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states of consciousness, nor are there “two processes” which occur “side by side” in 
the same person.  There is only one process.615 
In his introduction to Fechner’s Little Book of Life After Death (published in the very same month 
as ‘Does Consciousness Exist?’ and ‘A World of Pure Experience’), James seems to be flirting with 
an essentially similar form of panpsychism: 
Once we grasp the idealistic notion that inner experience is the reality, and that 
matter is but a form in which inner experiences may appear to one another when 
they affect each other from the outside, it is easy to believe that consciousness or 
inner experience never originated, or developed, out of the unconscious, but that it 
and the physical universe are co-eternal aspects of one self-same reality, much as 
concave and convex are aspects of one curve.616 
This statement, we contend, strongly suggests that James is amenable to a doctrine of 
‘panpsychist identism’ or ‘Russellian panpsychism’, according to which all properties are 
ultimately identical with phenomenal properties617.    
2.5.4. Conclusions 
The essays that comprise ERE represent a major shift in James’s worldview, at least as it appeared 
in his published works.  He had flirted with doctrines of neutral monism and panpsychism in 
previous works, and even with functional accounts of knowledge, but in ERE, for the first time, he 
attempted to articulate these ideas in a systematic way.  He now definitively rejects dualism.  He 
holds that everything in the world is comprised of pure experience – of sensible natures, or 
phenomenal properties – to be conceived after the analogy of human experience.  All of James’s 
philosophical commitments and beliefs, if they are to find a place in his mature worldview, must 
be made consistent with the metaphysics of radical empiricism.  The emergent soul of PP is 
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616 William James, ‘Introduction’, in Gustav Theodor Fechner, The Little Book of Life After Death, trans. by 
Mary C. Wadsworth (Boston: Little, Brown, & Company, 1904), p. xiii.  Reprinted in: The Works of William 
James: Essays in Religion and Morality, ed. by Burkhardt, p118.   
617 This panpsychist reading of ERE, especially insofar as it attributes a doctrine of panpsychist identism to 
James, would seem to imply a commitment on his part to metaphysical realism; i.e. to the belief that the 
external world has a definite structure independently of how it is perceived by observers.  As Sami 
Pihlström has pointed out, this creates a problem for those, like himself, who read James as a metaphysical 
idealist.  On this basis, he attempts to articulate a non-realist version of panpsychism.  See: Sami Pihlström, 
“The Trail of the Human Serpent is Over Everything” (Lanham: University Press of America, 2008), pp213-
228.  This problem does not arise on our interpretation, because we read James as a metaphysical realist 
(section 2.6.2.2). 




nothing but pure experience; God is nothing but pure experience618; atoms and molecules, insofar 
as they exist in themselves, are nothing but pure experience: 
Radical empiricism thus leads to the assumption of a collectivism of personal lives 
(which may be of any grade of complication, and superhuman or infrahuman as well 
as human), variously cognitive of each other, variously conative and impulsive, 
genuinely evolving and changing by effort and trial, and by their interaction and 
cumulative achievements making up the world.619 
Moreover, all of these entities and processes – all of these ‘personal lives’ – when perceived from 
the outside, appear in the form of matter, as parts of the physical universe; of the single space-
time-causal system that we call nature620.  Any lingering doubt as to the validity of this reading will 
be dispelled when we come to consider PU in section 2.7.   
ERE is also significant in attempting to construct a metaphysics that gives primacy to what James 
called ‘the personal view of life’621.  This can be seen in ‘A World of Pure Experience’, and the 
thesis of MTPE, but it is shown even more clearly in certain later essays, which we have not 
considered here, but which we will discuss in chapter 3.  Thus, in ‘The Experience of Activity’ 
James conceives of all causal activity by analogy with the human experience of effort and volition; 
and in ‘The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience’ he attempts to establish the 
quasi-objective/cognitive status of affectional and evaluative facts.  All of this, evidently, speaks to 
his desire to defend the personal view of life (the manifest image) from the encroaching 
mechanical view (the scientific image).  This, once again, demonstrates the harmony of James’s 
project with that of liberal naturalism. 
ERE contains just one brief discussion that refers explicitly to ‘naturalism’.  In it, James 
summarises the opposing views of rationalism and naturalism regarding the function of the 
intellectual capacities of human beings.  For rationalism, he says, the chief function of our 
intellectual capacities is to apprehend the objective truth about reality, and the truth of a thought 
                                                             
618 Richard Gale explicitly denies this claim. He ascribes to James’s mystic self the belief that God – or the 
wider mother-sea with which God is continuous – is a supernatural being to whom the doctrine of pure 
experience does not apply.  See: Gale, The Divided Self of William James, pp271-272.  In this case we think 
Gale is sacrificing fidelity to James in the name of the neatness of his interpretation.   
619William James, ‘Personal Idealism’, Mind, 12 (1903), pp93-97 (p97).  Reprinted in: The Works of William 
James: Essays, Comments, and Reviews, ed. by Frederick Burkhardt (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1987), pp540-545 (p545) 
620 We note a significant overlap between the metaphysics of radical empiricism and Peter Forrest’s 
‘Properly Anthropomorphic Metaphysics’ (PAM) and ’Defiantly Anthropomorphic Theism’ (DAT).  Forrest, 
like James, uses certain features of human consciousness as the basis for a broader metaphysical view, and 
models his concept of God on those features.  See Peter Forrest, ‘The Personal Pantheist Conception of 
God’, in: Alternative Concepts of God, ed. by Buckareff & Nagasawa, pp21-40 
621 Henry Samuel Levinson sees this connection. See: Henry Samuel Levinson, The Religious Investigations of 
William James (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981), p175 





is to be measured in terms of its theoretic simplicity and unity.  For naturalism, our intellectual 
capacities always subserve relatively short-term practical ends, and the truth of a thought is to be 
measured in terms of its ability to usefully connect us with experiences to which it points622.  As 
regards their conceptions of truth, James says, “rationalism and naturalism, or (as I will now call 
it) pragmatism, walk thenceforward upon opposite paths.”623  James then, sides explicitly with 
naturalism on this point, and even identifies the naturalistic conception of truth with the 
pragmatic conception.  This serves as a natural segue into the penultimate section of this chapter, 
in which we will launch a detailed investigation into James’s 1906 Lowell Lectures on Pragmatism. 
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In section 2.5.3.2 we touched on the relationship between the pragmatic conception of truth and 
the metaphysics of radical empiricism.  Despite James’s claims to the contrary in the preface of 
Pragmatism, we said, the two doctrines are mutually reinforcing; even mutually dependent to 
some degree.  We will explore James’s pragmatic conception of truth in more detail in section 
2.6.2.  This conception, however, is only a part of James’s pragmatist program.  The foundation of 
pragmatism is the pragmatic method, and James applies that method not only to truth but to the 
concepts of substance, science, and religion, among others.  In what follows, our investigation of 
Pragmatism will be split into three parts.  In section 2.6.1 we shall establish James’s notion of the 
pragmatic method, and we shall briefly consider his application of that method to the concept of 
substance.  We shall see that the pragmatic method includes the prescription that philosophy 
should maintain continuity with science, and is thereby perfectly aligned with the methodological 
thesis of naturalism.  In section 2.6.2 we shall examine James’s application of the pragmatic 
method to the concept of truth.  We will first attempt to state the theory; then we will weigh in 
on certain key debates concerning it; and finally, we will build out our own novel interpretation, 
according to which the pragmatic theory of truth may be viewed as an evolutionary theory of 
cognition.  Finally, in section 2.6.3, we will consider the relationship between pragmatism, 
science, and religion.  We will examine James’s notion that pragmatism serves as a mediator 
between religion and naturalism; we will revisit our suggestion from section 2.3, that Pragmatism 
constitutes a continuation of James’s critique of scientificism; and we will investigate James’s 
claims regarding the pragmatic truth of religion. 
2.6.1. The Pragmatic Method 
We have already seen, in ‘Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results’, James’s official 
statement of the pragmatic principle624.  There, he applied it to scholastic conceptions of God’s 
attributes.  Such attributes as God’s aseity and simplicity, he said, were utterly devoid of 
pragmatic meaning.  The sensations we may expect and the actions we must prepare in a world in 
which God possesses aseity and simplicity are no different from those we should expect in a world 
in which he does not.  The attributes of justice and omniscience, by contrast, have a relatively 
definite pragmatic meaning.  They mean that God will see all of our actions, good and bad, and 
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reward or punish us accordingly.  Here, in the second of the Pragmatism lectures, James offers us 
a homelier example of the pragmatic method in practice. 
Whilst out camping with friends in the mountains, he says, he returned to the campsite after a 
brief stroll to find his friends engaged in a ferocious metaphysical dispute.  They were discussing a 
scenario in which a man is trying to get sight of a squirrel moving around a tree.  As the man 
moves around the tree, the squirrel circles its trunk, always keeping out of the man’s sight.  “The 
resultant metaphysical problem now is this: Does the man go round the squirrel or not?625” 
“Which party is right,” I said, “depends on what you practically mean by ‘going 
round’ the squirrel.  If you mean passing from the north of him to the east, then to 
the south, then to the west, and then to the north of him again, obviously the man 
does go round him, for he occupies these successive positions.  But if on the contrary 
you mean being first in front of him, then on the right of him, then behind him, then 
on his left, and finally in front again, it is quite as obvious that the man fails to go 
round him, for by the compensating movements the squirrel makes, he keeps his 
belly turned towards the man all the time, and his back turned away.”626 
James’s friends were conflating two distinct pragmatic meanings of the phrase ‘going around’.  If 
they had applied the pragmatic method, they would have realised this, and the dispute could 
have been avoided. 
In the above example, the pragmatic method appears almost absurdly simple.  Surely human 
beings apply this method, if only implicitly, on a relatively regular basis.  James concedes that they 
certainly do.  Indeed, he insists that the method is by no means unfamiliar to philosophy.  Such 
philosophical giants as Socrates, Aristotle, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, he says, were adept at it, 
and made “momentous contributions to truth by its means”627.  Berkeley, for example, saw that 
the pragmatic meaning of ‘material substance’ is the experience of sensations; “of colour, figure, 
hardness and the like”628.  Locke, in turn, saw that the pragmatic meaning of ‘spiritual substance’ 
is personal identity, which he thought resolved into our consciousness of previous states of our 
self which we appropriate to our personal history629.  Finally, Hume saw that the pragmatic 
meaning of the ‘self’ is only a bundle of qualities within the stream of experience630.  James, as we 
know by now, agrees with each of these pragmatic resolutions to the traditional problems of the 
concept of substance.  In the subsequent lectures, he proposes to apply the pragmatic method to 
a number of other metaphysical problems, such as those resulting from disputes between 
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materialism and spiritualism, indeterminism and determinism, and pluralism and monism.  Finally, 
and most notoriously, he applies the pragmatic method to the concept of truth, wherein he 
arrives at the famous pragmatic conception of truth.  In each case James’s utilization of the 
pragmatic method aims at tempering metaphysical speculation with considerations of concrete 
facts and practical effects.  The general triumph of the pragmatic method, he says, “would mean 
an enormous change in … the ‘temperament’ of philosophy”; it would mean that “Science and 
metaphysics would come much nearer together, would in fact work absolutely hand in hand”631.  
This of course, is a relatively straightforward statement of the methodological thesis of naturalism 
(probably among the first of such statements).  In respect to methodology therefore, we may say 
that pragmatism and naturalism are perfectly aligned.   
2.6.2. The Pragmatic Theory of Truth 
2.6.2.1. The Theory Outlined 
In lecture six of Pragmatism, James proposes to apply the pragmatic method to the concept of 
truth.  Doing so, he thinks, leads to a revolutionary theory of truth that has distinct advantages 
over its competitors.  He begins by offering a broad definition of truth which he thinks both 
pragmatists and their opponents are bound to accept: 
Truth, as any dictionary will tell you, is a property of certain of our ideas.  It means 
their agreement, as falsity means their disagreement, with ‘reality’.  Pragmatists and 
intellectualists both accept this definition as a matter of course.  They begin to 
quarrel only when the question is raised as to what may precisely be meant by the 
term ‘agreement,’ and what by the term ‘reality,’ when reality is taken as something 
for our ideas to agree with.632 
Let us therefore attempt to establish precisely what James’s means by the terms ‘agreement’ and 
‘reality’, and how his understanding of these concepts differs from more traditional views.  We 
begin with the concept of reality.   
We may say that in James’s time two different concepts of reality were most prevalent.  On the 
one hand we have the absolute idealist’s conception, for which reality consists in the absolute 
point of view; in the eternal and unchanging content of the absolute mind.  On the other hand, 
we have the materialist’s conception, for which reality consists in the imperceptible entities 
described by physics, together with the imperceptible laws which govern them.  James, as we 
know from our investigation of radical empiricism, rejects both of these conceptions of reality.  
Absolute minds and material substances are among those transempirical entities/principles which 
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philosophy, in his view, must dispense with.  As the metaphysical thesis of pure experience states, 
reality is fundamentally experiential, and is wholly constituted out of bits of finite experience held 
together by experienced relations.  However, for the purposes of the present discussion this basic 
statement of the constitution of reality is not quite sufficient.  Certain higher-order facts – namely 
ideas or concepts – are also relevant here633.  James provides the following summary of his view 
of the constitution of reality.  It consists, he says, of three parts: i) concrete facts (i.e. sense 
perceptions), ii) necessary truths and relations of ideas, and iii) “the whole body of other truths 
already in our possession”634.   
Next then, we must assess James’s understanding of the concept of an idea’s ‘agreement’ with 
reality.  “The popular notion”, he remarks, “is that a true idea must copy its reality.”635  For 
absolute idealists, this means that our idea of an object must copy the absolute’s idea of it; for 
materialists, it means that our idea must copy something of the material constitution of the 
object.  In both cases it is assumed that some sort of straightforward one-to-one copying must be 
occurring.  While James concedes that this notion seems to work well in some cases, in 
considerably many others, he thinks, it quickly breaks down. 
Our ideas of sensible things do indeed copy them.  Shut your eyes and think of 
yonder clock on the wall, and you get just such a true picture or copy of its dial.  But 
your idea of its ‘works’ (unless you are a clock-maker) is much less of a copy … when 
you speak of the ‘time-keeping function’ of the clock, or of its spring’s ‘elasticity,’ it is 
hard to see exactly what your ideas can copy.636 
My idea of the clock, unless I am a clock-maker, is not an exact copy the clock.  For all I know, it 
may be a mock-clock, whose internal mechanisms are arranged incorrectly so that it serves no 
time-keeping function.  Moreover, there are complex physical properties/processes involved in 
the working of the clock that our ideas – even a clock-maker’s – cannot possibly copy in any 
straightforward sense.  James concludes that agreement with reality is going to have to consist in 
something more than simply copying. 
It is at this point that he suggests that we apply the pragmatic method to this problem, and ask 
what concrete difference is made by a belief’s being true; “What, in short, is the truth’s cash value 
in experiential terms?”637.  Pragmatism, he says, gives the following answer: “True ideas are those 
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that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify.  False ideas are those that we can 
not.”638  Elaborating on this thesis, he says that the truth of an idea “is not a stagnant property 
inherent in it”, but rather that ideas are “made true by events”.  Indeed, truth is itself a kind of 
event or process; “the process namely of its [an idea’s] verifying itself…”639.  But now, James says, 
we must pin down the pragmatic meaning of verification.  To begin with, we must distinguish 
between ‘full verification’ and ‘partial’ or ‘potential verification’.   
The full verification of an idea occurs when our having the idea leads to a sense perception which 
the idea copies.  James offers the example of a man lost in the woods who sees a cow-path and 
forms the idea of a house at the end of it.  He follows the cow-path, finds a house, and his idea is 
thereby fully verified.  “Such simply and fully verified leadings”, James says, “are certainly the 
originals and prototypes of the truth-process.”640  Other kinds of truth process – i.e. partial or 
potential verifications – are always “conceivable as being primary verifications arrested, 
multiplied, or substituted for one another”641.  The case of a non-clock-maker’s idea of a clock is a 
good example of partial verification.  We non-clock-makers assume our ideas of clocks to be true, 
and act as if they are true, and if we are not led to frustration, we take our assumption to have 
been correct.  Nowhere in this process does anything amounting to full verification of the idea 
occur.  James contends that most of the ideas we call true are, like non-clock makers’ ideas of 
clocks, only partially or potentially verified: 
For one truth process completed there are a million in our lives that function in this 
state of nascency.  They turn us towards direct verification; lead us into the 
surroundings of the objects they envisage; and then, if everything runs on 
harmoniously, we are so sure that verification is possible that we omit it, and are 
usually justified by all that happens.642 
In such cases our ideas do not terminate in perceptions which they copy, but rather lead us into 
the “surroundings” of such perceptions; into situations where having the relevant perceptions is a 
concrete possibility.  Our idea that the object on the wall is a clock, for example, might lead us to 
call a clock-maker to examine it, whereupon our idea could be verified; or our idea of tigers in 
India might lead us to catch a flight to India where we could see the tigers for ourselves.  As a 
matter of fact, we rarely do seek full verification in these cases, but this does not stop us from 
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calling our ideas true.  “Indirectly or only potentially verifying processes”, James concludes, “may 
thus be true as well as full verification-processes.”643 
True ideas, whether fully or only partially verified, lead us, in a “progressive” and “harmonious” 
fashion, “into or up to, or towards” their objects”.  “This function of agreeable leading”, James 
says, “is what we mean by an idea’s verification”644.  For an idea to agree with reality then, means 
for it to agreeably lead us into the vicinity of objects.  We call, and are entitled to call, any ideas 
which fulfil this function, true.  Recall however that the relevant realities with which a true idea 
must agree are not exhausted by sense perceptions.  Reality, for James, consists of three parts: i) 
concrete facts (i.e. sense perceptions), ii) necessary truths and relations of ideas, and iii) “the 
whole body of other truths already in our possession”645.  An idea’s leading into the vicinity of its 
objects, or even directly to a sense perception of them, will not necessarily make it true if it 
contradicts ii) or iii).  For example, we may hear a creak in an empty room and form the idea of a 
ghost behind the door, and we may open the door and really see a ghost before us, but if we are 
already convinced that ghosts do not exist, we might conclude that we are hallucinating, and that 
our idea is therefore false.  In this case we might say that although the idea has led to its object, it 
has done so disagreeably.  The leading was not progressive and harmonious; it was sudden, 
unexpected, and perplexing.  For someone else of course, this experience might not be perplexing 
at all, or it might be so convincing as to merit an amendment to their stock of past truths.  The 
crucial point is simply that squaring new ideas with our stock of past truths is an essential part of 
the process of agreeable leading.  James suggests that many of the misunderstandings of 
pragmatism result from a failure to appreciate this point646. 
The final part of James’s pragmatic concept of truth consists in his claim that true ideas are ideas 
which agreeably lead into the vicinity of their objects “in the long run and on the whole” (our 
emphasis); for, he says, “what meets expediently all the experience in sight won’t necessarily 
meet all farther experiences equally satisfactorily”647.  Thus, the truth of an idea, on the pragmatic 
account, is never absolute.  Ideas which are true today may turn out to be false tomorrow.  While 
this way of speaking may jar with popular intuitions about truth, it accords perfectly well with our 
actual use of the term.  That being said, James suggests that we may continue to employ the 
notion of absolute truth as a kind of regulative principle.  For pragmatism, absolute truth is “that 
ideal vanishing point towards which we imagine that all our temporary truths will some day 
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converge”648.  Thus we may say, for example, that many of our present scientific theories, 
although pragmatically true today, are absolutely false, because they are bound to be replaced in 
the long-run.  And we may say that our longer-lasting ideas are truer than our shorter-lived ones.  
Pragmatic truth and absolute truth, James acknowledges, may one day perfectly align, but if they 
do it will be because the absolute truth is made – i.e. verified – through concrete truth processes 
like those that he has outlined649. 
In summary, we may say that according to pragmatism there are two key criteria that must be 
met in order for an idea to be considered true: i) it must lead to, or into the vicinity of, its objects 
(sense perceptions), and ii) it must conform, all the while, to our stock of past truths.  These 
criteria alone suffice, when met, to make an idea pragmatically true.  But James adds the caveat 
that the ideas are truer that last longer, and that the ideal long run consensus of all inquirers 
constitutes a kind of pragmatic absolute truth650.   
2.6.2.2. The Realism/Idealism Debate 
The pragmatic theory of truth is utterly mired in debates and controversies.  This was true in 
James’s day, and it continues to be true today.  Among those debates we may distinguish one in 
particular that is important for our purposes; the debate between epistemological realist and 
epistemological idealist interpreters of the pragmatic theory of truth.  Realist interpreters hold 
that truths, for James, are about external realities that exist independently of individual minds, 
while idealist interpreters hold that truths are about mental phenomena internal to individual 
minds (i.e. about sense-data, or about other ideas/beliefs).  This debate is important because the 
idealist connotations of the pragmatic theory of truth are often held up as a point of conflict 
between pragmatism and naturalism.  Our view, by contrast, is that pragmatism and naturalism 
are closely aligned.  In what follows we will therefore consider this debate in some detail.   
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In lecture VII of Pragmatism, on ‘Pragmatism and Humanism’ James supplements the pragmatic 
theory of truth with the principle that, all other criteria being met, the truest belief is the one 
which best satisfies our passional nature651.  Many of James’s commentators, including R. B. Perry, 
Russell, Moore, and more recently Richard Gale, take this principle to be at the heart of James’s 
account, and to motivate an idealist interpretation of the pragmatic theory of truth652.  Gale for 
instance thinks that this principle, coupled with James’s analysis of ‘The Perception of Reality’ in 
PP, leads to a doctrine which he calls ‘ontological relativism’653.  According to ontological 
relativism, Gale says, human beings literally make their own realities; not just in the sense of 
shaping them in accordance with their interests, but also in the sense of actually bringing them 
into existence (possibly at will)654.   
Ellen Kappy Suckiel takes a slightly different route to a similar conclusion.  One consequence of 
the pragmatic theory of truth is that it makes the truth of an idea depend on human interests and 
purposes.  Thus, James says, depending on the circumstances it may work well to carve up the sky 
into one set of constellations or another; to treat a human being as a collection of atoms, a 
collection of cells, an integral consciousness, or a social unit, etc.  Evidently, not all of these 
distinctions can correspond to natural kinds; and yet according to pragmatism they are all true.  
On the basis of considerations like these Suckiel takes James to be endorsing a form of 
epistemological idealism.  “James”, she says, “considers common-sense physical objects to be the 
product of a pragmatic construction”.  And this, she thinks, commits him to the view that 
“realities may differ, depending upon personal interpretations of experience”, and thereby to “a 
constructionalist view of reality”655. 
Now, it is our contention that Gale’s and Suckiel’s interpretations cannot possibly be correct.  
James makes far too many statements which seem to directly contradict them; in particular in the 
eighth essay of The Meaning of Truth, on ‘The Pragmatist Account of Truth and its 
Misunderstanders’, where he addresses the misunderstanding that “No pragmatist can be a 
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652 See: Ralph Barton Perry, ‘Review of Pragmatism as a Philosophical Generalization’, Journal of Philosophy, 
Psychology, and Scientific Method, 4 (1907), pp421-428; George Edward Moore, ‘Professor James’s 
Pragmatism’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 8 (1907-8), pp33-77; Bertrand Russell, ‘Transatlantic 
‘Truth’’, Albany Review, 2 (1908), pp393-410 
653 Gale, The Divided Self of William James, pp190-198 
654 Gale does not say that James is wholly consistent on this point.  He acknowledges that many of James’s 
statements seem to go against the thrust of this ontological relativism.  He traces this inconsistency to 
James’s own divided self.  As promethean pragmatist he wants to make reality; as anti-promethean mystic 
he wants to discover it.  Accordingly, Gale refers to this tension as James’s ‘discovering-making aporia’.  See: 
Gale, The Divided Self of William James, pp190-198. 
655 Ellen Kappy Suckiel, The Pragmatic Philosophy of William James (Notre Dame: The University of Notre 





realist in his epistemology”656.  This misunderstanding, James thinks, arises chiefly from the notion 
that pragmatic truth consists in ‘satisfaction’.  This, recall, was the source of Gale’s irrealist 
reading of the theory.  Here, in MT, James gives an utterly unambiguous rebuttal of such readings: 
The pragmatist calls satisfactions indispensable for truth-building, but I have 
everywhere called them insufficient unless reality be also incidentally led to.  If the 
reality assumed were cancelled from the pragmatist’s universe of discourse, he 
would straight-way give the name of falsehoods to the beliefs remaining, in spite of 
all their satisfactoriness.  For him, as for his critic, there can be no truth if there is 
nothing to be true about.  Ideas are so much flat psychological surface unless some 
mirrored matter gives them cognitive lustre.  This is why as a pragmatist I have so 
carefully posited ‘reality’ ab initio, and why, throughout my whole discussion, I 
remain an epistemological realist.657 
Such a direct statement hardly needs further comment.  The question is why, given statements 
like this one, interpretations like Suckiel’s and Gale’s have arisen?658 
There are, we suggest, two key factors that give rise to idealist/irrealist interpretations of the 
pragmatic theory of truth.  First, there is James’s rejection of the popular and ingrained notion 
that truth is ascribable to propositions (conceived as sharable quasi mind-independent objects 
that are distinct from beliefs).  On this view propositions are the ultimate bearers of truth, and 
their truth entails that the states of affairs which they describe are realities.  Thus, true 
propositions attain a status almost equivalent to realities.  The true proposition ‘that Caesar 
crossed the Rubicon’ passes, in common parlance at least, for the actual fact of Caesar crossing 
the Rubicon.  It is on this basis that some commentators interpret James’s belief that truths are 
shaped by human interests as entailing that realities are shaped by human interests.  In fact, 
however, James ascribes truth to beliefs; and holds that the truth of a belief entails only its 
agreeably leading into the vicinity of its objects.  Thus truths, for James, are by no means 
equivalent to realities, and their being shaped by human interests does not entail that realities are 
so shaped.   
                                                             
656 James, The Meaning of Truth, p190 
657 James, The Meaning of Truth, p195 
658 Wesley Cooper offers a slightly more nuanced version of the idealist interpretation, suggesting that 
James, although an epistemological idealist, was a metaphysical realist.  He believed, in other words, that 
there were external realities existing independently of individual minds, but held that truth/knowledge did 
not involve a relation to those external realities.  This, according to Cooper, is because realities, for James, 
consisted in pure experience, which is essentially preconceptual, while truths always took a conceptual 
form.  Seeing as the conceptual cannot possibly correspond with the preconceptual, truths must be 
supposed to correspond with experiences that have already been conceptually cooked by some individual 
mind.  See: Cooper, The Unity of William James’s Thought, pp219-220. 
 





The other key factor that gives rise to idealist/irrealist interpretations of the pragmatic theory is 
the fact that it tacitly presupposes the metaphysics of radical empiricism.  James has said that the 
key realities with which our ideas correspond are experiences.  To those not familiar with ERE, this 
seems immediately to commit him to idealism, for experiences are usually supposed to be mental 
phenomena that are confined to individual minds.  The typical epistemological realist, by contrast, 
believes that ideas correspond with the material realities that are represented by experiences.  
However, as we know from our treatment of ERE in section 2.5, James does not believe that 
experiences are mental phenomena that are confined to individual minds.  Rather he believes 
that they are neutral phenomena that are accessible to multiple minds (neutral monism/naive 
realism), or else that they are the outer appearances of ‘experiences for themselves’; i.e. psychical 
realities existing independently of the minds that encounter them (panpsychism)659.  In either 
case, experiential realities, for James, clearly require a metaphysically and epistemologically 
realist interpretation. 
Robert Schwarz suggests that the apparent irrealist/constructionist strain in the pragmatic theory 
of truth amounts to a ‘world-making thesis’ according to which our experience is conceptually 
cooked and shaped by human interests to a much greater extent than common-sense would lead 
us to suppose660.  On this reading, Suckiel, for instance, is quite right to say that common-sense 
physical objects are pragmatically constructed for James, but wrong to say that realities are 
pragmatically constructed.  Common-sense physical objects are not realities; only pure 
experiences are realities.  Common-sense physical objects are not pure experiences; they are 
experiences that have been conceptually cooked.  As such, their being shaped by human interests 
leaves the realities untouched661.  Pragmatic world-making is therefore perfectly consistent with 
epistemological realism.  And with the supposed idealist connotations of pragmatism 
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panpsychism.  If panpsychism is true, and realities consist in experiences for themselves, then how can 
truth processes ever actually terminate.  The termination of a truth process, in this case, would involve the 
knower’s stream of consciousness actually passing into that of the object.  As a matter of fact, James frankly 
entertains this possibility, calling it ‘telepathic confluence’, and holding that it may, for all we know, really 
be possible.  If not, he says, then (given the truth of panpsychism) all truths will be of the virtual or 
substitutional kind; only ever leading us into the vicinity of their objects, and never right up to them.  See: 
James, The Meaning of Truth, pp129-133 
660Robert Schwartz, Rethinking Pragmatism (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2012), pp124-139.  Sami Pihlström 
offers an alternative reading which, although it also invokes the notion of ‘world-making’, concludes in 
favour of an irrealist interpretation of pragmatism.  See: Pihlström, Pragmatism and Philosophical 
Anthropology, pp1-30.  Both authors refer to Nelson Goodman’s theory of worldmaking in: Nelson 
Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1992) 
661 Strictly speaking we should say that common-sense physical objects, considered in the first intention, are 
pure experiences, and thus are realities (See Lamberth’s discussion referenced in footnote 633 above).  





undermined, Schwarz thinks, the path is now open for the development of a distinctively 
pragmatic naturalism:  
For the Pragmatists, inquiry guided by the tenets of scientific method is naturalism.  
Pragmatic naturalism does not demand an additional commitment to materialism, 
physicalism, or the elimination of the intentional.  Indeed, it questions the 
significance and intelligibility of such projects when they are forced to confront and 
comprehend experience.662 
Philip Kitcher offers an essentially similar reading of the relationship between pragmatism and 
realism663.  He too, thinks that such a reading establishes the possibility of a doctrine of pragmatic 
naturalism, characterized by an emphasis on human nature and on the social dimension of human 
inquiry, as well as by its rejection of strong, austere versions of scientism664.  Evidently pragmatic 
naturalism, as Kitcher and Schwarz conceive it, is a species of liberal naturalism665.  Its source in 
James’s Pragmatism bodes well, therefore, for our placement of him in the liberal naturalist 
tradition666.  In the next section we shall see another striking manifestation of the affinity 
between pragmatism and naturalism; one that sheds further light on the realism/idealism debate. 
2.6.2.3. The Pragmatic Theory of Truth as an Evolutionary Theory of Cognition 
The real key to the pragmatic theory of truth, in our view, is understanding its evolutionary 
dimension.  In a review of Schiller’s ‘Humanism’, published in 1904, James describes pragmatism 
as “a novel way of looking at the mind’s relations to reality”667.  He lists three influences that have 
conspired to make it fashionable: i) the criticisms of Mill, Lotze, and Sigwart, against the notion 
that ideas straightforwardly ‘copy’ reality, ii) the rising popularity of instrumentalist conceptions 
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663 Philip Kitcher, ‘Pragmatism and Realism: A Modest Proposal’, in Preludes to Pragmatism (New York: OUP, 
2012), pp128-144 
664 Philip Kitcher, ‘Pragmatic Naturalism’, in Philip Kitcher: Pragmatic Naturalism, ed. by Kaiser & Seide, 
pp15-44 
665 David Lamberth argues persuasively that pragmatism is strongest when kept free from such associations 
with naturalism.  He thinks that pragmatism, with its essential methodological focus, obviates the 
metaphysical opposition of naturalism and supernaturalism.  See: Lamberth, ‘Pragmatism and Naturalism: 
An Inevitable Conjunction?’, p85.  This does not bear directly on our thesis, which seeks to establish a 
Jamesian naturalism; not necessarily a pragmatic naturalism. 
666 There is a question, of course, as to the extent to which such a doctrine was already at work in James’s 
texts, and the extent to which the other aspects of his philosophy – in particular his religious views – are 
consistent with it. John Ryder for instance argues that, whatever the independent merits of pragmatic 
naturalism as a philosophical doctrine, William James was probably not a proponent of it.  See: John Ryder, 
‘Reconciling Pragmatism and Naturalism’, in Pragmatic Naturalism and Realism, ed. by Shook, pp55-77 
(p56). 
667 The Works of William James: Essays, Comments, and Reviews, ed. by Burkhardt, p550.  This review 
originally appeared in Nation.  See: William James, ‘Humanism’, Nation, 78 (1904), pp175-178.  We refer to 
The Works reprint for reasons of accessibility. 





of science/scientific theories, and iii) the growing acceptance of the doctrine of evolution.  On this 
last point James says the following: 
[N]ot only has the doctrine of evolution weaned us from fixities and inflexibilities in 
general, and given us a world all plastic, but it has made us ready to imagine almost 
all our functions, even the intellectual ones, as ‘adaptations,’ and possibly transient 
adaptations, to practical human needs.668 
In other words, evolution has made us realise that even the function of knowledge/knowing truth 
is shaped by evolutionary pressures, and geared towards adaptivity.  He elaborates, saying that 
“All our mental categories without exception have been evolved because of their fruitfulness for 
life, and owe their being to historic circumstances”669.  And not only the functions, he suggests, 
but any products of the functions – i.e. specific ideas, theories, and conceptions – are likewise to 
be regarded as adaptations670.  Thus, he refers approvingly to Georg Simmel’s view that “no 
human conception whatever is more than an instrument of biological utility; and that if it be 
successfully that, we may call it true, whatever it resembles or fails to resemble.”671 
In this little review on ‘Humanism’ then, James seems to present the doctrine of evolution as 
utterly central to the pragmatic theory of truth.  Indeed, he presents that theory as an inevitable 
consequence of applying evolutionary principles to our understanding of the phenomenon of 
cognition.  A number of commentators have noted this evolutionary connection, but few have set 
much store by it.  Sprigge for instance acknowledges that Darwinism is “one of the several 
tributaries leading to James’s pragmatism”672, but downplays its relevance to the final theory.  It is 
“doubtful” he thinks, that the theory of evolution really favours a pragmatist conception of truth 
over a common-sense correspondence theory: 
The correspondence theorist may grant that conscious thought has developed as a 
survival instrument, but he will claim that it is useful precisely to the extent that it 
provides the organism with a map of the world in which it must behave in ways 
which help it prosper.  Thus, since its particular utility to the organism lies in its 
correspondence to the environment, there will be a strong tendency for truth and 
survival value to the organism to go together, but this, so far from making them 
identical, depends on the fact that the first is a means to the second.673 
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670 Recall James’s statement from VRE regarding the adaptive value of religious beliefs: “It is but the 
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The pragmatists’ reasoning, Sprigge thinks, is wrong-headed.  They say that ideas are counted as 
true insofar as they prove adaptive, but it is much more natural to suppose that ideas prove 
adaptive insofar as they just are true; i.e. insofar as they accurately represent reality.  Both ways 
of conceiving the matter are, we suggest, not without merit.  However, in the final analysis it is 
the pragmatists’ conception that is the more profound.  To see why this so, consider the 
phenomenon of so-called ‘satisficing perceptions’, as highlighted by cognitive scientist Donald 
Hoffman: 
Male jewel beetles fly about looking for the glossy, dimpled, and brown wing-casings 
of females. When males of H. sapiens began tossing out empty beer bottles that 
were glossy, dimpled, and just the right shade of brown, the male beetles swarmed 
the bottles and ignored the females, nearly causing the extinction of the species 
(Gwynne and Rentz 1983).674 
In this, Hoffman says, the beetle’s perceptions “relied not on veridical information but rather on 
heuristics which worked in the niche where they evolved”.  The reason they worked well is 
because fallible, heuristic-based perceptual systems, are relatively simple and efficient to 
produce/run.  This is what Sprigge’s analysis fails to take into account.  Even granting that 
accurate perceptions are more adaptive, accuracy is not the only criterion of adaptivity.  All other 
things being equal, simplicity and efficiency are at least as important, if not more so.  Hoffman 
argues that the same analysis may apply to human perception.  It may be adaptive before it is 
objectively true, and where adaptivity diverges from objective truth, it may well be objectively 
false.   
Now, it is our contention that the pragmatic theory of truth embodies essentially the same logic, 
but applies it to cognition rather than perception.  Human cognition, it says, yields adaptive 
                                                             
674 Donald Hoffman, Manish Singh, Chetan Prakash, ‘The Interface Theory of Perception’, Psychonomic 
Bulletin & Review, 22 (2015), pp1480-1506 (p1481).  The reference to Gwynne and Rentz is to the following 
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heuristics rather than objective truths; it yields ‘satisficing cognitions’, selected more for their 
efficiency than for their accuracy.  James finds support for this way of conceiving of cognition in 
the fact that we frequently find that different and incompatible ideas and theories work well in 
different circumstances.  This is obviously the case, he contends, with our ideas about the 
mereological constitution of objects; i.e. about how we divide objects up into constituent parts.  
Thus, in psychology it often works well to treat an organism as an indivisible whole or integral 
consciousness; in biology it is best to treat it as a collection of cells; in chemistry, as a collection of 
molecules; and in physics, as a collection of particles675.  Depending on the particular domain of 
phenomena we are investigating different and often incompatible ideas/theories prove to be 
most useful.  This is true within science, where physicists and biologists carve up reality in 
different and incompatible ways, and it is also true of the competing theories of science and 
common-sense.  Sometimes it is useful to treat of colour exclusively in terms of surface 
reflectance and the wavelength of light; sometimes it is useful to treat of it in terms of 
phenomenal properties.  The fact that different and incompatible ideas/theories work better in 
different circumstances, should incline us, James thinks, towards the pragmatic association of 
truth with adaptivity: 
Ought not the existence of the various types of thinking which we have reviewed, 
each so splendid for certain purposes, yet all conflicting still, and neither one of them 
able to support a claim of absolute veracity, to awaken a presumption favourable to 
the pragmatist view that all our theories are instrumental, are mental modes of 
adaptation to reality, rather than revelations or gnostic answers to some divinely 
instituted world-enigma? [our emphasis]676  
Cognition, James says, yields “mental modes of adaptation” – i.e. adaptive heuristics – rather than 
objective truths.  We may call such heuristics true provided they meet James’s pragmatic criteria; 
provided they lead us into the vicinity of sense perceptions of their objects, and fit in with our 
stock of past truths677.  We note that this reading confirms James in his avowal of a qualified 
epistemological realism; it allows that true ideas, whilst not exactly copying reality, are 
constrained by and adapted to it.  It also makes sense of James’s unshakable confidence that the 
pragmatic theory of truth was destined to be accepted.  He had intuited, but not quite 
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successfully articulated, the fact that it was an inevitable consequence of the theory of 
evolution678.   
2.6.3. Pragmatism, Science, and Religion 
2.6.3.1. The Pragmatic Critique of Scientificism 
In section 2.3 we discussed James’s critique of scientificism.  We divided it up, recall, into three 
parts: i) the critique of scientism, ii) the critique of hyperscientific realism, and iii) the critique of 
the notion that there are sharp boundaries between science and non-science.  In each case, we 
said, pragmatism would supplement these critiques.  It would supplement the critique of 
scientism by introducing a theory of cognition that recognized non-scientific avenues to 
knowledge; it would supplement the critique of hyperscientific realism by setting out an 
instrumentalist account of scientific theories; and it would supplement the critique of sharp 
scientific boundaries by showing the underlying logic of science to be broad enough to encompass 
certain traditionally non-scientific disciplines.  In the present section we will complete James’s 
critique of scientificism by considering each of these pragmatic contributions in turn.   
i) The Pragmatic Critique of Scientism 
The thesis of scientism states that only science can provide us with genuine knowledge/truth 
about reality.  It is not difficult to see how the pragmatic theory of truth undermines this thesis.  
The pragmatic theory of truth says that human cognition, whether employed in scientific pursuits 
or otherwise, cannot give us objective truth; the best it can give us are adaptive heuristics.  It says, 
moreover, that the truth of these heuristics is not determined by the nature of the enterprise 
which produced them, but by their successful fulfilment of the function of agreeable leading; of 
leading us into the vicinity of sense perceptions of their objects, and of cohering with our stock of 
past truths.  Nowhere in this theory does James invoke science or any other discipline as an 
exclusive arbiter of truth or of genuine knowledge.  Indeed, the theory seems designed in part to 
preclude such arbitration. 
ii) The Pragmatic Critique of Hyperscientific Realism 
The thesis of hyperscientific realism states that only the terms of scientific theories refer to actual 
entities; i.e. that only entities postulated by science really exist.  James’s pragmatism undermines 
this thesis by adopting an instrumentalist analysis of scientific theories: 
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[A]s the sciences have developed … the notion has gained ground that most, perhaps 
all, of our laws are only approximations.  The laws themselves, moreover, have 
grown so numerous that there is no counting them; and so many rival formulations 
are proposed in all the branches of science that thinkers have become accustomed to 
the notion that no theory is absolutely a transcript of reality, but that any one of 
them may from some point of view be useful.  Their great use is to summarize old 
facts and to lead to new ones.  They are only a man-made language, a conceptual 
shorthand, as someone calls them, in which we write our reports of nature; and 
languages, as is well known, tolerate much choice of expression and many dialects.679 
James explicitly mentions Duhem (among others) as a source of this view.  In chapter one, recall, 
we saw liberal naturalist critiques of scientism and hyperscientific realism invoking Duhem’s 
famous ‘underdetermination thesis’, according to which the approximate nature of scientific data, 
together with the fact that multiple conflicting theories can explain that data, leads to the 
conclusion that scientific theories are underdetermined by evidence.  James seems here to be 
invoking the same thesis, and to the same effect.  This thesis, we said in chapter one, not only 
undermines hyperscientific realism, but also helps to bolster certain arguments against scientism.  
Part of James’s argument against scientism in WB for instance, revolves around the notion that 
normative elements play a role in scientific theory selection.  This argument assumes as a premise 
that scientific theories are sometimes underdetermined by data680. 
iii) The Pragmatic Critique of Sharp Scientific Boundaries 
We said in section 2.3 that the notion that there are no sharp boundaries between science and 
non-science is connected with the so-called ‘unity of science’ thesis which we discussed in chapter 
1.  The unity thesis, recall, states that all sciences are united by their possession of some single 
feature; a single subject matter, a single sociological form, a single method, etc.  James, we said, 
did not exactly reject the unity thesis.  Rather he endorsed it, but conceived of the shared 
scientific method in such broad terms that various traditionally non-scientific enterprises could 
also be said to employ it.  In WB he characterised that method as ‘the method of verification’.  It 
consisted, he said, in the formulation of hypotheses, the determining of the empirical 
consequences of those hypotheses, and the performance of experiments to test those 
consequences.  Post Pragmatism, we suggest, ‘the method of verification’ should be taken to 
have been superseded in James’s analysis by ‘the pragmatic method’.  The pragmatic method, 
after all, may be said to contain the method of verification as construed by James in WB: it asks 
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what practical effects a hypothesis will have – what sensations we may expect from it and what 
reactions we must prepare – and it proposes to test hypotheses according to their practical 
effects.  Insofar, therefore, as the method of verification constitutes the essence of the scientific 
method, the pragmatic method may be said to contain that also681.  As James says in a letter to 
Charles Strong in 1907, the pragmatic method “completes and enlarges” the scientific method682.  
The conclusion, as regards the question of the boundaries of science, is that legitimate 
knowledge-producing enterprises are to be distinguished by their employment of the pragmatic 
method, rather than by their employment of any special method of the sciences.  This, as we 
suggested in section 2.4, may explain why James drops the term ‘Science of Religions’ after VRE.  
He comes to appreciate that the important element in the legitimate study of religion is not so 
much any particular scientific method as the underlying pragmatic method.   
2.6.3.2. The Pragmatic Truth of Religion 
In some ways we may say that the tension between naturalism and religion that pervades James’s 
work becomes most overt in Pragmatism.  In this text, after all, James presents mediation 
between the naturalistic and religious worldviews as his explicit goal.  In the opening lecture of 
Pragmatism, we see James present this tension in terms of the contrasting tendencies of two 
kinds of temperament; the tender-minded and tough-minded temperaments.  The former, James 
says, are inclined towards rationalism and spiritualism, while the latter are inclined towards 
empiricism and naturalism.  The antagonism between these temperaments has, according to 
James, played a significant part in shaping philosophical debate throughout the ages.  For the 
majority of our history – from Plato all the way through to the great 17th century rationalists – the 
tender-minded have had the upper hand.  But now, James remarks, tough-mindedness is on the 
rise: 
For a hundred and fifty years past the progress of science has seemed to mean the 
enlargement of the material universe and the diminution of man’s importance.  The 
result is what one may call the growth of naturalistic or positivistic feeling.683 
This, in turn, has led to an intensification of the opposition between the tender-minded and 
tough-minded temperaments.  The philosophical constructions of each have tended to take more 
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and more extreme forms, with empiricists embracing epiphenomenalism and scientificism, and 
rationalists embracing absolutism684.  Meanwhile the common man, who typically embodies a 
mixture of the two temperaments, and hankers for a middle way, is left without proper 
philosophic representation.  The common man, James says, “wants facts; he wants science; but 
he also wants a religion”685.  What he finds however, is “an empirical philosophy that is not 
religious enough, and a religious philosophy that is not empirical enough” for his purposes686.  
Pragmatism, James suggests, is able to find a middle way between these extremes: “It can remain 
religious like the rationalisms, but at the same time, like the empiricisms, it can preserve the 
richest intimacy with facts.”687 
The key to pragmatism’s success as mediator between naturalism and religion is the pragmatic 
theory of truth.  According to the pragmatic theory, religious ideas, like many of the other 
products of human cognition, are to be understood as adaptive heuristics for dealing with 
experience.  That religious heuristics are adaptive is of course part of the argument of VRE.  
However, although adaptivity is a significant part of truth for James, it is not the whole of it.  
Adaptive heuristics, in order to be counted as true, must lead into the vicinity of sensory 
experiences of their objects, and must cohere with our stock of past truths.  Now, according to 
popular opinion religious ideas are suspect precisely because they fail to meet the former 
criterion.  Thus, James says, he fears that his exposition of the pragmatic theory “may have left 
the impression on many of you that pragmatism means methodically to leave the superhuman 
out.”688  This, he assures us, was not his intention.  James’s own views, after all, do not coincide 
with popular opinion on this matter.  He believes that religious ideas and theories lead, whether 
through conscious cultivation or subconscious incubation, to religious and mystical experiences; 
and he believes that religious and mystical experiences are “absolutely sensational in their 
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epistemological quality”689.  As such James holds that the hypothesis of God meets the first 
pragmatic criterion; it agreeably (adaptively) leads us into the vicinity of sensory experiences of its 
objects.  It is in this way that pragmatism acts as a mediator between religion and naturalism.  It 
offers us a method and a theory of cognition/truth that can establish religious hypotheses upon 
empirical principles.  It thereby treads the line “[b]etween the two extremes of crude naturalism 
… and transcendental absolutism”690, avoiding scientificism on the one hand and excessive 
rationalism on the other.  All that remains therefore is to show that it satisfies the second 
criterion; i.e. “to build it out so that it will combine satisfactorily with all the other working 
truths”691.  James insists, however, that Pragmatism is not the place to embark upon that task, 
electing to postpone it until another occasion. 
2.6.4. Conclusions 
In Pragmatism James’s naturalistic strain once again has a strong showing.  The pragmatic 
method, we saw in section 2.6.1, is perfectly aligned with the methodological thesis of naturalism; 
it aims to bring science and philosophy much closer together.  Some commentators (i.e. Kitcher 
and Schwarz) have even suggested that this is enough to qualify pragmatism itself as a form of 
naturalism.  In section 2.6.2, we saw that James, putting that method into practice, devised a 
pragmatic theory of cognition inspired in large part by the theory of evolution.  This theory, 
moreover, avoided some of the metaphysical excesses of its rivals.  It deliberately eschewed 
notions of the self-transcendency of thought, and of the instantaneous hooking-up of thought 
with reality.  In The Meaning of Truth, James suggests that one distinct advantage of the 
pragmatic account is that it utilizes “no other categories than those which we employ in 
describing other natural processes”692, and that it aims to show that “[k]nowing is just a natural 
process like any other”693.  One might almost construe it as an attempted naturalization of 
intentionality.   
The only part of Pragmatism that might be said to break from this overtly naturalistic pattern is its 
treatment of religion.  However, such a judgement rests, we think, on the preconceived notion 
that there is some essential incompatibility between naturalism and religion.  It is one of the 
explicit goals of this thesis – one that is consonant, on our reading, with the spirit of Pragmatism – 
to challenge this supposed incompatibility.  The pragmatic synthesis of religion and naturalism is 
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only half complete however.  James, as we said, leaves the task unfinished.  He has yet to show 
that the hypothesis of God can be made consistent with our stock of past truths.  This, we 
suggest, is what he tries to accomplish in A Pluralistic Universe, which is the subject of the final 
section of this chapter.  




2.7. A Pluralistic Universe 
A Pluralistic Universe is the consummation of a number of tendencies in James’s philosophy.  It is 
his chance to recoup the material he had planned for his second course of Gifford lectures; to 
articulate his polytheistic vision of the universe as “a collection of … selves, of different degrees of 
inclusiveness”.  It is his chance, also, to make good on the promise of ERE, to flesh out “the 
relations between radical empiricism and panpsychism”.  Finally, as we have just seen, it is his 
chance to build out the hypothesis of God so as to be consistent with his stock of past truths.  PU 
is justly regarded, therefore, as a supremely important text in James’s works.  As we said in the 
introduction to this chapter, we join David Lamberth in counting it as the definitive statement of 
his mature philosophical position.   
In what follows we will investigate PU under four heads.  In section 2.7.1 we will consider James’s 
novel classification of his worldview as a form of pluralistic pantheism (as opposed to piecemeal 
supernaturalism).  We shall see that pluralistic pantheism is committed to substance-monism, 
thing-pluralism, strong emergentism, and macro-causation.  By the lights of the schema we 
developed in chapter 1, it is therefore a species of radical religious naturalism.  In section 2.7.2 we 
will review James’s investigations of Fechner, and the doctrine of panpsychism he develops on 
their basis.  In section 2.7.3 we will look at Fechner’s/James’s notion that smaller consciousnesses 
combine into larger ones.  Finally, in section 2.7.4 we will try to establish the content of James’s 
mature concept of God as presented in PU.  We shall see that James defends a doctrine of finite 
theism, for which God is identical with a portion of the physical universe, and for which God’s 
consciousness constitutes the inner nature of that portion of the universe.  This finite theism, 
supplemented by James’s reconstructed doctrines of panpsychism and emergentism, will be a 
central part of our restoration of his theistic naturalism in chapter 3.   
2.7.1. Pluralistic Pantheism 
James begins his Hibbert lectures by revisiting one of his favourite themes; the relationship 
between philosophical preferences and psychological temperament.  There are, he says, two 
kinds of temperament that are decisive in determining philosophical preferences: the cynical 
temper and the sympathetic temper694.  Which temperament we possess determines what sort of 
worldview will appeal to us.  If cynical, James says, broadly materialistic philosophies will appeal 
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to us; if sympathetic, broadly spiritualistic ones will695.  The fundamental distinction between 
these types of philosophy, James suggests, is that the former defines the world “so as to leave 
man’s soul upon it as a sort of outside passenger or alien, while the latter insists that the intimate 
and human must surround and underlie the brutal.”696  This distinction, James thinks, is best 
construed as being one between ‘foreignness’ and ‘intimacy’697.  Materialistic philosophies 
tolerate and even celebrate foreignness; spiritualistic philosophies require a high degree of 
intimacy.   
The category of spiritualistic philosophy, James says, itself subdivides into a less intimate and a 
more intimate branch698.  On the one hand we have theism, which conceives of human beings as 
radically separate from and other than God; on the other hand we have pantheism, which 
conceives of human beings as “entitatively one with God”699.  “The essential dualism of the 
theistic view”, according to James, “has all sorts of collateral consequences” that make for 
foreignness: 
Man being an outsider and a mere subject to God, not his intimate partner, a 
character of externality invades the field.  God is not heart of our heart and reason of 
our reason, but our magistrate, rather; and mechanically to obey his commands, 
however strange they may be, remains our only moral duty.700 
At this point, James chooses to narrow the scope of his discussion.  Neither “cynical materialism” 
nor “old-fashioned theism” attain the degree of intimacy sought by modern men and women of 
the sympathetic temper: 
Our contemporary mind having once for all grasped the possibility of a more intimate 
weltanschauung, the only opinions quite worthy of arresting our attention will fall 
within the general scope of what may roughly be called the pantheistic field of vision, 
the vision of God as the indwelling divine rather than the external creator, and of 
human life as part and parcel of that deep reality.701 
For the remainder of the discussion, he will focus on the pantheistic branch of spiritualistic 
philosophy, of which, he says, there are once again two main species702.  On the one hand there is 
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the monistic or ‘all-form’ of pantheism, which holds that the totality – the all – constitutes a 
single, all-inclusive entity which alone is genuinely real, and that finite beings – the ‘eaches’ – are 
somehow illusory.  On the other hand we have the pluralistic or ‘each-form’ of pantheism, which 
holds that finite beings are genuinely real, and that the totality does not constitute a single entity 
in the strong sense that monists claim703.  James contends that the monistic form of pantheism, 
because it condemns the experience of finite beings to relative unreality and postulates a total or 
absolute perspective that is utterly unlike that of finite beings, “leaves us almost as much outside 
of the divine being as dualistic theism does”704.  The pluralistic form, on the contrary, leaving our 
finite experience intact, allows that human beings, as they are, may be genuine participants in the 
divine reality.  This, by James’s lights, makes pluralistic pantheism the more intimate variety. 
It is at this point that James situates his own worldview with respect to the types of philosophy 
under discussion.  Absolute idealism, he says, is an example of the monistic form of pantheism; 
his own view – radical empiricism – is an example of the pluralistic form705.  James is perfectly 
explicit on this point.  Radical empiricism is a form of pantheism.  It conceives of God as being of 
one substance with nature; not as a supernatural being interacting with nature from the outside.  
We know from Pragmatism that the core metaphysical difference between materialism and 
spiritualism is the former’s endorsement of CCP and the latter’s endorsement of macro-
causation706.  The core metaphysical difference between pantheism and theism, we suggest, is the 
former’s endorsement of substance-monism (and/or CCN) and the latter’s endorsement of 
substance-dualism707.  Finally, the core metaphysical difference between monistic and pluralistic 
pantheism is the former’s endorsement of thing-monism (according to which the world as a 
whole is the only genuine entity) and the latter’s endorsement of thing-pluralism (according to 
which the world is comprised of a plurality of genuine entities)708. 
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David Lamberth translates this discussion into a helpful tabulated schema, which we reproduce 












James’s worldview – radical empiricism – is a subspecies of pantheism, which is a species of 
spiritualism, which is a genus of philosophy that appeals to people of a sympathetic 
temperament.  It endorses substance-monism, thing-pluralism, strong emergentism, and macro-
causation710.  In what follows we will attempt to flesh out some more features of James’s 
pluralistic pantheism.  
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Temper    Genus       Species             Subspecies 
 
Cynical     Materialistic  
     [CCP] 
     (foreign) 
 
Sympathetic    Spiritualistic          Theistic  
     [MC]         [Substance-dualism] 
   (intimate)      (foreign) 
 
           Pantheistic                   Absolutism  
           [Substance-monism]           [Thing-monism] 
                     (intimate)                   (foreign) 
 
                Radical Empiricism  
                 [Thing-pluralism] 
            (intimate) 
Fig. 22 





Monistic pantheism, in its absolutist guise, is, James says, an exceedingly thin philosophy.  By this 
he means two things.  First, that the arguments it invokes are extremely tenuous, and second, 
that its almost total disconnection from experience and science makes it highly abstract and 
unrelatable711.  By way of contrast with absolutism, James wishes to outline the tenets of a 
philosophy which, although in many respects similar to it, stands at the opposite pole as regards 
thinness and thickness.  The philosophy he has in mind is that of Gustav Theodor Fechner, whose 
method was empirical and inductive, and whose arguments relied on analogies to concrete 
experiential facts rather than appeals to apriori principles712.  Fechner’s philosophy, the chief 
statement of which occurred in his book Zend-Avesta713, attempted to establish the truth of what 
he called ‘the daylight view of world’, according to which “the whole universe in its different 
spans and wave-lengths, exclusions and envelopments, is everywhere alive and conscious”714. 
Fechner’s main argument for this claim, according to James, is an analogical one: “My body moves 
by the influence of my feeling and will; the sun, moon, sea, and wind, being themselves more 
powerful, move by the influence of some more powerful feeling and will.”715  This, of course, is a 
highly simplified rendition of the argument in question.  It appears, in essence, to be a version of 
what contemporary philosophers call ‘the argument by continuity for panpsychism’716.  It says 
that the intrinsic nature of one portion of the physical universe – namely my body (or my brain 
and nervous system) – is experiential, and that, this being the only portion of the physical 
universe whose intrinsic nature we are acquainted with, we may rightfully suppose that the 
intrinsic nature of other portions of the physical universe is likewise experiential.  We may also 
suppose, Fechner thought, that just as the human body is correlated with an integral or 
‘collective’ consciousness, so certain other physical entities are correlated with integral 
consciousnesses: 
The entire earth on which we live must have, according to Fechner, its own collective 
consciousness.  So must each sun, moon, and planet; so must the whole solar system 
have its own wider consciousness, in which the consciousness of our earth plays one 
part.  So has the entire starry system as such its consciousness; and if that starry 
system be not the sum of all that is, materially considered, then that whole system, 
                                                             
711 James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp136-143 
712 James, A Pluralistic Universe, p145 
713 Gustav Theodor Fechner, Zend-Avesta (Leipzig, Leopold Voss, 1851) 
714 James, A Pluralistic Universe, p149 
715 James, A Pluralistic Universe, p151 
716 David Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2005), p251 





along with whatever else may be, is the body of that absolutely totalized 
consciousness of the universe to which men give the name of God.717 
James counts it as a considerable advantage of Fechner’s view that it allows for a high degree of 
variegation and complexity in the universe’s inner life.  Whereas absolutism postulates integral 
consciousness at only two levels – at the level of human beings and at the level of the universe as 
a whole – Fechner postulates it at a variety of levels, both infrahuman and superhuman.  He 
presumes not only that superhuman entities like planets and solar systems may possess an 
integral consciousness, but that infrahuman entities like plants, cells, molecules, and electrons 
may possess them too718.   
We must be exceedingly careful, James says, when engaging in this type of analogical thinking, 
not to neglect important differences between the proposed analogues.  Most people, he says, 
reasoning justly that, since the human mind is correlated with a body, so infrahuman and 
superhuman minds must be correlated with bodies, proceed to suppose, unjustly, that the bodies 
in question must be similar in every respect to animal bodies.  This, he insists, is a mistake.  “[A]ll 
that the analogy comports is a body”; not any particular kind of body.  The particular features of 
animal bodies, he says, are adaptations to particular habitats.  We should not necessarily expect 
non-animal bodies to possess those features719.  The earth’s body, for instance, has no use of the 
special features that prove adaptive for animal life.  “What need has she of arms,” James asks, 
“with nothing to reach for? of a neck, with no head to carry? of eyes or nose when she finds her 
way through space without either…”720  So much for arms and eyes, but what about the organ 
most frequently deemed to be a necessary correlate of consciousness; “Can there be 
consciousness,” James asks, “where there is no brain?”: 
But our brain, which primarily serves to correlate our muscular reactions with the 
external objects on which we depend, performs a function which the earth performs 
in an entirely different way.  She has no proper muscles or limbs of her own, and the 
only objects external to her are the other stars.  To these her whole mass reacts by 
most exquisite alterations in its total gait, and by still more exquisite vibratory 
responses in its substance. … For these cosmic relations of hers, then, she no more 
needs a special brain than she needs eyes or ears.721 
The body of the earth is thus radically different from the bodies of animals.  We may therefore 
expect the earth’s consciousness to be radically different from the consciousness of animals.  And 
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this line of reasoning applies just as much to infrahuman consciousness as it does to superhuman 
consciousnesses.  Plants for example are often held to possess no consciousness on account of 
their lacking a central nervous system.  But according to Fechner plants may possess an entirely 
different kind of consciousness than animals, correlated with an entirely different kind of 
organization.  “Violins and pianos give out sounds because they have strings”, James says; “Does it 
follow that nothing but strings can give out sound?”722   
This is an incredibly important point to get across in establishing any doctrine of panpsychism.  
Because our own consciousness, which is the only example of consciousness with which we are 
directly acquainted, is highly complex and receptive to its environment, we often suppose that 
consciousness is essentially complex and receptive to its environment; we think, for instance, that 
it is something that only arises in complex organisms, and that it is bound up with sensations of 
the external world.  But to raise this as an objection to panpsychism is obviously to beg the 
question.  It assumes that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon, and that the conditions for 
its emergence have to do with an entity’s complexity, its biological constitution, its capacity for 
sensation, etc.  But this is just what the doctrine of panpsychism calls into question.  Panpsychism 
rests on the premise that consciousness is not an emergent property but a fundamental one.  
Even bottom level physical entities – elementary particles or what have you – will possess some 
form of consciousness.  The consciousness of such entities will not, however, be complex or 
receptive to its environment; it will not involve anything like the sensory consciousness of 
complex organisms.  Rather the consciousness of such entities will be as radically different from 
animal consciousness as elementary particles are from animal bodies.  It may consist in a single 
self-enclosed phenomenal quality, without any internal variation, and without any receptivity to 
the external world.  It is naturally very difficult to conceive of such radically different forms of 
consciousness, but conceivability is by no means a perfect indicator of possibility723.   
The question which naturally arises out of the above discussion is this: what is the relation 
between integral consciousnesses at different scales?  What is the relation between the 
consciousness of elementary particles and the consciousness of human beings, or between the 
consciousness of human beings and the consciousness of the earth?  This is the question that 
James sets out to answer in lecture five of PU on ‘The Compounding of Consciousness’, which we 
will address in the next section. 
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2.7.3. The Compounding of Consciousness 
“The special thought of Fechner’s”, James says, with which he is chiefly concerned in the Hibbert 
Lectures, “is his belief that the more inclusive forms of consciousness are in part constituted by 
the more limited forms.”724  Thus, for Fechner the human stream of consciousness is in part 
constituted by the consciousness of our sense organs.  Each sense organ, James explains, 
elaborating on this claim, has a stream of consciousness associated with it; a stream of 
consciousness that is ejective to other such streams.  At the same time however, these streams, 
which in themselves are self-enclosed and ejective to one another, come together into a single 
perceptual field in the consciousness of the human being as a whole: 
While you listen to my voice, for example, you are perhaps inattentive to some bodily 
sensation due to your clothing or your posture.  Yet that sensation would seem 
probably to be there, for in an instant, by a change of attention, you can have it in 
one field of consciousness with the voice.  It seems as if it existed first in a separate 
form, and then as if, without itself changing, it combined with your other co-existent 
sensations.725 
Fechner claims that human minds stand in the same relation to a higher collective consciousness 
as the several forms of sensory consciousness stand to the human mind: 
Quite similarly, then, says Fechner, we must suppose that my consciousness of 
myself and yours of yourself, altho in their immediacy they keep separate and know 
nothing of each other, are yet known and used together in a higher consciousness, 
that of the human race, say, into which they enter as constituent parts.  Similarly, the 
whole human and animal kingdoms come together as conditions of a consciousness 
of still wider scope.  This combines in the soul of the earth with the consciousness of 
the vegetable kingdom, which in turn contributes its share of experience to that of 
the whole solar system, and so on from synthesis to synthesis and height to height, 
till an absolutely universal consciousness is reached.726 
The important claim here is that an entity’s consciousness is partially constituted out of the 
consciousness of its parts727.  James uses the combination of sensory consciousness as an example 
because he thinks that the different forms of sensory consciousness are intuitively separable; 
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each being associated with a particular sense organ.  If this is correct, he thinks, then their coming 
together in the human perceptual field is an absolutely definite instance of combination.  But he 
does not deny that there are other instances of combination involved in human consciousness.  
Indeed, on James’s premises it must be assumed that the consciousnesses of the sense organs are 
themselves constituted out of the consciousnesses of their cells; the consciousnesses of the cells 
out of that of their constituent molecules; of the molecules out of that of their constituent atoms, 
and so on.  The important thing is not the character of the consciousness combined, but the fact 
that combination occurs at all; the fact, or so Fechner asserts, that “states of consciousness, so-
called, can separate and combine themselves freely, and keep their own identity unchanged while 
forming parts of simultaneous fields of experience of wider scope.”728  It was this assumption, 
recall, that lead James to formulate the combination problem in PP.  He insists that it is not one 
we can “let pass without scrutiny.”729 
James begins the ensuing discussion with a restatement of the combination problem: 
We can’t say that awareness of the alphabet as such is nothing more than twenty-six 
awarenesses, each of a separate letter; for those are twenty-six distinct awarenesses, 
of single letters without others, while their so-called sum is one awareness, of every 
letter with its comrades.  There is thus something new in the collective 
consciousness.730 
In other words, macro-conscious states possess a unity that cannot conceivably be reduced to 
features of an aggregate of micro-conscious states; and, conversely, micro-conscious states 
possess a self-enclosedness that cannot conceivably be thought to exist at the same time that 
those states are co-conscious with other such states as parts of a macro-conscious state.  But this 
is precisely what Fechner believes.  He thinks that there are conscious wholes which, although in 
some sense more than the sums of their parts, are not something distinct from or additional to 
their parts; and he thinks that those parts, even whilst forming the whole, continue to exist as 
self-enclosed individual entities: 
As our mind is not the bare sum of our sights plus our sounds plus our pains, but in 
adding these terms together also finds relations among them and weaves them into 
schemes and forms and objects of which no one sense in its separate estate knows 
anything, so the earth-soul traces relations between the contents of my mind and the 
contents of yours of which neither of our separate minds is conscious.  It has 
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schemes, forms, and objects proportionate to its wider field, which our mental fields 
are too narrow to cognize.731 
How then, is Fechner to avoid the combination problem?  According to James, he faces the 
following dilemma: either he must concede that conscious wholes are something additional to 
their parts, or he must reject the logic of identity upon which the combination problem rests732.  
Taking the first horn of the dilemma, he insists, would amount to a relapse into substance 
dualism; a move that he himself simply refuses to make733.  But taking the latter – rejecting the 
logic of identity – seems on the face of it to be nothing short of absurd.  This, nevertheless, is the 
solution that James ultimately recommends: 
For my own part, I have finally found myself compelled to give up the logic, fairly, 
squarely, and irrevocably.  It has an imperishable use in human life, but that use is 
not to make us theoretically acquainted with the essential nature of reality – just 
what it is I can perhaps suggest to you a little later.734 
We will postpone out treatment of James’s solution to the combination problem until chapter 3.  
For now, let us consider how James’s panpsychism intersects with his mature conception of God. 
2.7.4. God 
James now considers the combination problem neutralised.  The hypothesis that human and 
other minds combine into a superhuman consciousness is therefore a legitimate one.  The 
question is, he says, whether this hypothesis should be considered “more probable or more 
improbable”735.  There are, for James, two pieces of evidence that count decisively in its favour.  
The first are the “abnormal or supernormal facts” that have been discovered by psychical 
researchers: 
I doubt whether we shall ever understand some of them without using the very letter 
of Fechner’s conception of a great reservoir in which the memories of earth’s 
inhabitants are pooled and preserved, and from which, when the threshold lowers or 
the valve opens, information ordinarily shut out leaks into the mind of exceptional 
individuals among us.736 
This of course is a reference to individuals like Leonora Piper, who James believes to be capable of 
accessing supernormal knowledge that could not have been acquired though the senses.  He had 
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already entertained the hypothesis of a mother-sea of consciousness as a way of explaining this 
capacity in Human Immortality737.  Now, unsurprisingly, he suggests that it counts towards the 
probability that there are superhuman consciousnesses.  But this particular sort of evidence, he 
concedes, comes from a region of inquiry “too spook-haunted to interest an academic 
audience”738.  The other key piece of evidence is drawn from the phenomenon of religious 
experience: 
I think it may be asserted that there are religious experiences of a specific nature, not 
deducible by analogy or psychological reasoning from our other sorts of experience.  I 
think that they point with reasonable probability to the continuity of our 
consciousness with a wider spiritual environment from which the ordinary prudential 
man (who is the only man that scientific psychology, so called, takes cognizance of) is 
shut off.739 
Religious and mystical experiences, James argued in VRE, are quasi-sensory experiences of 
religious objects.  Although not coercive for non-mystics, they do at least create a presumption of 
truth in favour of the hypothesis that God exists.  In Pragmatism James suggested that this 
presumption, although valid, lacks force until it can be shown how the hypothesis of God is 
consistent with our stock of past truths.  The key truths, for James, were the doctrines of radical 
empiricism on the one hand, and the fundamentals of the scientific worldview on the other.  The 
Fechnerian doctrine of panpsychism, he thinks, demonstrates that the hypothesis of God is 
consistent with those truths740.  Consistency having thus been achieved, he finds himself justified 
in declaring the hypothesis of God true (or reasonably probable at any rate).  In the remainder of 
lecture seven, and in his concluding lecture, James attempts to flesh out his concept of God more 
fully. 
Now that the combination problem has been neutralized, James concedes that the absolute is not 
the impossible being he had once thought it was741.  The consciousness of absolutely everything in 
the universe really may come together into a single absolute experience.  This, he notes, seems to 
be Fechner’s view.  Fechner believes that God is the “integrated soul of all things in the cosmos 
without exception”742.  It is not however a view to which James himself subscribes.  There are a 
number of reasons for this.  Firstly, conceiving of God as absolutely all-inclusive makes him 
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responsible for evil.  Secondly, it makes the universe deterministic.  Thirdly, in the view of many of 
James’s philosophical contemporaries, it makes God timeless.  James thinks that each of these 
notions make for intolerable foreignness, and ought to be rejected: 
[T]he only way to escape from the paradoxes and perplexities that a consistently 
thought-out monistic universe suffers from as from a species of auto-intoxication – 
the mystery of the ‘fall’ namely, of reality lapsing into appearance, truth into error, 
perfection into imperfection; of evil, in short; the mystery of universal determinism, 
of the block universe eternal and without a history, etc.; – the only way of escape, I 
say, from all this is to be frankly pluralistic and assume that the superhuman 
consciousness, however vast it may be, has itself an external environment, and 
consequently is finite.743 
“Having an environment, being in time, and working out a history just like ourselves,” James says, 
“he [God] escapes from the foreignness from all that is human, of the static timeless perfect 
absolute.”744 
This then, is James’s mature conception of God.  God is a finite being, existing within the universe.  
Like everything else in the universe, he is comprised of pure experience, which appears to 
outward perception in the form of matter.  He is in fact the intrinsic nature, or thing-in-itself, of a 
large portion of the physical universe; or to put it another way, that portion of the physical 
universe is his body745.  Just as that portion of the physical universe includes myriad other entities 
as its parts, so God’s consciousness includes the consciousnesses of those entities as its parts.  
Although in themselves they remain self-enclosed and ejective to one another, as parts of God’s 
consciousness they are co-conscious, and their contents are knitted together into schemes and 
patterns of which, by themselves, they know nothing.   
2.7.5. Conclusions 
A Pluralistic Universe constitutes the definitive statement of the metaphysical basis of James’s 
worldview.  In it, the piecemeal supernaturalism of VRE gives way to a doctrine of pluralistic 
pantheism.  The core tenets of this doctrine are substance-monism, thing-pluralism, strong 
emergentism, macro-causation, and the existential thesis of religious naturalism (according to 
which nature, or something within nature, merits a religious response).  In addition, James 
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articulates a doctrine of panpsychism, according to which the intrinsic nature of the physical 
universe is consciousness; and a doctrine of finite theism, according to which God’s consciousness 
is coextensive with a large portion of the physical universe.  None of the above, we contend, is 
overtly in conflict with naturalism.  The only possible point of conflict concerns James’s notion of 
macro-causation.  We know from VRE that he holds God to possess causal power, and to enter 
into causal relations, not only with human beings, but with the wider cosmos.  A key question yet 
to be answered is just how we ought to conceive of God’s macro-causal activity.  In order to 
answer this question, we will need to establish the precise nature of James’s doctrines of 
panpsychism and emergentism in much closer detail.  This will constitute the major task of 
chapter three.  Before we embark upon this task however, we wish to survey and summarise our 
findings in the present chapter, and to lay out our plan for the final part of the thesis.  





2.8. The Arch of James’s Naturalism 
We now have some sense of the development of James’s naturalism.  He began his career as a 
scientific naturalist, endorsing epiphenomenalism, and believing that “God is dead or at least 
irrelevant”746.  Upon falling into a depression in 1870, he found that his only way of escape was 
through a belief in freewill, and thereby amended his naturalism so as to accommodate a doctrine 
of mental causation747.  As we saw in The Principle of Psychology, he found the means of 
accommodating mental causation within a naturalistic worldview through a doctrine of 
emergentism.  He argued that integral consciousness was emergent from the physical properties 
of the human body, and that it realized its macro-causal power by influencing the outcomes of 
indeterministic events in the brain.  At the time of his writing PP James had had great confidence 
in the scientific method, believing science to be totally autonomous from metaphysics.  His 
abandonment of this pretence to autonomy in Psychology: Briefer Course, and his subsequent 
critique of scientificism in The Will to Believe, signalled the dawning in James of a more critical 
attitude towards science, and a corresponding shift of his naturalism in the direction of liberality.  
Also in WB, we saw James’s first flirtations with an overtly religious worldview.  Although he 
developed a thoroughly naturalistic ethical theory in ‘The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life’, 
he supplemented it with a doctrine of metaethical theological voluntarism that seemed in some 
respects to be in tension with his naturalism.  Next, in The Varieties of Religious Experience, we 
witnessed James straining his naturalism to make yet another significant accommodation; this 
time, of religious realism.  He had originally supposed such an accommodation to be possible, 
thinking to describe the resulting position as “theistic naturalism”.  However, upon his reading of 
Ward’s Naturalism and Agnosticism, he considered the term ‘naturalism’ irrevocably tarred with 
the brush of mechanicalism and scientificism, and abandoned the project.  Instead he declared 
himself a ‘piecemeal supernaturalist’, defining supernaturalism primarily in terms of the rejection 
of CCP.  Upon his return to America, James began work on a book of metaphysics that would fulfil 
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his original plan for a second course of Gifford Lectures.  The book was never completed, but 
several essays composed in this period were later published as the Essays in Radical Empiricism.  
In these essays James attempted to devise an empirical methodology that could accommodate 
religious experience, and took definite steps towards the doctrine of panpsychism that would play 
an important role in his mature religious/naturalistic synthesis.  In Pragmatism we saw James 
working diligently towards that synthesis, attempting to mediate between crude naturalism and 
crude supernaturalism.  To that end, he developed a naturalistic theory of cognition, that served 
to undermine scientificism on the one hand and religious dogmatism on the other.  Finally, in A 
Pluralistic Universe, the ‘piecemeal supernaturalism’ of VRE gave way to a doctrine of ‘pluralistic 
pantheism’.  The term ‘naturalism’, it seems, had still not recovered for James from Ward’s 
attacks, but the position articulated in PU is naturalistic in everything but name.  God, in PU, is 
identical with/emergent from a large portion of the physical universe.  His causal activity is 
confined to the space-time-causal system we call nature.  His existence is inferred by empirical 
means, from quasi-sensory experiences of his presence.  Given that James’s God is finite, and 
given that naturalism is free, at long last, from its associations with mechanicalism, we think that 
‘theistic naturalism’ is a fitting term to describe this doctrine.  According to the schema we 
developed in chapter one, it is undoubtedly to be classified as a form of radical religious 
naturalism.   
However, James’s naturalism, as it stands, is far from complete.  A number of loose ends remain 
to be tied up.  Firstly, we have yet to determine the precise character of James’s panpsychism.  As 
David Skrbina remarks in his recent study, Panpsychism in the West, panpsychism is really a meta-
theory of mind.  It does not make any explicit statements about the nature of mind itself, but 
simply holds that “however one conceives of mind, such mind applies to all things”748.  Thus, one 
can be a panpsychist interactionist dualist, holding that all physical entities interact with ontically 
distinct cartesian minds; a panpsychist reductive materialist, holding that all entities possess 
minds that reduce to their physical parts; a panpsychist identist, holding that minds constitute the 
intrinsic natures of all physical entities, etc.749  We have hinted that James was amenable to a 
doctrine of panpsychist identism, but we have certainly not yet established this point beyond 
doubt.  This issue is vitally important vis a vis our naturalistic interpretation of James, because 
different forms of panpsychism are differently compatible (or incompatible) with naturalism.  
Panpsychist interactionist dualism for instance, from a metaphysical perspective, is scarcely an 
improvement on traditional substance-dualism.  Panpsychist identism, meanwhile, looks to be 
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totally compatible with science and naturalism.  Secondly, we have yet to properly reconstruct 
James’s doctrine of emergentism.  As we said in the introduction to this chapter, it will be 
necessary, in order to make James’s mature worldview coherent, to develop his doctrine of the 
strong emergence/macro-causal power of mental phenomena from PP into a broader doctrine of 
emergentism and macro-causation that applies to integral consciousness generally.  Finally, a 
number of questions remain regarding our proposed restoration of James’s theistic naturalism.  
We have hinted that God, for James, is emergent from a portion of the physical universe, and that 
his causal activity is to be conceived after the analogy of human causal activity, but we have not 
clarified this account in detail.  We have also hinted at the possible reconciliation of James’s 
naturalistic ethics and his theological voluntarism, but once again, the details of this account 
remain to be worked out.  Our task in chapter three will be to address these various outstanding 
issues. 
In an oft-quoted memorandum regarding the publication of Some Problems of Philosophy James 
remarked that his philosophical system was “too much like an arch built only on one side”750.  He 
had hoped, indeed, that SPP might remedy this state of affairs; but alas, he died before it could be 
completed751.  This little note serves as a useful device for framing the third chapter of this 
project.  In that third chapter, as we said in the introduction, our interpretation will adopt a more 
constructive approach.  We may view it then, as an effort towards the completion of the arch of 
James’s system.  Now an arch, as any good mason will tell you, consists in a column, several 
voussoirs – the most important of which is the springer – and a keystone.  The column serves as 
the mount for the springer, which supports the other voussoirs.  The keystone, of course, is the 
most integral part, locking all the other pieces into position, and allowing the arch to stand up.  
James has completed one half of his arch.  He has a column: radical empiricism – a springer: 
pragmatism – and half of the keystone: his doctrine of religious experience.  In what follows we 
propose to submit our plans for the other side.  The column shall consist in a refurbished doctrine 
of panpsychism; the springer in a reconstructed doctrine of emergentism; and the other half of 
the keystone, in a restored doctrine of theistic naturalism.  Once these plans have been approved, 
construction can begin.   
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Chapter 3 – The Religious Naturalism of William James 
Our aim in the present chapter is to reconstruct the arch of James’s naturalism.  In order to do so 
we will have to refurbish James’s panpsychism, reconstruct his emergentism, and restore his 
theistic naturalism.  Each of these tasks are interrelated and mutually supportive, just like the 
parts of an arch.  Before we begin, we propose to consider each of them in more detail. 
i) The Column: Panpsychism 
Panpsychism is the column in James’s arch.  There are two primary reasons for our attempting to 
refurbish it.  Firstly, as we have said, some forms of panpsychism are more compatible with 
naturalism than others.  We therefore wish to establish James’s commitment to a doctrine of 
panpsychist identism, which is inherently compatible with science and naturalism.  Secondly, 
panpsychism is one of the means by which James is able accommodate a personal God within the 
natural world, for it allows him to say that God’s consciousness is the inner nature of a portion of 
the physical universe752.  It thereby serves as a vital foundation for his theistic naturalism.  In 
section 3.1, we will attempt to clarify and refurbish James’s panpsychism in several respects.  
First, in section 3.1.1, we will draw on a number of excellent contemporary studies to provide a 
thorough overview of panpsychism.  We will survey different possible versions of the theory, 
examine its presuppositions and commitments, and consider some of its philosophical 
consequences.  Next, in section 3.1.2, we will look at two popular arguments for panpsychism; the 
argument from non-emergence and the argument by continuity, both of which James gave 
versions of in the course of his career.  Following this, in section 3.1.3, we will review a 
particularly effective version of the argument by continuity, known as the intrinsic nature 
argument for panpsychism, and we will develop a Jamesian rendition of this argument.  Finally, in 
section 3.1.4, we will investigate the combination problem, discuss James’s solution to it, and 
situate James’s panpsychism with respect to contemporary versions of the theory. 
ii) The Springer: Emergentism 
Emergentism is the springer in James’s arch.  It is the other means, besides panpsychism, by which 
James is able to accommodate a personal God within nature.  For God’s personality entails more 
than just consciousness; it entails an integral, powerful consciousness.  And this can only be 
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achieved with a doctrine of emergentism.  Emergentism therefore, serves as a crucial support for 
the keystone of James’s theistic naturalism.  Our reconstruction of James’s emergentism will 
begin, in section 3.2.1, by laying some essential groundwork; we will attempt to further establish 
the legitimacy of an emergentist reading of James, and we will articulate the basic features of 
James’s emergentism.  We will then proceed, in section 3.2.2, to argue that James’s essay ‘On the 
Experience of Activity’ from ERE provides a mandate for developing his model of mental causation 
from PP into a general doctrine of macro-causation.  Finally, in section 3.2.3 we will attempt to 
deliver that doctrine, considering the applicability of the British Emergentist and quantum 
approaches to James’s account. 
iii) The Keystone: Theistic Naturalism 
Theistic naturalism is the keystone in James’s arch.  It is made secure by the column and the 
springer – by James’s doctrines of panpsychism and emergentism – and at the same time it 
secures the entire substructure.  Religion, James declared, is “mankind’s most important 
function”753; in opening ourselves to God’s influence, he said, “our deepest destiny is fulfilled”754.  
It is only fitting, therefore, that James’s religious doctrines, which collectively comprise his theistic 
naturalism, should constitute the keystone in the arch of his philosophy.  In section 3.3 we will 
present a restored version of James’s theistic naturalism.  We will begin in section 3.3.1 with a 
reconsideration of James’s finite theism.  This will involve updating the doctrine in light of the 
results of the preceding sections, and discussing the application of James’s model of macro-
causation to God’s causal activity.  Next, in section 3.3.2, we will re-examine the ethics of MPML.  
We will attempt to clear up some of the tensions in James’s account, and to supplement it with a 
reconstruction of the dispositional model of value experience that is nascent in James’s essay ‘The 
Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience’.  Finally, in section 3.3.3, we will revisit 
James’s account of religious experience.  We will attempt to flesh out that account, and to 
resituate it in the context of James’s restored theistic naturalism. 
3.1. Panpsychism  
William James would certainly have agreed with the observation that philosophical doctrines may 
come into and fall out of fashion due to factors that have little to do with their purely logical or 
theoretic merits.  Some, however, once out of fashion, seem to stay out, whilst others have a 
habit of returning over and over again.  In Panpsychism in the West, David Skrbina argues that 
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panpsychism is an example of the latter, recurrent sort of doctrine.  It made decisive appearances 
in Ancient Greece, where for a time it was almost the orthodox view.  It re-emerged among the 
great philosophical rationalists of the 17th century (notably Spinoza and Leibniz).  And it persisted 
into the 18th and 19th centuries in the philosophy of German Romanticism.  Since then it has come 
into fashion, or at least into the limelight, on two more occasions.  Once in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, in the philosophies of William James, Henri Bergson, Bertrand Russell, and Alfred 
North Whitehead, and a second time, in the present day, when the doctrine is being widely 
discussed by such prominent analytic philosophers as William Seager, Thomas Nagel, David 
Chalmers, Galen Strawson, and a whole host of others.  In the intervening periods panpsychism 
was by no means absent; but it was not so widely endorsed or discussed.  And yet despite this 
venerable history, and the recent resurgence of interest, panpsychism remains a fringe view 
among professional philosophers, and is frequently derided and dismissed without argument.  
Thus, Paul Edwards, in the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, called panpsychism an “unintelligible” 
and “meaningless” doctrine755; Madden and Hare described it as “an unmitigated disaster in the 
eyes of a great many contemporary philosophers”756; Karl Popper dismissed it as “fantastic” and 
“baseless”757; and Colin McGinn said it was “metaphysically and scientifically outrageous”758.  
More recently, in an exchange with David Chalmers in the New York Review of Books, John Searle 
dismissed panpsychism, without any real argument, as “breathtakingly implausible” and 
“absurd”759.  Given the centrality of panpsychism to James’s worldview, a worldview whose 
continuing fecundity we are keen to demonstrate, it will be necessary to push back against these 
prevalent anti-panpsychist intuitions.   
3.1.1. Panpsychism: An Overview 
As we have already said, panpsychism is really a meta-theory of mind.  It says that mind 
accompanies all things, but it does not say anything about the nature of mind itself.  As such, a 
number of varieties and permutations of the doctrine are possible.  David Chalmers, in a recent 
article on ‘Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism’, surveys a series of distinctions in/varieties of the 
doctrine.  We will discuss some of these together with others suggested in the literature in what 
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follows.  As we go we will attempt to situate James’s doctrine with respect to these various 
distinctions. 
i) Panpsychism vs Panprotopsychism 
To begin with we may distinguish between panpsychism and panprotopsychism.  Whereas 
panpsychism says that the ‘mind’ which attends all things is conscious mind – i.e. mind 
constituted of phenomenal properties – panprotopsychism says that the ‘mind’ which attends all 
things is protoconscious; i.e. that it is constituted of ‘protophenomenal properties’.  Chalmers 
stipulates that protophenomenal properties are “special properties that are not phenomenal 
(there is nothing it is like to have a single protophenomenal property) but that can collectively 
constitute phenomenal properties, perhaps when arranged in the right structure”760.  According 
to panprotopsychism then, fundamental physical entities possess protophenomenal properties, 
such that when they are arranged into certain structures – the human brain/nervous system for 
instance – they collectively constitute phenomenal properties. 
Russell, recall, interpreted James as a kind of panprotopsychist.  He thought that the metaphysics 
of radical empiricism led to a doctrine according to which the mental and the physical were 
differentiated out of an original neutral substance that possessed neither physical nor mental 
properties.  Chalmers, incidentally, offers a somewhat similar interpretation of James.  He reads 
‘Does Consciousness Exist?’ as implying a deflationary account of awareness, according to which 
awareness – i.e. the phenomenal or conscious aspect of experience – can be subtracted from the 
qualities of experience, leaving behind what Chalmers calls ‘Edenic qualities’.  The “sensible 
natures” that constitute pure experience, on this view, are Edenic qualities rather than 
phenomenal properties.  Which makes James a ‘panqualityist’ rather than a panpsychist.  Edenic 
qualities, unlike phenomenal properties, are supposed to be attributable to external, mind-
independent objects, so this interpretation also makes sense of James’s flirtations with naïve 
realism761.   
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The foregoing, however, is contrary to our own reading of ERE.  By our lights ‘Does Consciousness 
Exist?’ was aimed at rejecting substance dualism and at defining cognition in functional terms 
rather than at questioning the existence of phenomenal consciousness.  Chalmers’s interpretation 
requires that we assume a dramatic and unannounced shift in James’s views; namely from the 
‘esse est sentiri’ doctrine of PP to a putative deflationary account of awareness in ERE.  In PP, 
recall, James stated that “There is only one ‘phase’ in which an idea can be, and that is a fully 
conscious condition”762.  If not in that condition, he said, then what you have is not an idea at all, 
but a “physical brain process”.  On the basis of this doctrine James explicitly rejected the notion of 
unconscious mental states; or, what he regarded as an equivalent notion, that consciousness 
could be “nascent” in physical states/entities763.  We hold, contrary to Chalmers, that James’s 
mature view is consistent with PP in this respect.  Thus, on our interpretation, James is a 
panpsychist rather than as a panprotopsychist.   
ii) Constitutive vs Non-constitutive Panpsychism 
Next, we ought to distinguish between constitutive and non-constitutive panpsychism.  The 
former holds that macroexperience is “constituted” or “realized” by microexperience such that 
“macrophenomenal truths obtain in virtue of microphenomenal truths”.  Thus, if ‘Jones is having 
a visual experience of a dog’ is a macrophenomenal truth, this truth will obtain in virtue of truths 
like ‘Jones’s neurons/molecules/atoms, or what have you, possess XYZ phenomenal properties’.  
To put it intuitively, Chalmers says, constitutive panpsychism holds “that microexperiences 
somehow add up to yield macroexperience”764.  In other words, constitutive panpsychism holds 
that macroexperiences are the sum of their microexperiential parts.  Non-constitutive 
panpsychism, meanwhile, holds that macroexperiences are more than the sum of their 
microexperiential parts.   
Now, as we shall see in the next section, one of the key arguments for panpsychism entertained 
by James is a so-called ‘argument from non-emergence’.  This argument says that, seeing as 
phenomenal properties are genuine properties, and seeing as all genuine properties are identical 
                                                             
properties.  At the same time however he evidently interprets James as a naïve realist, for whom perceptual 
qualities are public and accessible to multiple subjects (i.e. for whom perceptual qualities are ‘edenic’ in the 
above sense).  As we mentioned in chapter 2, this conception seems on the face of it to be incoherent.  For 
the naïve realist perceptual qualities are qualities of external realities; for the panprotopsychist they are 
qualities of the perceiver’s brain.  We have yet to find a really lucid exposition of this ‘edenic qualities’ 
version of panprotopsychism. 
762 James, The Principles, I, p173 
763 James, The Principles, I, pp148-149 
764 Chalmers, ‘Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism’ in Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. by 






with properties of atoms, phenomenal properties must be identical with properties of atoms.  It 
implies, therefore, that macrophenomenal properties must be identical with – i.e. wholly 
constituted out of – microphenomenal properties.  And this, evidently, suggests a leaning towards 
a constitutive form of panpsychism.  However, as we saw in section 2.2, during in our 
investigation of PP, James also holds that consciousness is an integral thing not made of parts, 
possessing a strongly emergent unity/boundary (INC).  And this, it would seem, precludes a 
constitutive form of panpsychism.  Ultimately, we suggest, the apparent leaning towards 
constitutive panpsychism must be taken as superficial.  James’s comments in PU about collective 
consciousnesses being more than “the bare sum” of their parts, and weaving their parts into 
“schemes and forms” of which the parts know nothing, can only be read as advocating a non-
constitutive form of panpsychism.   
iii) Holistic vs Emergent Panpsychism 
There are, broadly speaking, two possible forms of non-constitutive panpsychism; holistic and 
emergent panpsychism.  Holistic panpsychism appeals to putative “fundamental physical entities 
that are not atomic or localized” as the physical counterparts to macroexperiences765.  In other 
words, it appeals to a doctrine of ontological holism, for which there are fundamental physical 
entities that are not constituted out of basic physical parts, or in which the whole has ontological 
priority over the parts766.  It says that such holistic physical entities are the counterparts to holistic 
macroexperiences.  Thus, Chalmers notes, certain idealist philosophers have claimed that the 
universe is such a holistic entity, and that it is the counterpart to a universal consciousness or 
oversoul.  Typically, such philosophers have combined this with the view that human 
consciousness is identical with the universal consciousness, yielding a position which Chalmers 
calls ‘identity cosmopsychism’.  Some of James’s absolutist opponents, we suggest, may well have 
advanced a doctrine very close to this767.   
Emergent panpsychism on the other hand holds that macroexperiences are strongly emergent 
from microexperiences, or that they are the counterparts to physical entities that are strongly 
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emergent from their physical parts768.  James, we suggest, must be counted as an emergent rather 
than a holistic panpsychist.  Ontological holism plainly goes against the spirit of his radical 
empiricism, which, as he says, always “starts with the parts, and makes of the whole a being of 
the second order”769.  Emergent panpsychism, moreover, synergizes with his emergentist view of 
consciousness in PP.  Integral consciousness, he there said, emerges from the atoms that 
constitute the brain.  On the emergent panpsychist reading, it emerges from the 
microexperiences that are the psychical counterparts to those atoms.  As Chalmers notes, it is an 
advantage of emergent forms of panpsychism that they easily avoid certain aspects of the 
combination problem.  On the downside however, they face all the same empirical problems that 
other doctrines of emergentism face. 
iv) Layered vs Fusionist Panpsychism 
The next distinction we wish to discuss is that between layered and fusionist doctrines of 
panpsychism.  According to the former, microexperiences continue to exist as individual, self-
identical entities, even after they have come together to constitute macroexperiences (or after 
macroexperiences have emerged from them).  According to the latter, microexperiences fuse 
together – and so cease to exist as individuals – once they have come together to constitute 
macroexperiences (or once macroexperiences have emerged from them).  James, we contend, 
must certainly adopt a layered account.  He believes, after all, that the consciousnesses of human 
beings and other organisms come together as parts of God’s consciousness, and yet continue to 
exist as individuals.  This is an utterly essential part of his mature philosophical worldview.  
Without it, his concept of God would lose much of its essential content.   
v) Russellian vs Non-russellian Panpsychism 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we wish to discuss the distinction between what Chalmers 
calls ‘russellian’ and ‘non-russellian panpsychism’.  In this case russellian panpsychism is the really 
distinctive view; non-russellian panpsychism being any panpsychist view that does not endorse 
the theses of russellian panpsychism.  Those theses may be characterized as follows.  Firstly, 
russellian panpsychism follows its namesake, Bertrand Russell, in holding that physical properties 
are essentially abstract, structural, relational, or dispositional, rather than intrinsic or categorical.  
In other words, physical properties like mass, charge, and spin, are properties that obtain in virtue 
of an entity’s relation to other entities; not in virtue of that entity’s intrinsic nature.  Secondly, it 
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holds that structural properties must be grounded in a base of intrinsic properties.  And thirdly, it 
holds that the required intrinsic properties – or some of them at any rate – are phenomenal 
properties770.  Thus, russellian panpsychism gives phenomenal properties ontological priority over 
physical properties.  It says that phenomenal properties are the fundamental realities, and that 
physical properties merely describe the relationships between phenomenal properties.  Another 
way of putting this would be to say that for russellian panpsychism conscious experiences are the 
possessors of physical properties.  Conscious experiences possess mass, charge, and spin; they are 
located in space, endure in time, and attract one another with a force proportional to their 
masses, and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them.   
The question of whether James was a russellian panpsychist is, we suggest, more difficult to 
answer than the others we have considered in this section.  He did of course make various 
statements that might encourage an affirmative response: for instance, “that inner experience is 
the [fundamental] reality, and that matter is but a form in which inner experiences may appear to 
one another when they affect each other from the outside”.  However, the ideas and concepts 
involved in this question are clearly highly complex.  No single statement will settle it definitively.  
Yet we contend that settling it may be vitally important.  Russellian panpsychism has certain 
distinct advantages over other forms of the doctrine.  It is, metaphysically speaking, much 
simpler, postulating only one kind of intrinsic property rather than two.  Furthermore, it answers 
certain crucial metaphysical questions; namely the question of how phenomenal properties fit 
into the natural world, and of what the intrinsic properties underlying physical structure are.  At 
the same time, it avoids certain metaphysical questions faced by other forms of the doctrine; such 
as the question of what the causal role of microphenomenal properties is771.  And finally, it is 
inherently compatible with scientific structural realism, and therefore with the fundamentals of 
the scientific worldview.  If James is a russellian panpsychist, we think, this would bode well for 
naturalistic interpretations of his worldview.  We will therefore come back to this question in 
section 3.1.3.  But first, in section 3.1.2, we will address two popular arguments for panpsychism, 
both of which James gives versions of in the course of his career. 
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3.1.2. Two Arguments for Panpsychism 
3.1.2.1. The Argument from Non-Emergence 
In the long history of panpsychism in the West, Skrbina manages to identify nine different kinds of 
argument for the theory.  Of these nine two in particular are of special interest to us on account 
of James having appealed to them at different points in his career.  The first is the ‘argument from 
non-emergence’, which Skrbina states as follows: “it is inconceivable that mind should emerge 
from a world in which no mind existed; therefore mind always existed, in even the simplest of 
structures.”772  James’s rendition of this argument occurs in The Principles of Psychology, where 
he seems to consider it the most compelling argument for the mind-dust theory.  He begins his 
exposition of the argument by establishing its key premise, namely the reducibility (or non-
emergence) of properties that come later in the course of nature (biological properties/mental 
properties, etc.) to the most original kind of properties (the properties of atoms/physical 
ultimates): 
The point which as evolutionists we are bound to hold fast to is that all the new 
forms of being that make their appearance [in the course of evolution] are really 
nothing more than results of the redistribution of the original and unchanging 
materials.  The self-same atoms which, chaotically dispersed, made the nebula, now, 
jammed and temporarily caught in peculiar positions, form our brains; and the 
‘evolution’ of the brains, if understood, would simply be the account of how the 
atoms came to be so caught and jammed.  In this story no new natures, no factors 
not present at the beginning, are introduced at any later stage.773 
This statement seems essentially to express the principle of ontological reducibility (POR) 
described in chapter 1 as a core tenet of scientific naturalism.  POR states that whatever genuine 
properties there are, they are identical with properties of the lowest level physical entities.  
James’s statement expresses this in negative form, emphasising the non-emergence of new 
properties rather than the reducibility of all properties to physical properties, but the content is 
basically the same.  And so, we are led to the following argument from non-emergence: 
• P1: States of consciousness exist (phenomenal properties are genuine properties). 
• P2: Whatever genuine properties there are, they are identical with properties of the 
lowest level physical entities. 
• C1: Phenomenal properties are properties of the lowest level physical entities.  
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The resultant doctrine of “atomistic hylozoism” postulates “an infinite number of degrees of 
consciousness, following the degrees of complication and aggregation of the primordial mind-
dust”.  It is, says James, “an indispensable part of a thorough-going philosophy of evolution”774. 
The argument from non-emergence, also known as the genetic argument for panpsychism, is one 
of the more popular arguments among contemporary proponents of the doctrine.  It does 
however face certain prima facie difficulties.  To begin with, many people seem to possess an 
intuition that runs counter to it; namely, the intuition that mental properties are emergent.  It is 
this intuition, presumably, that informs John Searle’s claim, in the aforementioned exchange with 
David Chalmers, that a thermostat “does not have enough structure even to be a remote 
candidate for consciousness”775.  The implication seems to be that consciousness is an emergent 
phenomenon, and that the conditions for its emergence have to do with the structure of its 
emergence-base.  This intuition is certainly widespread.  It receives support, in the present day, 
from the reigning functionalist paradigm in philosophy, and from the popular analogy between 
brains and computers.  Just as the total functional organization of a computer is required in order 
for the monitor present its display, so the total functional organization of the brain is required in 
order for consciousness to be present.  However, appeals to functionalism and to analogies like 
this one may well be misleading.  We are speaking, after all, about phenomenal consciousness, 
abstracted from any supposed functional properties.  The display on a computer monitor, and its 
relation to the functional organization of the computer, can easily be understood in purely 
physical/functional terms.  The relation between phenomenal consciousness and the brain seems 
to be very different.  There is an explanatory gap in the latter case that is not present in the 
former.   
Certain contemporary philosophers argue that the emergence of phenomenal consciousness from 
purely physical entities is too brute a case of emergence to be countenanced.  Galen Strawson for 
instance, in Consciousness and its Place in Nature, distinguishes between cases of intuitive 
emergence and putative cases of brute emergence.  He gives the phenomenon of liquidity as an 
example of the former kind.  Liquidity is not a property of physical ultimates or of H2O molecules, 
but when you put lots of H2O molecules together, they possess the property of liquidity.  Liquidity 
therefore, may be said, in some sense, to be an emergent property.  The emergence of liquidity, 
Strawson suggests, is relatively easy to grasp: 
We can easily make intuitive sense of the idea that certain sorts of molecules are so 
constituted that they don’t bind together in a tight lattice but slide past or off each 
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other (in accordance with van de Waals interaction laws) in a way that gives rise to – 
is – the phenomenon of liquidity.776 
Strawson insists that in making sense of the emergence of liquidity we need appeal to nothing 
more than “a small set of conceptually homogeneous shape-size-mass-charge-number-position-
motion-involving physics notions”; indeed, we naturally suppose that the phenomena of liquidity 
“reduce without remainder to shape-size-mass-charge-etc. phenomena”777.  When we move to 
the case of the putative emergence of phenomenal consciousness from the physical world, he 
thinks, the situation is quite different.  There is no such homogeneity between physical concepts 
and phenomenal concepts, and no simple story to be told about how we get from the one to the 
other.  We can understand, to be sure, how intelligence, cognition, wakefulness, etc. (i.e. 
consciousness conceived of in the functional sense) might emerge from physical entities, but we 
cannot understand how phenomenal consciousness emerges from physical entities.  Clearly, 
Strawson thinks, there is a fundamental disanalogy between the emergence of liquidity and the 
putative emergence of phenomenal consciousness.  The one is perfectly intuitive; the other is 
brute to the point of unintelligibility.  Ultimately, he thinks we have to dispense with the notion of 
brute emergence altogether778.   
3.1.2.2. The Argument by Continuity 
The next argument we wish to consider is the argument by continuity: “a common principle or 
substance exists in all things; in humans it accounts for our soul or mind, and thus by 
extrapolation it infers mind in all things.”779  This argument, Skrbina notes, is a species of a more 
general kind of argument known as an ‘argument by analogy’: “The root assumption is that 
humans possess a mind, and this fact is taken in connection with other points to show that all 
things possess mind.”780  We already noted that James employs a version of this argument in PU.  
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“My body”, he said, “moves by the influence of my feeling and will; the sun, moon, sea, and wind, 
being themselves more powerful, move by the influence of some more powerful feeling and 
will.”781  James here begins with the premise that his body possesses a mind.  But then he moves 
immediately to the conclusion that other physical objects possess minds.  As Skrbina says, in order 
for this argument to get off the ground, there need to be some “other points” in connection with 
which the initial premise is supposed to justify an analogy between the body and other physical 
objects.  What, we may ask, for James, are these other points?   
The answer, we suggest, can be traced back to the metaphysics of radical empiricism.  We know 
from ERE that James endorses the metaphysical thesis of pure experience (MTPE), according to 
which everything in the world is comprised of one kind of “primal stuff or material” called pure 
experience.  Because of his endorsement of MTPE, he insisted that external objects, insofar as 
they exist independently of the perceptions of humans and other organisms, must be 
‘experiences for themselves’ in the panpsychist sense782.  This, it seems, will serve as the required 
supplement to the Fechnerian analogy.  If physical objects must, in any case, be experiences for 
themselves, then it makes sense to conceive of them after the analogy of the experience we know 
best; namely human experience.  The question is, why does James accept MTPE in the first place?  
In section 2.5, recall, we suggested that James’s adoption of the thesis had to do with traditional 
Berkleyan considerations.  Here, however, we are after an explicit argument, and so we will 
attempt to reconstruct one on James’s behalf.   
The argument will take as premises three claims that James defends consistently throughout his 
career, together with a fourth that is implicit in his work, and that is, in any case, relatively 
uncontroversial.  The first of these claims, stated most explicitly in ERE, is that substance dualism 
is no longer tenable, and that some form of substance monism must be true; i.e. that reality is 
comprised of only one kind of stuff783.  The second claim, stated most explicitly in PP, is that 
experience, in the sense of phenomenal consciousness, is real and irreducible784.  The third claim, 
defended most explicitly in Pragmatism, is that the notion of a non-experiential substance is 
meaningless, and that the pragmatic meaning of ‘material substance’ is to be cashed out in 
exclusively experiential terms; i.e. that physical stuff is reducible to experience785.  Finally, the 
fourth claim, which is commonplace in the philosophy of mind, is that there are basically just two 
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candidates for fundamental kinds of stuff: experiential stuff and physical stuff.  Taking these four 
claims as our premises, we can construct the following argument for MTPE: 
• P1: Reality is comprised of just one kind of stuff.  
• P2: That stuff is either physical or experiential. 
• P3: Experience is real and irreducible. 
• P4: Physical stuff is reducible to experience. 
• C: Reality is comprised of experiential stuff (MTPE) 
The above argument does not, by itself, constitute an argument for panpsychism.  As we 
discussed in the section on ERE, it is also compatible with doctrines of phenomenalism, idealism, 
and naïve realism.  In order to get to panpsychism we must combine it with something like 
Fechner’s argument by analogy.  We then get the following: 
• P1: Reality is comprised of experiential stuff. 
• P2: My body (or a portion of my brain/nervous system), which appears outwardly as a 
physical object, is inwardly constituted out of an independent stream of experiential stuff. 
• C3: We may suppose, by analogy, that other physical objects are likewise inwardly 
constituted out of independent streams of experiential stuff. 
This then, is our reconstruction of James’s argument by continuity for panpsychism.  It is not, we 
think, wholly uncompelling.  It does however suffer certain defects.  Two in particular stand out as 
needing to be addressed before the total argument can be made persuasive.  Firstly, the notion 
that physical stuff is reducible to experience (premise 4 of the argument for MTPE) needs to be 
carefully qualified.  It is by no means obvious that this premise is true; indeed, professional 
philosophic and scientific opinion tends to point in the opposite direction.  Secondly, the 
conclusion to the argument by analogy for panpsychism is a rather weak one, giving us only the 
legitimacy of panpsychism as a hypothesis, rather than the probable truth of the doctrine.  Both 
of these defects, we suggest, are significantly ameliorated in the best contemporary versions of 
the argument by continuity.  Moreover, the new forms of the argument which we have in mind 
are highly compatible with James’s views.  We shall therefore investigate them in closer detail in 









3.1.3. The Intrinsic Nature Argument for Panpsychism 
3.1.3.1. Contemporary Versions of the Argument 
The contemporary version of the argument by continuity to which we have just alluded is known 
in analytic circles as ‘the intrinsic nature argument for panpsychism’786.  Along with the argument 
from non-emergence, it has proved to be the most popular argument for panpsychism among 
contemporary philosophers.  Seeing as James himself does not explicitly formulate his own 
version of the intrinsic nature argument, we propose to first unpack the argument on its own 
terms before considering how it intersects with certain of James’s ideas.  The argument goes as 
follows: 
• P1: Physics only tells us about the structural properties of reality. 
• P2: Structural properties must be grounded in a base of intrinsic properties. 
• P3: Phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties. 
• P4: Phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties of a certain portion of physical reality, 
namely the brain/nervous system. 
• C: We may expect the intrinsic properties of other portions of physical reality to be of a 
nature continuous with familiar phenomenal properties. 
 
i) P1: Physics only tells us about the structural properties of reality. 
Most contemporary versions of the intrinsic nature argument appeal to certain of Bertrand 
Russell’s ideas; ideas which Russell himself credits James with having inspired787.  This is especially 
true of their justification of P1 and P4.  In The Analysis of Matter, Russell argues that there is an 
important sense in which modern physics, and the knowledge it gives us, is fundamentally 
“abstract”788.  The average non-physicist, according to Russell, tends to suppose a far higher 
degree of continuity between the world of physics and the world of common-sense (between the 
scientific and manifest images) than really exists.  She/he supposes this because physics education 
begins with the manipulation of manifest objects like levers, weights, and pulleys.  Russell insists 
however that “in proportion as physics increases the scope and power of its methods, in that 
same proportion it robs its subject matter of concreteness”789.  The spacetime of general relativity 
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is incompatible with the phenomenal space and time that is perceived by human beings790; the 
matter which comprises Eddington’s common-sense table has little to do with the imperceptible 
entities that comprise his physicist’s table, etc.791  Matter, as far as modern physics is concerned, 
is only the abstract bearer of certain structural or relational properties.  William Seager explains: 
If someone asks what an electron is, all we can say is that it is a ‘particle’ with a 
certain mass (9.10938188 x 10-31 kilogram), electric charge -1, spin ½, etc.  Each of 
these attributes can only be defined relationally and all we know about them is what 
these relations provide.  A mass of m is just that property such that something with it 
will obey the relation that m=F/a for a force F and acceleration a, and so on.792 
All the fundamental properties described by physics are relational in this sense.  They are defined 
in terms of the way that they dispose their bearers to interact with other such bearers of 
relational properties.  They tell us “nothing”, Russell says, about the “intrinsic quality” of their 
bearers; about what those bearers are like considered in themselves, or independently of other 
things793.   
ii) P2: Structural properties must be grounded in a base of intrinsic properties. 
There is, we suggest, little in the way of explicit argument to support premise 2.  Its strength lies 
more or less exclusively in its intuitive plausibility.  Russell expresses this by saying that a world 
without intrinsic properties would be one in which “all things in the world will merely be each 
other’s washing”794.  In A Place for Consciousness, Gregg Rosenberg attempts to articulate the 
relevant intuition by way of an analogy.  A universe without intrinsic properties, he says, would be 
like a game of chess without a board or pieces795.  Consider the following.  There is a story of two 
chess grandmasters turning up to a poorly organized tournament and, not being provided with a 
board or pieces, agreeing to engage in a game of chess without them.  The grandmasters notated 
the entire game on a sheet of paper, passing it between themselves after finishing each turn.  
This, according to Rosenberg, invites an interesting hypothesis: that the game of chess may 
consist solely in its rules together with the ‘moves’ of the players.  In order for this analogy to be 
perfect of course, we would have to imagine the game taking place without the paper, or indeed 
the physical brains of the players, or anything else extrinsic to the rules and the players’ moves.  
But the point is clear enough.  We can understand the claim that chess is purely relational; that it 
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has no intrinsic properties.  The question is, can we accept this claim?  Can we accept the claim 
that any system of purely relational properties like chess could exist without any concrete entities 
to realize/instantiate it?  And more importantly, can we accept the claim that our own universe is 
such a purely relational system?  Rosenberg joins Russell in answering in the negative796.   
William Seager, in his article ‘The ‘Intrinsic Nature’ Argument for Panpsychism’, offers a slightly 
different version of premise 2 which he calls ‘The Principle of the Reducibility of Relations’ (PRR).  
This principle, which he traces back to Leibniz, states that “all extrinsic properties are determined 
by intrinsic properties”797.  In the case of certain extrinsic properties, like ‘being taller than’, the 
principle seems intuitively applicable; one person’s being taller than another can be analysed in 
terms of the intrinsic heights of each person.  In other cases, such as those of spatial relations, the 
principle is not so easy to apply.  “The idea that my intrinsic properties somehow determine that I 
am 50 miles from a burning barn”, Seager suggests, “seems ridiculous.”798.  He notes however that 
panpsychism, in conceiving of intrinsic properties as phenomenal, offers us one of the more 
promising prospects for the application of PRR to spatial relations; “for it does not seem 
altogether hopeless to define space and time in terms of perceptual contents, given that there are 
sufficient perceiving subjects to ‘nail down’ the infinite and continuously varying spatial and 
temporal relations that structure our world.”799  We will revisit this point in the next section. 
iii) P3: Phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties. 
The most obvious route to premise 3 involves an appeal to our introspective knowledge of 
phenomenal consciousness.  This is the strategy adopted, quite convincingly, by William Seager in 
the article just mentioned.  Seager appeals to a traditional and plausible definition of intrinsic 
properties as those properties which an entity would possess considered independently of all 
other entities in the universe; or, in other words, those properties it would possess if it were 
completely alone in the universe800.  From here Seager invokes certain Cartesian considerations to 
argue that states of consciousness are intrinsic properties.  “The philosophical problem of the 
                                                             
796 For a contemporary defence of the affirmative response – i.e. of the claim that the universe is purely 
relational – see: Ladyman & Ross, Everything Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized.  Ladyman and Ross refer to 
the resultant position as ‘ontic structural realism’.  Following John Worrall, they endorse the doctrine of 
scientific structural realism, according to which scientific theories tell us about the structural properties of 
reality.  However, they part from Worrall in claiming that the structural properties thus revealed are wholly 
constitutive of reality. 
797 Seager, ‘The ‘Intrinsic Nature’ Argument for Panpsychism’, p131 
798 Seager, ‘The ‘Intrinsic Nature’ Argument for Panpsychism’, pp131-132 
799 Seager, ‘The ‘Intrinsic Nature’ Argument for Panpsychism’, p132 
800 Strictly speaking, we should probably talk of intrinsic properties as those properties an entity would 
possess, not just if it were alone in the universe, but if it were itself the sum-total of the universe, for an 
entity “alone” in the universe might still be thought to be related to space. 




external world”, he says, “and the coherence of solipsism entail that consciousness is an intrinsic 
property of things.”801  It is not at first easy to see Seager’s point here.  States of consciousness, 
the critic will say, are dependent on states of the brain, which in turn are dependent on the state 
of the organism, which is dependent on the state of the environment, and so on.  A brain could 
not exist completely alone in the universe, and neither, therefore, could consciousness.  This 
objection both begs the question and misses the point however.  Seager’s point is that 
introspection reveals phenomenal properties to be properties that could conceivably – i.e. in 
some possible world – exist totally independently of anything else.  Phenomenal properties are 
not defined, as structural properties are, in terms of how they dispose their bearers to interact 
with other bearers of phenomenal properties.  They are not really defined at all.  They just are.  
To possess a phenomenal property is, in an important sense, just to be that property; to have 
direct acquaintance with its qualitative character.  Thus, we can conceive of a possible world that 
consists solely of phenomenal redness; we cannot conceive of a possible world that consists solely 
of a certain mass (or spin, or charge) 802.   
iv) P4: Phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties of a certain portion of physical 
reality; namely the brain/nervous system. 
Now we come to premise 4, which in many ways is the most decisive premise for the intrinsic 
nature argument.  Premise 4 may be said to follow from combining the preceding three premises 
with a certain kind of theory regarding the relation between mind and matter; namely a 
‘psychophysical identity theory’.  Undoubtedly the most popular form of this theory among 
contemporary philosophers is the famous ‘mind-brain identity theory’.  We shall briefly consider it 
in what follows with a view to illustrating this point.  The mind-brain identity theory says, roughly 
speaking, that any given mental state is literally identical with some neurophysiological state803.  
Most philosophers of course, have tended to view the identity theory as essentially reductive, and 
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802 It may be instructive in this regard to consider the coloured afterimages we see on the backs of our 
eyelids when we close our eyes after looking at a light source.  In these cases, we have seemingly objectless 
experiences of phenomenal colour properties.  It is certainly possible to conceive of such properties existing 
in total isolation, without any extrinsic or other properties to support them, in a way that it is not possible 
to conceive of physical properties existing. 
803 The identity theory is sometimes supposed to have been superseded by functionalism, which identifies 
mental states with functional states rather than with their neural realizers, but this claim is greatly 
overstated.  Unless we hold that functional states/properties are strongly emergent, which few 
philosophers do, they too must ultimately be reducible to physical states/properties.  The only way of 
parsing this reducibility, short of outright elimination, is through an identity theory.  We note that even 
emergentists may endorse a version of the identity theory.  They may hold that certain physical wholes are 
strongly emergent from their physical parts, and that mental states are identical with those emergent 






to conceive of it asymmetrically, as entailing the reducibility of the mental to the physical.  There 
is nothing however in the logic of the identity theory itself that requires that one conceive of it in 
this way; indeed, this conception would seem to be contrary to its basic logic.  As Galen Strawson 
points out: 
[W]hen the identity theory makes its great identification, it doesn't (of course) take 
anything away from the nature of experience, as ordinarily and correctly conceived 
of … (if it did take something away from the nature of experience, it would no longer 
be identifying experience with anything, it would be talking about something else.) … 
Rather, it adds something to the nature of neural physical activity as ordinarily 
conceived of. It states that at least some neural physical activity consists, literally 
consists, of experience, experience in all its heady luxuriance.804 
The identity theory, properly conceived, no more reduces the mental to the physical than it 
reduces the physical to the mental.  It is at this point that the preceding three premises become 
relevant.  For given premises 1 through 3, the identity theory would seem to make the 
phenomenal properties of brains overwhelmingly plausible candidates for being the intrinsic 
properties in which their physical counterparts are grounded805.   
v) C: We may expect the intrinsic properties of other portions of physical reality to be of a 
nature continuous with familiar phenomenal properties. 
Which brings us at last to the conclusion of the intrinsic nature argument.  Seeing as physics tells 
us nothing about the intrinsic properties of the physical world, it gives us no reason to suppose 
that those properties must be non-experiential.  And seeing as the only knowledge we have of the 
intrinsic properties of the physical world shows us that at least some of those properties are 
experiential, it is legitimate, and indeed economical, to suppose that others of them may also be 
experiential.  We could not hope for a better summary than the one provided by Arthur 
Eddington in his Gifford Lectures on The Nature of the Physical World: 
The physical atom is, like everything else in physics, a schedule of pointer readings 
[i.e. it is known only abstractly].  The schedule is, we agree, attached to some 
unknown background.  Why not then attach it to something of a spiritual [i.e. 
mental/phenomenal] nature of which a prominent characteristic is thought.  It seems 
rather silly to prefer to attach it to something of a so-called “concrete” nature 
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805 This has the somewhat paradoxical but strangely beguiling result that, as Russell put it, “what the 
physiologist sees when he looks at a brain is part of his own brain, not part of the brain he is examining”, 
and that “what is in our heads is the mind (with additions) rather than what the physiologist sees through 
his microscope”. See: Russell, The Analysis of Matter, p383; p387.  In other words, when a physiologist 
examines a brain, what he actually experiences are the intrinsic properties of his own brain, from which he 
infers (in some sense) the structural properties of the brain he is examining.  Interestingly, Morton Prince, 
whom James references in connection with panpsychism in ERE (section 2.5.3.4), provides an analysis that 
is almost identical to Russell’s.  See: Prince, pp58-60.  




inconsistent with thought, and then to wonder where the thought comes from.  We 
have dismissed all preconception as to the background of our pointer readings, and 
for the most part we can discover nothing as to its nature.  But in one case – namely, 
for the pointer readings of my own brain – I have an insight which is not limited to 
the evidence of the pointer readings.  That insight shows that they are attached to a 
background [i.e. an intrinsic base] of consciousness.  … I may expect that the 
background of other pointer readings in physics is of a nature continuous with that 
revealed to me in this particular case.806 
So goes the intrinsic nature argument for panpsychism.  It is not perhaps a knock-down argument, 
but combined with certain others, such as the argument from non-emergence, it is, we suggest, 
deeply compelling. 
3.1.3.2. James’s Intrinsic Nature Argument 
Let us now consider how James’s views on panpsychism intersect with the intrinsic nature 
argument.  It is our contention that James endorses some version of every premise in this 
argument, together with the conclusion.  We propose to demonstrate this by working through the 
premises one by one, showing in each case how James’s views can be seen to support them. 
i) P1: Physics only tells us about the structural properties of reality. 
The key statements of James’s which support premise 1 occur in PU in the context of his 
exposition of Bergson’s critique of intellectualism.  There James argues that “the sciences … of 
space and matter”, which deal with “the transformations of external things”, provide us with a 
purely “’theoretic’ or scientific knowledge” that “touches only the outer surface of reality”, and 
tells us nothing about its “inner nature”807.  It is easy to see how these statements map onto 
Russell’s analysis.  The sciences of space and matter (i.e. physics) only give us knowledge of the 
outer surface (i.e. the structural properties) of reality, and not of its inner nature (i.e. its intrinsic 
properties).   
ii) P2: Structural properties must be grounded in a base of intrinsic properties. 
Although there is a great deal of talk in PU about the “inner nature”808, “inner dimension”809, 
“inner quality”810, and “inner life”811 of reality, and although it is certainly implied that such an 
inner nature is required to support the “outer surface” of things studied by science, nowhere in 
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the text does James make this claim explicitly.  The closest he gets to doing so is not in fact in PU 
but in VRE, where he insists that “personal experience … is the one thing that fills up the measure 
of our concrete actuality, and any would-be existent that should lack such a feeling, or its 
analogue, would be a piece of reality only half made up.”812  This could be seen as an 
endorsement of both premise 2 and premise 3.  The suggestion seems to be that an outer surface 
without an inner nature would be “a piece of reality only half made up” (i.e. that it would not be 
possible), and that personal experience is the only decent candidate (perhaps the only 
conceivable candidate) that we have for an inner nature of things.   
Recall that Seager offered us an alternative version of premise 2 that he called ‘The Principle of 
the Reducibility of Relations’ (PRR).  At first glance PRR might be thought to be in conflict with 
James’s philosophy; did James not argue precisely for the irreducibility of relations?  However, a 
moment’s thought reveals that this conflict is merely apparent.  What PRR claims is the 
analysability of relations in terms of intrinsic properties; not the possibility of eliminating relations 
altogether.  James’s theory of relations in ERE does in fact involve a more or less explicit 
endorsement of PRR.  He claims that all relations, including the most problematic external 
relations like spatial relations, are wholly analysable in terms derived from experience.  This then, 
is as straightforward an endorsement of premise 2 as we could hope to find. 
iii) P3: Phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties. 
We have just seen James’s claim from VRE that the inner nature of every piece of reality is 
personal experience.  We know that James sharpened this thesis in ERE and PU, where he claimed 
that reality at large is comprised of pure experience, and that external entities are inwardly 
constituted out of independent streams of experience.  This, we think, is sufficient to imply a 
commitment to premise 3.  What we really want in the case of premise 3 however is not an 
endorsement of the claim that experience does, as a matter of fact, constitute the inner natures 
of certain things, but rather some suggestion of why experience is the sort of thing, in principle, 
that should constitute inner natures.  Such an explanation is, so far as we can tell, lacking in the 
work of James, just as it is lacking in the work of Russell.  Recall however that Seager appealed to 
very basic Cartesian intuitions in order to establish premise 3.  It is very possible that James and 
Russell simply took these intuitions for granted, and saw no need of making them explicit.   
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iv) P4: Phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties of a certain portion of physical 
reality; namely the brain/nervous system. 
Given our conclusions regarding premises 1 and 2, it follows that James must also endorse 
premise 4.  The brain and nervous system plainly have an ‘outer surface’ the properties of which 
are discoverable by physics; that ‘outer surface’ must be grounded in an ‘inner nature’; and that 
‘inner nature’ must be comprised of experience (which for James is constituted of phenomenal 
properties).  There is however one more thing to be said on this point.  Recall that in PP James 
established a thoroughgoing parallelism of mind and brain.  He refrained, at that stage, from 
identifying the mind with the brain, or from supposing that mental properties were properties of 
the brain.  He abstained altogether, in fact, for methodological reasons, from offering any 
definitive metaphysical account of the relation between mental properties and physical 
properties.  Later however, in ERE, he made a formal break with dualism, and embraced the 
metaphysical thesis of pure experience (MTPE).  As such, we must reconceive his commitment to 
parallelism in light of this change.  The mental and the physical – the mind and the brain – are no 
longer to be conceived as two parallel realities, but as “co-eternal aspects of one self-same reality, 
much as concave and convex are aspects of one curve”813.  Thus, the human stream of 
consciousness, in James’s mature worldview, is the ‘inner nature’ of the human brain; and the 
human brain is the ‘outer surface’ of the human stream of consciousness.  We take this to be 
equivalent to premise 4. 
v) C: We may expect the intrinsic properties of other portions of physical reality to be of a 
nature continuous with familiar phenomenal properties. 
Finally, the conclusion is more or less equivalent to the basic Fechnerian argument from analogy 
which we outlined in section 3.1.2.  “My body moves by the influence of my feeling and will; the 
sun, moon, sea, and wind, being themselves more powerful, move by the influence of some more 
powerful feeling and will.”  Just substitute “my body” for ‘my brain’ (as per P4); “moves by the 
influence of” for ‘is the outer surface of’ (as per P1); and “feeling and will” for ‘stream of 
consciousness/experience’ (as per P4).  Adding all of this together, we get the following Jamesian 
intrinsic nature argument: 
• P1: “the sciences … of space and matter” touch only “the outer surface of reality”. 
• P2: An outer surface without an inner nature would be “a piece of reality only half made 
up”. 
                                                             






• P3: The human stream of consciousness is the “inner nature” of a certain portion of 
physical reality, namely the human brain. 
• C: We may expect the inner natures of other portions of physical reality to be of a nature 
continuous with human consciousness. 
Given that James holds streams of consciousness to be comprised of pure experience, and holds 
pure experience to be constituted of sensible natures (phenomenal properties), we suggest that 
this conclusion is basically equivalent to that given by contemporary versions of the argument. 
3.1.4. The Combination Problem 
We have now considered some of the strongest arguments in favour of panpsychism, and have 
demonstrated how they intersect with James’s views.  The next thing to do will be to discuss what 
many philosophers, including James himself, see as the most serious problem with the theory.  
This is the so-called combination problem, first formulated by James in PP, and later named by 
William Seager in his 1995 article ‘Consciousness, Information, and Panpsychism’814.  James’s 
original statement of the problem is as follows: 
Take a hundred of them [feelings/microexperiences], shuffle them and pack them as 
close together as you can (whatever that may mean); still each remains the same 
feeling it always was, shut in its own skin, windowless, ignorant of what the other 
feelings are and mean.  There would be a hundred-and-first feeling there, if, when a 
group or series of such feelings were set up, a consciousness belonging to the group 
as such should emerge.  And this 101st feeling would be a totally new fact; the 100 
original feelings might, by a curious physical law, be a signal for its creation, when 
they came together; but they would have no substantial identity with it, nor it with 
them, and one could never deduce the one from the others, or (in any intelligible 
sense) say that they evolved it. 
Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell each one word.  
Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word 
as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence.  
We talk of the “spirit of the age,” and the “sentiment of the people,” and in various 
ways we hypostatize “public opinion.”  But we know this to be symbolic speech, and 
never dream that the spirit, opinion, sentiment, etc., constitute a consciousness 
other than, and additional to, that of the several individuals whom the words “age,” 
“people,” or “public” denote.  The private minds do not agglomerate into a higher 
compound mind.815 
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As with the doctrine of panpsychism itself, contemporary philosophers have located a number of 
interesting distinctions in the combination problem, and have given it a variety of distinct 
formulations.  These formulations, according to Chalmers, can be said to fall into three broad 
categories: the subject combination problem (“How do microsubjects combine to yield 
macrosubjects?”), the quality combination problem (“How do microqualities combine to yield 
macroqualities?”), and the structure combination problem (“How does microexperiential 
structure … combine to yield macroexperiential structure?”)816.  Within these categories there are 
one or two sub-problems that are especially relevant to our discussion.  Thus, within the subject 
combination problem we are particularly interested in the ‘subject-summing problem’, according 
to which no group of microsubjects necessitates the existence of a macrosubject817, and the 
‘synchronic constitution problem’, according to which no group of microsubjects can 
synchronically constitute a macrosubject818; i.e. can maintain their own identities whilst at the 
same time being parts of a macrosubject.  Within the structural combination problem, we are 
particularly interested in the so-called ‘boundary/unity problem’, according to which the 
boundary/unity of macroexperiences cannot be analysed into a mere aggregate of 
microexperiences819. 
Now, the question for us is this: which version of the combination problem is James advancing?  
According to Chalmers, James is best understood as advancing a version of the subject-summing 
problem.  James says, after all, that one “could never deduce” a macrosubject from a group of 
microsubjects.  Indeed, he states bluntly that “private minds do not agglomerate into a higher 
compound mind”.  Statements like these can easily be read as implying a version of the subject-
summing problem.  As Chalmers says, “Given 101 subjects, it seems that the existence of the first 
100 does not necessitate the existence of the 101st”820.  Chalmers even suggests that James’s 
                                                             
816 Chalmers, ‘The Combination Problem for Panpsychism’, in Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. 
by Brüntrup & Jaskolla, pp182-183 
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deflationary account of the soul in PP, and his questioning of the existence of consciousness in 
ERE, constitute attempts to circumvent the subject-summing problem by undermining the notion 
that subjects are a condition for experience at all821.  This, no doubt, is an ingenious reading, but it 
is not one that we can wholly endorse.  The subject-summing problem, we contend, is only 
peripheral for James.  The much more serious problem is undoubtedly the boundary/unity 
problem.  That this is so is perfectly evident from James’s discussion of the compounding of 
consciousness in PU.  There, recall, he restates the combination problem as follows: 
We can’t say that awareness of the alphabet as such is nothing more than twenty-six 
awarenesses, each of a separate letter; for those are twenty-six distinct awarenesses, 
of single letters without others, while their so-called sum is one awareness, of every 
letter with its comrades.  There is thus something new in the collective consciousness. 
[our emphasis]822 
The problem, evidently, is not that the microsubjects do not necessitate the macrosubject; it is 
that the macrosubject is more than the sum of the microsubjects.  It is an integral consciousness, 
possessing a strongly emergent boundary/unity that cannot be analysed into a mere aggregate of 
microexperiences.  It is for this reason that James raises the combination problem as an objection 
to absolutism, and says that it leads to theism.  The absolute, he says, being more than the sum of 
its parts, cannot be analysed into an aggregate of finite subjects.  As such, we must suppose that 
it is something additional to the universe of finite subjects; namely, the God of traditional 
theism823.  The whole discussion of combination in PU would make no sense if subject-summing 
was the crux of the problem. 
Now, perceptive readers may have noticed a seeming contradiction in our interpretation.  We 
said earlier, in section 3.1.1, that James was best conceived of as an emergent panpsychist.  But 
emergent panpsychism clearly avoids the boundary/unity problem altogether.  There is no need 
for emergent panpsychists to explain how an aggregate of microexperiences constitutes a 
bounded/unified macroexperience, because emergent panpsychists do not hold that aggregates 
of microexperiences constitute macroexperiences.  Rather, they hold that macroexperiences 
emerge from microexperiences.  They may therefore simply grant that macroexperiences possess 
strongly emergent features.  James, it seems, cannot have conceived of himself as an emergent 
panpsychist, or else he would not have been troubled by the boundary/unity problem.  Our 
response is simply to concede that James did not conceive himself as an emergent panpsychist.  
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Indeed, we find it unlikely that such distinctions/possibilities had consciously occurred to him.  We 
hold, nevertheless, that his total worldview implied such a doctrine, and that it constitutes the 
best interpretation of his underlying philosophic vision.  Furthermore, we hold that there was 
another aspect of the combination problem that troubled James – one which was not solved, but 
rather exacerbated by his emergentism – and that James did not clearly distinguish between 
these aspects.  When, later in PU, he comes to discuss his solution to the combination problem, 
he seems, without acknowledging any distinction, to emphasize what we called the synchronic 
constitution problem rather than the boundary/unity problem.  
In lecture VI James frames the combination problem as having arisen iatrogenically, as a result of 
philosophers’ misapplication of conceptual logic.  “Conceptualisation”, he tells us, “involves 
placing parts of experience in classes, and treating them by the law of their class.”824  Thus, in a 
classic example, we place ‘Socrates’ in the class ‘man’ and then, treating him by a law of this class 
– that ‘all men are mortal’ – we deduce that ‘Socrates is mortal’.  Sometimes, James says, this 
process of conceptualization goes awry.  This occurs when we employ concepts privatively rather 
than positively; when we use them “not merely to assign properties to things, but to deny the 
very properties with which the things sensibly present themselves.”825  Thus, in an example James 
takes from Sigwart, a horseman is denied the capability of going by foot because it is part of the 
definition of the concept of a horseman that he rides on a horse826.  To give a more pragmatic 
example, a platypus might be denied the capability of laying eggs because it is part of the 
definition of the concept of mammal that all mammals give birth to live young.  It is James’s 
contention that the combination problem arises out of a similar instance of vicious 
conceptualisation.   
The particular intellectualistic difficulty that held my own thought so long in a vice 
was, as we have seen at such tedious length, the impossibility of understanding how 
‘your’ experience and ‘mine’, which ‘as such’ are defined as not conscious of each 
other, can nevertheless at the same time be members of a world-experience defined 
expressly as having all its parts co-conscious, or known together. [our emphasis]827 
Although this statement is somewhat ambiguous, the preamble concerning conceptual logic 
seems to suggest the following reading.  It is part of the definition of a stream of consciousness 
that it is entirely self-enclosed or ejective to other streams of consciousness.  Streams of 
consciousness cannot, therefore, according to conceptual logic, figure at the same time in a 
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context in which their self-enclosedness is somehow ameliorated or overcome.  They can be self-
enclosed or co-conscious, but they cannot be both at once828.  This, it seems, is a statement of the 
synchronic constitution problem rather than the boundary/unity problem.  James, we suggest, did 
not really distinguish between the two.  This is part of the reason why he continued to be 
troubled by the combination problem even after his own thinking began to move in the direction 
of emergentism. 
Contrary to Chalmers’s reading, we hold that the boundary/unity problem and the synchronic 
constitution problem are at the heart of the combination problem for James.  The subject-
summing problem, although certainly implied by some of what he says, figures only peripherally.  
Our reading is leant further support, we suggest, by the fact that James’s final solution to the 
combination problem, pace Chalmers, does not invoke a deflationary account of the subject.  
Rather, it may be said to consist in the following three claims.  First, as we have already seen, the 
claim that the combination problem arises iatrogenically, as a result of philosophers’ 
misapplication of conceptual logic.  Second, the claim that conceptual logic is an evolved capacity, 
which subserves “practical adaptation”829; i.e. which yields adaptive heuristics rather than 
objective truths.  And third, the claim that conceptual logic is specifically adapted to dealing with 
the “outer surface” of reality rather than with its “inner dimension”830.  He elaborates on this last 
claim by saying that conceptual logic is best utilized in “the sciences … of space and matter, where 
the transformations of external things are dealt with”831.  In other words, conceptual logic is best 
adapted to dealing with the structural properties of things rather than with their intrinsic 
properties.  James concludes that the combination problem is not a real problem at all.  It only 
arises due to the misapplication of conceptual logic to a part of reality that it is not adapted to 
handle.  The solution, accordingly, is simply to abandon the combination problem altogether.  This 
solution, we contend, is aimed primarily at the synchronic constitution problem, and might have 
some limited success therein.  But it utterly fails as a solution to either the subject-summing 
problem or the boundary/unity problem.   
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In conclusion we would like to suggest that James’s panpsychism is an ‘emergent layered 
russellian panpsychism’.  It holds that macroexperiences are strongly emergent from 
microexperiences; that they exist synchronically with their microexperiential parts; that 
experiential/phenomenal properties constitute the intrinsic natures of physical objects; and that 
they exist in a fully conscious condition.  Because it is a panpsychism, and not a 
panprotopsychism, it avoids the need of invoking the brute emergence of consciousness.  Because 
it is russellian, it is compatible with scientific structural realism, and eludes Colin McGinn’s 
accusation of scientific outrageousness832.  Because it is layered, it allows a place in nature for 
superhuman consciousness, without thereby diminishing human consciousness.  And because it is 
emergent, it escapes the boundary/unity problem.  James’s panpsychism is so important to our 
interpretation because it allows him to identify God’s consciousness – one of his key 
characteristics – with the intrinsic nature of a portion of the physical universe.  It thereby makes 
the existence of a divine consciousness consistent with the causal closure of nature.  In section 3.3 
we shall see how James’s panpsychism combines with his emergentism to serve as the basis for 
his theistic naturalism.  But first we must proceed with our reconstruction of that doctrine of 
emergentism.
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3.2.1. From Combination to Emergence 
The boundary/unity problem, according to Chalmers, is that of explaining how a mere aggregate 
of microexperiences can constitute a bounded/unified macroexperience.  We have suggested that 
James’s panpsychism, being emergent, avoids this problem.  However, there is another side to the 
boundary/unity problem that is not so easily dealt with.  Gregg Rosenberg, who, as Chalmers 
notes, is a key contemporary exponent of this problem833, presents a quite different formulation 
than the one we have just seen.  For him it is not so much the combination of microsubjects into a 
bounded/unified macrosubject that is the problem; but the putative correspondence or identity 
of a bounded/unified macrosubject with physical facts that are supposed to be essentially 
atomistic: 
I start with the observation that consciousness has inherent boundaries.  Only some 
experiences are part of my consciousness; most experiences in the world are not.  
Arguably, these boundaries are what individuate me as an experiencing subject in the 
world.  I argue that this poses a problem that any theory of consciousness must 
answer.  How can consciousness have boundaries?  What element of the natural 
world dictates the way these boundaries are drawn?834 
The difficulty is really the odd empirical facts about bounded phenomenal fields 
existing surprisingly at a midlevel of the physical world, at a scale corresponding to 
physical activity in animal brains.835 
It is surprising for Rosenberg that bounded subjects exist at a midlevel of the physical world 
because he takes for granted – along with the majority of contemporary naturalists – the principle 
of ontological reducibility (POR).  According to this principle there is no midlevel of the physical 
world; there is really only the bottom-level.  Now, the boundary problem, in Rosenberg’s 
formulation, may sound somewhat familiar.  This, we contend, is because it is essentially a version 
of James’s ‘problem of stating the connection between the mind and the brain’ (PCMB): 
PCMB: every fact about the mind must correspond with some fact about the brain (parallelism) 
with which it is structurally isomorphic (PPSI); but the mind being holistic (INC) and the brain 
atomistic (mereological atomism/POR), structural isomorphism fails to hold between them. 
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At the time of writing PP, recall, we said that James could envision only two possible solutions to 
the problem: the material monad theory, according to which the total stream of consciousness is 
correlated with a single mereological atom, and the soul-theory, according to which the total 
stream of consciousness is not, strictly speaking, correlated with any physical object.  In PP he 
elected to adopt a version of the soul theory, which we argued was equivalent to a doctrine of 
strong emergentism about the mental.  He thereby admitted an exception to his psychophysical 
parallelism.  Post ERE and PU however, this solution is plainly no longer viable.  The 
methodological psychophysical parallelism of PP has given way to a full-blown psychophysical 
identity theory.  The mental and the physical are no longer to be thought of as two kinds of entity 
or stuff that we ought, for methodological purposes, to regard as being correlated; they are now 
to be thought of as “co-eternal aspects of one self-same reality, much as concave and convex are 
aspects of one curve.” How then, we must ask, is James supposed to have solved PCMB after ERE 
and PU?   
3.2.1.1. Two Divergent Readings of James Concerning Emergence 
PCMB results from the conjunction of psychophysical parallelism (and thus PPSI), INC, and 
mereological atomism.  We have just said that post ERE/PU some form parallelism is beyond 
reproach.  Which means that James must either significantly modify his parallelism (so as not to 
entail PPSI), or he must abandon either INC or mereological atomism.  That he continued to 
endorse INC cannot, we contend, be doubted836.  To begin with the boundary/unity problem is 
predicated on INC.  If consciousness were not integral in the sense of INC, then there would be 
nothing to stop us from identifying it with an aggregate of mental atoms.  Secondly, as we shall 
see shortly, James makes a number of statements in PU that all but explicitly confirm the thesis.  
Which leaves us with two options.  Either James modified his parallelism so as not to entail PPSI, 
or he abandoned mereological atomism.  These two options form the bases of two divergent 
readings of James’s mature philosophy.  The first we shall call the ‘conservative reading’; the 
                                                             
836 David Lamberth and others note that James seems to recant his notion that states of consciousness are 
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live.  Still, in them, we can call parts, parts.”  See: The Works of William James: Essays in Philosophy, ed. by 
Burkhardt, p88.  Evidently these statements are concerned with how we ought to speak about states of 
consciousness; not with their actual ontological constitution.  In PP James had worried about even 
distinguishing the parts of mental states conceptually; now he concedes that doing so may be valid and 
useful.  He still holds however that conscious fields are “integers” with ontological priority over their parts, 






second, the ‘emergentist reading’.  In what follows we will briefly consider them both, before 
settling on a preferred option to address in greater detail. 
Before we begin, a word of explanation is due concerning different forms of emergentism.  We 
have already argued of course, in chapter two, that James endorsed a doctrine of strong 
emergentism about mental phenomena.  There we were speaking specifically about the 
emergence of integral consciousness from physical atoms.  We also argued, in the section 
preceding this one, that James endorsed a doctrine of emergent russellian panpsychism.  In this 
case the claim was that integral consciousness was strongly emergent from mental atoms.  Now, 
depending on one’s views regarding the metaphysical status of emergents, both of these 
doctrines might be compatible with mereological atomism.  Thus, one might hold that integral 
consciousness is strongly emergent from an aggregate of mereological atoms, or from an 
aggregate of mereological mental atoms.  The ‘emergentist reading’ that we are about to consider 
differs from both of these doctrines in attributing to James the view that there are physical 
wholes that are strongly emergent from their physical parts.  In other words, it finds him to 
endorse a doctrine not dissimilar to classic British Emergentism, with its different kinds of 
material substances existing at different levels of nature.  This form of emergentism, is not 
compatible with mereological atomism.  It says that certain physical objects, like brains for 
instance, are more than mere aggregates of atoms. 
i) The Conservative Reading 
According to the conservative reading, James adopted a modified version of parallelism at some 
point between PP and PU.  In support of this reading we may point to the fact that James makes 
statements in PU that seem to imply his continued endorsement of both INC and mereological 
atomism.  Consider the following statement, which he makes after invoking the relation between 
a bird and its feathers as a metaphor for the relation between the total stream of consciousness 
and its putative microconscious parts: 
The bird-metaphor is physical, but we see on reflection that in the physical world 
there is no real compounding.  ‘Wholes’ are not realities there, parts only are 
realities.  ‘Bird’ is only our name for the physical fact of a certain grouping of organs, 
just as ‘Charles’s Wain’ is our name for a certain grouping of stars.  The ‘whole,’ be it 
bird or constellation, is nothing but our vision, nothing but an effect on our 
sensorium when a lot of things act on it together.  It is not realized by any organ or 
any star, or experienced apart from the consciousness of an onlooker.  In the physical 
world taken by itself there is thus no ‘all,’ there are only the ‘eaches’ – at least that is 
the ‘scientific’ view.  In the mental world, on the contrary, wholes do in point of fact 




realize themselves per se.  The meaning of the whole sentence is just as much a real 
experience as the feeling of each word is…837 
This statement would seem to imply James’s endorsement of both mereological atomism and INC 
in one stroke.  In the ‘physical world’, there are no wholes, but only parts.  If we follow this to its 
logical conclusion, as James did in PP, we arrive at the doctrine of mereological atomism, 
according to which all physical entities are wholly reducible to their lowest-level parts.  In the 
‘mental world’ meanwhile, wholes “realize themselves per se”; they exist in themselves, 
independently of the experience of any onlooker.  Hence, INC is true.   
If this reading of the above statement is correct, then there are only two options as regards 
James’s response to PCMB.  Either he has modified his parallelism so as not to entail PPSI, and 
thus believes that an atomistic brain can serve as the objectively real counterpart to an integral 
consciousness, or he has simply forgotten or become confused about PCMB, and so no longer 
feels its force.  Given that the latter option leads us to conclude that James has fallen into obvious 
contradiction, the principle of charity dictates that we must assume the former to be correct.  
However, the former option is not without its difficulties.  The plain fact of the matter is that the 
form of panpsychism that James endorses does commit him to PPSI.  In order not to entail PPSI, 
James’s panpsychism would have to be of the non-identist, non-russellian variety.  It would have 
to hold that consciousness – macro-consciousness at any rate – does not constitute the intrinsic 
nature of its physical counterpart, but that it is merely correlated with it in some weaker sense.  In 
combination with his doctrine of mental causation from PP, this would give James’s view an 
uncomfortably dualistic tinge.  In this respect, the conservative reading would seem to go against 
the spirit of his radical empiricism, and his intrinsic nature type arguments for panpsychism.  It has 
the advantage however of involving minimal deviation from established interpretations of his 
work. 
ii) The Emergentist Reading 
According to the emergentist reading, James continued to endorse the same form of parallelism 
throughout his career.  If anything, his transition from methodological parallelism to panpsychism 
only strengthened his commitment to PPSI.  What changed was rather his attitude towards 
mereological atomism.  In the days of PP, he had been dazzled by science into believing that the 
doctrine was unassailable.  But after PP, especially during the writing of WB, he developed a more 
critical attitude towards science.  He grew suspicious of hyperscientific realism, and therefore, of 
                                                             






mereological atomism.  This suspicion was later compounded by his reading of Bergson and his 
critique of intellectualism.   
On the emergentist reading, the conservative reading misunderstands passages like the one 
quoted above.  James, in the above passage, is not stating his present view, but rehearsing an old 
argument/playing devil’s advocate for expositional purposes.  The line of reasoning encapsulated 
in the passage above is one that, “if I had been lecturing … a very few years ago, I should 
unhesitatingly have urged…”838 (my emphasis).  “So long”, he says, “as this was the state of my 
own mind,” – so long, that is, as the above passage characterised his beliefs – “I could accept the 
notion of self-compounding in the supernal spheres of experience no more easily than in that 
chapter on mind-dust I had accepted it in the lower spheres.” (my emphasis)839  This “was” the 
state of James’s mind; i.e. it was the state of his mind some years ago, before his reading of 
Bergson.  Look again at the passage quoted above.  James qualifies his description of mereological 
atomism with the statement: “ – at least that is the ‘scientific’ view.”  He implies, therefore, that it 
is not necessarily his own view.  Indeed, he places ‘scientific’ in inverted commas, as if to question 
its scientific status.  Perhaps he means to suggest that it is really only the scientificistic view.   
In support of the emergentist reading we may cite comments like the following, from Some 
Problems of Philosophy.  James begins chapter VI with a familiar description of the empirical 
method, according which it “proceeds from parts to wholes, treating the parts as fundamental 
both in the order of being and in the order of our knowledge.”840  But to this he affixes the 
following footnote: 
Naturally this applies in the present place only to the greater whole which philosophy 
considers; the universe namely, and its parts, for there are plenty of minor wholes 
(animal and social organisms, for example) in which both the being of the parts and 
our understanding of the parts are founded.841 
The implication, according to the emergentist reading, is clear enough.  Whilst the universe is a 
mere aggregate, such entities as animals and social organisms are genuine physical wholes.  In 
entities like these the whole has ontological priority over the parts; i.e. it is strongly emergent 
with respect to them.  This, of course, is entirely incompatible with the doctrine of mereological 
atomism.  
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Thus, on the emergentist reading, James abandons mereological atomism, and comes to believe 
that the brain is an emergent whole, structurally isomorphic with the integral consciousness that 
is its intrinsic nature.  In this way PCMB is solved, and the spirit of James’s radical 
empiricism/russellian panpsychism is preserved.  The chief problem with the emergentist reading 
is that James nowhere explicitly disavows mereological atomism, and fails to articulate any 
detailed doctrine of emergence.  A charitable explanation for the former fact might be that he did 
not wish to ruffle too many scientific feathers, but this hardly makes sense coming from one of 
the most avid supporters of psychical research on his side of the Atlantic.  As for the latter fact, 
we might suppose that James lacked the conceptual tools to articulate a detailed doctrine of 
emergence, but once again, this is somewhat difficult to believe.  The above quote, together with 
his various comments on emergence from PP, surely demonstrate that he was capable of framing 
the concept of emergent physical wholes, and yet they stand more or less alone in suggesting that 
he held this view. 
Neither of these readings then, are without their difficulties.  The truth of the matter may well be 
that James simply had not worked out his position thoroughly in regard to these issues.  Whatever 
the case may be, it is our contention that the emergentist reading presents us with an intriguing 
new window into James’s philosophy, and one that it worth exploring.  In the remainder of this 
section therefore, we will attempt to reconstruct James’s nascent emergentism in some detail.  
Doing so, we suggest, is the key to restoring his theistic naturalism, and to completing the arch of 
his philosophy. 
3.2.1.2. The Emergence of Psycho-physical Wholes  
Let us suppose then that post ERE the notion of an emergent consciousness that is not structurally 
isomorphic with its physical counterpart has been definitively abandoned.  The mental is 
henceforth to be conceived of as the inner nature of the physical; the human stream of 
consciousness as the inner nature of the human brain, etc.  It seems, on these terms, and contrary 
to James’s contention in PP, that the brain can and must serve as the “objectively real 
counterpart” to the human stream of consciousness.  The brain, therefore, must be more than an 
aggregate of mereological atoms.  It must be a genuine entity in its own right; strongly emergent 
with respect to its parts.  Consider the following line of reasoning: 
• P1: Human consciousness is an integral thing not made of parts (INC). 
• P2: The human brain, in order to serve as the objectively real counterpart to human 
consciousness, must be more than an aggregate of atoms; i.e. it must be a strongly 






• P3: The human brain (post ERE) is the objectively real counterpart to human 
consciousness. 
• C: The brain is a strongly emergent entity. 
This specifically Jamesian line of reasoning can be expanded into the following general argument: 
• P1: The human stream of consciousness possesses a strongly emergent boundary/unity 
(INC). 
• P2: This boundary/unity constitutes a structural feature of human consciousness. 
• P3: Physical facts must be structurally isomorphic with their mental counterparts (PPSI). 
• P4: The human brain is the physical counterpart of human consciousness. 
• P5: The human brain must possess a strongly emergent boundary/unity. 
• C: The human brain is a strongly emergent entity. 
There are those of course who will dispute P1, but the boundary/unity problem, which is taken 
seriously by a number of contemporary philosophers, would seem to imply some version of it.  P2 
appears to be on safe ground; such notions as ‘boundary’ and ‘unity’ seem intuitively to suggest a 
structural component (e.g. we may speak of the boundary and unity of a cell as being an element 
of or a result of its structure).  P3, as we have said, is implied by any psycho-physical identity 
theory; even those who reject it will likely accept this implication.  P4 is accepted, in one form or 
another, by the majority of contemporary philosophers.  And P5 and the conclusion are logically 
entailed by P1-4.  Not just James then, but anyone who accepts INC, can be led logically to the 
conclusion that the brain, or some portion of the brain and nervous system, is a strongly 
emergent physical whole842.   
Now as we have seen, the human stream of consciousness is not, for James, the only example of 
integral consciousness in nature.  We know from PU that such entities as electrons, molecules, 
plants, animals, planets, galaxies, and of course God, are also supposed to possess integral 
consciousnesses.  All of these entities, by way of arguments like those just outlined, must 
therefore be supposed, like the brain, to be genuine entities that are strongly emergent with 
respect to their parts.  In order to proceed with this discussion, it will be necessary to have a 
name for entities like these.  We propose to call them ‘psycho-physical wholes’ or ‘psycho-
physical individuals’843.  They are integral (bounded/unified) psychophysical entities that are 
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strongly emergent with respect to their psycho-physical parts.  They are contrasted with 
psychophysical aggregates, which are mereological (unbounded/ununified) aggregates of lower-
level psychophysical entities that are wholly reducible to those lower-level entities.  Thus, we 
might presume that whereas electrons, molecules, and organisms are psychophysical wholes, 
rocks, wisps of smoke, and arbitrary clusters of atoms are psychophysical aggregates.  If we 
translate the Fechnerian speculations of PU into this terminology, we may say that God, for 
James, is the largest psycho-physical whole in the universe; that he crowns a nested hierarchy of 
lesser psycho-physical wholes, from galaxies and planets, to animals and plants, to molecules and 
physical ultimates; and that those lesser wholes, whilst being parts of God, and being co-
conscious with one another in his consciousness, nevertheless remain bounded and unified in 
themselves.   
At this point, PCMB has dissolved.  There is no longer any structural mismatch between an 
integral consciousness and an atomistic brain.  Once we have embraced something like the notion 
of emergence outlined above, the brain ceases to be wholly atomistic; it too becomes something 
integral, possessing a boundary and unity over and above its parts.  Psychophysical structural 
isomorphism is thereby restored.  And it holds throughout nature.  Wheresoever there is integral 
consciousness, there is an integral physical entity; and together they constitute an emergent 
psychophysical whole.  Likewise, where there are only aggregates of physical entities, there are 
only aggregates of consciousness, possessing no shared boundary or unity844.  In the next section 
we will turn to the vital question of how we should understand the macro-causal power of 
psychophysical wholes. 
                                                             
844 The above discussion of course raises the question of what the criteria for emergence are.  Some popular 
possible criteria include: i) having a certain configuration (as per Brian McLaughlin’s analysis which we 
discussed in section 1.4.2.1), ii) having ‘non-aggregative properties’ (see: William Wimsatt, ‘Aggregativity: 
Reductive Heuristics for Finding Emergence’, in Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and 
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3.2.2. From Mental Causation to Macro-Causation 
On the emergentist reading, James holds that certain natural systems constitute psychophysical 
wholes.  Some of these systems, at least human organisms and God, possess macro-causal power 
over and above their parts.  Although James does not explicitly say it, it seems perfectly plausible 
that other systems in this category might also possess macro-causal power.  However, James only 
provides a model for understanding macro-causation in the case of human organisms.  That 
model, from PP, was articulated in the context of a discussion of mental causation, without any 
reference to a broader category of macro-causation.  It is not obvious, therefore, that we would 
be justified in extending this model to macro-causation in general.  Furthermore, it is not obvious 
how this model could be translated in such a way as to accommodate entities other than the 
brain/human organism.  In this section and the following one we will address both of these issues 
in turn.  First, in the present section, we will argue that James’s essay, ‘The Experience of Activity’, 
from ERE, mandates an extension of his model of mental causation from PP to macro-causation 
generally.  Then, in the following section (3.2.3), we will attempt to translate James’s model of 
mental causation into a viable approach to macro-causation.   
3.2.2.1. The Experience of Activity 
In ‘The Experience of Activity’, James wishes to establish radical empiricism’s commitment to two 
important claims: 
i) Our experience of effort and volition is the original datum of our concept of causal power. 
 
ii) Wheresoever we postulate causal power, we must conceive of it after the analogy of 
effort and volition. 
Let us begin by unpacking the first claim.  The context for this claim goes back to Hume’s analysis 
of causation from An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.  According to Hume, our belief in 
causality amounts to nothing more than a custom or habit845.  We experience certain events in 
constant conjunction with certain other events, and we habitually expect them to be conjoined in 
the future.  At no point do we actually experience the causal connection between the events.  
Recall James’s affirmation of Hume’s analysis in WB: 
The principle of causality, for example, – what is it but a postulate, an empty name 
covering simply a demand that the sequence of events shall someday manifest a 
deeper kind of belonging of one thing with another than the mere arbitrary 
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juxtaposition which now phenomenally appears?  It is as much an altar to an 
unknown god as the one Saint Paul found at Athens.846   
‘The Experience of Activity’ marks a shift in James’s views regarding causality.  He now affirms the 
methodological thesis of pure experience, according to which only the data of direct experience 
can form the subject matter of philosophy.  According to this thesis, he says, either the original 
datum of the concept of causality must lie in experience, or the concept of causality must be 
totally meaningless847.  In searching experience for a plausible datum, we quickly come upon an 
obvious candidate: namely the experience of effort and volition. 
The experience of effort and volition, according to James, is a species of the more general 
experience of activity.  He explains this is the following way.  Activity, in itself, is “the bare fact of 
event or change”848.  Such activity may be either “aimless or directed”.  When directed, it is said 
to show a particular “tendency”.  If that tendency meets with resistance, we are said to 
experience a kind of “strain or squeeze”849.  It is only at this point, properly speaking, that effort 
and volition come onto the scene.  The experience of effort and volition consists in the experience 
of sustaining a felt tendency in spite of strain or squeeze.  It is this, according to James, that is the 
original datum of our concept of causal power: 
Sustaining, persevering, striving, paying with effort as we go, hanging on and finally 
achieving our intention – this is action, this is effectuation in the only shape in which, 
by a pure-experience philosophy, the whereabouts of it anywhere can be discussed.  
Here is creation in its first intention, here is causality at work.850 
This is James’s first claim.  Our experience of effort and volition is the original datum of our 
concept of causal power.  From here he leaps, almost immediately, to the second claim; that 
wheresoever we postulate causality, we must conceive of it after the analogy of the experience of 
effort and volition.  Nowhere does he outline an explicit argument that takes him from the first 
claim to the second.  He simply insists that a radically empirical philosophy is “obliged” to 
conceive of causal activity in this way851.  It is possible, we think, to reconstruct James’s reasoning 
in the form of an argument by analogy: 
• P1: Reality is wholly constituted of experiential stuff. 
• P2: The inner nature of causal activity must therefore be experiential. 
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• P3: The inner nature of human causal activity is the experience of effort and volition. 
• P4: We may suppose, by analogy, that the inner nature of other causal activity is 
essentially continuous with the human experience of effort and volition852. 
With this, we contend, we have a mandate for developing James’s account of mental causation 
from PP into a general account of macro-causation.  But his discussion in ‘The Experience of 
Activity’ does not end here.  He goes on to address the question of what the possible loci of causal 
activity might be, and of what the relationship between causally powerful wholes and causally 
powerful parts might entail.  We will briefly examine both of these questions before moving on. 
3.2.2.2. The Loci of Macro-Causation 
James has tried to establish that our experience of effort and volition is the original datum of our 
concept of causal power.  And he has argued that wheresoever we postulate causal power, we 
must conceive of it after the analogy of effort and volition.  He has said nothing yet, however, 
about where we ought to postulate causal power; he has said nothing, that is, about which 
entities he takes to be causally powerful.  Certainly, he says, we feel causal activity to be going on 
at the level of the total stream of consciousness, in our efforts and volitions.  This feeling, 
however, may be mistaken.  In any case, he concedes, it surely does not account for the whole 
causal story of human behaviour.  What about, for instance, our brain cells?  If they cease to be 
active, then effort and volition will also cease.  Ought we not then to postulate causal activity in 
brain cells?  If we do so, then what is the relationship between their causal activity and the causal 
activity of the organism as a whole?  And what, furthermore, is the relationship between the 
causal activity of cells and organisms and that of God?  There are, according to James, at least 
four ways of envisioning the relationship between causally powerful entities at different levels853: 
i) Lower level causal activity takes precedence. 
ii) Middle level causal activity takes precedence. 
iii) Higher level causal activity takes precedence. 
                                                             
852 James does in fact imply something like this argument in SPP when he says: “If we took these 
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iv) Causal activity occurs on multiple levels, with none necessarily taking precedence. 
The first scenario, taken to its logical conclusion, amounts to a version of the automaton theory, 
which we know from PP that James rejects.  The second implies a denial of certain facts of 
physiology; how could we explain the dependence of mental phenomena on physiological 
conditions without assuming some causal power on the part of the latter?  The third, if taken to 
its logical conclusion, gives all causal power to the universe, and leads to absolutism.  James’s 
preferred option is thus the fourth: 
Naively we believe, and humanly and dramatically we like to believe, that activities 
both of wider and of narrower span are at work in life together, that both are real, 
and that the long-span tendencies yoke the others in their service, encouraging them 
in the right direction, and damping them out when they tend in other ways.854   
In other words, causally powerful entities exist at a variety of natural levels, with larger, more 
inclusive entities possessing proportionally more causal power, and exerting some degree of 
overriding influence upon smaller ones.  To this he adds the following: 
But to represent clearly the modus operandi of such steering of small tendencies by 
large ones is a problem which metaphysical thinkers will have to ruminate upon for 
many years to come.855 
The following section will attempt to do just that.  It will attempt to represent the modus 
operandi of macro-causation in a fashion that is consistent with James’s mature philosophy. 
3.2.3. Towards a Jamesian Account 
Now that we have established our mandate for developing James’s account of mental causation 
from PP into a general account of macro-causation, let us briefly reconsider some of the details of 
the former.  In chapter 2 we provided the following diagram to illustrate James’s model 
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In PP, recall, mental events (the Cs) were construed as being emergent from neurophysiological 
events (the Ns).  Post ERE and PU, it would be more accurate to say that higher-level 
psychophysical events emerge from lower-level psychophysical events.  Regardless however, the 
basic picture remains the same.  The character of C1 is largely but not entirely settled by the 
character of N1, and is partially spontaneous or self-chosen in virtue of exertions of effort on the 
part of the human being in whose brain the events are occurring.  The character of N2, 
meanwhile, is largely but not entirely settled by the character of N1, and partially settled by the 
character of C1.  And so on and so forth.  This model, we suggest, fits into the broad emergentist 





The only difference between the two models is the inclusion in James’s of the series of curved 
arrows above the higher-level events (the Cs).  These curved arrows are supposed to represent 
the spontaneous or self-chosen quality of higher-level events on James’s account.  But there is 
nothing in principle to stop the emergentist model from incorporating 
spontaneity/indeterminism.  We take it therefore that James’s account of mental causation is 
essentially consistent with emergentism.   
In chapter 1 we examined two possible emergentist approaches to macro-causation; the British 
Emergentist approach, and the quantum approach.  The British Emergentist approach appealed to 










C3 C2 C1 
Fig. 16 




approach appealed to the indeterministic events of quantum mechanics – specifically to the 
collapses of the wavefunctions of entities in the brain – as loci for the downward causal influence 
of emergent mental states.  James’s model of mental causation, we contend, could be adapted in 
either of these directions.  In what follows therefore, we propose to sketch two renditions of a 
Jamesian account of macro-causation; a British Emergentist rendition and a quantum rendition.  
We will attempt to examine some of the advantages and disadvantages of each, and to settle on 
the solution that best suits James’s philosophy. 
3.2.3.1. The British Emergentist Rendition 
As we saw in chapter 1, the British Emergentist approach to macro-causation revolves around the 
classic scientific conception of causation in terms of forces and laws.  James is certainly familiar 
with this conception.  Indeed, he uses it to frame his discussion of mental causation in PP.  
Common-sense, he says, formulates the notion of mental causation in terms of the claim that 
feelings and ideas are forces.  He suggests that a thorough-going metaphysical investigation of the 
notion of mental causation “will probably preserve the common-sense view that ideas are forces, 
in some translated form.”856  Later, in chapter XI of PP (on ‘Attention’), James explicitly addresses 
the question of mental causation under the heading ‘Is Voluntary Attention a Resultant or a 
Force?’857.  Here he opposes the belief that voluntary attention is the outcome of “exclusively 
material laws” to the belief that voluntary attention may constitute “an original psychic force”858.  
The use of the term ‘resultant’ here is particularly significant.  In physics this term designates the 
sum of two or more vectors (the magnitude and direction of forces in physics are described using 
vectors).  Thus the ‘resultant’ of two or more forces acting upon an object is the sum of those 
forces combined through vector addition.  H. G. Lewes and later British Emergentists deliberately 
defined ‘emergent’ forces and effects in contradistinction to ‘resultant’ forces and effects.  The 
former, unlike the latter, were more than the sum of elementary physical forces.  These 
statements, we contend, indicate that James’s account of mental causation is susceptible of a 
British Emergentist interpretation.  Further support for this contention can be found in James’s 
later works859. 
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Consider the following passage from VRE.  According to a popular belief, James tells us – one, he 
notes, that is yet to be defeated by science – certain entities in the world operate by 
“individualized personal forces”860: 
The savage thinks that things operate by personal forces, and for the sake of 
individual ends.  For him, even external nature obeys individual needs and claims, 
just as if these were so many elementary powers.  Now science, on the other hand, 
these positivists say, has proved that personality, so far from being an elementary 
force in nature, is but a passive resultant of the really elementary forces, physical, 
chemical, physiological, and psycho-physical, which are all impersonal and general in 
character.861 
James here evidently conceives of ‘personal forces’ in the same way that he had conceived of 
‘original psychic forces’ in PP.  The difference is that here he is suggesting that such personal 
forces may be operative in nature outside of human brains/nervous systems.  We note that James 
describes such personal forces as “individualized”; implying that they may apply uniquely to 
individual psycho-physical wholes, rather than – like other emergent forces – invariantly across 
members of their class.  This may indicate the manner in which James intends an emergent-forces 
type conception of macro-causation to be consistent with a libertarian concept of freewill. 
If our reading of the statements and comments above is correct, then James’s position is easily 
construed as being essentially similar to British Emergentism.  Certain configurations of matter – 
such as those which constitute brains – give rise to emergent forces, which enable novel sorts of 
motion and behaviour in the particles that comprise those configurations.  The advantage of the 
British Emergentist rendition of James’s approach to macro-causation is, firstly, its simplicity, and 
secondly, the fact that all of the ideas and concepts involved are of James’s own time.  It requires 
no great interpretative leap to imagine such a development of James’s doctrines.  
3.2.3.2. The Quantum Rendition 
The above reading is in tension with what we are calling the quantum rendition of a Jamesian 
account of macro-causation.  As we saw in chapter 1, forces in physics combine by vector 
addition.  As such, the existence of emergent forces requires no gap in the coverage of physical 
law; that is, it requires no appeal to indeterminism.  Yet James explicitly states that mental 
causation, on his view, would require indeterminism.  He repeatedly emphasises the 
“spontaneous” character of such causation, and seems to equate it with libertarian freewill.  The 
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implication, we suggest, is that mental causation is not to be regarded as law-governed at all.  
Consider the following passage: 
If … the feeling which coexists with the brain-cells’ activity reacts dynamically upon 
that activity, furthering or checking it, then the attention is in part, at least, a cause.  
It does not necessarily follow, of course, that this reactive feeling should be ‘free’ in 
the sense of having its amount and direction undetermined in advance, for it might 
very well be predetermined in all these particulars.  If it were so, our attention would 
not be materially determined, nor yet would it be ‘free’ in the sense of being 
spontaneous or unpredictable in advance.862 
Thus, even if mental phenomena are not determined by fundamental physical laws, they might 
still be determined by emergent mental laws.  In this case, according to James, they would not be 
‘free’.  In order to be ‘free’, as he thinks they are, they must be “spontaneous or unpredictable”.  
In this respect the quantum approach to macro-causation, with its appeal to indeterminism, 
seems to fit James’s account better than the British Emergentist approach. 
In PP, recall, James insisted that mental causation would require that the outcomes of certain 
neural events be undetermined.  From among the range of possible outcomes of such events, the 
soul (i.e. the total stream of consciousness considered as an emergent phenomenon) would 
“make one effective”.  This process would correspond, he said, with the conscious experience of 
effort; specifically, with the effort to attend to particular ideas in the mind.  Such efforts to attend 
would delay or hasten an idea’s stay in consciousness by a minute duration, thus increasing or 
decreasing the likelihood of that idea taking hold, and of relevant actions being performed.  The 
similarity of James’s account to the quantum approach of Henry Stapp is quite remarkable.  For 
Stapp mental causation is made possible because the outcomes of certain neural events – the 
wavefunction collapses of calcium-ions exiting ion channels – are indeterministic.  He proposes 
that consciousness induces the collapse of calcium ion wavefunctions, thereby determining 
which, out of a range of possible landing sites on vesicles, the calcium ion interacts with.  This in 
turn determines the conditions under which neurotransmitters are released, which effects 
behaviour.  Stapp even suggests, in terms almost identical to James, that this process corresponds 
with the conscious experience of effort.  The effect of exertions of effort, he says, is to determine 
“attention density”; i.e. the amount and duration of attention paid to an object.  By holding a 
particular ‘template for action’ in place for a longer duration, consciousness increases the 
probability that the intended action will occur863.  Stapp notes the coincidence of his hypothesis 
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with James’s account, but insists that his own view was devised wholly independently of James, 
on the basis of “purely theoretical considerations of the quantum physics of this process”864. 
3.2.4. Conclusions 
Both of these renditions of James’s account of macro-causation have considerable merit.  There is 
a good deal in James’s works to corroborate both of them.  On the one hand he insists that a 
finally satisfactory account of mental causation “will probably preserve the common-sense view 
that ideas are forces, in some translated form”.  On the other hand, his appeal to indeterminism, 
and to the notion that mental causation works by operating on a space of possibilities, maps very 
closely onto the quantum approach.  Although, as we said, there is some tension between these 
approaches, we think that the most natural reading of James would have us incorporate elements 
of both.  Something like the following, we suggest, comes close to what he envisioned.  
Psychophysical wholes are configured in such a way as to give rise to emergent configurational 
forces, and to allow for the amplification of the effects of indeterministic events.  They realize 
their macro-causal power by acting upon the space of possibilities left open by indeterminism 
(perhaps utilizing mechanisms like those described by Stapp), but the whole process operates in 
accordance with emergent configurational forces/laws.  These laws, being individualized and 
probabilistic, leave room for an element of spontaneity.  This then completes our reconstruction 
of James’s doctrine of emergentism.  In the final part of this chapter, we shall see how this 
doctrine combines with James’s layered russellian panpsychism to serve as the foundation for his 
theistic naturalism. 
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3.3. Theistic Naturalism 
We now have the column and the springer of James’s arch assembled.  All that remains is to lower 
the keystone – his theistic naturalism – into place, and to see if the arch stands up.  We said in the 
introduction to this chapter that James’s theistic naturalism may be said to consist in three key 
elements: i) his finite theism, ii) his theological voluntarism, and iii) his doctrine of religious 
experience.  In what follows we will investigate each of these elements in turn.  We will begin, in 
section 3.3.1, by exploring his finite theism, looking at his conception of God’s finitude, his 
processual character, and his personality.  We will proceed, in section 3.3.2, to examine his 
theological voluntarism, revisiting its roots in MPML, and reconsidering them in the light of our 
emergent panpsychist interpretation.  Finally, in section 3.3.3, we will revisit James’s doctrine of 
religious experience from VRE, and resituate it with respect to his restored theistic naturalism. 
3.3.1. Finite Theism 
3.3.1.1. God’s Finitude 
James’s key claims regarding God’s finitude occur in PU.  Prior to that there are hints that he may 
be amenable to such a view, but in PU his statements on this point are absolutely unequivocal.  
The divine consciousness, James says, “however vast it may be, has itself an external 
environment, and consequently is finite”; “he is finite, either in power or in knowledge, or in both 
at once”; “Having an environment, being in time, and working out a history just like ourselves, he 
escapes from the foreignness of all that is human, of the static timeless perfect absolute.”865  God 
is a finite being existing within the universe, but at the same time he is a hugely expansive and 
powerful being.  He may contain almost everything in the universe within him.  Our own galaxy at 
least, together with everything that comprises it – its solar systems, planets, organisms, and 
molecules – are “internal parts of God”866.  Presumably other galaxies are likewise parts of God.  
James’s view only requires that God have “the least infinitesimal other of any kind” outside of 
himself867.  Just what that ‘infinitesimal other’ consists in is not clear.  We are left with the image 
of God as a kind of super-system of all the galaxies in the universe, fringed by a penumbra of slag 
and debris that it excluded from the divine being.  Alternatively, we might suppose that entities 
which are parts of God – organisms for instance – break out of the divine being at certain points; 
i.e. at those points that are coextensive with their evil thoughts/acts.  In this case it would be as 
though we are all ordinarily submerged in the waters of the divine ocean, but that in performing 
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evil thoughts/acts we temporarily burst above the surface.  The following diagram helps to 
illustrate James’s mature conception of God and his relation to the universe and entities within it.  
The dotted line representing the boundary of the universe indicates that the universe itself is not, 
for James, a psychophysical whole.  The area between the green line and the dotted line is that 












In light of our reconstructions of James’s doctrines of panpsychism and emergentism, we offer the 
following summary.  The universe, for James, is essentially psychophysical in constitution.  Certain 
natural systems within the universe constitute causally powerful psychophysical wholes (the solid 
circles), strongly emergent from their psychophysical parts.  God is the largest such system (the 
green circle).  He contains myriad other psychophysical wholes within himself as parts.  Those 
parts constitute part of the content of his consciousness, but in his consciousness they are woven 
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into schemes and patterns of which the parts themselves are unaware.  Crucially, God does not 
contain everything within himself.  There is always some slag or debris that falls out of his orbit; 
some dregs that are left in his cup.   
Besides his metaphysical relation to the universe and entities within it, there is another important 
sense in which James’s God is finite.  James’s universe, recall, is an indeterministic universe.  
Ontological indeterminism, for James, is a necessary condition for the possibility of free will and 
moral realism, and cannot be compromised at any cost.  As such, God too, as a being within the 
universe, is subject to indeterminism.  This means that he cannot possess certain attributes 
possessed by the God of traditional theism; for instance, omniscience and omnipotence.  He 
cannot possess the former because he cannot know the outcomes of all indeterministic events.  
He may know all the possible outcomes of indeterministic events, and even the probabilities that 
given outcomes will occur, but he cannot know with certainty which will actually come to pass.  
He cannot possess the latter for essentially similar reasons.  He may be able to influence the 
outcomes of almost all indeterministic events, but he cannot decide the outcomes of all them.  
For one thing, he cannot decide the outcomes of events outside of his being.  For another, he 
cannot completely override the free causal activity of human beings and other responsible agents.  
As such, James says, God is in the position of an expert chess player facing up against a novice: 
The expert intends to beat.  But he cannot foresee exactly what any one actual move 
of his adversary may be.  He knows, however, all the possible moves of the latter; 
and he knows in advance how to meet each of them by a move of his own which 
leads in the direction of victory.869 
James’s God then, although limited in respect to his knowledge and power, is nevertheless able to 
steer things towards his intended course.  In the next section we will try to say a little bit more 
about the nature of that intended course, and the manner in which it is taken. 
3.3.1.2. God’s Processual Character 
As James has said, being finite, God is not static and eternal, but exists in time and has a history.  
In other words, God may be said to possess a processual character to some degree.  The notion of 
God as a processual being has become an increasingly important one in the past century.  Building 
on the ‘process philosophy’ of Alfred North Whitehead, so-called ‘process theology’ has become 
an important research topic in theology and religious studies.  A number of philosophers and 
theologians, not least Whitehead himself, have discussed James’s relationship to the process 
                                                             






tradition870.  Johanna Seibt, in her excellent SEP article, acknowledges the importance of James’s 
‘process-based account of the self’ as a key source of inspiration for early process philosophers871.  
Both Nancy Frankenberry and David Ray Griffin have noted connections between the metaphysics 
of radical empiricism and the process view872.  And Donald Viney recognizes the significance of 
James’s meliorism for process theology873.  Only a few commentators however, venture to 
suggest that James might actually have been a process theist of some sort.  Mark Boone is among 
the few to have done so, suggesting that James’s religious views may be interpreted as a kind of 
‘extreme process theology’, for which God is “still in the making”, and represents “the eventual 
stability of ideals”874.  In this section we want to explore this notion of the processual character of 
James’s God in more detail.   
i) Process vs Substance 
The notion of ‘process’ and of ‘process-philosophy’ is typically defined in contradistinction to the 
notion of ‘substance’ and to the doctrine of ‘substantialism’.  The doctrine of substantialism may 
itself be said to have two parts.  Firstly, it says that there are bare substances underlying the 
phenomenal world and grounding/carrying its properties.  Secondly, it says that the typical 
constituents of reality – usually supposed to be substances of the sort just described – are 
relatively permanent, independent entities.  Process philosophy, by contrast, says that there are 
no bare substances underlying immanent natural processes, and that the typical constituents of 
reality are sets of constantly changing, interdependent events875.  James’s worldview, we contend, 
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is aligned with process-philosophy in both respects.  Regarding the former, in PP he inveighed 
against the notion of spiritual substance, attacking the putative immaterial souls and 
transcendental egos that were supposed by some thinkers to lie behind the stream of thought.  In 
ERE and Pragmatism he extended that critique to material substance, endorsing Berkeley’s view 
that the pragmatic meaning of material substance is only the possibility of sensations, and 
developing a metaphysics according to which the world consists in pure experience alone, without 
any transempirical connective support.  Regarding the latter, he held that pure experience was to 
be conceived of after the analogy of human experience, and that human experience is essentially 
processual; that it is stream-like, continuous, and in a constant state of flux and change.  God, for 
James, is only a larger or more god-like self.  As such, he too is essentially processual.  He is, as it 
were, a gigantic stream of cosmic-divine consciousness; a series of unique, gestalt, phenomenal 
states, in constant flux, yet sensibly continuous with one another876.   
ii) God as ‘The Ideal’ 
Now, a key question in process-theology concerns the eventual outcome of the world process.  
Although this does not constitute a very prominent theme in James’s theistic naturalism, it is 
certainly present, and in our estimation has significant philosophical/theological consequences.  
The key, we contend, to approaching this theme in James’s work, is understanding his notion of 
God as ‘the Ideal’.  James invokes this formulation at several points in VRE, saying that God is a 
personification of “the Ideal”, that human beings are continuous with “an ideal power”, and that 
the phenomenal world is subject to causal influences from “the ideal world”877.  The question is, 
in precisely what sense does James intend the term ‘ideal’ in this case?  Four distinct but 
overlapping uses of this term may be said to be relatively typical in the history of philosophy.  
Firstly, one may use the term as a byword for ‘mental’, ‘psychical’, ‘experiential’, etc.  Secondly, 
one may speak of ‘the ideal’ or ‘ideality’ as contrasted with ‘the real’ or ‘reality’; i.e. as denoting 
something wholly mind-dependent that does not exist in the ‘real’ world.  Thirdly, one may speak 
of ‘the ideal X’ or ‘the ideal of Y’ in a quasi-Platonic sense, as denoting the archetypal or 
superlative version of something.  And fourthly, one may speak of ‘an ideal/ideals’, denoting 
specific preferences, values, or goals adopted by human beings.   
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On the face of it, it seems impossible that James could have intended his application of the term 
to God in any of the latter three senses.  James’s God is not ideal in the sense of being unreal; 
neither is he an archetypal version of something, or a value adopted by human beings.  This 
leaves the first sense of the term, according to which the ideal is synonymous with the mental.  
This usage, however, would be highly uncharacteristic for James, and would seem to contradict 
certain of his statements in VRE and elsewhere.  Consider the following for instance.  In the 
concluding lecture of VRE James tells us that ‘the unseen region’ (a.k.a. God) “is not merely ideal, 
for it produces effects in this world”878.  This is an ambiguous statement.  On the one hand James 
says that God “is not merely ideal” (our emphasis), implying therefore that he is partially ideal, 
but on the other hand he seems to be contrasting the ideal with the real, as per the second of the 
senses of the term discussed above.  This would seem to be tantamount to saying that God is 
partially real and partially unreal, which on the face of it makes little sense.  Fortunately, another 
of James’s statements, this time from a letter to Charles Strong, helps to clear up this ambiguity.  
Strong had written to James after the publication of Pragmatism to warn against his superstitious 
tendencies, and to advise his adoption of “an ideal God”, or “God of things as they should be”, 
rather than “an existent God”, or “God of things as they are”.  An ideal God, in Strong’s view, 
serves as a regulative principle promoting social/moral progress, but strictly speaking, “does not 
exist”879.  James’s reply is as follows: 
Your warnings against my superstitious tendencies … touch me, but not in the 
prophetic way, for they don’t weaken my trust in the healthiness of my own attitude, 
which in part (I fancy) is less remote from your own than you suppose.  For instance, 
my “God of things as they are,” being part of a pluralistic system, is responsible for 
only such of them as he knows enough and has enough power to have accomplished.  
For the rest he is identical with your “ideal” God. … What harm does the little 
residuum or germ of actuality that I leave in God do?  If ideal, why (except on 
epiphenomenist principles) may he not have got himself at least partly real by this 
time?880 
James’s God, it seems, really is partially unreal.  He is partially unreal (and partially real) in the 
sense that he is undergoing a process of progressive self-realization, and is only part of the way 
through that process.  A more intuitive way of understanding this, perhaps, would be in terms of 
the concept of potentiality.  Just as a seed is potentially a tree, so the “germ of actuality” that 
presently constitutes God’s being is potentially a more perfect and complete version of God.  This 
makes perfect sense on our interpretation, for we hold that the contents and structure of the 
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universe, which are themselves constantly evolving, inform the contents and structure of God’s 
consciousness.  Just what the final end of this process is supposed to be James does not venture 
to say in his letter to Strong.  We do however get some idea of what he had in mind from certain 
passages in Pragmatism. 
iii) The Notion of ‘The Ultimate’ 
In section 2.6 we described how James applied the pragmatic method to the concepts of 
substance and truth.  Another key concept to which he applies the method is that of ‘unity’.  In 
lecture IV, on ‘The One and the Many’, he bemoans the absolute idealists’ clumsy attributions of 
‘unity’ or ‘oneness’ to the universe as a whole.  There are, he insists, a number of pragmatically 
distinct senses of the concept of unity, and it makes a great difference which sense we intend 
when we attribute unity to the universe.  Thus, he distinguishes the unity of a universe of 
discourse, unity by way of physical or sensible continuity, causal unity, generic unity, unity of 
purpose, aesthetic unity, and noetic unity881.  Pluralists, he says, may help themselves to any of 
these senses of unity except for the last one.  To attribute noetic unity, or unity of knowledge, to 
the universe, implies that all things, past, present, and future, are gathered up into “one 
instantaneous or eternal knower”882.  This sense of unity entails what contemporary philosophers 
call ‘thing-monism’, or ‘existence monism’; i.e. the doctrine that the universe as a whole is the 
only genuine entity.  It is therefore incompatible with James’s thing-pluralism, as articulated in 
PU.   
Now, it is in the context of his discussion of noetic unity that James makes some illuminating 
statements regarding the possible final end of the process of God’s self-realization.  After telling 
us that noetic unity, in the absolutists’ scheme, is incompatible with pluralism, he goes on to 
suggest that there may be a different scheme in which no such incompatibility arises.  He explains 
as follows: 
With the whole of past eternity open for our conjectures to range in, it may be lawful 
to wonder whether the various kinds of union now realized in the universe that we 
inhabit may not possibly have been successively evolved after the fashion in which 
we now see human systems evolving in consequence of human needs.  If such an 
hypothesis were legitimate, total oneness would appear at the end of things rather 
than at their origin.  In other words the notion of the ‘Absolute’ would have to be 
replaced by that of the ‘Ultimate.’  The two notions would have the same content – 
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the maximally unified content of fact, namely – but their time-relations would be 
positively reversed.883 
Further light is shed on this notion of ‘the Ultimate’ in a reply James wrote to Henry Adams 
concerning the latter’s ‘Letter to American Teachers of History’.  Adams had made much in his 
letter of the importance of the theory of entropy, according to which the universe is inevitably 
tending towards a state of ‘thermodynamic equilibrium’.  Adams worried that this theory, which 
was (and still is) counted as unassailable by physicists, fundamentally undermined the project of 
history and the humanities884.  James begins his reply by doubting the finality of the theory of 
entropy, and ends by suggesting that, even if is true, it need not have the dire consequences 
Adams fears: 
Though the ultimate state of the universe may be its vital and psychical extinction, 
there is nothing in physics to interfere with the hypothesis that the penultimate state 
might be the millennium – in other words a state in which a minimum of difference 
of energy-level might have its exchanges so skilfully canalisés that a maximum of 
happy and virtuous consciousness would be the only result.  In short, the last expiring 
pulsation of the universe’s life might be, “I am so happy and perfect that I can stand 
it no longer.”885 
This then, is the final end of the process of God’s self-realization as James envisioned it.  He 
thought that God, and the contents of God’s consciousness, was becoming more and more 
unified, and that consciousness in general was becoming more and more happy and virtuous.  
Crucially, human beings were to be important participants in this process.  It would culminate, 
given sufficient effort on our part, in a state of maximal unity, virtue, and happiness. 
3.3.1.2. God’s Personality 
The last feature of James’s God that we wish to examine in his personality.  In WB James asserts 
that there are two key features which, by his reckoning, God must be supposed to possess: “First, 
it is essential that God be conceived as the deepest power in the universe; and, second, he must 
be conceived under the form of a mental personality.”886  Elaborating on this notion of 
personality, James says that “God’s personality is to be regarded, like any other personality, as 
something lying outside my own and other than me, and whose existence I simply come upon and 
find.”887  We suggest that personality, in this case, is being conceived in essentially the same terms 
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that James prescribed in PP.  There, recall, he counted it as an essential characteristic of thought 
that it “tends to be part of a personal consciousness”888.  He cashed this out in terms of a 
thought’s belonging in a series of thoughts which is ejective to, or completely cut-off from, other 
such series of thoughts (other personal consciousnesses)889.  He told us that each thought 
“belongs” with the other thoughts in its series by virtue of their all being invested with a special 
feeling of “warmth” or “intimacy” which “runs through them all like a thread through a chaplet 
and makes them into a whole”890.  Each thought in the series feels the warmth in itself to 
resemble the warmth invested in other thoughts in its series, and “appropriates” them – accepts 
ownership of them – accordingly891.  Thus, to say that “every thought tends to be a part of 
personal consciousness” is to say that every thought belongs in a series of other thoughts with 
which it feels a common warmth and intimacy, and which is ejective to, or completely cut-off 
from, other such series of thoughts.  James insisted that personal consciousness, in this sense, is 
“the very ‘original’ of the notion of personality”892.   
We think that James’s notion of God’s personality in WB is consistent with PP in this respect.  
God’s personality entails, first and foremost, his possessing, or rather being, a series of thoughts 
or states of phenomenal consciousness that belong together in the relevant way and that are 
ejective to other such series.  As to the content of God’s consciousness, James ventures to say the 
following: 
In whatever other respects the divine personality may differ from ours or may 
resemble it, the two are consanguineous at least in this, – that both have purposes 
for which they care, and each can hear the other’s call.893 
We know from MPML that James goes slightly further than this, and attributes demands or ideals 
to God as well.  Indeed, he believes that God’s possessing a personality is a necessary condition of 
his grounding moral obligations.  On the interpretation we have been developing in this chapter, 
God’s consciousness is the intrinsic nature of a large portion of the physical universe.  Its 
contents, such as his purposes and demands, must themselves, therefore, be the intrinsic natures 
of certain physical systems within that portion of the physical universe894.  In this respect the 
contents of God’s consciousness should be understood analogously to the contents of human 
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consciousness.  Just as we suppose that human demands are correlated with some set of 
entities/events in the human body, so we must suppose that God’s demands are correlated with 
some set of entities/events in God’s body.  This kind of analogical reasoning is entirely consistent 
with James’s approach.  In PU James addressed an objection according to which the earth cannot 
have an integral consciousness because it has no nervous system.  He answered this objection by 
insisting that a nervous system does not require “literal brain-fibres” and by pointing out that the 
earth has plenty of other kinds of fibres that could serve the same function895.  We may say 
something similar about divine demands.  God may not possess the kinds of neural mechanisms 
that are correlated with human demands, but he might possess some functionally equivalent 
mechanisms.  God’s demands, moreover, may be very different, phenomenologically speaking, 
from human demands.  Human demands are felt over relatively short timescales, they tend to 
incorporate a linguistic component, certain emotional content, etc.  None of this need be true of 
God’s demands.   
Another aspect of James’s concept of God that might reasonably be subsumed under the category 
of ‘personality’ is his possession of macro-causal power.  God, for James, as we saw in VRE, plays a 
causal role in bringing about and/or participating in religious and mystical experiences.  In 
addition, he enters into ‘wider cosmic relations’ the nature of which James left unspecified.  In 
light of what we have discovered so far in this chapter, we think we are now able to say what such 
‘wider cosmic relations’ consist in.  As per the suggestion of James’s essay on ‘The Experience of 
Activity’, God may be supposed to exert an overriding causal influence not only upon human 
beings, but upon the other infrahuman and superhuman entities that are his parts.  Thus, God will 
be able to exert a causal influence on galaxies, planets, molecules, particles, etc.  In doing so he 
will ‘yoke them’ in service of his higher purposes, which purposes, we may suppose, are 
essentially aligned with our own.  As James says: 
I believe … that we stand in much the same relation to the whole of the universe as 
our canine and feline pets do to the whole of human life.  They inhabit our drawing 
rooms and libraries.  They take part in scenes of whose significance they have no 
inkling.  They are merely tangent to curves of history the beginnings and ends and 
forms of which pass wholly beyond their ken.  So we are tangent to the wider life of 
things.  But, just as many of the dog’s and cat’s ideals coincide with our ideals, and 
the dogs and cats have daily living proof of the fact, so we may well believe, on the 
proofs that religious experience affords, that higher powers exist and are at work to 
save the world on ideal lines similar to our own. 896 
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God’s causal activity, of course, must be realized in accordance with the model we set out in the 
previous section; i.e. though action upon the space of possibilities left open by indeterminism 
and/or through emergent configurational forces/laws.  In this respect James’s notion of divine 
action will be similar to that of Arthur Peacocke and Philip Clayton, which we discussed in chapter 
1.   
3.3.2. Theological Voluntarism 
We now have a much better understanding of James’s mature concept of God, and of the basic 
metaphysical picture that underlies his theistic naturalism.  In the present section we wish to 
investigate how that picture intersects with James’s ethical views.  Recall that in section 2.3, on 
WB, we reviewed the ethics of ‘The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life’ (MPML).  We located in 
that essay a humanistic ethics, consisting in a doctrine of evolutionary intuitionism, a social theory 
of moral obligation, a desire-satisfaction theory, and a doctrine of preference utilitarianism; and a 
religious ethics, consisting in a doctrine of metaethical theological voluntarism.  We noted at the 
time Michael Slater’s assertion that the religious part of James’s ethics entails a commitment to 
supernaturalism, and therefore undermines any naturalistic aspirations of the humanistic part.  
We also noted his and Richard Gale’s contention that James’s preference utilitarianism is 
incompatible with his deontological intuitions.  In what follows we will attempt to overcome these 
tensions, and to integrate James’s humanistic and religious ethics into his theistic naturalism. 
3.3.2.1. Overcoming the Tensions in James’s Account 
In section 2.3 we noted certain tensions in James’s ethical philosophy.  Of particular interest was 
the tension between what Richard Gale termed his ‘deontological intuitions’ and his ‘utilitarian 
casuistic rule’897.  Closely related to this is a tension between his defence of a quasi-realistic 
‘evolutionary intuitionism’ earlier on in the essay, with his wholly subjectivist approach in the 
later sections.  Let us revisit both of these tensions very briefly.  In the first case we have James 
expressing on the one hand his intuition that the lonely torture of one lost soul is not justified by 
the permanent happiness of millions, and on the other, insisting upon the general casuistic rule 
that we ought always to maximise demand satisfaction.  Clearly, say commentators like Gale, the 
deontological intuition and the utilitarian casuistic rule are in conflict.  If we follow the latter 
indiscriminately, then we ought to conclude that the lonely torture of one lost soul is justified by 
the permanent happiness (or perpetual demand satisfaction) of millions.  In the second case we 
have James in the earlier sections of the essay defending an ‘evolutionary intuitionism’ according 
                                                             






to which certain of our moral ideals have their source in an evolved faculty of ‘moral perception’, 
but insisting in the later sections that moral perceptions/intuitions have no legitimate normative 
force.  As Graham Bird has pointed out, James’s evolutionary intuitionism has the flavour of 
certain contemporary dispositional models of value experience, and seems to evince a leaning 
towards moral realism, whereas his demand satisfaction theory pulls him in the direction of 
subjectivism and antirealism898.  In the remainder of the present subsection we will address the 
first of these tensions.  The following section will be devoted to the second.   
There are, broadly speaking, three options for resolving the tension between James’s 
deontological intuitions and his utilitarian casuistic rule: 
i) Accept that the deontological intuitions are mistaken. 
ii) Abandon the utilitarian casuistic rule. 
iii) Amend the utilitarian casuistic rule. 
The first option cannot be the right one for James.  Although the demand satisfaction theory and 
the utilitarian casuistic rule (together with his theological voluntarism) form the basis of James’s 
metaethics, his normative ethics consists almost entirely in deontological intuitions and 
pronouncements899.  They simply cannot be dispensed with without eviscerating the real ethical 
content of much of his philosophy900.  Option (ii) is surely preferable to option (i).  It is the option 
taken John Wild, who claims that the religious ethics of the later sections of MPML supersedes 
the earlier utilitarian ethics901.  Against option (ii) we have claims like that of Richard Gale to the 
effect that, seeing as James never explicitly recanted the ethical theory of MPML, it should be 
taken to be consistent with his mature views902.  Certainly option (iii) is the most parsimonious 
provided a viable version of it can be formulated.  Let us therefore explore this possibility in what 
follows. 
There are, we suggest, two basic ways of amending James’s utilitarian casuistic rule so as to 
accommodate his deontological intuitions.  The first is that favoured by Richard Gale, of 
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expanding James’s definition of ‘the good’ to include more than just demand satisfaction, and of 
reformulating his casuistic rule to be ‘good-maximizing’903.  On this view demand satisfaction 
becomes just one good among others.  Other important goods might include ‘becoming a morally 
responsible agent’ and ‘treating people as ends in themselves’.  Where these other goods 
compete with demand satisfaction, the latter may well lose out.  Thus, torturing lost souls, though 
it might maximize demand satisfaction, will not maximize the treatment of people as ends in 
themselves, and so, on balance, may not be good-maximizing.  The second way of amending 
James’s casuistic rule is by admitting of qualitatively different demands, and by reformulating the 
rule so as to give precedence to certain kinds of demand.  Thus, it might be said that humanitarian 
demands or religious demands have more weight than hedonistic demands.  This is the strategy 
adopted by Ellen Suckiel in Heaven’s Champion; she argues that James’s treatment of saintly 
values in VRE implies a judgement of the relatively high value of religious demands904.  This 
second way of amending the casuistic rule looks at first glance to preserve more of James’s 
account.  It seems for instance to allow us to preserve his claim that the essence of good is to 
satisfy demand.  However, this impression is in many ways misleading.  In assigning more weight 
to certain kinds of demands than to others, this second way of amending the casuistic rule 
implicitly appeals to some independent standard of goodness; independent that is, of demand 
satisfaction.  It implicitly holds that religious demands or humanitarian demands are intrinsically 
better than hedonistic demands.  Thus, the second way of amending the casuistic rule becomes 
almost indistinguishable from the first.  In either case we must expand James’s definition of the 
good to allow for a hierarchy of goods or values, with some assigned greater weight than others.  
This of course invites the question of what the values of different kinds of demands are?  The 
obvious answer to this question, for James, is that their values correspond with God’s 
preferences.  James invoked God’s preferences as a way of settling how qualitatively 
homogeneous demands ought to be subordinated to one another; it seems only natural that he 
should invoke God’s preferences to settle how different kinds of demands ought to be 
subordinated to one another.  As such, the role of God remains much the same as it was in 
MPML: his overarching demands secure moral objectivity, and his way of valuing different kinds 
of demands constitutes the finally valid casuistic scale.   
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3.3.2.2. A Dispositional Model of Value Experience 
We said in section 2.3.1 that James’s theological voluntarism in MPML was purely metaethical.  
He explicitly stated that human beings do not have access to God’s demands, and that belief in 
God served only as a regulative ideal to let loose in us the strenuous mood.  In this case the 
question arises as to what normative principles we should adopt in ethics.  James has an answer 
to this question in MPML: we must follow the utilitarian casuistic rule, and satisfy as many 
demands as possible.  This answer however, as we saw in the last section, contradicts his strongly 
held deontological intuitions.  The only way to make his ethical philosophy consistent is by 
admitting of qualitatively different demands, and by amending his casuistic rule so as to give 
precedence to more valuable demands.  Note however that this renders the casuistic rule 
impotent as a normative principle.  We can no longer simply satisfy as many demands as possible 
– a reasonably intuitive endeavour – now we must satisfy as many and as highly valuable 
demands as possible.  Absent some independent standard for evaluating demands, such a project 
looks to be a non-starter.  How are we to determine which demands are the most valuable?  We 
suggest that a closer examination of the second of the two tensions we raised in the previous 
section will yield a plausible answer to this question. 
Recall that the first of the three questions James addressed in MPML was the ‘psychological 
question’: ‘What is the historical origin of our moral ideas and judgements?’.  In answer to the 
question James attempted to find a middle way between the two extant alternatives of 
‘intuitionism’ and ‘evolutionism’.  According to intuitionism, our moral ideas have their source in 
an apriori faculty of moral intuition; according to evolutionism they are developed through the 
experience of pleasures and pains and through subsequent rational analysis.  James’s position, 
which we called ‘evolutionary intuitionism’, held that moral ideas result primarily from an 
evolved, ‘brain-born’ faculty of moral intuition.  Through this faculty, James explained, we 
experience “moral perceptions” of the “fitnesses between things”905.  It could only be from such a 
faculty, he surmised, that intuitions like the lost soul intuition could arise.  However, having 
developed this account of ‘evolutionary intuitionism’ James seems to put it to one side, and 
refrains from mentioning it for the rest of the essay.  Later, when he addresses the question of 
how we should decide between conflicting demands, he explicitly rejects ethical intuitions (brain-
born or not), as legitimate carriers of normative force.  That such intuitions did carry normative 
force for James is shown by his earnest expression of the lost soul intuition, and of countless 
similar intuitions throughout his works; and yet he was forced to concede in MPML that they 
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were not legitimate carriers of such force.  This, we suggest, was a mistake.  And there is some 
reason to believe that James recognized that it was a mistake later on in his career.  In what 
follows we will attempt to spell out just what we mean by this claim.   
We begin with a few observations.  Firstly, James repeatedly uses the language of perception in 
describing our evolved faculty of moral intuition.  This faculty yields “moral perceptions”; it deals 
with “directly felt fitnesses between things”; through it we detect a “repugnancy in things” and an 
“inward dignity” in others, etc. (our emphasis in all of the above).  This language suggests an 
element of objectivity.  We are not dealing with mere feelings that we have about things, but with 
properties that we perceive in things.  Secondly, despite his calling them moral perceptions, there 
is reason to believe that they are not, strictly speaking, moral.  Such perceptions, he says, do not 
tell us what is “wicked” (i.e. morally wrong), but rather what is “mean and vulgar” (also what is 
‘repugnant’, ‘hideous’, ‘noble’, and ‘dignified’).  And thirdly, such perceptions do not constitute 
demands, and so do not in themselves produce obligations.  Rather, they inform demands.  We 
perceive that it would be hideous to torture the lost soul, and so we demand that the lost soul not 
be tortured.  These observations, we contend, strongly suggest a certain interpretation of James’s 
evolutionary intuitionism; namely that it is concerned primarily with value rather than morality.  It 
describes a faculty which yields evaluative perceptions; which deals with the evaluative properties 
of things.  Moreover, we suggest, it presents value experience as something quasi-objective.  This, 
of course, is highly significant.  For if value experience is objective, then it might provide us with 
the standard we require for evaluating demands. 
On the basis of an interpretation not dissimilar to the one above Graham Bird has suggested that 
James’s evolutionary intuitionism resembles certain contemporary ‘dispositional models’ of value 
experience.  In his essay ‘Moral Philosophy and the Development of Morality’ Bird compares 
James’s account with the dispositional models of Jonathan Bennett and Mark Johnston906.  We 
note that John McDowell’s secondary quality model of value experience, which we mentioned in 
chapter one, is also an account of this kind.  The upshot of these accounts, to put it succinctly, is 
that evaluative properties are not wholly subjective.  Rather, they are dispositional properties of 
objects/states of affairs, to merit, in conjunction with human cognitive capacities, certain 
evaluative judgements.  Thus, for such models, the torture of lost souls for the sake of the 
happiness of the majority is ‘hideous’ in the sense that this state of affairs possesses a 
dispositional property to merit, in conjunction with human cognitive capacities, an evaluative 
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judgement of hideousness.  Ultimately, Bird does not find sufficient evidence in MPML for 
claiming that James’s evolutionary intuitionism amounts to a dispositional model of value 
experience, but he does conclude that James’s ethical philosophy could make good use of such a 
model907.  The remarkable thing about Bird’s essay is that he omits any mention of James’s 
desperately relevant account of value experience from ERE908.  We will attempt to remedy this 
omission in what follows. 
3.3.2.3. The Place of Evaluative Facts in a World of Pure Experience 
The account of value experience to which we have just referred is articulated in the fifth essay of 
ERE, on ‘The Place of Affectional Facts in a World of Pure Experience’.  In it, we contend, James 
develops something very close to a dispositional model of evaluative facts, not dissimilar to 
McDowell’s secondary-quality-model which we discussed in chapter one.  Like McDowell’s, 
James’s model can claim with some justice to be naturalistic, and like McDowell’s, it might serve 
as a decent basis for a relatively robust doctrine of moral realism. 
We begin by noting that by ‘affectional facts’ James means not only “our pleasures and pains, our 
loves and fears and angers”, but also such facts as “the beauty, comicality, importance or 
preciousness of certain objects and situations”909.  In other words, he means not just affectional 
facts, but also evaluative facts.  His goal in the essay is to show “[t]hat the popular notion that 
these experiences are intuitively given as purely inner facts is hasty and erroneous”910.  In other 
words, he aims to show that such facts have a quasi-objective status.  He begins with a brief 
discussion of the general character of value experience, for which he refers to George Santayana’s 
The Sense of Beauty911.  He summarises Santayana’s account as follows: 
The various pleasures we receive from an object may count as ‘feelings’ when we 
take them singly, but when they combine in a total richness, we call the result the 
‘beauty’ of the object, and treat it as an outer attribute which our mind perceives.  
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We discover beauty just as we discover the physical properties of things.  Training is 
needed to make us expert in either line.912 
So far as the pure phenomenology goes, value experiences seem to involve facts about the valued 
objects themselves.  They seem to be something like dispositions of the objects, which, given the 
appropriate “training”, can be “discovered” by beings with the right sensory and conceptual 
capacities.   
James notes that in this respect evaluative facts are similar to secondary qualities.  For common-
sense, such qualities really are in their objects: “Sound, as such, goes through the air and can be 
intercepted.  The heat of the fire passes over, as such, into the water which it sets a-boiling.”913  It 
was only in response to purely intellectual as opposed to practical needs – once such needs had 
arisen in human inquirers – that people thought to call these qualities subjective.  They did so not 
because of any discernible feature of secondary-quality-experiences themselves, but because of 
their relations to other objects of experience.  Purely physical objects do not affect one another 
by virtue of their secondary qualities; minds with the appropriate sensory capacities are required 
to make them efficacious.  James thinks that the same is true of affectional/evaluative facts: 
It does not work to assume that physical objects are going to act outwardly by their 
sympathetic or antipathetic qualities.  The beauty of a thing or its value is no force 
that can be plotted in a polygon of compositions, nor does its ‘use’ or ‘significance’ 
affect in the minutest degree its vicissitudes or destiny at the hands of physical 
nature.914  
This, James thinks, is why philosophers tend to consign affectional/evaluative facts to the inner 
world.  It is because purely physical objects do not affect one another by means of them915.  
However, this way of conceiving the matter, according to James, is problematic.  For one thing it 
assumes the very premise that he has laboured in ERE to discredit, namely that ‘mental’ and 
‘physical’ – ‘thought’ and ‘thing’ – are names for two radically different kinds of reality.  If the 
metaphysical thesis of pure experience is correct, then so-called mental entities or minds are 
every bit as physical, and every bit as real, as material objects.  Thus, the claim that purely 
physical objects do not affect one another by means of affectional/evaluative facts turns out to be 
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false.  For “although they [affectional/evaluative facts] are inert as regards the rest of physical 
nature, they are not inert as regards that part of physical nature which our own skin covers”916: 
Take a mass of carrion, for example, and the ‘disgustingness’ which for us is part of 
the experience.  The sun caresses it, and the zephyr wooes it as if it were a bed of 
roses.  So the disgustingness fails to operate within the realm of suns and breezes, – 
it does not function as a physical quality.  But the carrion ‘turns our stomach’ by what 
seems a direct operation – it does function physically, therefore, in that limited part 
of physics.917 
This is not of course to say that evaluative facts and physical facts are functionally equivalent, or 
that they have an equivalent ontological status; rather it is to say that the mental/physical 
distinction cannot serve as the basis for consigning the former to a realm of pure subjectivity.  
Such facts, although they bear different relations to the rest of experience than ‘physical facts’, 
and although they require the appropriate cognitive capacities and the appropriate training in 
order to be discovered, are no less real, and no less deserving of inclusion within a philosophical 
system.  For James, as for McDowell, evaluative facts are facts about valued objects.  They are out 
there in the world, and they are irreducible to physical facts.  But they are nevertheless firmly 
grounded in the potentialities of natural beings.  If therefore McDowell’s account can be 
considered naturalistic, so, we contend, can James’s. 
So, how do we square this dispositional model of value experience with the ethics of MPML?  We 
suggest that something like the following would be a relatively parsimonious option.  To begin 
with, we must ensure that the dispositional model of value experience is consistent with James’s 
existential condition for ethics (and with MTPE).  Everything in James’s philosophy is comprised of 
pure experience, and so evaluative properties will have to be experiential properties, or to be 
properties of experiential entities.  In this sense James’s model will differ from the others we have 
been considering.  Whereas they tend to construe evaluative properties as dispositional 
properties of physical entities to produce particular mental states in experiential entities, James 
must construe them as dispositional properties of experiential entities to produce particular 
mental states in other experiential entities918.  Next, we suggest that we keep James’s claim that 
demands are coextensive with obligations.  We should say therefore, that value judgements are 
not yet moral facts, and so do not yet produce obligations.  Rather, evaluative facts inform 
demands/obligations; and importantly, demands/obligations themselves possess evaluative 
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properties.  It is on the basis of their evaluative properties, as we perceive them, that we must 
judge individual demands/kinds of demands.  And it is on the basis of those judgements that we 
must attempt to comply with the modified casuistic rule: i.e. to satisfy as many and as highly 
valuable demands as possible. 
3.3.3. Religious Experience 
The last part of James’s theistic naturalism is his doctrine of religious experience.  We already 
investigated that doctrine as it appeared in VRE.  Our aim in what follows is to integrate it into 
James’s theistic naturalism.  This integration will revolve around James’s notion of ‘the mystical 
perspective’, conceived of as a form of consciousness that is present in mystical experiences, and 
that is contrasted with our ordinary waking consciousness, or ‘rationalistic perspective’.  We think 
that this notion of the mystical perspective helps to bring out the basically naturalistic character 
of James’s doctrine of religious experience.  This is because the mystical perspective, according to 
James, does not contradict “the ordinary outward data of consciousness”, but “merely add[s] a 
supersensuous meaning” to it919.  As such, it cannot possibly entail any conflict with naturalism.  
Mystical experiences, on the interpretation we will develop, are not revelations of a supernatural 
reality enabled by some unique ‘sensus divinitatis’; they are enhanced perceptions of the natural 
world, enabled by familiar human faculties that are grounded in the physiology of the human 
body. 
3.3.3.1. The Mystical Perspective and the Rationalistic Perspective 
In chapter 2 recall, we considered James’s treatment of the epistemic status of mystical 
experience.  There we gave the first two parts of his conclusion on this matter: 1) that mystical 
experiences are authoritative for those who have them, and 2) that they need not be 
authoritative for those who do not have them.  The time has now come for us to consider the 
third part of James’s conclusion, which goes as follows: 
(3) They [mystical experiences] break down the authority of the non-mystical or rationalistic 
consciousness, based upon the understanding and the senses alone.  They show it to be 
only one kind of consciousness.  They open out the possibility of other orders of truth, in 
which, so far as anything in us vitally responds to them, we may freely continue to have 
faith.920 
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James had already introduced this idea earlier on in the lecture on ‘Mysticism’.  Following his own 
experiences with nitrous oxide, he said, the following idea was forced upon him: 
[O]ur normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one 
special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of 
screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different.  We may go 
through life without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, and 
at a touch they are there in all their completeness, definite types of mentality which 
probably somewhere have their field of application and adaptation.921 
During mystical experiences our normal waking consciousness breaks down, and is replaced by an 
entirely different form of consciousness.  This new form of consciousness, James says, does not 
contradict “the ordinary outward data of consciousness”, but “merely add[s] a supersensuous 
meaning” to it.  It carries with it a kind of “excitement”, he says, “like the emotions of love or 
ambition, … by means of which facts already objectively before us fall into new expressiveness 
and make a new connection with our active life.”922  This mystical consciousness seems to those 
who experience it to constitute “a more enveloping point of view”; “a window through which the 
mind looks out upon a more extensive and inclusive world”923.   
This, unfortunately, is more or less all that James has to say on this topic in VRE.  We can however 
begin to reconstruct his position in more detail on the basis of certain insights drawn from one of 
the last essays he ever published; namely, ‘A Suggestion About Mysticism’.  In this essay James 
proposes that mystical experiences involve a so-called ‘lowering of the threshold’ or ‘extension of 
the field’ of consciousness so as to let in certain contents from the subliminal region924.  He had 
already advanced a similar hypothesis in Human Immortality, in connection with the transmission 
theory of consciousness and the notion of a mother-sea of consciousness925.  Indeed, even in VRE 
itself James had advanced a hypothesis essentially similar to this one.  There, however, his 
emphasis was on the phenomena of automatism, and the notion that mystical experiences 
involve incursions from the subconscious region.  Here, his suggestion is rather that they involve 
extensions of ordinary consciousness into the subconscious region.  The difference is subtle but 
important.  The former suggests the appearance of extraordinary content within one’s normal 
waking consciousness; the latter suggests a much more drastic shift of one’s total perspective.   
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James draws an analogy between the extensions and contractions of consciousness involved in 
mystical experience and those involved in psychopathological phenomena such as cases of 
alternating personality.  Recall Janet’s patient Lucie, each of whose personalities had variously 
contracted fields of consciousness.  When, after treatment, Lucie’s personalities became 
integrated, those fields of consciousness underwent a corresponding integration.  From the 
perspective of her primary consciousness, a drastic extension of the field had taken place.  
Mystical experiences are essentially similar, except that the field extends from normal to 
supernormal rather than from subnormal to normal.  Just how far the field extends in mystical 
experiences James does not venture to say.  The obvious assumption as regards monistic mystical 
experiences is that the field extends all the way out to the boundary of God’s consciousness, but 
James’s hypothesis does not require this.  Indeed, he seems to think that most experiences of this 
kind involve extensions that are more or less confined to the subject’s brain, taking in only the 
subject’s own “subconscious memories, conceptions, emotional feelings, and perceptions of 
relation, etc.”926  Almost any transient extension of the field of consciousness, according to James, 
is bound to be mystical to some degree: 
It will be transient, if the change of threshold is transient.  It will be of reality, 
enlargement, and illumination, possibly rapturously so.  It will be of unification, for 
the present coalesces in it with ranges of the remote quite out of its reach under 
ordinary circumstances; and the sense of relation will be greatly enhanced.  Its form 
will be intuitive or perceptual, not conceptual, for the remembered or conceived 
objects in the enlarged field are supposed not to attract the attention singly, but only 
to give the sense of a tremendous muchness suddenly revealed.927 
Extensions of the field of consciousness are bound to produce certain characteristics of mystical 
experience; for instance, their noetic and unitive quality928.  They are noetic because they bring 
new facts into view; facts which were previously hidden in the subliminal region of consciousness.  
They are unitive because the brain naturally tries to integrate those facts into the primary 
consciousness, leading to a sense of relation and enlargement.  We have attempted to illustrate 
this notion of the expansion and contraction of the field of consciousness in the following series of 
diagrams (the dark blue representing the human field of consciousness and the light blue 
representing God’s field of consciousness, as per figs. 17-21 in section 2.4.4.1): 
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In this way, one may view mystical experiences in terms of expansions and contractions of the 
field of human consciousness929.  Viewed as such, they will not involve any new sensory content 
that could contradict the ordinary outward data of consciousness.  When the threshold falls, 
James says, “what comes into view is not the next mass of sensation; for sensation requires new 
physical stimulations to produce it, and no alteration of a purely mental threshold can create 
these”930.  Rather, they add a “supersensuous meaning” to the data of consciousness.  Now this, 
presumably, means that James’s likening of mystical experience to sensory experience in VRE is 
meant to be taken purely analogically.  Mystical experiences may be “absolutely sensational in 
their epistemological quality”, but they cannot be absolutely sensational in their phenomenal 
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quality.  But if this is so, then why do mystics consistently claim that their experiences are similar 
to perceptions?  If not sensory content, in what does their perceptual quality consist?  The 
answer, we suggest, is that the mystical perspective enhances our ordinary perceptions.  In the 
next two sub-sections we will develop this notion in greater detail 
3.3.3.2. The Mystical Perspective on Nature 
One can, we contend, make sense of James’s mature doctrine of religious experience by 
supposing that the mystical perspective involves enhanced perceptions.  The question is, what 
precisely do these enhanced perceptions consist in?  James’s treatment of the intellectual content 
of mystical experience may be said to give us a broad answer.  The mystical perspective enhances 
our perceptions in such a way that we seem to feel God’s presence, and to feel our unity with 
him/her.  This answer however, although reassuring, is rather vague.  We will get a more concrete 
sense of this notion of ‘enhanced perceptions’ by examining certain key differences between the 
mystical and rationalistic perspectives.   
James’s first mention of the rationalistic perspective/consciousness does not of course occur in 
VRE; it is a consistent theme throughout his work.  In WB and Pragmatism, he contrasted 
rationalism with empiricism, saying that the former gravitated towards theoretic rather than 
factual rationality, and towards logic and a priori principles rather than experience.  Also in WB, 
he referred to the so-called ‘mechanical view of life’ (according to which nature is to be described 
without recourse to the category of personality) as ‘mechanical rationalism’.  In VRE James 
suggested that rationalism gives epistemic primacy to “abstract principles”, and identified 
“physical science” as a fruit of the rationalistic consciousness931.  And in PU and SPP James finds 
rationalists to be the chief perpetrators of the misapplication of conceptual logic to the inner 
nature of reality.  This last point is of special interest to us in the present discussion.  We think it 
plausible, given the foregoing, to suppose that the rationalistic perspective has a natural 
propensity for conceptual logic, and for the abstract, physicalist explanations that it favours.  In 
the aforementioned discussions from PU and SPP, James contrasts conceptual logic, which deals 
only with the outer surfaces of reality, with the faculty of “sympathetic intuition”, which 
penetrates into the inner nature of reality932.  Our account in the present section builds on the 
suggestion that, just as the rationalistic perspective has a propensity for conceptual logic, so the 
mystical perspective has a propensity for sympathetic intuition.  Following an essentially similar 
line of reasoning, Richard Gale has argued that mystical experiences, on James’s account, involve 
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heightened activity in this faculty of sympathetic intuition933.  He thinks that they allow us to intuit 
the inner life of the cosmos, thus changing “the dead blank it of the world into a living thou, with 
whom the whole man may have dealings”934.  We find this suggestion highly compelling.  It is the 
key, we think, to understanding a part of the way in which the mystical perspective enhances our 
perceptions. 
James’s first detailed discussion of the faculty of sympathetic intuition occurs in his Talks to 
Teachers.  In the penultimate talk, on ‘What Makes a Life Significant’, we find the following 
remarkable passage: 
Every Jack sees in his own particular Jill charms and perfections to the enchantment 
of which we stolid onlookers are stone-cold.  And which has the superior view of the 
Absolute truth, he or we?  Which has the more vital insight into the nature of Jill’s 
existence, as a fact?  Is he in excess, being in this matter a maniac? or are we in 
defect, being victims of a pathological anaesthesia as regards Jill’s magical 
importance?  Surely the latter; surely to Jack are the profounder truths revealed; 
surely poor Jill’s palpitating little life-throbs are among the wonders of creation, are 
worthy of this sympathetic interest; and it is to our shame that the rest of us cannot 
feel like Jack.  For Jack realizes Jill concretely and we do not.  He struggles toward a 
union with her inner life, divining her feelings, anticipating her desires, understanding 
her limits as manfully as he can … We ought, all of us, to realize each other in this 
intense, pathetic, and important way.935 
Jack approaches “union” with Jill’s “inner life” through acts of sympathetic intuition.  All of us, 
James says, ought to aim for the same thing in our relations with every human being.  We take it 
that sympathetic intuition, so described, is a familiar component of social perception.  But this 
familiar faculty, according to James, is not only the key to understanding the inner natures of 
other human beings.  As he argues in PU, it is the key to understanding the inner nature of all 
reality.  When we turn this faculty upon the wider universe we find not the abstract outer 
surfaces of mechanical rationalism, but the “collectivism of personal lives” of radical empiricism.  
The rationalistic consciousness, we may say, is relatively inept in the exercise of sympathetic 
intuition.  It is stone-cold to the inner life of the universe, and anaesthetic to its magical 
importance.  The mystical consciousness, meanwhile, greatly enhances our faculty of sympathetic 
intuition.  Now, God, for James, is a finite person existing within the natural world.  As such, we 
may, in principle, intuit his inner life just as we would any other natural being.  What we are 
suggesting is that the mystical perspective makes this much easier.  It allows us to passively feel 
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God’s presence in the world, just as we passively feel the presence of other human minds when 
we encounter them.  This is the sense in which mystics feel the presence of God; not as a 
supernatural entity outside of nature, but as the mind indwelling within it.  In what follows, we 
will consider another way in which the mystical perspective may be said to enhance our 
perceptions. 
3.3.3.3. The Mystical Perspective on Value 
James says in VRE that mystical experiences are quasi-sensory experiences.  He also says, 
however, that they are indefinite and ineffable, like “states of feeling”.  Some commentators 
insist that the analogy with sensory experience should only be read as implying an epistemological 
similarity with sensory experience, and not any phenomenological similarity.  Mystical 
experiences, they insist, as construed by James, do not necessarily involve any sensory qualities at 
all.  This, indeed, was a popular conception of James’s account of mysticism among some of his 
contemporaries.  They thought that he had made mystical experiences into wholly inner, 
subjective phenomena, and on this basis charged him with inconsistency for attributing cognitive 
value to them936.  In recent decades, modern commentators have appealed, on James’s behalf, to 
the doctrine of TPAF, as a way of avoiding this ‘charge of subjectivity’.  Thus, they have argued 
that James’s defence of affectional facts as quasi-objective and as possessors of cognitive value 
applies to religious experiences.  Henry Levinson and Nancy Frankenberry go so far as to identify 
religious facts with affectional facts937.  Their analysis, we think, is intriguing, but ultimately 
incomplete.  In examining why, we shall succeed in developing a more nuanced account of the 
evaluative component in religious and mystical experience.   
To begin with, we should note that the quasi-objective/cognitive status of affectional facts in 
TPAF, is intimately bound up with their reference to outer realities.  Thus, James tells us that the 
landscape is beautiful, the situation tragic, the carrion disgusting, etc.  We intuitively feel that 
without these outer realities, such affectional facts would lose their objective/cognitive status.  If 
this is correct, then religious experiences cannot be purely affectional facts, but must point or 
refer to some outer reality.  We note that this accords with James’s contention early on in VRE 
that religious experiences are essentially intentional; that is, that they are always directed 
towards a religious object or objects938.  It is on this basis that Ellen Suckiel offers a more nuanced 
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account according to which religious experiences, rather than being identical with affectional 
facts, have an affectional/evaluative component.  She thinks that they reveal the religious value, 
or holiness, of certain objects/states of affairs.  She even suggests that this is part of the 
supersensuous meaning which the mystical perspective adds to the ordinary outwards data of 
consciousness939.   
Michael Slater, building directly upon Suckiel’s account, attempts to integrate this notion of an 
evaluative component in religious experience with James’s wider ethical philosophy.  He begins by 
suggesting, along similar lines to Suckiel, that religious experiences involve “evaluatively enriched 
perceptions”940.  We see this, for instance, in the following experience, quoted from VRE: 
It was like entering another world, a new state of existence.  Natural objects were 
glorified, my spiritual vision was so clarified that I saw beauty in every material object 
in the universe, the woods were vocal with heavenly music; my soul exulted in the 
love of God, and I wanted everybody to share in my joy.941 
Such evaluatively enriched perceptions, Slater suggests, play a part in bringing about the dramatic 
moral transformations James describes in the lectures on ‘Conversion’ and ‘Saintliness’.  They 
instil those who have them with new values and ideals, which, when realized, manifest in the 
characteristic fruits of religion.  This, Slater suggests, amounts to a reversal of James contention 
from MPML, according to which human beings have no access to God’s demands: 
Religious faith now serves not only to awaken and sustain moral strenuousness in 
human beings, but also provides an objective ground for our moral ideals as well as 
the means by which we come to acquire knowledge of those ideals. This represents a 
decisive change in James’s ethics in general and his moral theory in particular.942  
On all of these points, we are in almost complete agreement with Suckiel and Slater.  We note, 
furthermore, that their accounts – particularly Slater’s with its notion of ‘evaluatively enriched 
perceptions’ – map perfectly onto the account of value experience which we located in TPAF in 
the previous section.  According to that account, recall, evaluative facts are facts that are out 
there in the world waiting to be discovered.  The more fully educated our cognitive capacities, the 
greater the range of evaluative facts we can perceive, and the more accurately we can perceive 
them.  We may supplement this account with Slater’s by supposing that the mystical perspective 
involves heightened activity in our faculty of evaluative perception.  It awakens us to the 
existence of religious/holy values we had hitherto not perceived, or at any rate, that we had not 
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found compelling.  It causes us to recognize, correctly in James’s view, the relatively high value of 
certain religious demands/obligations943.  In doing so, we note, it is only enhancing our ordinary, 
natural faculty of evaluative perception. 
3.3.3.4. The Mystical Perspective on Truth 
The last question that we wish to consider is that of the truth status of the mystical perspective.  
Specifically, we want to consider Richard Gale’s claim that the mystical perspective, with its 
sympathetic intuitions of the inner life of the cosmos, gives us more than merely pragmatic truth 
about reality.  We think that this claim, in spite of its prima facie conflict with the pragmatic 
theory of truth, is somewhat compelling.  Gale’s view, of course, is that this conflict is to be 
explained in terms of the conflict between James’s divided selves.  The promethean pragmatist 
says all truth is pragmatic; the anti-promethean mystic says that mystical truth is absolute.  We, 
for our part, would want to frame this claim somewhat differently.  We would want to say 
something more like the following.  That while the rationalistic perspective is a highly 
developed/evolved form of consciousness, which therefore yields only adaptive heuristics, the 
mystical perspective is a raw or default form of consciousness, and is therefore able to access real 
truth.  This formulation chimes well with a view of Frederic Myers that James quoted approvingly 
in his notes for the Lowell Lectures on Exceptional Mental States: 
The arrangement with which we habitually identify ourselves – what we call the 
normal or primary self – consists, in my view, of elements selected for us in the 
struggle for existence with special reference to the maintenance of ordinary physical 
needs, and is not necessarily superior in any other respect to the latent personalities 
which lie alongside it…944 
The implication of this statement would seem to be that while the primary self (characterised by 
the rationalistic perspective) consists of “elements selected for us in the struggle for existence”, 
other latent personalities (i.e. the mystical perspective) might not.  The mystical perspective may 
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have lingered dormant in the subliminal region of consciousness, not subject to the evolutionary 
pressures that have forced our other cognitive capacities in the direction of maximal adaptivity.   
This, we concede, is a tempting possibility.  In the end, however, it is not one we can accept.  It 
threatens too great a rupture with James’s overall worldview.  To admit of ideas that are more 
than pragmatically true would undermine James’s epistemology to too great a degree.  This, in 
turn, would undermine James’s critique of scientificism, and much of the distinctiveness of his 
naturalism.  As James says in VRE, mystical forms of consciousness “probably somewhere have 
their field of application and adaptation”.  It is just that their field of adaptation is different from 
that of the rationalistic perspective.  Whereas the rationalistic perspective is adapted to “the 
maintenance of ordinary physical needs”, and to manipulating and controlling the environment, 
the mystical perspective is adapted to the maintenance of spiritual needs, and to understanding 
and harmonizing with the environment.  The pragmatic theory dictates that, both perspectives 
being adaptive, both must be true.  And yet there are points at which they evidently conflict.  As 
such, the question arises as to which will prove more adaptive ‘in the long run and on the whole’.  
James, of course, has his hunches.  In VRE he said that saints – paradigmatic occupiers of the 
mystical perspective – are maladapted to the present; they are liable to be taken advantage of by 
the crueller elements in society.  They may however, with their excess of virtue, be prophetic.  
They may be a torchbearers for a future millennial society: 
To such a millennial society the saint would be entirely adapted.  His peaceful modes 
of appeal would be efficacious over his companions, and there would be no one 
extant to take advantage of his non-resistance.945   
The saint, James concludes, is therefore “abstractly a higher type of man” than the strong man.  
Likewise, we may suppose, the mystical perspective is abstractly a higher type of perspective than 
the rationalistic perspective.  But the millennial society has not yet arrived.  If truth is adaptivity 
therefore, we must concede that the mystical perspective is not yet true.  Truth however, for 
pragmatists, is in the making.  And reality too is in the making.  We, together with God, are its co-
creators.  Thus, we can make the mystical perspective true by bringing that millennial society 
about.  Salvation, therefore, is not guaranteed.  It is not already granted in the Absolute; nor is it 
in the power of a supernatural God to grant.  Rather it is a natural process, wholly in the hands of 
natural beings, taking place within the space-time-causal system we call nature. 
                                                             






As commentators like Gale have rightly pointed out, James’s philosophy cannot be consistently 
interpreted as a form of scientific naturalism946.  In this thesis we have tried to show that it can, 
however, be interpreted as a form of liberal naturalism; specifically, as form of radical religious 
naturalism.  Our argument for this conclusion, and our exposition of the relevant interpretation, 
proceeded as follows.   
We began in chapter 1 by surveying the varieties of naturalism.  We saw that the term 
‘naturalism’, since its inception, has been used to denote a variety of philosophical positions, and 
we argued that no one usage of the term – no one form of naturalism – enjoys a prima facie 
privilege (section 1.1).  We then outlined the commitments of the form of naturalism that is most 
popular among contemporary philosophers, namely scientific naturalism.  We saw that scientific 
naturalism is typically committed to the causal closure of nature, the causal closure of the 
physical, the principle of epistemological reducibility, the principle of ontological reducibility, 
scientism, and the methodological thesis of naturalism (section 1.2).  Following this we examined 
the doctrine of liberal naturalism, as represented by the contributors to De Caro and Macarthur’s 
anthology.  We summarised the liberal naturalist critique of scientific naturalism; its arguments 
against scientism, hyperscientific realism, and the unity of science thesis.  We saw that liberal 
naturalism is typically committed to weak and/or strong emergentism, and to the disunity of 
science thesis (section 1.3).  Next, we investigated the possibility of a form of naturalism that 
endorses not only strong emergentism, but also macro-causation, and which therefore rejects the 
causal closure of the physical.  To this end, we diffused Jaegwon Kim’s famous causal exclusion 
argument, and reviewed two of the most plausible contemporary approaches to macro-causation; 
namely the British Emergentist and quantum approaches.  We argued that such a doctrine is 
indeed coherent, and we proposed to call it ‘radical liberal naturalism’ (section 1.4).  Finally, we 
considered the relationship between naturalism and religious naturalism.  We found that all the 
forms of naturalism we discussed have viable religious counterparts, which are distinguished by 
their commitment to the existential thesis of religious naturalism; that nature or something within 
nature merits a religious response.  On this basis we developed a tabulated schema for 
categorising the varieties of naturalism (fig. 13), and provisionally situated James in that schema.  
We suggested that James was a radical religious naturalist, committed to the causal closure of 
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nature, strong emergentism and macro-causation, and the existential thesis of religious 
naturalism (section 1.5).   
In chapter 2 our broad aim was to establish the textual evidence for this provisional assessment.  
We sought to do so through a chronological treatment of James’s core published works that 
focused on the development of certain naturalistic themes in his philosophy.  We began with the 
Principles of Psychology, highlighting James’s commitment to the methodological thesis of 
naturalism, unearthing his doctrine of the strong emergence of mental phenomena, and 
examining his account of mental causation (section 2.2).  Next, we turned to The Will to Believe, 
drawing together James’s various statements on science into a coherent critique of scientificism 
(which, we found, significantly foreshadowed the liberal naturalist critique of scientific 
naturalism), and providing a systematic account of his ethical philosophy as presented in ‘The 
Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life’ (section 2.3).  Following this we investigated The Varieties 
of Religious Experience, noting James’s continued commitment to the methodological thesis of 
naturalism, bringing out the naturalistic elements in his account of religious experience, and 
demonstrating the superficiality of his endorsement of ‘piecemeal supernaturalism’ (section 2.4).  
From here we proceeded to an examination of the Essays in Radical Empiricism, arguing for the 
superiority of a panpsychist reading of James’s doctrine of pure experience (section 2.5).  Then we 
looked at Pragmatism, demonstrating its methodological alignment with naturalism, refuting 
purportedly non-naturalistic idealist readings of the pragmatic theory of truth, and presenting a 
novel interpretation of that theory as an evolutionary theory of cognition (section 2.6).  Finally, 
we investigated A Pluralistic Universe, arguing for James’s transition from ‘piecemeal 
supernaturalism’ to ‘pluralistic pantheism’ (or finite theism), and considering how that doctrine 
intersected with the panpsychism James had adopted from Fechner (section 2.7).  We concluded 
chapter 2 by arguing that our various findings therein had confirmed us in our provisional 
assessment of James as a radical religious naturalist.  He was committed to the causal closure of 
nature (as evidenced by his exposition of finite theism in PU), to a weak version of the 
methodological thesis of naturalism (as evidenced by his methodologies in PP, VRE, and 
Pragmatism), to strong emergentism and macro-causation (as evidenced by his defence of those 
doctrines as they apply to mental phenomena in PP), and to the existential thesis of religious 
naturalism (as evidenced by his endorsement of religious realism in VRE and PU).  However, we 
conceded that there were some loose ends that remained to be tied up.  We had not yet 
established the precise nature of James’s panpsychism, and demonstrated its consistency with 
naturalism.  Nor had we reconstructed James’s doctrines of strong emergentism and macro-





settled how James’s finite theism intersected with his broader metaphysical and ethical views 
(section 2.8).  All of this would be the task of chapter 3. 
In chapter 3 we proposed to complete the arch of James’s naturalism by reconstructing his 
doctrines of panpsychism, emergentism, and theistic naturalism.  We began with panpsychism, 
analysing James’s arguments for the theory, locating an ‘intrinsic nature argument for 
panpsychism’ in his work, and positioning his doctrine in relation to contemporary versions of the 
theory as a form of ‘emergent layered russellian panpsychism’.  This form of panpsychism, we 
argued, is inherently compatible with science and naturalism (section 3.1).  Next, we turned to 
emergentism, establishing a mandate for a thoroughgoing emergentist reading of James, 
clarifying the nature of a Jamesian doctrine of emergentism, and extending James’s doctrine of 
mental causation from PP to apply to the infra/superhuman consciousnesses of PU (section 3.2).  
Finally, we carried out a restoration of James’s ‘theistic naturalism’.  Using his reconstructed 
doctrines of panpsychism and emergentism, we demonstrated that the finite God of PU is a 
psychophysical whole, emergent – like other infra/superhuman consciousnesses – from a portion 
of the universe; and endowed with macro-causal power that is realized by emergent forces 
and/or by a capacity to influence the outcomes of indeterministic events.  Next, we sought to 
integrate James’s finite theism with his ethical views.  We did so by first conceding the need for 
him to allow the existence of qualitatively different demands; then, by recovering his nascent 
dispositional model of value experience according to which human beings are able to discover the 
relative value of different kinds of demands; and lastly, by arguing that religious experiences 
involve enriched perceptions that reveal the relatively high value of religious demands, thereby 
bringing our demands into closer conformity with God’s (as per James’s theological voluntarism).  
Finally, we resituated James’s doctrine of religious experience in the context of his restored 
theistic naturalism.  We drew on his notion of the mystical perspective in order to argue that 
religious experiences are not revelations of a supernatural reality enabled by some unique ‘sensus 
divinitatis’, but enhanced perceptions of the natural world, enabled by familiar human cognitive 
capacities (section 3.3).   
With this, our reconstruction of James’s arch is complete, and our conclusion is thoroughly 
established.  It is possible, and indeed desirable, to interpret James as a radical religious 
naturalist.  In doing so, this thesis has shed new light on several aspects of James’s philosophy.  
We have consolidated and systematized James’s once-disparate and disconnected critique of 
scientificism, and demonstrated its relationship to contemporary debates.  We have presented a 
novel narrative, and novel arguments, that demonstrate the superficiality of James’s commitment 






We have developed a novel reading of the pragmatic theory of truth as an evolutionary theory of 
cognition, that helps to clarify many of the ambiguities therein.  We have provided a new analysis 
of James’s panpsychism in the light of contemporary studies, that has for the first time enabled a 
detailed classification of his version of the theory (as a form of emergent layered russellian 
panpsychism).  We have reconstructed the doctrine of emergentism which – as Sprigge, Bird, and 
McLaughlin have noted – was nascent in James’s work, and in doing so have opened up a 
revolutionary new understanding of his basic metaphysical commitments.  And finally, we have 
accomplished the restoration of James’s theistic naturalism, demonstrating the final unity and 
coherence of his metaphysical, ethical, and religious views, and articulating a Jamesian 
dispositional model of value experience in the process.   
As well as providing these concrete contributions to James studies, this thesis has furnished much 
material that is ripe for further development in the fields of philosophy and theology.  It has 
provided a corrective to the widespread view that James is essentially anti-naturalistic.  That view, 
as we have shown, depends on a particular, relatively austere concept of naturalism.  In the light 
of contemporary debates – in particular, in light of the emergence of liberal naturalism – it was 
necessary to provide an updated view of James’s relationship to naturalism.  This thesis, we 
contend, has definitely succeeded in this respect.  In doing so, it has exorcised some of the 
‘spookiness’ from James’s philosophy, retrieving it as a resource for contemporary naturalism, 
and reinstating James as a friend and forebear of the movement.  Additionally, it represents a 
contribution to debates in the field of analytic philosophy of religion.  There is significant overlap, 
for instance, between what is presented here and much of the research coordinated under the 
auspices of Andrei Buckareff and Yujin Nagasawa’s ‘Alternative Concepts of God’ and ‘Pantheism 
and Panentheism’ projects947.  James’s theistic naturalism (or pluralistic pantheism) constitutes 
just the sort of alternative concept of God which, according to Buckareff, contemporary 
philosophers of religion will benefit from exploring.  For one thing, it attempts to mediate 
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between crude naturalism and crude supernaturalism, thereby fulfilling the project’s mandate to 
break the stalemate between traditional theism and new atheism.  For another, it is genuinely 
novel, making God not just finite in power and knowledge, as per the process theisms of 
Whitehead, Hartshorne, and David Ray Griffin, but also finite in space.  James’s God is probably 
best described as a being a ‘proper part’ of the universe; a view that appears to be relatively 
unique in mainstream theology, and that, if James is correct, offers new possibilities for the 
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